

**MORE'S RAPHAEL HYTHLODAY :
MISSING THE POINT IN *UTOPIA* ONCE MORE ? ***

In a recent article, Merritt Abrash remarked that « Most interpretations of Thomas More's *Utopia* have missed the point of the book, » and that, instead of representing More's own concepts of an ideal society, *Utopia* expresses his « deepest misgivings » about what later became known as utilitarianism ¹. The following study, an attempt to demonstrate how and why many readings have missed the point, will focus on Hythloday as the author's expression of his deepest misgivings. I shall try to show how More sets traps for the readers yet at the same time builds in devices that might warn the more perceptive reader.

As I shall elaborate throughout my inquiry, one crucial trap, and at the same time a warning device, is Peter Giles' introduction of Hythloday to More :

« his sailing has not been like that of Palinurus but that of Ulysses or, rather, of Plato. Now this Raphael -- for such is his personal name, with Hythlodæus as his family name -- is no bad Latin scholar, and most learned in Greek ». ²

How easy it is to « miss the point » this early in the book is perhaps best evidenced by the footnote in one of the college texts, where Robert M. Adams tries to explain why More is bringing in Palinurus, Ulysses, and Plato :

The pilot of Aeneas slept over his steering oar, fell overboard, and perished : *Aeneid* V, 832 ff. Palinurus is a type of the careless traveler, Ulysses is a type of the man who learns from traveling, and Plato (who made trips to Sicily and Egypt) is a type of the man who travels to learn ³.

This reflects the views generally held during More's time ⁴. However, what does it mean that, in a context in which the teller of a wondrous account is introduced to the reader, Hythlodæus, i.e., « nonsense-peddler, » is compared to Ulysses ? Could it be that More is bringing to bear the fact that Ulysses was one of the most famous « nonsense-

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peddlers » in classical antiquity, an accomplished liar and deceiver ? Whether or not this would make Hythloday an outright liar, it at least would make him a character whose words will have to be taken with a grain of salt. Swift will use such a dissociating device when he has Gulliver, to assert the veracity of the account of the Houyhnhnms, quote the very words with which Sinon « sold » the Trojans the Wooden Horse that was to destroy them. The reader who despite Swift's warning « buys » Gulliver's Trojan Horse, i.e., accepts without question that man *ought to be* like the Rational Horses and, since he is not, wrongly concludes that man is Yahoo, destroys himself by becoming a misanthrope ⁵. It seems to me that More warns the reader and dissociates himself from his narrating character much in the same way in which Swift will.

If the reader accepts *in toto* Hythloday's ideal society, i.e., the mental version of Ulysses' Trojan Horse, he will suffer a fate comparable to that of the Trojans ⁶. Allowing himself to be taken in by what I will call the Ulyssian Hythloday, the reader will, like Polyphemus, be blinded. Or to use another allusively operative analogy, the reader will be destroyed by the Utopians and their European representative Hythloday in much the same way that the Utopians keep sending the Zapoletan mercenaries to their deaths (pp. 207-209). Significantly for our assessment of the Utopians and their actions toward others, the Zapoletans are presented as what Harry Berger, Jr. calls « cyclopean » ⁷ : they are « blind » in that they never realize that they are being manipulated by the Utopians.

Once we have discovered More's dissociating irony in Peter Giles' introduction of Hythloday the sailor, we are also led to ask the following question : what kind of traveler is Odysseus ? ⁸ True, Odysseus « learns from travelling » (Adams), as Hythloday supposedly does. Yet he is not exactly a successful traveler : it takes him ten years to reach home, mainly because of his blunders in the land of the Cyclopes. There, as he will acknowledge in his account at the court of King Alcinous, it is against his crew's sound advice that he first waits for Polyphemus and then, in sinful hubris, reveals his name to the giant, actions through which he incurs the wrath of Poseidon. By comparing Hythloday to Odysseus, then, More is also questioning Hythloday's character : the latter's attempt to sell the Utopian system is a sin. As we shall see, however, Hythloday's sin is quite the opposite of Odysseus' firmly asserting his identity -- it is an altogether different kind of « hubris ».

Odysseus is socially irresponsible both to his men and to his family at home, not only in his actions with Polyphemus and his voluntary one-year stay with Circe, but even in the Calypso episode where for seven years he hides from humanity and his obligations toward it. Is More allu-

ding to this side of Odysseus and thus insinuating that when Hythloday advocates the Utopian order he is guilty of committing a socially irresponsible act ? And since the aspect of Utopia which Hythloday praises the most is the security it affords, would it be far-fetched to argue that Utopia is -- like Ogygia, Calypso's island -- the dream paradise of any weather-beaten sailor ? If that is the case, Utopia can be viewed as a security fantasy.

A security-fantasy interpretation would tie together all the other readings offered in the preceding paragraphs. Whether or not Hythloday is deliberately telling lies, there *is* no place that could offer man the security the Utopians enjoy, unless it were the womb. As has been noted, « Calypso » derives from the Greek word meaning « to envelop. » Thus Odysseus' stay on Ogygia is a metaphoric return to the womb, and his departure from the island is his rebirth into humanity as well as a re-acquisition of his identity ⁹. The womb offers security, but the price it exacts for that security is the negation or at least a severe restriction of individual identity -- precisely the price man has to pay for living in Utopia, and for living in the modern communistic or other totalitarian societies.

Berger, too, associates Utopia with the security of the womb : « The very self-enclosed spatiality of Hythloday's green world is ... womblike retreat protected from the outside world » ¹⁰. While calling Hythloday a latter-day Odysseus, however, Berger does *not fully* capture the point in *Utopia*. He ignores the allusively functional *similarities* between Hythloday and Odysseus : « [Hythloday] is a latter day Odysseus (the analogues are numerous and pointed) though somewhat in reverse : gladly leaving home he steers toward fabulous places which, for the Greek hero, were preparations for homecoming » ¹¹. And he views Phaiakia as the analogue of Utopia. The latter reading offers itself in view of the fact that Phaiakia is described as a human paradise and that in its near inaccessibility the country's geography is similar to Utopia's. What I should like to suggest is that More is using both Phaiakia and Ogygia as analogues for Utopia and that, when he conflates the two analogues, he is adroitly playing one against the other to expose Utopia for what it is : not only is it not the paradise it appears to be, but, with its utilitarian attempts at all but eliminating human passion, Utopia is as lifeless and sterile as the Ogygia that is totally devoid of human relationships. In Phaiakia Homer shows us some real people -- Nausikaa probably being the most memorable and certainly the most lovable -- something we do not encounter in Utopia.

