The Debellation of Salem and Bizance

Sir Thomas More

Page and line numbers correspond to The Complete Works of St. Thomas More (Yale University Press), volume 10.

A complete concordance to this work can be found at www.thomasmorestudies.org/publications.html#Concordance.

Spelling standardized, punctuation modernized, and glosses added by Mary Gottschalk

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Punctuation

The only punctuation marks found in the original printed version of A Dialogue of Comfort are the period, comma, question mark, slash, or “virgule” ( / ), and parentheses. Quotation marks, semicolons, dashes, exclamation points, italics, and suspension points have been added with the goal of making the text more readily understood by present-day readers. Many commas needed to be inserted and many removed in deference to current rules about restrictive and nonrestrictive phrases. Italics are added for titles and, occasionally, for emphasis. As for the suspension points ( … ), these are substitutes for many of More’s slashes. He often used a slash where we would use a semicolon, a dash, or italics; but he also, quite often, used one to indicate whether a certain phrase was meant to be connected more closely with the one preceding it or with the one following it; to call attention to parallel elements in different phrases; or simply to facilitate serious reflection. He also quite often used a slash for dramatic purposes—to indicate, perhaps, a coming sly comment, or some possibly surprising conclusion. The evident thoughtfulness with which More punctuated this book leads one to suspect that he anticipated its being often read aloud, and wanted to make sure the reader got the cadence right. He writes as though he were speaking.
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The Declaration of the Title

The Debellation of Salem and Bizance—sometime two great towns, which, being under the great Turk, were between Easter and Michaelmas last past (this present year of our Lord, 1533) with a marvelous metamorphosis enchanted and turned into two Englishmen by the wonderful inventive wit and witchcraft of Sir John “Some Say,” the Pacifier… and so by him conveyed hither in a dialogue, to defend his Division against The Apology of Sir Thomas More, Knight. But now—being thus, between the said Michaelmas and Halloweentide next ensuing, in this debellation vanquished—they be fled hence and vanished, and are become two towns again… with those old names changed, “Salem” into “Jerusalem” and “Bizance” into “Constantinople”… the one in Greece, the other in Syria… where they may see them that will, and win them that can. And if the Pacifier convey them hither again, and ten such other towns with them, embattled in such dialogues: Sir Thomas More hath undertaken to put himself in the adventure alone against them all. But and if he let them tarry still there: he will not utterly forswear it… but he is not much minded as yet, age now so coming on and waxing all unwieldy, to go thither and give the assault to such well-walled towns, without some such lusty company as shall be somewhat likely to leap up a little more lightly.

The Preface

Sir Thomas More to the Christian Readers

If any man marvel (as I ween some wise men will) that ever I would vouchsafe to bestow any time about making answer to the Pacifier’s Dialogue, considering his faint and his feeble reasoning: I cannot, in good faith, well excuse myself.

1 declaration: explanation  3 debellation: conquest  5 Michaelmas: the feast of Saint Michael the Archangel (September 29)  6 marvelous: amazing  8, 17 Pacifier: Peacemaker; Appeaser  9 hither: to here  9 dialogue: i.e., Salem and Bizanze, by Christopher St. German  9 his Division: i.e., A Treatise concerning the Division between the Spirituality and Temporalty, by St. German  // division: discord; dissension  10 apology: apologia; defense  12 hence: away from here  14 Bizance: Byzantium  16 may: can // will: wish to  19 put . . . adventure: put himself in the venture; stick out his own neck  20 and if: if  // tarry: remain  21 forswear: swear not to do  22 waxing: (he) becoming // unwieldy: infirm; feeble // thither: there  24 lusty: vigorous  28 ween: suppose // wise: sensible  29 vouchsafe: bother  29 bestowed: spend  30 faint: weak  31 in good faith: in all honesty // excuse: defend
therein. For as I suddenly went in hand therewith and made it in a braid: so when I since considered how little need it was, I marveled mine own self, and repented, too, that I had not regarded the book as it was worthy, and without any one word let it even alone.

Howbeit, good readers, what one thing or twain specially moved me to make answer to it, and how it happed me to fall in hand therewith and to spend and lose a little time about it, to make the matter the more plain unto you: that thing shall I show you.

As soon as mine Apology was once come out abroad, anon heard I word that some were very wroth therewith. And yet in my mind had there no man cause, neither preacher nor pacifier, no, nor no heretic neither. For I had but spoken for myself, and for good folk, and for the Catholic faith—without reproach or reproof to any man’s person, or willing any man any harm that were willing to amend. And whoso were willing to be naught still, had cause to be wroth with himself, you wot well, and not with me.

But all this would not serve me; for very wroth were they with me. Howbeit, their causeless anger did not greatly grieve me. For I was not so far unreasonable as to look for reasonable minds in unreasonable men.

But then heard I shortly that thick and threefold the pens went to work, and answers were a-making, divers, by divers very great cunning men. And of this travail of such great, mountainous hills, I heard much speech made almost every week—so far forth that at last it was told me for truth that unto one little piece one great cunning man had made a long answer of twelve whole sheets of paper, written near together and with a small hand.

But in good faith, I could but laugh at that. For as for that piece, I was very sure that the cunningest man that could come thereto, neither in twelve sheets nor in twelve quires neither, write as near as he could, should never answer it well.

For that piece was the answer that in mine Apology I make, as
you see there, unto certain sermons wherein my Dialogue was
touched for writing against Tyndale’s false translation; and
wherein was also defended, against my Confutation, Tyndale’s
wise chapter in which, against my Dialogue, he laboreth to prove
that the Word was before the Church—and in all his chapter
never toucheth the point; and the sermon that defended him
walketh as wide as he.

It was told me, as I say, that answer was made to that place;
and what shift there was found to the remnant, that could
I not hear. But to the first point I heard say that there was
devised that whereas I rehearse that the preacher spoke of
“poisoned bread,” I rehearsed him wrong, for he spoke but of
moldy bread. And this piece, it was told me that in that new
answer it was reasoned at length, and set forth very lustily.

But come the book abroad once, I shall soon abate that courage.
For first, since he taketh record that he said but “moldy bread”: if I
bring witness also that he said “poisoned bread,” then can his
witness stand him in none other stead but for to prove for
him that he said both.

Secondly shall I prove that he said “poisoned bread” by such
means that men shall see by reason that though the other were
possible—yet was it far unlikely.

Finally shall I further prove that though the man had said not
“poisoned bread” but only “moldy bread”—yet shall I prove, I
say, that as the case stood, that same not “poisoned bread” but
“moldy bread” was yet, for all that, a very poisoned word.

Hearing, therefore, that this gay book was made of the twelve
sheets of paper, and lacked but overlooking, and that many more were
in hand that shortly should come out: like as a husband whose
wife were in her travail hearkeneth every handwhile and
fain would hear good tidings—so since I so much heard of so
sore travail of so many, so cunning, about divers answers,
I longed of their long labor to see some good speed, and some
of those fair babes born that they travailed on.

And when these great hills had thus travailed long, from
the week after Easter till as much before Michaelmas: the good
hour came on as God would, that one was brought abed, with sore labor at last delivered of a dead mouse. The mother is yet but green, good soul, and hath need of good keeping; women wot what caudle serveth against her afterthroes.

Now, after that the book was out and came into my hands... and that I saw the manner and the fashion thereof: two things only moved me to write and meddle with it. One, that I saw therein followed and pursued the selfsame shrewd, malicious intent that was purposed in his first book, of Division: that is to wit, to make the ordinaries, with fear of slander and obloquy, leave their duties undone and let heretics alone... and over that, with an evil new change of good old laws, labor to put heretics in courage, and thereby decay the faith.

This was indeed the very special point that made me write yet again. And yet found I so little reason in his reasoning that methought it should not need. For this wist I very well: that whosoever had wit, and would confer and compare together the words of his answer with the words of mine Apology, should soon perceive that his answers were even very dull and dead.

But then was there another thing that I considered in it—which point unprovided for might soon deceive the reader. For albeit the Pacifier hath in some places put in mine own words where it pleased him, yet hath he for the most part used a pretty craft: to misrehearse my matter and leave my words out. Yea, and besides this, the man hath in some places left out some of his own, and misrehearsed them... to make the reader ween that in the reproving them, I had written wrong.

Now had I supposed to remedy those things, and make him an answer, in three or four leaves, with only pointing the reader to the places, with writing in what leaf he should find the matter. For the words once read—the trouble should show itself.

But while I was thus minded and went thereabout—his answer...
in his *Dialogue* had found such a way, with walking
to and fro, keeping no manner order, and therewith making me
seek so long for some one place, that I saw well I should sooner
answer him all anew than find out for many things the place
that I should seek for.

I made, therefore, in few days, this answer that you see. And
some such places yet as I had happed to find, I have remitted
the reader unto in mine *Apology*… where for his ready finding,
I have numbered him the leaf. And yet have I for some folk
done somewhat more, too. For I see well, surely many men are nowadays
so delicate in reading, and so loath to labor, that they
fare in other books as women fare with their primer… which
though they be content to say sometimes the fifteen psalms, and
over that, the psalms of the Passion, too, if they find them all fair
set out in order at length—yet will they rather leave them
all unsaid than turn back to seek them out in other parts
of their primer.

And therefore, lest some readers might hap in this book to
do the same, some places of the *Apology* much necessary and
not long, that with much seeking I fortuned to find out, to
ease the reader’s labor and make all open unto him I have put in
also into mine answer here. Yea, and yet over this, in the things
of most weight I have put into this book his own words too.
And so shall you, good readers, without any pain of seeking,
have all the matter plain and open before your eyes, that ye shall
well see that I love the light no less than this Pacifier would
fain walk in the dark. For as the dark is in this matter all his
advantage: even so is verily the light in like wise mine.
And whereas there are some that commend his answer for
the compendious brevity thereof and shortness: I nothing
therein envy the man’s praise. For like as no man can make a
shorter course than he that lacketh both his legs: so can no
man make a shorter book than he that lacketh as well words as
matter. And yet when, by the places conferred so well together, the
feebleness of his answer shall appear: then shall he lose the
praise of shortness, too. For when it shall well be seen that he saith
nothing to the purpose: then shall every wise man think his

1–2 *walking to and fro*: going back and forth     7 *remitted*: referred
11 *delicate*: fastidious; particular     12 *fare*: do    // *in*: with    // *primer*: prayer book
13 *content*: willing
13 *the fifteen psalms*: the Gradual Psalms, or Songs of Ascents; Psalms 120–134.
14 *psalms of the Passion*: the Penitential Psalms (Psalms 6, 32, 38, 51, 102, 130, and 143)
14 *fair*: nicely     15 *at length*: in full     21 *open*: manifest
26–27 *would fain walk*: is desirous of walking
book too long by altogether. And that ye may well perceive that so it is indeed, let us now leave off the preface and fall unto the matter.

The First Chapter

In his first chapter he toucheth two things. One, that I have deceived his hope, in that I have not in mine Apology “devised some convenient ways” to reform and redress the division between the temporality and the spirituality; to which point I will answer after, in the touching of his second chapter.

The other point is that since he never found any fault in any work of mine (of which for “other lets” he “never read” none!), he marveth much, therefore, that I make such objection against his… and namely in that work which I would name an “apology,” which name signifieth, as he saith, “an answer or a defense.”

Now, where this good man declareth what thing an apology is, and saith that it is an answer or a defense… for which cause he the more marveth that I would in that book write against any treatise of his who never had anything written against any work of mine… as though that therefore my writing against his work would in no wise agree with the name of my book: I might answer him that the touching of his book was but an incident (as I show in the 100th leaf of my said book), and not my principal matter; and therefore of many naughty things I touch there but a few, and such as were in no wise to be dissembled. But now marvel I much more wherefore he should so marvel that I would in the work which I name an answer or a defense write against his work which nothing wrote against mine. For if the thing that I write against his words be an answer or a defense indeed: then though it be not a defense for myself, yet is the cause of all his marvel gone. For in that book that is called mine Apology, it is not required by the nature of that name that it be any answer or defense for mine own self at all—but it sufficeth that it be of mine own making an answer or defense for some other.

1 altogether: the whole thing 5 toucheth: criticizes
6 deceived his hope: disappointed him 7 convenient: suitable
7 division: discord; dissension 8 temporality: laity // spirituality: clergy
11 for: because of // lets: hindrances; things that got in his way
13 namely: especially 16 declareth: explains 21 agree: be consonant
23 an incident: something incidental 24 naughty: bad; reprehensible
26 dissembled: ignored; passed over // wherefore: why
28–29 his . . . wrote: the work of someone who wrote nothing
35 some other: someone else
And as these titles *Calvitium Synesii*, *Moriae Erasmi*, be names convenient for those books of theirs, though the matters in those books signified by those names do not only pertain unto Synesius and Erasmus, or peradventure to neither of them both at all: so may my book well bear the name of an answer or a defense if it be an answer or a defense made by me, though it were all made for other folk, and not one piece thereof made for me.

So is it now that mine *Apology* is an answer and a defense, not only for my former books, wherein the new brethren began to find certain faults... but over that, in the selfsame part wherein I touch the book of *Division*, it is an answer and a defense for many good, worshipful folk against the malicious slander and obloquy so generally set forth, with so many false “some say”s, in that seditious book.

The selfsame piece is also an answer and a defense of the very good old and long-approved laws, both of this realm and of the whole corps of Christendom... which laws this Pacifier in his book of *Division*, to the encouraging of heretics and peril of the Catholic faith, with warm words and cold reasons oppugneth.

And finally, forasmuch as many good, virtuous folk began upon that ill book of *Division* to have a right evil opinion of the maker himself, whom I, for his plain confession of the true faith, took and take yet for a man good and Catholic: therefore I in many places of mine *Apology* lay the fault from the man himself unto some wily shrews that deceived him. And so was mine *Apology* an answer also, and a defense, for the person of the Pacifier himself.

And where he goeth about now for to confute it—there is not in all the remnant of his answer one piece that anything impaireth any point of mine *Apology*. Howbeit, of truth, in this point he goeth most near me. For this answer hath he made in such manner wise that I shall have now much more ado than I then had to make any wise man ween that ever himself meant well. And yet will I not leave it so... but

1 *Calvitium Synesii*: Synesius’ *In Praise of Baldness*
1 *Moriae Erasmi*: Erasmus’ *In Praise of Folly*  
4 *peradventure*: perhaps
10 *new*: modern  
13 *worshipful*: reputable  
14 *obloquy*: bad-mouthing
17 *long-approved*: long-established  
20 *warm*: heated  
21 *cold reasons*: lame arguments
21 *oppugneth*: assails  
23 *right evil*: very bad  
24 *maker*: author
26 *from*: away from  
27 *shrews*: scoundrels  
31 *anything*: at all; in any way
33 *goeth most near me*: comes the closest to getting me; strikes his best blow at me
still will put it from him to some false, wily shrews, though the man do, as he doth, say contrary thereto himself.

And the more the man denieth that thing himself—the more he maketh it likely to be true. For when in the things that so plain appear so naught, he rather taketh the matter all whole upon him than suffereth any part to be laid from him—but if the man have an importunate pride, as by God’s grace he hath not, else is it a sure sign and a good token that he is such a good simple soul as soon may be deceived… while we see that his wit serveth him no better but that he would rather appear malicious than unwise.

But now that I have proved him that the name of “apology” may serve very well for every piece of my book—now will I somewhat see how the matters of his book agree well with the name thereof. I mean not here his book of Division (for of that book the name and the matter agree together well), but I mean of his new book that we be now in hand with, which book, as appeareth in the first front of the first leaf, is named Salem and Bizance. And therein, of a hundred and six leaves (for so many be in the book), there are scant fully fifteen that anything agree with the name.

Now, if he will say that the communication between Salem and Bizance is but a by-matter beside, and that all the remnant between their talkings is the very book: then is it worse; for then hath his book never a name at all.

Moreover, if it so were: then should none of the three last chapters bear the names that they do—that is to wit, the 22nd, the 23rd, and the 24th chapter—but likewise as he calleth the beginning of their communication, before his matter, an introduction, so should he have called those three chapters after his matter an extraduction.

And yet I wot not well what I may say thereof. For in the beginning of the book, their first communication is called an introduction; and so is it entitled upon the leaves. And yet in the very end of that introduction, before the first chapter, the man saith himself—in the person of Bizance—that he hath made as yet none introduction at all. What he meaneth by this
can I not tell… but if he mean to make men ween that Salem and
Bizance were two Englishmen indeed, and spoke those words
themselves without any word of his.

But now—because he showeth himself so cunning in Greek
words that upon this word “apology” he findeth the aforesaid
fault with mine Apology, as though I were overseen and
observed not the nature of an apology—let us see how well himself,
that in the beginning calleth his book a dialogue, observeth
the nature and property of a dialogue.

In the third leaf, when Salem showeth himself desirous to see
the Pacifier’s answer, Bizance answereth:

I shall cause it to be written hereafter in this dialogue, word for
word, as it is come to my hands; and then thou shalt with good will
have it. And thou shalt understand that his answer beginneth at the
next chapter hereafter ensuing, and continueth to the place where
I shall show thee that it endeth.

Consider, good readers, that this introduction he doth not
bring in as a rehearsal of a communication had before, but as
a communication present. And then let him show me
where ever he hath heard in his life any two men, in
their talking together, divide their present communication
into chapters. This is a point not only so far from the
nature of a dialogue, but also from all reason, that a very child
would not, I ween, have handled the thing so childishly.

Also, that Bizance telleth Salem that the Pacifier’s answer
shall be written into their dialogue, that is to wit, into their communication—
who saw ever the like? Who saw ever anything
written into a communication, and writing planted in among
words spoken?

And what reason hath it to tell him whereabout in their
communication the Pacifier’s words shall begin and where
they shall end? As though Salem, talking with Bizance, had
not the wit to perceive when Bizance speaketh himself and
when he readeth him the Pacifier’s words written!

4 cunning: knowledgeable
6 overseen: out of line
12 cause it to be written: have it written // in: into
13 with good will: with cheerful consent (on my part); i.e., be welcome to
18 rehearsal: relating // communication: conversation
30 what reason hath it: what sense does it make
Also, what a strange, monstrous beast maketh Bizance to Salem the Pacifier’s answer, while he maketh as though Salem could neither perceive the head nor the tail but if himself pointed him to them both with a stick!

Then stand they both still thereas they first meet; and that is in the street by likelihood (for there folk most commonly meet, that meet at adventure as they do); and there is all the answer perused—the reading whereof standeth them, at the least, four or five hours, I trow. Howbeit, there I was a little overseen. For they stand not there still about the reading... but there stand they still, both twain, all the while that Bizance is, as you see, into their talking and communication writing it. And that is, but if Bizance write fast, I warrant the work of a week. Now, then, at the week’s end, when all the twenty-one chapters are written—Bizance in the twenty-second chapter giveth Salem warning that there is the answer of the Pacifier ended. And this was by the Pacifier full prudently devised. For else would Salem ween that their own talking together in the other three chapters by mouth had been still nothing else but only Bizance’s writing... and else would also Salem have thought that his own words of exhortation against the great Turk, and his own rehearsing of that exposition of the Apocalypse, had been still the Pacifier’s words against mine Apology.

And finally in the very end, to show that he could write not in only prose, he endeth all the whole book in this wise: with a glorious rhyme—“And thus the glorious Trinity / have in his keeping both thee and me”... and maketh Bizance pray for no more but for them two, after the manner of the good man Grime, a mustard maker in Cambridge that was wont to pray for himself and his wife and his child, and grace to make good mustard, and no more.

And thus you see, good readers, that whereas this man is so cunning

3 but if himself: unless he himself
5 stand... still: they both keep standing
5 thereas: right there where
7 at adventure: by chance
8 perused: gone through; examined
8 standeth: takes
9 was a little overseen: made a little mistake
11 both twain: both of the two
13 I warrant: I’m sure
15 giveth Salem warning: notifies Salem
17 full: very
21 against: with regard to
22 exposition of the Apocalypse: commentary on the Book of Revelation
25 all the whole: the whole entire
in Greek words that he can shortly find the fault where I fail in the nature of an apology—himself in his own dialogue so well conserveth the property of a dialogue, and expresseth it so naturally, that it could never be done more naturally, not though he that wrote it were even a very natural indeed.

But where he seemeth to have marveled, when he read mine Apology, that I would make objections against his work while he never wrote anything against no book of mine: in good faith, if he had, I would never have been the more hasty, but somewhat, peradventure, the less, lest it might have seemed that some desire of revenging mine own displeasure had excited me thereto; whereas now, no worldly profit growing to me thereby, there is much less cause for any good man to think that I would take the labor to write against a work I wist not whose, but if that it had at the leastwise seemed to myself that there were such things therein as God would give me thank to give men warning to be well wary of them.

And where he saith he will not touch everything “particularly,” but take another order (all out of order) in answering thereunto—I cannot let him in his own book to use what order that best may serve his purpose. But me thought, and yet think, that I myself took a very plain, open way, when the chapters of his which I would answer to, I perused always everything in order. Which order while he followeth not with me—how you shall find it, yourselves shall, good readers, judge upon the end. But yet in the meanwhile, at the first face, it seemeth not that with leaping out of order, he meaneth to make you the matter very plain.

Nor all, he saith, he will not answer neither… for “avoiding of tediousness.” And of truth if he have (as he seemeth to signify) any other business—I think it be somewhat tedious to him to answer altogether.