While conflating the two Homeric analogues, More also assigns to each of them several correspondents. One analogue of Utopia is Calypso's island Ogygia, and Phaiakia finds a second correspondent in the *locus amoenus* where the dialogue with Hythloday is held. Phaiakia, we should remember, is the place where in his epic flashback Odysseus gives an account of his wondrous travels and adventures, an account which, significantly for the correspondences I have attempted to establish, includes his stay on Calypso's island. And Phaiakia is the place where Odysseus, through his confession to Alcinous, a descendant of Poseidon, ridding himself of the past, makes himself ready for his homecoming. We shall later see how Raphael's « Phaiakia, » i.e., his conversation with More and Giles, is related to his own « homecoming ».

Bearing in mind that More the author is undercutting the seriousness of his statements in the introduction of Hythloday, let us scrutinize More's comparison of Raphael to Plato the sailor. Hythloday himself endows More's statement about Raphael being a Plato-like sailor with a sense subtly different from the surface meaning when he says :

doubtless, Plato was right in foreseeing that if kings themselves did not turn to philosophy, they would never approve of the advice of real philosophers because they have been from their youth saturated and infected with wrong ideas. *This truth he found from his own experience with Dionysius.* (p. 87, italics added)

Why, the reader will have to ask himself, does More mention Plato as a sailor ? I should like to suggest that More is here referring to the Plato who eventually traveled to Syracuse in order to put into practice his *Republic*, which was to be the model for *Utopia*. Plato's ill-success in applying his idealism to practical politics makes him a « poor traveler » --and by implication it does the same to Plato's analogue Hythloday.

My « poor traveler » argument, in which Raphael's family name (as well as his association with Odysseus the not altogether successful traveler) and Plato's Syracusan failure incriminate each other, may seem circular. Yet my argument gains that appearance only because it tries to retrace the sometimes labyrinthine paths of More's own argument, which, as befits a mock-encomium, becomes indeed circular when, in order to undercut what Hythloday has to tell us, More also undermines Plato. That More -- or at least More's text -- does undermine Plato is strongly suggested by the fact that he mentions first Plato's political adventure and then Plato's advice that wise men should stay out of politics.

What now emerges is that More is turning Plato into a metaphoric traveler who in his Syracusan venture is analogous to Hythloday himself. More is presenting Plato as a man who applies his innovative ideas, admirable though they may be in a theoretical discussion, beyond their appropriate functions. It does not damage my case that the two statements -- on what Plato did in Syracuse and what he had said before -- come from Raphael, for the statements are historically correct. In fact, it seems to be to Hythloday's credit that unlike Plato himself he abides by Plato's principle and rejects More's suggestion to apply himself to some political office. This would, of course, appear to conflict with the Ulyssian destructive function which I attributed to him earlier, especially when he replies to More :

« I have no such ability as you ascribe to me and, if I had ever so much, still, in disturbing my own peace and quiet, I should not promote the public interest. In the first place almost all monarchs prefer to occupy themselves in the pursuits of war -- with which I neither have nor desire any acquaintance -- rather than in the honorable activities of peace ... » (p. 57).

The words with which Hythloday explains why he would not want to serve in high office sound sincere and convincing. And that is exactly why they are so dangerous. The point is easily missed if we fail to realize how these words are informed by what Hythloday says in Book II. Reading them, however, against the background of the description of the Utopians, we discover a parallel between the Utopians' attitude toward foreign mercenaries and Hythloday's own attitude toward other people. As Abrash notes, the Utopians *say* they hire mercenaries because having the « dregs of mankind » killed off benefits the human race, but, as Hythloday informs us, there is an underlying basis for this¹² : « The Utopians, just as they seek good men to use them, so enlist these villains to abuse them » (p. 209). Similarly, Hythloday does not care whether or not, by doing something that might disturb his own peace and quiet, he could actually promote the public interest. In reality he is interested only in his own peace and quiet, i.e., in leading an undisturbed life.

Such a life even excludes the stress of having to assert oneself against a powerful opponent in a debate. More makes this important point at the conclusion of his book. There are certain objections that More the conversation partner would have liked to raise to Hythloday's advocacy of the Utopian system :

« I knew, however, that he was wearied with his tale, and I was not quite certain that he could brook any opposition to his views, particularly when I recalled his censure of others on account of their fear that they might not appear to be wise enough, unless they found some fault to criticize in other men's discoveries. I therefore praised [the Utopians'] way of life and his speech and, taking him by the hand, led him in to supper ».

The fear that opposition might create the impression that one is expressing disagreement merely to appear 'smart' is hardly a valid reason for not voicing one's opposition. More is letting Hythloday off the hook, and by *letting the reader know* that he is letting Hythloday off the hook within the conversation he has been reporting, More, from outside the dialogue, finally exposes Hythloday for what he is : a tired Odysseus selfishly seeking an Ogygia where he will be free of responsibilities. And putting the lid on his dissociating irony, More concludes his report by describing how he had aided this fatigued Odysseus in his quest by taking his hand like that of a scared child and leading him into the safety and security of the dining room. As R.S. Sylvester puts it, « More is perhaps ... indicating that Hythlodæus, once so proudly independent, so all-knowing and so all-seeing, now needs a helping hand quite desperately. Blinded by his absorption in his own vision, cut off from his auditors by being hypnotized with himself, he can no longer find his own way back to reality ». ¹³ I shall in a moment tackle the question of whether Hythloday indeed *wants* to find his way back to reality.

In his explanation, quoted earlier, of why he would not enter any public office, Hythloday twice uses phrases describing states or activities of peace (personal « peace and quiet » and « honorable activities of peace »). We have caught him thinking of his *own* peace and quiet -- and that is why he makes the deliberately false or at least grossly exaggerating statement that almost all monarchs are more dedicated to war than to peace : he is trying to give us a credible as well as creditable excuse for wanting to lead a life that does not entail *any* public responsibilities. While presenting the monarch in the high profile of leading war -- an activity which his dialogue partners as well as the reader would normally consider a necessary evil that kings sometimes just have to perform -- Hythloday paints himself as being devoted to the low profile of the « good arts of peace, » as devoted to « bonis artibus, » i.e., to activities leaders ideally should be dedicated to. What by his own admission he is devoted to is indeed quite literally an *ars bona*, the art of easy living. He expresses this idea through a rather facile pun when he says, « tamen

quum ocio meo negocium facerem, publicam rem nihil promoveam, » which literally translates : « I would not be promoting the public interest even if I inflicted business upon my business-free time ». More precisely, since *neg-ocium* is the negating compound of *ocium*, we should translate : « ... even if I inflicted non-leisure upon my leisure ». In other words, the basic form of Hythloday's life is leisure, and any form of non-leisure would be self-inflicted trouble.