Finally, where he saith that he supposeth to make it appear by his “answers,” and by his “considerations” and his “declarations,” that mine “objections” are “little to be pondered”: first, for his arguments made against the laws whereby the faith is preserved and heresies kept under, those arguments all his

3 conserveth: observes; stays true to // property: nature 4 though: even if
5 natural: born idiot 7 while: when 9 hasty: hotheaded
11 displeasure: offendedness 12 growing: coming 17 thank to give: credit for giving
20 let . . . to use: prevent . . . from using 25–26 upon the end: in the end; ultimately
26 at the first face: at first glance 30 tediousness: irksomeness
30 of . . . have: if he does actually have // signify: indicate 33 supposeth: expects
34 declarations: explanations 35 for: as for 37 under: suppressed
answers will never be able to maintain. And as to the remnant—in
good faith, the better that he may make you his innocent
mind appear, the gladder a great deal will I be thereof;
nor nothing purpose I therein, by this present book, to do
further than to make you clearly perceive that how well soever
himself here declare his good meaning, myself was not
causeless there moved to find fault in his writing.

The Second Chapter

In the second chapter, beginning in the fifth leaf, he bringeth
forth the first "consideration," which is that I in the 89th leaf of
mine Apology "confess that 'murmur and dissension against the
clergy'" was then already "far 'gone onward in its unhappy
journey'"… and that afterward, in the 106th leaf of the same book, I
bring in "a very dark sentence whereby it appeareth" that I mean
"that the displeasure and grudge between them 'is indeed neither
so great as [he] maketh it… and yet grown to so great as it is, but
even now, of late.'" But whoso look there in that place shall, I
suppose, find it nothing dark… but if it be such a man as
list not to understand it.

And where I say there that this division such as it is, which
is nothing such as this man maketh it, is not "grown to so great
as it is but since that Tyndale's books and Frith's, and Friar
Barnes', began to go abroad": therein he would seem to say the
contrary, and biddeth me look better upon the matter and I shall
find it otherwise. And indeed, with better looking thereon, I
find it somewhat otherwise. For I find the time of such increase
as I speak of, much shorter than I there assign, and that by a
great deal. For it was grown the greater by the occasion of the
selfsame book of the Division—though the maker, as himself
saith and as I trust too, intended it not of purpose. And therefore
where he saith that since I confess that there was division at the
time of the making of mine Apology, it appeareth that I have
no mind to have it ceased, because that I seek not out the
causes and devise the remedies—verily, good readers, I never
took and accounted myself for a man meet and able to make a

1 maintain: support; hold up  2 in good faith: really and truly  3 mind: intention
6 declare: make known  11 confess: admit; acknowledge  12 unhappy: unfortunate
14 dark: obscure  // appeareth: is made obvious  15 grudge: ill feeling
15 them: i.e., the clergy and the laity  17 even: just  // whoso: whoever
18 nothing: not at all  19 list not: does not want
23 go abroad: get out there; be circulated  24 biddeth me: tells me to
24 look… matter: take a better look at the thing  27 assign: specify  33 mind: wish
35 meet: suitable
reformation of such two great parties as the spirituality and
the temporality of this whole realm be. And verily, if I knew
some such great causes as this man setteth forth for true,
which I know for false… and that I then knew the ways to
reform them to: I would use other ways toward it than seditious
slanderous books. For as I have expressly declared
in mine Apology, neither never did I, nor never intend
to do, put out abroad in print, under color of
reformation, faults that were hateful and odious to hear,
either of the one party or of the other… and especially so many
at once as, if they were all true, were not all likely to be remedied
at once… but the more part for the while remaining
little remedied, should but make either party to the other more
odious, and both parties more infamous among such
others (if any such anywhere be) as would be glad and rejoice
to hear much evil spoken of them both.

And this I say although that all were true. And now
would I much less use that manner in making rehearsal of those
things whereof many be false and untrue, and many others also
very trifles… and the very chief things that this Pacifier desireth
to have reformed be laws already well made, which
he would have made worse. For where they have been by wise
men well devised for the repressing of heresies, some by Parliament
in this realm, some by the general council of Christendom:
those deviseth he so to be changed now as the
change which he desireth, though by God’s grace he
desireth not that it so should, yet out of doubt indeed should
turn to the encouraging of heretics and increase of heresies,
with the diminishment and decay of the Catholic, Christian
faith. Whereupon would not fail to fall, which Almighty God
keep from us, his grievous indignation upon us. And therefore
God keep us from such reformations!

Now, to lay to me therefore as a great fault that I blame his
book in those untrue “some say”s that under color of ceasing
division, excite and set forth division, but if myself could
cease it, when such books make it—is much like as if he would
say that there ought no man to blame him that would burn up
another man’s house, but he that would build it again.

And therefore, with this good reason of his, he putteth me in
remembrance of an answer that a man of mine made
once much after the same fashion. I had sometime one with me
called Cliff, a man as well known as Master Henry Patenson.
This Cliff had been many years mad; but age had taken
from him the rage, so that he was meetly well waxen harmless
among folk. Into Cliff’s head came there sometimes in his
madness such imaginations against images as these heretics
have in their sadness. For like as some of them, which after
fled and ran away (and some fell to theft and were
cought), pulled down of late upon London Bridge the image of the
blessed martyr Saint Thomas: so Cliff upon the same bridge
upon a time fell in talking unto an image of our blessed Lady…
and after such blasphemies as the devil put then in his
mouth (and nowadays bloweth out by the mouths of many
heretics, which, seem they never so sad, be yet more
mad than he)—he set hand upon the Child in her arm
and there broke off the neck. And afterward when honest men,
dwellers upon the bridge, came home to my house and there
blamed Cliff before me, and asked him wherefore he broke off
the Child’s neck in our Lady’s arm—when Cliff had heard
them, he began to look well and earnestly upon them… and like a
man of sadness and gravity, he asked them, “Tell me this,
among you there: Have you not yet set on his head again?” “No,”
quoth they, “we cannot.” “No?” quoth Cliff. “By the Mass, it is the more
shame for you. Why speak you to me of it, then?”

And even thus answereth me now this good man… which
where his seditious “some say”’s set forth division, and break
the Child’s neck, reckoneth it a shame for me to find any fault
with him for the breaking but if myself could glue it
together again.

And therefore where he saith that I should have proved that
all the causes that he layeth as causes of division be no causes of
division, or else I should have devised the remedies—albeit I

2 again: back up  3 reason: reasoning  4 man: servant
5 sometime: at one time  8 fairly: become
10 imaginations: designs  11, 18, 25 sober-mindedness
11 who: who  13, 15 image: statue  15 upon a time: one day
15 fell in: started  20 honest: honorable; upstanding
22 blamed: made accusation against  24 well and: good and; very
26 set . . . again: put his head back on  27 quoth: said
33 together again: back together  35 layeth: puts forth; alleges
have answered him therein already, yet this I say therein further:
that I have proved well and clearly that the very chief cause that he
layeth is laid very untruly; that is to wit, the mishandling
the people to their destruction upon suspicion of
heresy. Which cause if it were as true as it is false, were so
weighty that it were well worthy to be laid for a matter of
division. And while it is not true—yet by such books being
blown about in every part of the realm for true, may well
mishap to make a division... while the dwellers in
every quarter about, by credence given to the book, may at the
first face ween that though it be not so thereas they dwell themselves,
yet ween, I say, that it were so in all other places. Whereof
though they shall by leisure perceive the contrary with
search—yet they that ask no further question shall believe it
still. And so a rumor once begun and spread abroad is not
after soon removed.

Now, as for his other causes of this division: divers I have
touched and showed sufficiently that they be not sufficient.
But as for me to peruse his whole book of Division through,
was no part of my purpose. For if those things that I did
touch had seemed to me tolerable, I would in good faith
have been loath to have touched them either. In which
while with his “considerations” and “declarations” he goeth about
now to show that he then meant no harm, I will not therein
much hinder him, but be glad rather to further him in the excuse
of his meaning; and so did I, as I have said, even in mine
Apology too. But though I be glad to excuse his own mind in the
meaning—yet can I not excuse his unwise following of false, wily
counsel in the doing.

The Third Chapter

The third chapter, containing his second consideration,
read and consider it whoso list; for I can see nothing in it to be
considered by me. For in effect it containeth nothing else
but that he would the clergy should, as much as they may,
avoid all occasion of murmur and grudge... of the temporality toward them, but if it be pharisaical grudge; yea, and though the deed that they should forbear were good; in which point, because that one point would wax a long work, I will fall in no dispiciens. But in as far forth as he giveth any man good counsel and wisheth all thing well, so far forth shall he and I not vary... but and he call me to him, I will sit and pray for it with him.

But yet where he saith, in the end of the chapter, that I “endeavor” myself “very much to oppress all them that will show such things of the spiritualty”: indeed, some such as have made such lies, I have told it them. But as for any oppression, let him prove one, and let him call that one twenty. And if he can prove none, as I wot well he cannot—then, good readers, let him be believed thereafter.

Moreover, where he saith that I in my mind prove it an “intolerable default in the people,” for misjudging the clergy where I think they have “no cause so to do”; and that therein I “leave them as though all the whole cause and principal default were in [the temporality],” wherein he saith that my “judgment” is “far deceived”: in this point, good reader, he saith somewhat to me if he said true. And surely if he thought that he wrote herein true... then wisdom would he should have written mine own words in. And if he feared that it would be found false: then honesty would that he should have left his own words out. But verily, good readers, and he seek this seven years, he shall in all mine Apology find you no such words of mine. But he shall find far the contrary. For I do there, I wot well, in such places as I show that men were unreasonable that would take this thing or that thing (such as I rehearse of his bringing forth) for any reasonable cause of division—there I say, in those places, that the Pacifist missaith the people, and that the people be much more reasonable than to take it so. And therefore here he believeth me again.

And also let him show you forth any one place in which I say that all the whole fault, or the principal fault either, is in the

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1, 2 grudge: ill feeling 5 fall in: get into // dispicions: disputations
7 vary: disagree // and: if 10 show: tell / state 11 of: about
15 thereafter: accordingly 17 intolerable: exceedingly great // default: fault; defect
21 far deceived: extremely erroneous
21–22 he... me: he would be giving an answer to me that was worth something
22 if he said true: if what he was saying was true
23–24 would... written: would have had him write 25 honesty: honor; decency
32 missaith: slanders 34 believeth: tells lies about
temporality; and then believe him the better in another matter. And in the meanwhile till he bring it forth, or else that you find it yourselves, ye may with reason, at the leastwise in this matter, believe me better than him; and I will never desire you to believe me one day longer. For I have neither laid the principal fault in the one nor the other. And thus hath he made you of me three lies in one chapter.

The Fourth Chapter

In his fourth chapter, beginning in the eighth leaf, he first showeth a diversity between the example that I put in the 94th leaf of mine *Apology*, of a pacifier between a man and his wife, and the thing that I there resemble it unto—that is to wit, his own book, that maketh a like pacification between the temporality and spirituality.

But surely the difference that he putteth seemeth to my poor wit greatly to impair his part. For if it be as he saith it is—that, whereas the husband would be loath to hear any evil spoken of his wife and therefore will can such a pacifier no thank that will tell him such tales of her before his neighbors, the temporality will be glad to hear harm spoken of the spirituality—then was it so much the worse done to write openly to the temporality such things of the spirituality to feed and nourish any such evil delight; or openly to the spirituality… being (as he said) likewise affectionate… the faults of the temporality, either. Howbeit, I cannot in good faith say, but if I should belie him, that on that side willingly he greatly passed his bounds; but of oversight, unawares, he hath in some things slandered the temporality too.