Hythloday is following the principle of Plato who had « by a very fine comparison » shown that philosophers are right in abstaining from active politics (p. 103). The « very fine comparison » which Plato has Socrates draw is the following :

the philosopher remains quiet, minds his own affairs, and, as it were, standing aside under a shelter of a wall in a storm and blast of dust and sleet and seeing others filled full of lawlessness, is content if in any way he may keep himself free from iniquity and unholy deeds though this life... ¹⁴

If allusively operative in Hythloday's words, Socrates' shelter-comparison would tie in neatly with our reading of Hythloday as an irresponsibly selfish security seeker. In fact, the following contrasts seem to offer themselves as allusively functional. Whereas Plato's philosopher abstains from public service in order to retain his integrity -- to « keep himself free from ... unholy deeds » -- Hythloday merely wishes to keep his personal *ocium* / leisure. Furthermore, Socrates did not eventually remain in his shelter but, instead, courageously took a stand on public issues that cost him his life -- and the post-Morean reader may be inclined to associate Socrates' and More's courageous deaths with each other and contrast them to Hythloday's cowardice ¹⁵. Similarly, Plato serves as a foil for Hythloday : while Plato had only his theories to rely on when he embarked on the Syracusan venture, Raphael supposedly has already seen the ideal society in practice but, instead of putting his experience to use, he withdraws into his shelter of leisure. Is this not an « unholy deed » ? Hythloday is guilty of what I will call negative hubris, guilty of arrogating the right to be an island unto himself. As he complacently -- proudly ? -- states it : « Nunc sic uiuo ut uolo » (« I now live as I please, » p. 57).

Hythloday explains why he would not even try to put his own experience to use :

« If anyone, when in the company of people who are jealous of others' discoveries or prefer their own, should propose some-

thing which he either has read of as done in other times or has seen done in other places, the listeners behave as if their whole reputation for wisdom were jeopardized and *as if afterwards they would deserve to be thought plain blockheads unless they could lay hold of something to find fault with in the discovery of others* ». (pp. 57-59, italics added)

Hythloday proceeds to list other reasons which appear equally valid. Taken in by these arguments, the reader could easily « miss the point » in Hythloday. However, More has built in a warning device : the portion I have italicized. Remember that at the close of his book More will use this statement as an excuse for not contradicting Hythloday, as an excuse which is entirely invalid and is advanced by More to let Hythloday off the hook but also to let the reader know that he is doing Hythloday this favor. Brought to bear upon the present context, More's conclusion informs the reader that here in Book I Hythloday is trying to let himself off the hook : yes, politics with its jealous or simply stupid people is a tough *negocium*, but that is not sufficient grounds for not trying to do one's share in promoting the public interest.

MORUS AS FOIL FOR HYTHLODAEUS

I said earlier that More uses even Plato as a foil to expose Hythloday. Yet as the best foil for Hythloday More, in the final analysis, presents himself. He does this very subtly through *word-interaction* when he begins his book as follows :

The most invincible King of England, Henry, the eighth of that name, who is distinguished by all the accomplishments of a model monarch, had certain weighty matters recently in dispute with His Serene Highness, Charles, Prince of Castile. With a view to their discussion and settlement, he sent me as a commissioner to Flanders ... (p. 47)

Unlike the Hythloday whom he will meet on his mission to Flanders, More actively engages in « certain weighty matters -- non exigvi momenti negocia quaedam » (p. 46), literally « some non-leisures of no small importance ».

In her essay on « Litotes : Denying the Contrary, »¹⁶ Elizabeth McCutcheon observes that the « inherent ambiguities and the potential spread of meaning » in the five Latin words « non exigvi momenti nego-

cia quaedam » are sacrificed by translators who interpret the litotes simply as a means of emphasis ; even the Yale translators « have, in a sense, made up our minds for us ». The litotes here is « significant, » she notes, because « this first 'non' foreshadows the processes of negation and opposites which typify so much of the *Utopia* ».

I have discussed the process of negation and opposites which goes on in Hythloday's *ocium* vs. *negocium* apologia. I called Raphael's pun facile -- but so is his entire outlook on life, as is shown by the interaction between More's opening statement and the later pun which the « non » foreshadows. Hythloday's outlook on life is facile (or at least he presents it as facile) in that he can see only (or pretends he can see only) the black of the *negocium* and the white of the *ocium*, only the black of what he considers insurmountable problems and the white of absolute security : the negation of *ocium* by its opposite *negocium* -- and vice versa -- typifies Hythloday.

Hythloday exhibits this either-or neurosis in yet another facile pun, which actually precedes the *ocium-negocium* word play. When Giles says, « I meant not that you should be in servitude but in service to kings, » Raphael replies, « The one is only one syllable less than the other » (p. 55) : he is pathetically playing the verb *servire* (« to be in servitude ») against the verb *inservire* (« to be in someone's service »). Hythloday is punning with his back against the wall. In his desperate effort to get himself off the hook, Hythloday seems to succeed -- *seems* because, as will be elaborated, the author may be including Giles the character as an accomplice in his manipulation of Hythloday -- with respect to Giles, who retorts that, whatever Hythloday may want to call public service, this is the only way in which Raphael can be useful and also make himself happier. Giles' reply provides Hythloday with a splendid opportunity to expound his own fashion of keeping his « peace and quiet ». However, as far as the author and his readers are concerned, Raphael stays with his back against the wall : More's opening words make sure of that.

There is yet another instance in which Raphael is let off the hook, and it seems thematically relevant that this instance occurs in the account immediately following his attempt to save face in his devotion to *ocium*. In his meeting with Cardinal Morton, Hythloday had objected to England's capital punishment for theft, contending that there would not be many thieves if the social conditions were different. He was opposed by a lawyer attending the meeting : « you have spoken well, considering that you are but a stranger who could hear something of these matters rather than get exact knowledge of them -- a statement which I shall make

plain in a few words » (p. 71). It has no bearing on Hythloday's case that the lawyer, according to Raphael « determined to adopt the usual method of disputants who are more careful to repeat what has been said than to answer it, » possibly would have made many redundant statements. What counts is that the lawyer never gets a chance to be true to his announcement that he would « demolish and destroy » all of Hythloday's arguments (p. 71), because

« 'Hold your peace', interrupted the Cardinal, 'for you hardly seem about to reply in a few words if you begin thus. So we shall relieve you of the trouble of making your answer now, but we shall reserve your right unimpaired till your next meeting, which I should like to set for tomorrow, provided neither you nor Raphael here is hindered by other business' ».