Then showeth he farther wherefore he wrote those things in English, though Jean Gerson wrote them but in Latin; wherein, to say the truth, he layeth a cause sufficient wherefore that Jean Gerson wrote them in Latin. But whether he lay cause sufficient wherefore himself should not rather have let them alone than write them in English, against the counsel of Jean Gerson himself, as I touched in mine *Apology*—
that I leave yourselves, good readers, to consider. For I will not
much strive against his excuse. For I greatly shall not need, I
think, since all his excuse amounteth to no more but that he
meant that some laymen reading the priests’ faults in English
might put them in remembrance to amend them; especially
because he saith even in the same chapter, a little before, that the
temporality so much delighteth to hear of them.

Then goeth he farther in the same chapter… and whereas in his
book of the Division he would have seemed between the temporality
and the spirituality to have spoken indifferently and to
have told them their faults on both parts equally, here (in the
d second side of the leaf) he telleth us the cause wherefore
he did not so, and saith in this wise:

I have spoken of defaults and abuses in the spiritualty more than
of defaults in the temporality… because the spiritualty ought to be
the guiders and givers of light by their doctrine and good examples to
the temporality; and if their light be darkness, where shall the temporality
then fetch their light? Truly I wot not where. And I doubt
that then they both shall walk still in darkness. And therefore it is that
John Chrysostom saith upon Matthew, the twenty-first chapter: that if
priesthood be holy and sound, all the Church flourisheth; and if it be
corrupt, the faith and virtue of the people fadeth also and vanisheth
away. Let this, therefore, as to this point, be the final conclusion
for this time: that whosoever proveth defaults to be in the
temporality, he proveth also defaults to reign in the spirituality; and
therefore the defaults in the temporality will never be voided till the
defaults in the spirituality be first reformed; and therefore have I
first spoken of some defaults that be in the spirituality.

Surely, good readers, I like well these words. For they be very
good and they prove very well, and very true it is—nor I never said
the contrary, but have in mine Apology plainly said the same—
that every fault in a spiritual man, though the thing were of itself
all one, is yet by the difference of the person far worse and
more odious, both to God and man, than it is in a temporal

2 strive: argue  //  greatly shall not need: won’t much need to
5 in remembrance: on notice  6 because: since
6 even . . . chapter: in the very same chapter  10 indifferently: impartially
19 walk still: keep walking  20 upon: on the basis of
20–23: This is actually from Pseudo-Chrysostom; see the section on Matthew 21:16 in
Saint Thomas Aquinas’ Golden Chain.  26 voided: gotten rid of
30 prove: pan out; work out  32 spiritual man: member of the clergy
33 all one: entirely the same  //  by: on account of  20/34—21/1 temporal man: lay person
man. But yet the worse that every private spiritual man’s fault is, so much is it the more harm to defame the corps of the spiritualty openly in the face of the temporality in such manner as the book of *Division* doth—of which I have proved those that are weighty false, and could (if I would now lose time about it, while that I have touched is sufficient) show the substance of all the remnant to have little substance too.

And therefore the words of Saint Chrysostom which he layeth for his book were in part the very cause that made me write against his book. For surely, as Saint Chrysostom saith, if the priesthood be corrupt, the faith and virtue of the people fadeth and vanisheth away… which is without any question very truth, for though Saint Chrysostom had never said it, our Savior saith as much himself: “Ye be,” saith he to the clergy, “the salt of the earth, and if the salt wax once fresh and wearish, wherein shall anything be well seasoned? And you be the light of the world. And therefore if the light that is in the world be dark—how dark shall then the darkness be itself?”

But now say I, since that the priesthood being corrupted, it must needs follow that the faith and virtue of the people fadeth and vanisheth away; and upon Christ’s words it must follow that if the spirituality be naught, the temporality must needs then be worse than they: thereupon I conclude upon the other side, against the Pacifier’s book, that since this realm hath (as, God be thanked, indeed it hath) as good and as faithful temporality, and (though there be a few false brethren in a great multitude of true Catholic men) as hath for the quantity any other country christened—it must needs, I say, follow that the clergy, though it have some such false, naughty brethren too, is not in such sore manner corrupted as the book of *Division* goeth about to make men ween… but as good for their part as the temporality for theirs.

And therefore in like wise I say that—upon the selfsame words of Saint Chrysostom and of our Savior Christ—the

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1 *private*: individual  
3 *openly*: publicly  
16 *fresh*: not salty  //  *wearish*: flat; savorless  
23 *naught*: bad  
27 *false*: no-good / sham  
28 *true*: upright / true-blue  
30 *naughty*: evil-minded  
31 *sore*: terrible
said book of the *Division*, in defaming the spiritualty, defameth the temporality much more; which is the thing that, as I said, seemeth me neither honorable nor profitable, in open-printed books, for any Englishman to do; nor, verily, I think the maker would not have done, if he then had thought so far.

But now goeth he farther and saith:

And though Master More cannot deny these faults [I suppose you have heard me deny such as were the chief, and proved them, I ween, untrue], yet all the amendments that he allayeth in his *Apology* is only in punishment of heresies, as is said before; whereunto he specially moveth the ordinaries not to be “slack nor the more remiss” for “fear of evil words and slander of the people.” And if they be therefore “the more slack in calling, attaching, and examining, and farther ordering of heretics,” he saith, “God will not fail to make fall in their necks the double slander of that from whence they fled.” And in another place he moveth the temporality to join with the spiritualty, “each with other lovingly,” to “repress and keep under” those “ungracious folk,” by whom he meaneth heretics. Upon which motion I shall somewhat show my mind, as hereafter followeth, in the next chapter.

Here he complaineth again that I devise no remedies, as though the whole provision for allthing lay upon mine hand. I do somewhat for my part when I pray God to give us all the grace—spiritual and temporal both—to keep well and observe such provisions as God hath given good men the grace to make already. For if we keep them well—I ween there are meetly many made. And if we break the old—so will we by likelihood break these as well, that he would have me now devise and study new. And somewhat I do better for my part, while I labor to have the good old provisions kept, than this Pacifier doth for his, while he laboreth to have them broken, and namely those laws that are of the very best, and made for the faith against heresies.

But then laboreth he, as methinketh, to make the brethren...
angry with me... and rehearseth and inculcateth into their ears that I 
exhort both the spiritualty and the tempora!ty too, those to 
whom the matter appertaineth, not to be anything the more 
slack in repressing of heresies for fear of infamy.

Surely, good readers, whatsoever I wrote in that behalf, I will  
require every man to have it even here... for written and repeated 
again. For when we see that the words of his writing 
which I have in mine Apology rehearsed you, how well soever 
he meant therein (as I trust he meant but well), have yet that plain, 
open appearance in them that they were well likely to put such as 
should see to the repressing of heresies in doubt and fear of 
infamy, and to be had among the people as folk suspect of mishandling 
good folk and of cruelty: I reckon it the part of every 
good man, that any zeal hath to the conservation of the Catholic 
faith, to encourage them on the other side—to the doing 
of their duty therein—and not to set the respect of their 
estimation among men (which yet they shall also much the 
better conserve among all the people save those few that are 
naught) before the saving of their souls and keeping the 
favor of God; namely since the keeping of people from heresies 
and putting the scabbed heretics out of the clean 
flock is one of the special things that the Apostle gave the 
bishop warning of. Let him find out any word of mine 
wherewith I would any harm to any man that would amend, 
and then let him lay it to me. And whosoever intendeth 
ever to be good—I am well content that the Pacifier make him 
not my friend.

The Fifth Chapter

In the fifth chapter he toucheth punishment of heresies, and 
divideth the matter into four sorts of people; wherein, forasmuch 
as he nothing saith that toucheth me, I let them pass, all 
four.

After those four sorts perused—he speaketh of the fifth, 
which he very earnestly dispraiseth, that are those which take 
and hold contrary ways... to the true faith indeed. But then, in

1 inculcateth: drums  6 require: invite  // even: right  12 had: held 
12 mishandling: mistreating  16 respect: consideration  17 estimation: reputation 
20–23: See Titus 3:10–11.  21 scabbed: leprous  22 special: specific 
22 the Apostle: Saint Paul  23 warning of: instruction to do 
23 find out: find by searching for  24 would: (show that I) wish 
25 lay it to me: level that charge against me  25–26 intendeth... be: has no intention of being 
31 toucheth me: hurts my case  34 dispraiseth: deprecates
that part, he much misliketh in me both that I call them any
evil name, as the “naughty brethren,” or “heretic brethren,”
and also that I call them good names too, as the “blessed
brethren” and “evangelical brethren.”

And for the first—in calling them any such evil names—he
saith I do not as I “would be done to”… as “appeareth,” he saith, in
mine Apology. Surely I suppose he may therein find that I
force not what such as they be call me. And I can write no worse
word by them, I wot well, than they write many by me.

And, too, as for to give evil names to such folk as are so evil
indeed—let him call it “railing” at his pleasure… but howsoever
it be in me, I wot well that some others have done
so that yet were no railers… except Saint Paul were a railer
when he called his churlish keepers “dogs,” and when he called the
chief priest a “whited wall,” which was a spiteful word among
them; and except Saint Polycarp railed when he called the
heretic Marcion “the devil’s eldest son,” and except our Savior
railed when he called the scribes and the Pharisees “hypocrites.”

But then that I call them again good names—this thing, lo, this
good man reckoneth a very monstrous manner: to make them
both good and bad. But this is a monster, lo, of every man’s
making. For so call not I them alone, but the whole people too, in
such manner of speaking as every man useth when he calleth one
self naughty lad both a “shrewd boy” and a “good son”—the one
in the proper, simple speech, the other by the figure of
irony, or antiphrasis. And by a like manner figure Saint Jerome
against the old heretic Vigilantius calleth him sometimes
Vigilantius, and sometimes again Dormitantius; and so he calleth
that heretic two contrary names, as well as I do these.

And where he cannot tell what I mean by “the new-broached
brotherhood”—that am I content to tell him: I mean that they be a
barrel of poison, that the devil hath late set abroach, and
laboreth by them to poison other men.

And where he cannot bear it that they, being such, should be
called by the name of “evangelicals”—I well allow the good
mind of the good man that he therein showeth himself so to
bear to the faith that it grieveth him to hear heretics called by
such a good, gracious name. But he must consider that it is now,
and some years already past hath been, the name by which they
have been as commonly called, in all the countries Catholic,
as by their own very name of “heretic.” And the occasion thereof
grew first of that that themselves took that name “evangelical” arrogantly
to themselves, both by the “evangelical liberty” that they
pretended, as folk that would live under the Gospel and under
no man’s law beside, and because they would also believe
nothing further than the very Scripture, all which they take now
under the name of “the Gospel.” For the New Law they take for nothing
else but for the declaration and perfection of the Old.

Now, when they had taken this name commonly upon themselves,
the Catholics, telling them that they neither lived nor believed
according to the Gospel, letted not, yet, to call them by the same
name too; and that not to their praise, but to their rebuke and
shame. And some turned in writing that name of theirs in scorn,
and instead of “evangelicals” wrote them “pseudo-evangelicals.”

Now, if this man cannot bear it that I call them as the old folk
do—though I would myself leave it for his pleasure, that would
make, ye wot well, but a small change. For other folk will call
them still yet by what name they list, and neither I nor he can
let them.

But to the intent he may be somewhat the less discontent with
me for calling heretics by a good name—he shall understand
that upon such occasion and such manner, it is no new-begun
thing so to do. For a certain sort there were of the heretics
that were the Manichaeans which were first among themselves
called by the name of “Catharistae”—that is to wit, pure and clean—and
afterward the Catholics called them by the same name. And so
doeth Saint Augustine also call them in his writing. But yet he
declareth both their false heresies and their secret shameful
living for such that, though he call them by the name of
pure and clean, as we call now these brethren evangelical, yet
he meant that they were neither pure nor clean indeed, no more

3 gracious: godly  6 very: true  9 pretended: laid claim to
10 beside: in addition  13 declaration: elucidation
16 letted not: did not forbear  18 turned: altered  21 leave: drop; desist from
21 for his pleasure: to please him  23 what: whatever  24 let: stop
28 sort: subset; variety  33 declareth: shows // false: contemptible
than these folk in living or belief follow the very Gospel indeed.

But then cometh he forth upon me somewhat solemnly with a very folly and with a solemn lie. For lo, good readers, these are his words, I warrant you wise and true:

And now will I say somewhat further concerning this matter, and that is this. I marvel much how Master More durst, for offense of his conscience, and for dread of the King's displeasure, and of the whole realm, bring up such a slanderous name in this realm, and put it in print, that may lightly touch not only many of the common people, but also of the greatest of the realm—as well spiritual as temporal—if he and others of his affinity list to call any of them one of the "blessed brethren," or of the "good brethren." And in this point it seemeth that he forgot the honor of the realm, which he seemed much to regard when he said he could not think it to the honor of the realm that other realms should ween that the whole clergy of this realm should be "so far fallen into the grudge and indignation of the whole temporality" as he saith it is spoken to be in the said treatise which he calleth "the book of Division"; for certainly it is more dishonor to the realm to have it noised that the realm is full of heretics than that the temporality grudgeth against the spiritualty; and so he escheweth and fleeth the less slander, though it were all true that he saith, and runneth headlong into the greater.

And now will I say somewhat further concerning this matter, and that is this. I marvel much how this man durst, for offense of his conscience and displeasure of God, bring up such a slanderous lie upon me, and write it in his book, that I should write in mine Apology that the realm is full of heretics!

If the case were now no better upon my part, nor no worse upon his, but that in mine Apology there could no such saying be found—what rebuke were it yet unto him, if he were a man openly known by name? As now the shame cleaveth not on his cheeks, but he soon shaketh it off, while his name is

3, 4 solemn(ly): ceremonious(ly)  4 a very folly: something really ludicrous
5 warrant: guarantee // wise and true: in all seriousness   6 somewhat: something
7 durst: dared    9 bring up: bring into fashion    9, 27 slanderous: disgraceful
10 lightly: well // touch: taint; give a black eye to  12 affinity: affiliation; circle
12 list: choose  17 grudge: ill feeling  20 noised: reported; spread around
21 grudgeth: grumbles; complains // against: about  22 escheweth: avoids
22 less slander: lesser disgrace  27 upon: about  32 rebuke: disgrace  34 while: since
not at his book. But, now, since that in mine Apology I
plainly write the contrary—what words will there serve to say
to this man the things that he were in this point very well
worthy to hear!

Read, good Christian readers, the forty-seventh chapter of mine Apology,
beginning in the 260th leaf, and there shall you plainly see
that I say plain the contrary. For whereas this Pacifier did in
his book of Division, under the name of “some” others, belie of
likelihood some of the spirituality then, surmitting that they “as
of policy” noise “that the realm is full of heretics more than it
is indeed,” as he now believeth me here, surmising that I do say
the same: ye shall there see that I show it to be unlikely that any
politic spiritual man would so say for policy… since so to say
were for them, for the cause that I there show, very far against
good policy. And there I further show that some heretics
have falsely made that noise, and there I tell for what cause.
And afterward, in folio 268, I show that for all their busy bragging,
they be yet indeed but a few.

Now, good readers, when I thus have written there, in both the
places, so open and so plain, that the realm is not full of heretics,
nor hath therein but a few, though that few be indeed over many…
and grown more also, by negligence in some part, than
there hath been in some late years past—how may this man
find in his heart, for shame, to write in this wise? And, as it were,
with such authority so solemnly check me falsely, for writing
that the realm is full, and then excuse his like fault by mine… and
yet in the comparison make mine the greater, too? But now is all
the craft of that comparison discovered, and the glory of that argument
defaced, while you see that his fault is true, and that mine he
feigneth and findeth not in my book, but plain and expressly
the contrary; and that he spinneth that fine lie without
flax, fetching it out of his own body as the spider spinneth
her cobweb. And thus is my fault fair wiped away, and his
lieth still in his neck, and another now laid unto it.

Now, as this was no little folly—for him to lose his credence with

1 at: on 7 plain the contrary: the exact opposite 9 surmitting: falsely charging
9–10 as of: out of 10, 13, 14 policy: expediency 11 surmising: falsely alleging
16 show: state 20 over: too 22 late: recent // may: can
23 find . . . shame: i.e., be so devoid of shame as to be able to find it in his heart
24 check: reprove 25, 28, 32 fault: offense 27 craft: guile; deceitfulness
28 while: when // true: actual 29 feigneth: fabricates 32 fair: completely
33 in his neck: on his shoulders // laid: added 34 folly: idiocy // credence: credibility
that open lie, that might be so soon and so plainly controlled and reproved—so is his first point also no less folly than that, wherein he marveleth so much that I dare, for my conscience, and for displeasure of my prince, “and of the whole realm,” bring up that “slanderous name” in the realm, to call these heretics the “brethren”… considering that it “may lightly touch not only any man of the common people, but also of the greatest of the realm, as well spiritual as temporal,” if either myself or any of mine “affinity” “list to call them one of the ‘blessed brethren,’ or of the ‘good brethren.’”

This is, forsooth, one the most simple, sought-out folly that ever I yet saw set out with high words so solemnly. For first, as for to call them by the name of the “brethren,” is nothing of my bringing up, but a word walking in every man’s mouth (which thing I cannot believe but this man well knoweth himself, as strange as he maketh the matter) and begun by the good, blessed brethren themselves—as well appeareth upon their own letters, enough to be showed, at sundry seasons sent between them.

Now, touching the great fear and peril that he putteth lest I or some of mine “affinity” may slander any of the greatest of the realm if we list to call any such man one of the “good brethren”: the good man may take his rest, I warrant him, and shall not need to break his sleep therefor. For first, as for mine affinity, is not very great. For I have none affinity but as I think himself hath and every other man: that is to wit, either by gossipred or by marriage; except he mean to call all the true Catholics mine affinity, and all the others his own. And then, which way soever he mean, a lewd slanderous word were as likely to happen in one of his affinity as in one of mine. And as for myself, the Pacifier himself is (as his “some say”s show) somewhat more set upon an appetite of slandering than am I, which bear a little more reverence to the great men of the realm, spiritual and temporal both, and more honest mind unto the small also, than wrongfully to defame either...
great or small by calling either the one or the other any of the blessed, bicched, new-broached brotherhood… except only such as by their own open writings, or by their open words, be plainly proved heretics.

But yet consider well, good readers, what a wise reason this is that he bringeth forth. For what peril is there, of such slander, more by this name of “the good brethren” than by the other name of “heretics”? Is not the old name of “heretics” as slanderous as this new name of “the blessed brethren”? What name can this good man devise us himself to call them by, in which name the same peril of slander may not fall as well as in this? Men may by this wise reason call them by no name at all, for fear lest I or mine affinity might, if we list, call not only any of the people, but also the greatest lords, both spiritual and temporal, by the same name, and so bring them in slander. For the slander is all one whatsoever the name be, when the thing is all one that is meant and signified thereby.

And this man useth himself in this place, therefore, very circumspectly for this point in this chapter, where he speaketh of heretics after his four sorts of folk before. For he calleth them there by no name at all himself, but saith of the fourth sort:

These be the worst sort of people before all others, except only another sort of people which Sir Thomas More in his Apology calleth sometimes “desperate wretches,” sometimes “stark heretics,” and sometimes “the blessed brethren,” and sometimes “the naughty brethren” [etc.].

So that this good man himself here, like a true-faithful man, affirmeth them naught… and such and so naught as there be none worse. But name (as it seemeth), for fear of occasion of slander, he durst here none call them himself, but saith they be they whom I call thus and thus.

Well, I will make no vow thereof as yet… but I will peradventure at a leisure hereafter, upon better advisement, use the same circumspection and policy that I learn of his example here…

2 bicched: accursed; execrable // new-broached: recently launched
3 open: publicly disseminated / publicly spoken 5 wise reason: brilliant argument
6, 8, etc. slander(ous): disgrace(ful) 12 by this: according to this
14 people: commoners 15 in: into 18 useth: conducts; comports
25 desperate: hopeless // stark: arrant; out-and-out
33 at a leisure: with opportunity for deliberation // advisement: consideration
34 policy: prudence // of: from
and when I speak of such manner folk, give them no name
at all myself… but for a token, that men may wit whom I
mean, I shall say, “those fellows, I mean, that Saint Paul, pardie,
calleth heretics so… and that be all they that obstinately hold any
self-minded opinion contrary to the doctrine that the common-known
Catholic Church teacheth and holdeth for necessary to
salvation.”

After all this, in the 14th and 15th leaf he asketh me, with a
solemn driven process, whether I would not think it good
and well done… that all such as have authority to punish heretics
should, before they punish them, amend first their own
faults. And I think yes, in good faith, that it were very well
done; and I would that every man would so do indeed, that
either should correct heretic or any malefactor else.

But then again I ask him, that though this were well done—if
every man would wax as good as another good man would
wish him, and as himself would wish another man to be—yet
if there were some that were not so suddenly so well disposed as to
amend their own faults so soon as the duty of their office
would require of necessity that they should do correction upon
the faults of some other folk: should they not yet do it, for
all that, in the meanwhile, and other folk to whom it appertained…
be bound to assist them therein, though their own
faults were not all amended yet?

To this question, lo, he hath in the same place answered me yes,
as I have him to the other. And thus, good readers, this good
man and I, after our sore conflict in the other matter, have yet
in these two points struck hands again and be, God be
thanked, meetly well agreed together, God hold it.