By his own account, Hythloday is let off the hook ; he is even allowed to continue his argument, a privilege denied to the lawyer.

The Cardinal's stated reasons for silencing the lawyer, then, are as invalid as will be More's for suppressing his own disagreement at the conclusion of the dialogue. Yet there is another parallel between Hythloday's meeting with the Cardinal and More's conclusion. After stating that he had praised the Utopians' way of life and applauded Hythloday's speech, More continues :

« I first said, nevertheless, that there would be another chance to think about these matters more deeply and to talk them over with him more fully. If only this were one day possible ! » (p. 245)

These two passages neatly inform each other. There will not be that « one day » when it will be possible for someone to pin Raphael down, for Raphael will not permit this : he is giving More a clear message to that effect when, even before he gives his account of Utopia, he relates to him his encounter with the lawyer who had been denied his « tomorrow. » However, More the author does of course have his « tomorrow », and he drives home his point when at the end he echoes Hythloday's clear message just as clearly and unequivocally. More the author and lawyer will pretty much do what the Cardinal's lawyer had said he would do before Morton interrupted him : « I shall demolish and destroy all your arguments ».

There is another aspect in which the Morton episode and the ending of *Utopia* mirror each other. After apologizing to More for having burdened him with the lengthy Morton story, Hythloday says,

« Though I ought to have related this conversation more concisely, still I feel bound to tell it to exhibit the attitude of those who had rejected what I had said first yet who, immediately afterward, when the Cardinal did not disapprove of it, also gave their approval, flattering him so much that they even smiled on and almost allowed in earnest the fancies of the hanger-on, which his master in jest did not reject. From this reaction you may judge what little regard courtiers would pay to me and my advice ». (p. 85)

The courtiers supposedly would deal with Hythloday's views in the about-face manner of those at Morton's house who approved of Raphael's statements merely because the Cardinal had not disapproved of them. The latter fact, however, does *not* mean that Morton had approved : the lites « non improbante Cardinale » (p. 84) implies ambiguity. On the contrary, when, in order to describe the courtiers' flattery of the Cardinal, Raphael mentions Morton's humoring of the fool, is he not all but equating his own position with that of the fool and thus suggesting that the Cardinal may not have valued Hythloday's observations ?

Hythloday, it seems, is expressing concern not so much over the practice of flattering as over his own failure to persuade or other people's unwillingness to accept his ideas -- or both. This does not mean that he *is* concerned over whether or not others would value his ideas : he is deliberately belittling the acceptance he finally received at the Cardinal's house and might also find in court, and he is doing this to furnish a creditable excuse for his withdrawal from *negocium*. However, More the character sees through Raphael's game and does exactly what the attending guests did to the Cardinal and what the courtiers allegedly would do to Hythloday : More is flattering Hythloday when he tells him that everything in his lengthy Morton tale « has been both wise and witty » (pp. 85-87), for some of the things he had spoken in Morton's house are downright nonsensical, such as calling the Polylerites « kind-hearted » (p. 77) and « humane » (p. 79) although they execute convicts who accept money for their forced labor and also execute those who pay the money !¹⁷

But then what the author seems to have in mind is that Hythloday *does not want acceptance* : the Raphael of the Morton tale is deliberately making statements in order to undermine his own trustworthiness and/ or the credibility of his judgment. And why would he be doing this ? A simple answer seems to offer itself : the surest way of gaining permission to become a dropout is to force people to reject you. The More of the conclusion of *Utopia*, after his arm has been twisted more than sufficiently, grants Hythloday this permission -- and he does so precisely in the manner which Raphael had in gross exaggeration attributed to all courtiers : through flattery. And in Book I, More is granting Hythloday his *ocium* in the fashion of the Cardinal whom More the author held in high esteem : first by not criticizing Raphael's account of the Morton episode and then by tolerating his subsequent advocacy of non-involvement in active politics, much in the way in which he would tolerate the jesting of a fool. In fact, More is only baiting the selfish security-seeker Hythloday when he repeatedly urges him to overcome his aversion to court life ; as far as More-the-character-and-author is concerned, Hythloday's *ocium* is a good riddance.

HYTHLODAEUS VERSUS HIS CLASSICAL HOMOLOGUES

I will now return to the sailing comparison. Hythloday is a poorly travelling Odysseus stricken with fatigue ; too tired to put his experience to use, he is even a poorer traveller than Plato, who at least made a practical effort to promote the public interest. Or does Hythloday already correspond to the Plato *after* the Syracusan failure, i.e., has his visit to Utopia instilled in him the same disgust with which Plato returned from Syracuse ? If that is the case, then it would be possible to argue that Hythloday, disenchanted with the dangers he sees inherent in the potentially ideal or at least ideal-looking Utopian order, is maliciously trying to share his disappointment with others by « selling » them the Ulyssian Horse.

This, of course, is not to say Hythloday's criticisms of contemporary society are unfounded. On the contrary, after More, within the dialogue reported, lets Hythloday off the hook but keeps him there as far as the reader is concerned, he closes with the following statement :

« I cannot agree with all that he said. But I readily admit that there are very many features in the Utopian commonwealth which it is easier for me to wish for in our countries than to have any hope of seeing realized ». (pp. 245-46)

More, then, agrees with many of Hythloday's criticisms and he shares the latter's frustration over the impossibility of having the good features of Utopia materialized in this world. Yet More proves himself to be the *aner spoudogeloios* that Hythloday is not, when he channels this frustration into a serio-comical, humanistic-ironic game with political ideas. As the sovereign humanist that Hythloday is not, More does not abandon the floundering ship. May one not say that Hythloday is a cowardly rat that leaves a ship which is floundering but by no means sinking ?