The Sixth Chapter

His sixth chapter beginneth in the 16th leaf, wherein he
showed that I in mine Apology “mistake the letter” of his “said
treatise”… and he telleth which words. But he telleth neither in
what place of his book his words are nor in what place of my

2 token: hint  3 pardie: by golly  9 solemn . . . process: dramatic drawn-out discourse
9–10 good and: very  14 any malefactor else: any other evildoer  16 wax: become
28 struck hands: shaken hands  29 hold it: keep it that way  32 showed: stated
32 letter: literal meaning
book you may find mine. Those two things he leaveth out, because he would, as he said in the beginning, not follow the order of my chapters, but take that way that should be best to the plain “opening of the truth.” But forasmuch as meseemeth that to the plain opening of truth the readier way is to read first both the places, and then this his answer after: ye may therefore, good readers, find both his words and mine in mine Apology—his in the leaf 123; and mine against which he now reasoneth in his answer, ye shall find folio 127. And now, good readers, if you read and consider those two places first, and then compare well the words of mine Apology there with the words of his answer here—it shall suffice for this matter. For there shall you see well that I mistake not the letter of his words. For I say not nay but that his words go only against spiritual men… but his reason runneth out against every kind of men, spiritual and temporal too. And there I show also the reason wherefore and why. And therefore I ween it will appear plainly that I mistake not the letter of his treatise at all… and that his reason runneth out indeed against every kind of men. For there is neither spiritual man nor temporal but he may take harm by abundance. But so is there, as I there say, neither spiritual man nor temporal but he may with abundance do good.

But now the declaration of his mind in this answer mendeth all the matter. For here he declareth that by these words of his “in a manner strangling” he meaneth the diminishing of some fervor. As though a man would say that by “almost killing with a club” he meant the giving of a fillip in the forehead with his little finger!

But since that in this sixth chapter of his, his great, mortal “strangling” is now straggled away, and turned into venial sin, we shall for this matter trouble you no longer… but every man may take holy water and go home to dinner, for service is all done here for today.

The counsel of Saint Bernard (that he there speaketh of) to the pope Eugenius is in good faith, as methinketh, very

9 reasoneth: argues
15 reason: argument
17 wherefore: on account of which
24 declaration: explanation // mind: intent
well brought in. And I would advise every spiritual man to follow it, and to take good temporal men to him and let them do all his temporal business for him. This think I good as for mine own mind, but if there be in any part any laws made already to the contrary, by such folk as it cannot become me to control. Howbeit, I suppose that much part of their temporal business is done by temporal men indeed.

As for his act of Parliament that he speaketh of, I suppose verily that the clergy would not be against it. And such acts are there already made more than one, good and sufficient… but if he mean to set an addition thereto: that the King’s Grace should expressly be bound by the act that if he gave any license of mortising into the Church, it should be void… except such cases as this good man list to limit and give him leave. Since His Highness is now moved by this good man here thereto—His Grace may agree to it when it pleaseth him.

As for the great matter that he maketh of that I never, in all the time that I was conversant in the Court, could perceive any of the noblemen above the number of seven, and yet not now so many, that ever thought it good that any possessions of the Church should without a lawful cause be taken away therefrom: I marvel much what he meaneth, and what subtle conceit he conceiveth in his wise breast, that he so muttereth and mumbleth upon that word… as though such communication, either on the one side or the other, were of such high importance that it were either felony or some heinous misprision, either in telling the tale again or else in keeping it counsel so long. For I wot ne’er, in good faith, in which of the twain this good man findeth the fault, or whether he find any or none. But if he find any—in which of the twain soever he find it, he findeth but his own folly. For now shall you, good readers, see what little insight the man hath in anything that he readeth. First he rehearseth a part of my words written in mine Apology, folio 139, where I say that I “never found in all the time while I was conversant in the Court, of all the nobility of this land, above the number of seven that ever I perceived to be of the mind that it were either

2 temporal men: laymen  3 temporal: secular; worldly  4, 10–11 but if: unless
6 control: challenge  10 good and: quite  13 of: for
13 mortising: mortmain; a transference of land as a perpetual, inalienable possession
14 list: should choose  15 moved: exhorted
17 great matter: big deal  24 word: statement
24 communication: talk  26 heinous misprision: high crime bordering on felony
27–28 keeping it counsel: keeping it in confidence  28 wot ne’er: have no idea
30–31 in . . . it: in whichever of the two he finds it  31 folly: foolishness
32–33 insight . . . in: understanding . . . of  33 rehearseth: quotes
right or reasonable, or could be to the realm profitable, without lawful cause to take any possessions away from the clergy."

Now upon these words ye shall see what he gathereth, by which ye shall see what wit and what learning the man hath. These are his words, lo:

Since Master More saith that he hath not known above seven (whereof, he saith, three are dead) that were of the mind that it were reasonable without cause to take possessions from the clergy—in which words it is included that he knew seven of that mind, whose opinions it liketh him to rehearse and put in writing and in print also . . .

This man hath a special insight in inclusives and exclusives, when he weeneth that in my words it were included that I knew seven of that mind that it were reasonable to take away possessions from the Church without cause. My words were, you wot well, that I never knew above seven that without lawful cause to take away from the Church thought either right or reasonable, or that it could be to the realm profitable. What include these words, now? Do they include, as he saith, that I say that I knew seven that thought it reasonable? This man is so cunning in his inclusives and exclusives that he discerneth nothing between copulatives and disjunctives. This man, I see well, never learned the rule that almost every boy can: that to the verity of a disjunctive, it sufficeth any one part to be true. Let him now learn it, therefore . . . and then shall he perceive that my words include no farther but that I say that I knew seven which, among them all, thought some one of those three things—that is to wit, either some of them some one, and some of them some other, or else all seven some one of those three things; that is to wit, *either* right *or* reasonable *or* profitable, without any determination which of the three. And neither includeth those words of mine that I say all seven thought it right, nor that all seven thought it reasonable; no, nor yet that all seven thought it profitable. But it hanteth not upon his
determination, but upon mine own declaration, which of these three things which of those same seven thought or which one of the three they all thought; and never one of those three things is determinately included to any one of the seven. For if I would say that I never knew in all my life any man above the number of seven that had been either at El-Kahirah or at Salem or at Bizance—do these words include that I say that I have known seven that have been at Salem? That am I sure they do not. But I may well stand by those words if I said after, that I have known seven persons that have been all seen at Bizance… but as for El-Kahirah or Salem, I never knew any one that had been at any one of them both.

And in like wise will I well stand by mine other words and verify them with a good excluding of this man’s including. For I say, and very truth it is, that I never found any nobleman above the number of seven that without lawful cause to take away possessions from the clergy thought it either right or reasonable or that it could be for the realm profitable. I found not, I say, above seven that thought any one of all these three—is not this true but if I found seven that thought all three? Yes, forsooth, true enough though I never found any one that ever thought any two of the three. And now, therefore, though I never found any nobleman so unrighteous, or so unreasonable, as to think it right or reasonable without lawful cause to take away any possessions from the clergy: yet have I found seven that have thought, if right and reason would bear it, they could tell how that as for worldly policy, some of the possessions taken away might be to the realm profitable. And some one hath thought that it would be peradventure profitable to the realm that the lords had the lands whose ancestors had mortised them. And peradventure he that so thought should not have lost a groat by it. And some other hath thought that it would be more profitable to put it into hospitals of some certain new-fashioned foundation, and thereof neither make priests the

1 declaration: clarification  3 never: not a  4 determinately: definitely  
6, 11 El-Kahirah: Cairo  20 is . . . if: is this not true unless  27 bear: support  
28 policy: expediency // some . . . away: the taking away of some of the possessions  
30–31 the lords . . . ancestors: the lands should be had by the lords whose ancestors  
31 mortised: given them to the Church as perpetual, inalienable possessions  
33 groat: a coin roughly equivalent to a nickel
masters nor no laymen neither, but some good sad, honest, virtuous widows that would be tendable and tender to sick folk, and that should yearly yield an account unto the ordinary. And some others have thought it better to divide and cant it among good poor husbandmen that should till the ground their own hands, and take the land for their labor; with divers other devices more, every man after his own mind. And what harm was there now in any of all their minds, that this good, wise man would have my words seem so heinous upon a sentence that himself includeth in them… and which sentence of his, reason excludeth from them… and in which, as you plainly see proved, this man wot ne’er what he meaneth. And to the intent that he should well know that the matter is nothing fearful, therefore wrote I that three were dead—because he should well wit that there were yet the more part alive. And therefore, if the good man think any great, heinous offense in the matter—let him come to me himself, and I shall bring him to some of them, that shall not make it strange to say again the same to himself; and then he may use it at his pleasure, as his high wisdom shall think convenient.

Then saith he farther, in the second side of the 18th leaf, that he cannot tell what cause I would think a cause reasonable to take any possessions from the Church. But yet—since it is implied in my words that some cause lawful and reasonable there may be—he thinketh, he saith, that peradventure if I “were asked the question therein by them that have the authority to do it,” I “would show what” I “meant thereby.” There shall in good faith need no great, solemn examination of me by men of authority for that matter. For I will not stick to tell it unto himself… but have told it already to him, and every man else that list to read it, a good while ago in my book of the Supplication of Souls; and there may this good man go seek it if it please him, and then use it as it like him.

But finally, after his heart somewhat eased, he cometh to himself again and endeth the chapter very well, wishing the clergy the grace that the apostles had… and declaring that

1 sad: settled; firmly established in condition // honest: chaste 2 tendable: attentive 4 cant: apportion 5 husbandmen: farmers 7 devices: ideas // mind: way of thinking
10 sentence: meaning 12 wot ne’er: has no idea 14 because: so that 15 more part: majority; greater number 18 make it strange: be reluctant
29 stick: hesitate 30 list: cares
he “never desired” them the apostles’ poverty nor would them no less than they have… and exhorting “them that have abundance of possessions to be well wary” so to use it as it be not a let of the devotion “that they should have to God” and the charity that they should show to their neighbor. In these three things he saith, as methinketh, very specially well. And I pray you heartily, good readers, every man the rather at my poor request, whatsoever he wrote before, think now that he meant then but thus.

The Seventh Chapter

His seventh chapter beginneth in the 19th leaf, and therein, upon a six leaves… he argueth against a little doubt that I moved upon the beginning of his first chapter of his Division; which words of his and mine thereupon begin in mine Apology, folio 101. And the same point is touched again there, folio 106. When you have read there what I say, then may you read here his answer, wherein he declareth the matter, and argueth it by cases of law, much after the manner of a mootable case—full well-favouredly, in good faith—and with long labor proveth at last that it must be taken in such wise as he seeth that among other constructions I construed his mind myself… though I was loath to do so, because that way was the worst for himself. But now he remedieth that with a line or twain wherein he declareth that he meant not to prefer every secular priest before those that are in religion. Wherein I would have trusted him as well upon his word as upon the reason that he layeth for it now—which, save for the trust that I have to his word, I would ween he never thought on when he wrote the Division… but rather ended the clause in such wise as it happed; without any respect, peradventure, to the increase and growing of the sentence in the end.