What is important for our present discussion is that the desertion distinguishes Hythloday from Virgil's Palinurus while at the same time it makes him a Palinurus of sorts. Unlike Palinurus, Hythloday leaves the ship before it can threaten his personal safety or comfort. However, like the Palinurus who lets Morpheus take over the rudder, he does fall asleep : instead of getting actively involved in politics, he allows others to steer the ship of state. What he either fails to realize or, as is more likely, actually wishes for is that a development in the direction of Utopian totalitarianism would drown him in an ocean of « calypsoic » oblivion, an oblivion to the responsibilities which every individual has toward society. Thus, one of the main functions of More's allusion to the *Aeneid* may well be that of pointing up the following contrast . Whereas Hythloday refuses to contribute his services to the body politic, Palinurus was the sacrifice which Neptune had demanded for assisting in the *fatum Romanum*, in the founding of the most powerful and most politically efficient nation the world had ever seen. On that account, the « poor sailor » Palinurus contributed more to the commonwealth than Hythloday is willing and Plato was able to do.

The above reading would explain why More has Peter Giles continue his introduction of Raphael as follows :

« He had studied [Greek] more than Latin because he had devoted himself unreservedly to philosophy, and in that subject he found that there is nothing valuable in Latin except certain treatises of Seneca and Cicero ». (p. 51)

When More pointedly models his *Utopia* after Plato's *Republic*, his intent is not to advocate Greek philosophy as a solution for practical political problems. On the contrary, the implication is that the Romans -- whom Hythloday himself calls « the greatest experts in managing the commonwealth » (p. 75) -- were more successful in political matters than the Greeks *because* they were less given to philosophical speculation. In other words, what Giles says about Hythloday and Greek writings is a red her-

ring for those readers who over-eagerly identify with Hythloday, but it is also an instance of dissociating irony and a warning device for those who prefer Roman pragmatism to Greek theorizing.

More is employing dissociating irony not only in Hythloday's characterization itself but already when he puts the beginning of that characterization into the mouth of Giles. In other words, in his introduction of Hythloday to More Peter Giles either is presented as one who « misses the point » in the land Utopia, or he is put in as a co-layer of More's trap for the reader -- or *both* ! I think More is here in his presentation of Giles the character masterfully employing a both-and irony. At any rate, while Giles the character may or may not have misjudged Hythloday and therefore Utopia, the real Giles, a star student of Erasmus, could hardly have been expected to misread the book *Utopia* -- the possibility of a discrepancy between the character and the real person may well be part of More's game.

Whether the author is including the character in his game by having him vicariously for many a reader misjudge Hythloday and Utopia -- I earlier pointed up that Giles will allow Hythloday to get away with his *servire-inservire* 'copout' -- or whether Giles is intended as a co-layer of the trap (and at the same time the warning device !) for the reader, the real Peter Giles, in a letter to Busleyden, did express his reservations about the reliability of Hythloday. After -- in a tone of irony ? -- calling Hythloday « a man superior even to Ulysses himself in the knowledge of countries, men, and affairs, » and praising the skill of his narrative, he proceeds :

« Nevertheless, when I contemplate the same picture as painted by More's brush, I am as affected as if I were sometimes actually living in Utopia itself. By heaven, I am even disposed to believe that in all the five years which Raphael spent on the island, he did not see as much as one may perceive in More's description.... I am at a loss which I should admire first or most : the faithfulness of a most happy memory ... or the sagacity with which he has noted the sources ... from which all blessings possibly could arise ... or the force and fluency of his discourse ... This is especially amazing since he is a man distracted by a mass of public business and domestic affairs ». (p. 23)

As Sylvester puts it, Giles « has a special interest » in the problems of Hythlodaeus' reliability : « His distinction between what Hythlodaeus

sees in the new land and what More's narrative reveals to us about both the ideal country and Hythlodaeus' view of it is crucial ». ¹⁸ There is a direct correlation between the distance separating More's faculty of perception from Hythloday's own on the one hand, and on the other the contrast Giles highlights between Hythloday who withdraws into his *ocium*-shelter and More the busy citizen involved « in tot publica simul & domestica *negotia* » (p. 22, italics added). Giles of course knew -- if a pun on « A Man for All Seasons » is permissible -- that More was a man for *all* occasions. ¹⁹ And he drew the proper conclusion from this knowledge : Hythloday is totally unlike More in that he is only able to rise to very few occasions and therefore has no choice but to limit himself to the *ocium* of his private life. Hythloday, then, is quite correct in stating that he does not possess the abilities which More ascribes to him, and Hythloday is *not* like the Odysseus whom the Renaissance idealized because Homer had described him as an *aner polytropos*, a « man of many turns, » a « man for all occasions ». The « Odysseus » as he was viewed by the Renaissance is no one else but More himself, not only because he was *polytropos* with respect to his private-and-public life in a way in which Hythloday is not, but also because he is *polytropous in the manner* in which he manipulates Hythloday -- as well as the readers who over-eagerly identify with Raphael.

SATIRIST A BUTT OF SATIRE.

This polytropous manipulation course satirizes Hythloday. As Berger expresses it : « Hythloday unwittingly supplies an anatomy of the Utopian mind, for he shows how withdrawal is founded on despair of things as they are. Actuality is reduced to a negative ideal ». ²⁰ In his satiric account Hythloday lacks the balance that would enable him to satirize contemporary conditions without having his account cause him psychosomatic fatigue, and even to tolerate the satiric opposition which More would have liked to present before closing the dialogue.

Perhaps More had his fictional character Hythloday in mind when he wrote to Giles : « Some are so dull-minded that they fear satire as much as a man bitten by a mad dog fears water » (« tam simi quidam sunt, ut nasum omnem velut aquam ab rabido morsus cane reformident, » pp. 44-45). More indicates that he is using the term *nasus* (« satire ») also in its literal sense : the satirist possesses the « keen nose » which can smell anything that deserves to be satirized ; and punning on the term which describes the satiric mind, More depicts its opposite as

simus, a word which simply means « flat-nosed » and originally had nothing to do with a « dull mind ». As he uses *negocium* to give a new negative meaning to *ocium*, More is employing *nasus*, which had long meant « flair », in such a fashion that in this context *simus* comes to mean a dull mind.

More seems to be presenting Hythloday as a sailor who is afraid to venture out onto the ocean because he had been the victim of *cynicism*. The Renaissance reader was aware of the secondary meaning of « dog » as « cynic » -- the latter deriving from the Greek word for dog, *kyon* -- and all he had to do to understand More was to make the connection between *nasus* as « satire » and as « keen nose » on the one hand, and More's mention of a hydrophobic dog whose bite causes someone to fear water on the other. Hythloday, then, is so much a « flat-nosed » as opposed to « keen-nosed » *kyon*/satirist himself that he has to be afraid of the latter not because he might be a cynic but because, as in the case of More, the keener satirist recognizes that the *kyon* Hythloday bit himself when he « bit » the real world by cynically devaluing it through the contrast with the Utopian ideals.

Hythloday's fear of water, allusively corresponding to Odysseus' fear of the Poseidon who symbolizes the elements, is a fear of reality and especially a fear of the opposition which reality has in store. I discussed earlier how More, to spare Raphael, exhausted by his own *sermo*²¹, any opposition he might encounter, takes the sailor by the hand and leads him into the safety of the dining room ; if we wish to stay with the canine imagery, we could say that the author presents Hythloday as a flat-nosed puppydog who is afraid of the whipping -- not the « biting » since More is no cynic -- which he might receive from More with his superior *nasus*. Outside the dialogue, More the satirist whips Hythloday anyway ; in fact, if we believe in the magical killing power of satire,²² then More kills Hythloday and the type of man he represents, and he does this to save mankind from hydrophobic cynicism.

I grant that my attempt to link Hythloday as Satirist Satirized to the comment More makes in his letter to Giles about hydrophobic people and dull-minded persons afraid of satire is speculative. But then speculation which is boldly playful yet closely examines the text is perhaps the most potentially fruitful approach to More's exuberant humanistic-ironic play with serious ideas. This would seem especially true for our approach to Hythloday, since he is the exact opposite of More. As Berger puts it : « Hythloday is too earnest and intense, ... he lacks the sense of play, musing and amused, by which a more tentative and self-conscious mind

remains negatively capable ... Unable to control his distance and detachment within the world, he detaches himself from the world ». ²³ And Berger proceeds to note, « Hythloday made his withdrawal easy by getting rid of all natural and emotional attachments *early in life* » (italics added), quoting the passage where Hythloday informs his conversation partners that he had in his young years distributed all his possessions among his relatives and friends in order to eliminate any obligations toward them. In other words, he had been a social dropout long before he visited Utopia. He claims he was « hale and hearty » (p. 55) when he thus severed all ties, yet already then his mental state was pathological. Perhaps we can call his state an incipient neurosis with dissociative features, the neurasthenia which causes Shakespeare's Hamlet either to be indecisive or, for the most part, to do the wrong thing. There is, however, one important difference. Whereas Hamlet feels personally called upon to set right a world which he thinks is « out of joint », Hythloday feels an impulse to withdraw from this world.

« UTOPIE MATRICIELLE » ?

Freud, Ernest Jones, and others have tried to explain Hamlet's problem as a mother-fixation. While not arguing for or against the Freudian interpretation of *Hamlet*, I should like to offer for Hythloday an interpretation which, although it makes no psychoanalytic claims ²⁴, goes beyond and -- quite literally -- much deeper than does any mother-fixation theory. Having compared Hythloday to the Odysseus of the Calypso episode, I will now take the next logical step and interpret his problem as a *womb-fixation* which manifests itself in his security-fantasy tale about Utopia : after all, as far as identity and the responsibilities that go with identity are concerned, the womb is « Noplace », the womb is « Utopia ». In other words, Hythloday is verbalizing his chronic regression-to-the-womb when he tells his tale of Utopia, and he is in adult fashion action out his regression to the womb/Utopia when he declines to serve in a public *negocium*.

This refusal divests Hythloday of his profession as sailor. For as More points out to him.

« If you cannot pluck up wrongheaded opinions by the root, if you cannot cure according to your heart's desire vices of long standing, yet you must not on that account ... abandon the ship in a storm because you cannot control the winds ». (p. 99).

If Hythloday is a cowardly rat leaving a ship that is floundering but not sinking, More is here treating him as generously, and thus with regards to the reader as satirically, as he will be at the conclusion of the book. For Hythloday does not really *abandon* the ship of state : he has never entered it. Consequently, Hythloday *never has been* a sailor in the figurative sense in which he was introduced by Giles ; an Odysseus born on Ogygia, he decided because of his hydrophobia never to leave the calypsoic stage. Or to put it in the terms of his own Ogygia : Raphael has been a sailor only on the calm waters of the bay surrounded by the womb Utopia.

Commenting on the crescent shape of Utopia, Adams notes that the « country's likeness to the new moon is perhaps less striking, for a post-Freudian generation, than its resemblance to the womb ». ²⁵ As André Prévost more recently noted in his *L'Utopie de Thomas More*, where he speaks of an *Utopie matricielle* ²⁶, the association with the womb is firmly imbedded in the language describing Utopia's geography :

L'idée d'une Utopie-archétype-maternel s'imprime dans la sémantique utilisée par le récit mythique de la genèse de l'île. Les mots venus sous la plume de More dans l'acte créateur de la composition sont connotés par l'idée de puissance générative. Ce vocabulaire hallucinatoire de génération ... s'ouvre avec l'expression, *in lunae speciem renascentis ... la forme de la lune, en train de renaître*. L'image de la naissance rejoint bientôt celle d'un ventre maternel ... *Le port intérieur est la matrice séminale de l'île* ²⁷.

After listing further convincing examples, Prévost raises an important question : is More's association of Utopia with the womb subconscious or deliberate ? Prévost seems to lean toward the latter but does not commit himself. I think the womb-association is intentional, which however, does not mean that a psychoanalytic examination of this context of ideas might not tell us more about Thomas More the person. In the present study I am not so much concerned with the author's psyche as with that of his fictional Hythloday. This character, even from the calypsoic hideout of his own mental Utopia/womb, poses a Ulyssian danger. He does this regardless of whether we view him as an imprudent sailor in the sense that his tale may cause others to commit fatal mistakes, or as a deliberate deceiver. The latter interpretation, however, seems to me to be closer to the point in *Utopia*, although it is possible that in his both-and irony More deliberately leaves room for the coexistence of -- and ludic

interaction between -- the two interpretations. « As Raphael leads Tobias to 'Rages, a city of the Medes' (Tob. 5:14), so Hythlodæus conducts his listeners to Utopia : 'I will conduct him thither, and bring him back to thee' (Tob. 5:15) » (p. 301n). The question is : does Raphael Hythloday bring the listener/reader back from Utopia ? I submit that, much like the Pied Piper, Hythloday intends to leave the listener/ reader to be destroyed by Utopia.