I was once half in mind here to have kept schools with him yet in this point once again, even all of pleasure… and to have

1–2 would them no less: i.e., wanted them to have any less
3 well wary: very careful        3–4 a let of: a hindrance to        6 saith: speaks
6 pray: beseech 7 the rather: the more 12 upon a: on some
12 doubt: problem 13 moved: brought up // upon: concerning
18–19 a mootable case: a hypothetical case debated, as an exercise, by law students
19 full well-favouredly: quite nicely        21 constructions: interpretations
25 religion: i.e., religious orders        26 reason: argument        27 layeth: presents
27 to: regarding        29 clause: passage; section        30 respect: consideration
30–31 to . . . sentence: of what the meaning would add up and amount to
32 kept schools: engaged in academic disputations
33 even all of pleasure: all just for fun
brought it yet again in question whether the circumstances of his words were able to prove that he meant otherwise than he now argueth that it must needs be taken. And then if the circumstances so did, whether common usage and acceptance of a word should against the circumstances of the matter have like strength in all other things as it hath in matters of law; and whether the reasons used in the courts in matters of law be of like strength in every other thing as they be when they be made in matters of law… and of like vigor and force in every place abroad as they be in the courts in which they have been long received and accepted for sure and stable grounds.

And whether in this point between him and me—being no matter of the law nor pertaining to the judgment of any court, but to be considered by the whole people in every man’s reason at large—the cases of the law of this realm that he bringeth in, which be judged and sure and should serve the one party in the law though the matter were the weight of a thousand pounds, should because we be Englishmen, and our matter written in England and in English words, stand for a sure and an insoluble argument though the laws both civil and canon that are called the common laws of all Christendom besides us were, as peradventure they be in the selfsame cases, fully and wholly to the contrary.

And yet would I besides this a little have assayed so to shake his cases of London and Michaelmas that peradventure to many a man in London between this and Michaelmas should they never have seemed like unto our matter, by that time that I had once declared them the difference.

These points, and haply more too, was I when I read his answer half minded, as I say, to have brought in and disputed with him upon this matter. For I was waxen with the reading of his answer very merry, and waxen, methought, a young man again… and seemed set at a vacation moot with him in some Inn of the Chancery, because of his common intendment, and his proper cases of law.

5 against: with regard to    7 reasons: arguments
10 abroad: out there; i.e., outside of the courts    21 insoluble: irrefutable
21 though: even if    25 assayed: tried; attempted    29 declared: showed
34 moot: debate of a hypothetical case, engaged in by law students for practice
35 common intendment: (rule) of common understanding
But then I considered that as I was in the reading of his answer merry—so was himself, I saw well, in the writing weary; and other readers, that were no lawyers, would in the reading wax almost as weary. Then saw I also that when himself had all said, he liked not his own all the best... but after all his pain taken in the answering, seeing that his answer liked him not, he was fain to fall to another way, and telleth me that there needeth none answer to that point at all, because that there is no fruit, he saith, in that objection.

Now, therefore, if the objection be fruitless, and therefore the answer needless, and verily fruitless too: now to reply thereto were labor half lost and more. And therefore, good readers—forasmuch as to the answer made by the manner, no law putteth us further to reply—the matter is at a demurrer in this point, and we at your judgment, wherein ye may use your wisdom and judge it even as you find it. Wherein the best that he can ask is but to be dismissed, and judged that he meant not to prefer the state of chantry priests before the state of religious priests... but meant as he now declareth his mind (which very few folk could before, as I suppose, have guessed)—that the variance between priests and priests, that is to wit, between secular priests and secular priests, is more to be lamented than between other priests and religious, or between religious and religious, because the variance between priests and priests is more marked and more notable than any of the others, because the secular priests go more abroad.

Now, if this exposition of his mind may serve to acquit him now (which I am content it do)—it is all, I promise you, that it may do. For it will never serve him to recover damages. For he can never blame no man that perceived not that before, that is scant credible yet.

But yet, because he so much inculcateth the lack of fruit in many of mine objections, and that they be no matters of no moral virtue—I will not answer him with the like... and say that in many of his pretended causes of division is no fruit at
all, nor no moral virtue neither... as in procuring the people to believe untruly that the prelates handle men uncharitably, and for heresies vex them wrongfully, and give occasion that some perish both in body and soul... which if the ordinaries had handled them charitably, had been in both twain saved... and that it will be very hard to find so much as any one spiritual man such as himself deviseth and adviseth that none but such should be suffered to be judge in heresy; and laboring also the good laws of this realm and of all Christendom to be changed, to the ease of heretics, that have been made for the repressing of heresies; with such other things like (that are in his book of Division), more than I ever wrote word of yet, in which (as I have often said), forasmuch as I see that he professeth himself to hate and abhor these heresies that these folk now hold whom Saint Paul calleth heretics (I dare not now for him, but when I forget myself, call them by none other name), I would with good will that men should think he meant no hurt. But in the words of the writing, taken after the “common usage and acceptance” of speaking, as he will in this his seventh chapter have me take them, there is neither moral virtue nor fruit, but full unfruitful vice.

But as I said, I will not in defense of mine answer him with faults of his. For mine were never the better though his be naught too. But I say that mine objections in mine Apology be not fruitless, because they defend the truth and make good folk perceive both what harm it were to believe such evil lies, and what damage it were to put away such good laws... and how unreasonable it were in other men’s faults to take small things for very heinous and great... or for them that in a fellowship are faulty, not to bear displeasure only to their persons, but to be at division in general with the whole company. And this fruit is there also: that though that book say the contrary, strangers such as are here and can read English, which are not, ye wot well, a few, may yet perceive by plain proofs in mine Apology that not only there is no such great general causes of division as the book of Division saith that there is, but also that there is no such great general division
through the realm indeed. These fruits are there in many
of mine objections against his book in mine Apology.

Now, whereas some of mine objections peradventure lay but
either lack of learning in him or lack of natural wit: since
his name is not at his book, but he speaketh himself unknown,
this profit is there in such objections—that without his
rebuke or shame, the readers may by those faults perceive that
the writer was not of any such special qualities as the book
wherein so much evil was contained should be much leaned unto
for credence and authority of the man.

Finally, the very self objection whereof he speakeoth in that
seventh chapter of his in his new book, and saith there is no
profit in that objection, and that therefore it needed none answer…
but he might grant me all that ever I say therein, and
yet none effectual matter were there for all that: thereto I say
that look, whoso list, what I say therein, and he shall find that
if this man grant all that, he shall grant in himself much more
oversight, and much more lack of learning, too, than were requisite
in him that would put out books abroad; and therefore
his writing the less to be regarded while his person is
unknown… whereas if his person were known, he might be
peradventure perceived, for all that, for such a special man
beside, that his approved wisdom and learning, well known
otherwise, might for the estimation of his book more than counterpoise
some such oversights as at a time might haply to
escape a right wise man that would write by candlelight while he
were half asleep.

But then I say further yet… that in that objection was a matter
of no little effect. For, taking that he meant as himself saith he
did, his words seemed plainly to show that he reckoned the
state of chantry priests to be a state of more perfection than
the state of religious priests. And therefore the objection contained
matter of great effect, and which he much needed to
answer and to declare that he meant not so… but that he meant as
he now declareth: that division is between secular priests
more lamentable than between religious, because the secular
priests be more abroad, and thereby their variance more
known. Which exposition few men, I ween, would have thought upon before. But now that he saith he meant so—I am very well content therewith, and would that all folk should take it so too; and yet is it, ye wot well, but very winter ware, and an excuse as cold as a key.

The Eighth Chapter

His eighth chapter beginneth in the second side of his 25th leaf, and pretendeth to answer my words written against his, in the nineteenth chapter of mine Apology, which beginneth folio 116. And now he saith that I say there that I wot not well what he meaneth in that he saith that the spirituality call the worldly honor of the Church and of spiritual persons the honor of God. And therefore he saith here that he will, and so doth, declare therein what he there meant thereby.

But here is now the craft. Whereas I did there show what I thought he meant thereby, and therefore made answer to those things that I thought he there meant: now—the matter being changed here, by his new declaration—he bringeth in mine answers made there, and confuteth them for insufficient now, when his new declaration hath made a change in the matter; as though I had then meant to answer this that I was not then aware that he would now say, nor, I ween, himself neither.

But read first, good readers, the nineteenth chapter of mine Apology, beginning folio 116, and there shall you see those words of his sufficiently answered, for the thing that methought he meant. And then, after that done, consider his answer here… in which, for all his holy piece of a sermon, what doth he tell me? He telleth me that honor is “only due to virtue,” and that no man may “covet honor without offense… except it be to the honor of God”; and that “inordinate appetite of honor is deadly sin”; and that “if a spiritual man would accept honor by reason of any spiritual dignity,” and that “God were thereby dishonored,” then that honor were “not to be called honor but dishonor”—and that “yet some laymen say” that spiritual men “call it an honor to God.”
All this whole tale, for all this holy sermon, is yet to the matter, in maintenance of his former words which he would here seem to defend, utterly told in vain. For first, in all this tale he telleth us not well what he calleth worldly honor which he saith the spiritualty calleth the honor of God, and which was the thing that I said I wist ne’er what honor he meant. For where he would seem to declare it—there is his declaration both very bare and yet against him, too. For in the second side of the 26th leaf, he dribbleth in a word of spiritual dignity… and thus he saith:

Then I mean further, that if any spiritual man would accept a worldly honor by reason of any spiritual dignity, and God were thereby dishonored, as it may be by many circumstances, as if for such worldly honor charity be in any manner broken or denied, justice delayed, any of the seven sacraments not duly administered—or the people not diligently and plainly instructed—that then it is not to be called honor to God, but rather dishonor; and that yet, some laymen say, they call it an honor to God. And surely the truth is that many laymen say that for the maintenance of such worldly honor, spiritual men both religious and secular be negligent sometimes in such things as be before rehearsed, and that yet they call such worldly honor the honor of God.

Here he hath told us that if any spiritual man would “accept” a “worldly” honor “by reason of any spiritual dignity,” whereby God were dishonored, that honor were not honor. But yet he telleth us not what manner of “worldly” honor it is that he meaneth to be accepted “by reason of a spiritual dignity”… nor yet what manner thing such worldly honor is; nor, touching that spiritual dignity, he telleth not whether he mean a desire in any man to attain any spiritual dignity for some kind of worldly honor he thinketh should follow thereon, or else some worldly honor by reason of any spiritual dignity that the man hath already.

I let pass his cold and unsavory told tale of charity “denied,” and justice “delayed,” and some of the seven sacraments “not duly administered,” for “maintenance” of such “worldly” honor as some
spiritual men, both secular and religious, by reason of
spiritual dignities “accept,” as “some laymen” say. A poor tale
and a cold, by my faith, to be told for a cause of a heinous
universal division. For this were an endless division, if every
such fault of some should upon every “some say” be laid
for a cause of division against the general body.

And yet besides all this, I say that his first words are
nothing maintained with all this matter. For his first words
spoke of a consent and agreement wherein secular priests and
religious, for all the variance between themselves for other
things, yet agree together about the maintenance of that
worldly honor that they call the honor of God. And here he
speaketh but of another matter: that is to wit, that for the maintenance
of worldly honor spiritual men both religious and
secular be negligent sometimes, and in some manner break or
deny charity, delay justice, and do not duly administer some of
the seven sacraments, nor diligently and plainly instruct the
people.