Hythloday's putative foil Palinurus, according to Virgil's own statement, is guiltless (« insonti, » *Aen. V*, 841). He even tried his best to resist Morpheus who had approached him in the guise of a fellow Trojan ²⁸. Palinurus, then, not only exhibits the trustworthiness and the sense of social responsibility that Hythloday lacks, but, unlike the Hythloday as he represents himself in the dialogue, he also distrusts the *serenum* (« the calm, » *Aen. V*, 851), i.e., he distrusts what we now can call the « peace and quiet ». On the other hand, it is precisely because Hythloday knows the dangers of the *serenum* that he maliciously tries to lull others into that destructive *serenum*. This would even put Hythloday much closer to the treacherous Morpheus than to Palinurus, the *traditionally* « careless traveler ». Hythloday -- to use Sylvester's words -- is « both uprooted himself and an uprooter of others » ²⁹.

I trust that More was a close enough reader -- or shall we say, enough of a *nasus* ? -- to know that the exegetical tradition had misread Virgil. The more « dull-minded » readers had allowed themselves to be misled, not by Virgil but by his main character -- just as the dull-minded readers will be misled, not by More but by his character Hythloday. Aeneas, not knowing what exactly had happened to Palinurus, had lamented :

O nimium caelo et pelago confise sereno,
nudus in ignota, Palinure, iacebis harena. (*Aen. V*, 870-71).
For trusting too much in sea and sky serene,
Palinurus, you'll lie unburied on unknown sands.

Even if Good Aeneas can « miss the point » in his assessment of a nautical situation, who could blame the reader, lacking the divine guidance which Aeneas had, for misjudging a situation that is much more complex because it deals with much more than with the assessment of nautical skills and experiences ?

What, I hope, will bring my argument full circle is that even *pious Aeneas* had been a victim of the Trojan Horse. While Odysseus is the

direct link between the Wooden Horse on the one hand and the Utopians and their European messenger on the other, I earlier also mentioned the Sinon who ushered in the instrument of destruction. It seems to me that More is actually establishing a connection between Sinon and Hythloday when the latter already in Book I introduces the Utopians. Were I to enter politics, he says, I would have to proceed as follows :

« If I would stick to the truth, I must needs speak in the manner I have described. To speak falsehoods, for all I know, may be the part of a philosopher, but it is certainly not for me. Although that speech of mine might perhaps be unwelcome and disagreeable to those councilors, yet I cannot see why it should seem odd even to the point of folly. What if I told them the kind of things which Plato creates in his republic or which the Utopians actually put in practice in theirs ? Though such institutions were superior (as, to be sure, they are), yet they might appear odd because here individuals have the right of private property, there all things are common ». (p. 101)³⁰

In a context where Hythloday asserts that, in contrast to the philosophers who tell useful lies to achieve their ends, he would not veer from the truth even if it put him in an unfortunate position, it seems to me that More is alluding to the passage where Sinon, in order to convince the Trojans of his sincerity and his unhappy situation, affirmed the treacherousness of Odysseus (*Aen.* II, 90 ff.). Since the Trojans knew Odysseus well enough, Sinon's words found willing ears among them :

cuncta equidem, tibi, rex, fuerit quodcumque, fatebor
vera (inquit) neque me Argolica de gente negabo ;
hoc primum ; nec si miserum Fortuna Sinonem
finxit, vanum etiam mendacemque improba finget. (II, 77-80)

« I'll tell it all, my lord, yes, all, and tell
it true, » he said. « I'm Greek. Be that confessed
first off. If [wicked] Fortune molded Sinon luckless,
she shall not mend him foul and a liar, too ».

Regardless of whether the Latinist will see certain stylistic similarities between Hythloday's and Sinon's speeches, once we realize the association with Odysseus and the Trojan Horse, an allusive filiation with Sinon's words becomes likely. Such a filiation would mean that, like the Sinon who pretended to dissociate himself from the treacherous Odysseus, Raphael at this very moment joins the philosophers in telling lies -- as he will in his later account of Utopia.

Commenting on Hythloday's words, the Yale edition quotes pronouncements, from Plato to More himself, advocating the « lie useful in the line of duty » (p. 374n). However, the editors overlook an important point of Hythloday as well as *Utopia* when they proceed, « In the exchange between Hythlodaeus and More, the dilemma does not, of course, revolve about the matter of trivial fibbing but whether a serious and upright man should consent to or connive at evil courses in the hope that he may be able to restrain his ruler from worse misdeeds » (p. 375n). The point is not what, in a conditional clause, Hythloday says he would or would not do were he to enter public service. The point is what he is already doing at this very moment, namely, in Sinon-like fashion maliciously advocating the Utopian institutions -- and, unlike the lies of the well-meaning philosophers, Hythloday's words are not « useful » but potentially as destructive to mankind as the Wooden Horse had been to the Trojans. Yet at the same time these words are useful to Raphael himself because, in contending that his views would be « unwelcome » to the councilors, they furnish a credible reason for his *ocium*. And if Sinon's persuasive confession that he is « Argolica de gente », i.e., Greek, is allusively operative, then Hythloday is « Utopiensi de gente » -- and that is why he tries to « sell » his Utopian Horse.

As we have seen, however, More builds into his *Utopia* enough warning devices, and it would perhaps not be inappropriate to see in More the author a Laocoon warning against the Utopian Horse :

aliquis latet error ; equo ne credite Teucri.
quidquid id est, timeo Danaos et dona ferentes. (*Aen.* II, 48-49)

There's treachery here. A horse ? Don't trust it, Trojans !
Whatever it is, I fear Greeks even with gifts.

Those readers who heed More's warning will not accept the « Utopian Gifts, » not even if they are nicely wrapped in the guise of Greek philosophy, the harmless discipline to which Raphael Hythloday supposedly had devoted himself.

NOTES

1. « Missing the Point in More's Utopia », *Extrapolation*, 19 (1977), 27.
2. *Utopia* and correspondence quotations, in English and where necessary in Latin, are from *The Complete Works of St. Thomas More*, vol. IV, eds. Edward Surtz and J.H. Hexter (New Haven and London : Yale University Press, 1965), hereafter referred to as the Yale edition. The quoted paragraph is from pp. 49-51. Page citations will be inserted in the text.
3. *Sir Thomas More : Utopia*, Translated and Edited by Robert M. Adams (New York : Norton & Co, 1975), p. 6n.
4. Cf. Edmund Spenser's letter prefacing *The Faerie Queene*, in which the poet remarks that Homer presents Odysseus as the example of a good governor and virtuous man.
5. Cf. my article, « Pope's Clarissa, the Trojan Horse, and Swift's Houyhnhnms », *Forum for Modern Language Studies*, 13 (1977), 6-11.
6. I make this point in my article, « Thomas More and Hythloday : Some Speculations on *Utopia* », *BHR* (XLIII, 1 (1981), 123-127.
7. « The Renaissance Imagination : Second World and Green World », *Centennial Review*, 9 (1965). I quote Berger from the reprint in Adams' edition ; the present quotation is from p. 203.
8. In the following I shall use the name Odysseus rather than Ulysses, especially since the *Odyssey* will be discussed.
9. G. E. Dimock, Jr., « The Name of Odysseus », *The Hudson Review*, 9 (1956), 52-70, reprinted in *Homer : The Odyssey*, Translated and Edited by Albert Cook (New York : Norton & Co., 1974), pp. 406-24.
10. Adams, p. 206.
11. P. 204.
12. P. 32.
13. « 'Si Hythlodaeo credimus' : Vision and Revision in Thomas More's *Utopia* », in *Essential Articles for the Study of Thomas More*, Edited with an Introduction and Bibliography by R.S. Sylvester and G.P. Marc'hadour (Archon Books : Hamden, 1977), p. 300. The article is reprinted from *Soundings*, 51 (1968), 72-89.
14. From the *Republic*, quoted in the Yale edition, p. 377n.

15. I discuss a possible connection between Hythloday's cowardice and More's courageous death in my article, « Thomas More, Hythloday, and Odysseus : An Anatomy of *Utopia* », *American Imago*, 37 (1980) 38-48. The article deals with the question of when More the author « is » Hythloday and when he « is » not. For that important question see Robert C. Elliott, *The Shape of Utopia* (Chicago and London : University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 25-49.
16. *Moreana*, 31-32 (1971), 116-21. I quote from the reprint in Adams' edition, pp. 224-30.
17. For a discussion of how Hythloday's account of the Utopians may be informed by his account of the Polylerites, see my article referred to in n. 6 above.
18. Pp. 294-95.
19. Giles knew More as *omnium horarum hominem* from Erasmus' preface to the *Praise of Folly*. Cf. G. P. Marc'hadour, « A Name for All Seasons, » in *Essential Articles*, p. 550.
20. Adams, p. 210.
21. Cf. Sylvester, p. 300.
22. Robert C. Elliott, *The Power of Satire : Magic, Ritual, Art* (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1966), passim.
23. Adams, p. 210.
24. For a psychoanalytic discussion, see my article referred to in n. 15 above.
25. P. 34n. -- For a discussion of the womb shape of *Utopia*, see also the article listed in n. 15 above.
26. (Paris : Mame, 1978), pp. 163-66.
27. P. 164n (author's italics). Owing to exigencies of space, I cannot here address the important philosophical aspects which Prévost discusses in his chapter « Fonctions de *L'Utopie de More* » and especially in the section on « *L'Utopie matricielle* ». The *dialectique utopienne*, it seems to me, could be profitably employed to support and complement the argument of the present study.
28. Palinurus addresses Morpheus :
Aenean credam (quid enim ?) fallacibus auris
et caelo, totiens deceptus fraude sereni ? (*Aen.* V, 850-51)
What ? Leave Aeneas to faithless winds and sky,
I who have learned so often how calms deceive ?
Latin quotations are from *P. Vergili Maronis opera*, ed. F. A. Hirtzel (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1963). Translations are from *Vergil : The Aeneid*, trans. Frank O. Copley (Indianapolis : Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965).

29. P. 297.

30. « Nam si uera loqui uolo, talia loquar necesse est. Caeterum falsa loqui, sitne philosophi nescio, certe non est meum. Quanquam ille meus sermo ut fuerit fortasse ingratus illis, atque molestus, ita non uideo cur uideri debebat usque ad ineptias insolens. Quod si aut ea dicerem, quae fingit Plato in sua Republica aut ea quae faciunt Vtopienses in sua, haec quamquam essent, ut certe sunt, meliora, tamen aliena uideri possint, quod hic singulorum priuatae sunt possessiones, illic omnia sunt communia ». (p. 100)

• **O BOLETIM DA SOCIEDADE DE GEOGRAFIA DE LISBOA** (1979)

publie une conférence donnée par Fernando de Mello Moser à cette Société le 6 février 1979, et intitulée « Tomás Moro e o seu heterónimo português » (71-88). Un *hétéronyme* est plus qu'un pseudonyme ; c'est un être fictif qui, en sus de son nom, vous prête son psychisme, son personnage tout entier, donc son point de vue. Dans l'*Utopie*, cet hétéronyme est un rude marin portugais très différent du diplomate londonien, mais néanmoins capable d'exprimer la dimension idéaliste, platonicienne, prophétique de More -- ce qu'il y a en lui de véhément, d'impatient et d'intransigeant. Les réflexions de notre docte ami lisbonnais nous proposent « une lecture simultanée de l'*Utopie* et de la personnalité de More ». Cette « lecture globale » entend ne sacrifier aucun des aspects ou des accents que des lecteurs différents tendent à isoler et à privilégier. Un éclairage indubitable est fourni par l'*Eloge de la Folie* ; le terme de *morosophe* (« sage-fou ») que ce livre partage avec l'*Utopie*, ne se retrouve-t-il pas équivalement dans le nom de Raphaël Hythlodée -- à la fois ange pèlerin capable de guérir notre cécité (mentale) et « débiteur de sornettes » ?

Les Portugais de 1515 sillonnent les mers vers l'Ouest et vers l'Est ; dans quelle direction situer l'*Utopie* ? Symboliquement, elle est, bien sûr, aux antipodes de l'Angleterre. Mais les traits dont More la compose proviennent de tous les horizons, y compris sans doute, comme le veut M.P. Alexéev, des colonies dalmates où Sebastiano Giustiniani avait représenté Venise avant de devenir (1515) ambassadeur à Londres ; et y compris ce « pays du Prêtre Jean », dont l'empereur députa une mission auprès du roi Manuel de Portugal en 1513 : cette *Legatio* éthiopienne inspira à Damien de Gois un « reportage » en latin dont la version anglaise, due à John More, fils du chancelier, parut à Londres en 1533 -- « premier ouvrage d'un auteur portugais à être traduit en anglais », dit le conférencier, qui en souligne l'exotisme utopien. *Moreana* n° 14 consacre 62 pages à une édition bilingue de ce texte, reproduit également, d'après une édition ultérieure, par J.V. de Pina Martins dans *Humanismo e Erasmismo na cultura portuguesa do século XVI* (Paris 1973).

G. M.