All this tale, as you see, toucheth the private faults of some: such
as for the maintenance of that worldly honor which they call
God’s honor thus misuse themselves. But this tale is
nothing sib to his other tale that he told and I touched
before. For that spoke of such agreement all in one—that is to wit,
a holding together which signifieth a maintaining each
of other against other men—in maintenance of that worldly
honor that they call the honor of God, in like wise as for
matters of their own they be one against another among themselves.

And thus you see plainly, good readers, that this manner of maintaining
of his former words is a clean going from them,
and a leaving of them unmaintained… and (because he cometh
upon me before, in another place, with cases of law) were in the
law a very plain departure, and should in any of the King’s
courts, if I demurred upon it, utterly mar all his matter.

And so it appeareth that some other “some” have said this unto
him since, to gloss his first words with. And yet I marvel

3 heinous: grievous
8 nothing . . . matter: not at all upheld by all this stuff
10 variance . . . for: disagreement . . . about
11, 13, etc. maintenance: upholding
15 negligent: remiss // break; sin against
21 misuse: misconduct
22 sib: similar
23 touched: discussed
30 clean going: complete departure
34 demurred upon it: entered an objection // mar all his matter: destroy his whole case
36 gloss: put a spin on
that he could think their saying worth the rehearsing again. For who can believe that any spiritual man would be so mad as to call worldly honor used to God’s dishonor the honor of God! I can scant believe that any layman would so tell him; at the leastwise not with that addition that he now putteth new thereto.

But, now, if it so be that, on the other side, all spiritual men would with one voice together call the honor of God that worldly honor that worldly folk do to the Church and unto spiritual persons for the devotion that good laymen bear to God and unto spiritual persons for God’s sake, by reason of their Holy Orders and honorable rooms that they bear in Christ’s church; though some of them, as this man saith, sometimes do not their duty therein, but leave some part of their duties toward God’s honor undone therefor: yet, for the devotion of the temporal persons that for God’s honor do it, they may all well call it God’s honor indeed. And therefore is this good man in that point fully answered, as solemn a matter as he made thereof.

But now, concerning his former words—of the agreement of all spiritual folk together in the maintenance of their worldly honor, for all their private displeasures and dissensions in other things among themselves—with which he cometh in after here again, and referreth him to the “common opinion of much part of the people both spiritual and temporal”: whether laymen so say or not, I say that though all men so said, yet is no man at division with them therefor. For there is no cause wherefore any man should. For it is none unreasonable thing that since those things which this man speaketh of—that is to wit, those spiritual dignities to which he saith such worldly honor appertaineth—are lawfully their own, each of them should in all lawful ways, and such as are by no law prohibited, help and assist other to keep them, though there be for private matters of their own, variance and suit between them. And this may they with better conscience do each for other than each of them for themself. For in this,
that they do for other, is there not the sin of ambition that
this man here speaketh of. And this is the part not only of
spiritual men, religious and secular both, but of every good
temporal man too; and not only to do so for them, but every
man also for other. And therefore what reason had those same
“some” that so told this man (if there were any some such indeed)
to take this thing for any cause of division? Or why did
not he so rather tell them than put their fond tale in his
book?

But then one pretty piece he hath of two parts, by which he
weeneth that the spiritualty can in no wise escape but that they
must needs be betrapped in the one. For when he hath said
that the people say that spiritual men be sometimes negligent
in keeping or granting charity, or in speedy doing of
justice or in duly administering some of the seven sacraments,
or in plain and diligent instructing of the people—then with a
proper piece of two parts thus he conclueth the matter:

And if it be not so as the people say: then are the spiritual rulers
bound to help the people out of that judgment, or else they be not
without offense themselves. And on the other side, if it be as the
people say: then are spiritual men bound to reform it.

As for this two-handed sword, some young, lusty friar would
boldly beat off with a two-handed staff, and tell this man
again that if “the people,” as he putteth for the one part, said in
such things not true: then seeth he not, nor no man else neither,
what the spiritual rulers could do to put them out of
that judgment but tell them, “Nolite iudicare et non iudicabimini”;
and so will that side of the sword do this man little
service. And then on the other side, if the people in these
things say true, as it is well likely they do: then true it is
that the spiritual men be bound to reform it. But then is it
as true again that the thing being but such as this man
rehearseth—that is to wit, negligence but in some, in doing of
some part of their duty, and that also but sometimes—is no

1 ambition: inordinate seeking of distinction  8 fond: idiotic  10 pretty: ingenious
12 the one: either the one or the other  17 proper: fine  20 offense: fault
22 two-handed: very large, and two-edged  // lusty: vigorous
23 beat off: i.e., beat it off  24 again: in reply
cause of division to set the whole temporality against them all; and that side of the sword the friar would with this end of his staff beat hard unto this man’s own head.

Now goeth this man farther, folio 27, and showeth that mine answer to his words which you read in the nineteenth chapter of mine *Apology* be “very dark,” by the reason that I use therein so often this word “some say,” which is, he saith, done after a railing fashion. But as you know well, good readers, I have taken that word “some say” of his book, in which I read it so often… that it falleth sometimes into my pen ere I be aware.

And as for the railing fashion, if I durst be bold to tell so sad a man a merry tale, I would tell him of the friar that, as he was preaching in the country, spied a poor wife of the parish whispering with her pewfellow; and he, falling angry therewith, cried out unto her aloud, “Hold thy babble, I bid thee, thou wife in the red hood!” Which when the housewife heard, she waxed as angry again… and suddenly she started up and cried out unto the friar again, that all the church rang thereon: “Marry, sir, I beshrew his heart that babbleth most, of us both! For I do but whisper a word with my neighbor here, and thou hast babbled there all this hour!” And surely, good readers, save for letting of the word of God in this good man’s sermon—I durst well in the same word, “some say,” beshrew him, and beshrew him again, that most hath railed therewith, of this good man or me. For read my words there when ye will, and you shall find that I with that word do but in a manner play with him. But by Saint Mary, he, how well soever he meant, his words with his many “some say”s bring good men in slander and obloquy of the people, and peradventure in peril, too, with untrue, surmised tales of mishandling folk for heresy… and all colored under “some say”s to make the lies seem somewhat likely. Such shrewd “some say”s, lo, be no merry sporting, but be sad and earnest rude railings indeed.

Then he toucheth mine answer made in the said chapter of mine *Apology*, and doubly confuteth it—that I say that he hath heard some laymen say the contrary. For first he saith he

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3 unto: on 4 showeth: says 6 dark: obscure 7, 23, 26 word: expression
9 of: from 12, 33 sad: serious 12 merry tale: funny story
17 waxed . . . again: got as angry in return // started: jumped
17–18 cried . . . again: shouted back to the friar
18 that . . . thereon: so loudly that the whole church reverberated with the sound thereof
18 marry: indeed 19, 23 beshrew: accuse 21 all this: this whole
21–22 letting . . . God: i.e., the insertions of Scripture 22 durst well: would well dare
22 in the: with regard to the 28, 29 in: into
28–29 slander and obloquy of: discredit and ill repute with 30 surmised: trumped-up
32 likely: plausible // shrewd: devious // sporting: poking of fun
34 toucheth: brings up
never heard layman say to him the contrary... but that all the spiritual men, religious and secular, hold together in the maintenance of the worldly honor that they call the honor of God, and of the riches of spiritual men.

Now, you wot well I speak, in the said nineteenth chapter, that of the spiritualty such as are fallen from the faith unto heresy hold not at all with that honor that I thought he there had meant—that is to wit, with building and garnishing of churches—but be both against that and tithes, and offerings, and obits and trentals, and purgatory and Mass and all. And I had went, in good faith, that of so great a thing, and so much spoken of, it had happed him to hear some laymen speak; but he saith nay. Well, we can no farther, then, but stand unto his word, and take an oath of his honesty therein; and yet I ween, as honest as he is, whatsoever he be, his own honest friend... will be loath to swear with him therein.

But then saith he farther, that though it were so—that would not yet answer his saying. It would not, to say the sooth, in very deed, taking his word as I ween he meant it. But taking his word to the worst (as he taketh always mine) and yet but even as he wrote it (but if it be printed false), it is a confutation to it. For if those spiritual persons, both religious and seculars, that are fallen from the faith to heresies hold not with the remnant—then, pardie, though they were fewer than they be, it is not all true that he saith: that in the maintenance of such honor they hold together all. And yet, as I have already showed you, it would not help his part of a penny though they did every one—seculars and religious, Catholics and heretics too. And therefore can he not say but he is in this point answered, even to the very full.

Then, in the 28th and 29th leaf, he subtly findeth a fault that I say that there are some such of the spiritualty so fallen unto heresies that it is pity that ever they were thereof; because, he saith, we should not despair of them... but they may repent and amend. And also though they do never amend—yet I should not say so. For men may not say by the devil that "it is
pity that ever he was created,” because God’s justice is showed on him. We will in this matter keep no long schools. But this every man knoweth: that whoso use a common word spoken among the people is reckoned so to mean therein as the common people mean that use it. And therefore, since the people that so speaketh meaneth not to speak against amendment, but against the present wretched state that the man standeth in at the time: that word may by God’s grace be borne meetly well enough. And as touching the devil, though men may not grudge against God’s just punishment—yet peradventure a man might say without peril of damnation that it was pity that he so misused himself; as in them that are for their heinous offenses put unto painful death, though we say they were served as they well deserved, yet we let not to say it was pity that they guided themselves no better. And Saint Chrysostom pitieth also the devil. And our Savior himself pitied Jerusalem, and for the pity wept also thereon, for the punishment that should fall thereon; and yet was it the just punishment of God.

And though the parties afterward may amend and do good again: yet for the time till they amend—yes, and after, too—we may pity that they were in such case as to hurt them whom they have already remediless destroyed, by their false doctrine dead in the damnable heresies that they learned of them, and lie therefore buried in hell. And therefore the thing that I may not absolutely pity: yet in some respects I may.

Finally, he saith that I should not call any heretics desperate wretches. This is a sore point, I assure you: to call a wretch such as he showeth himself to be—to call him desperate whose living showeth no manner hope of amendment. Saint Cyprian, I see well, was sore overseen, which in the seventh epistle of his first book, for less things than these are, calleth some folk desperate. And yet was Saint Polycarp farther overseen, which calleth Marcion the first-begotten son of the devil. This man hath here, as he weeneth, found out proper fantasies, wherein I had liefer leave him in the liking than lose much time in answering of such blunt subtle trifles.
But to the matter, good readers, concerning the former words of his *Division*, albeit that I have here more than fully confuted this chapter of his, for any defense that he hath for his said former words, whereabout is all our matter: read yet the eighteenth chapter of mine *Apology*, wherein you shall see divers other like words of his; and apply me mine answer there to those other words of his which he defendeth here; and ye shall see that he shall have more work than enough to defend them well, and to make them serve him to purpose.

**The Ninth Chapter**

His ninth chapter beginneth in the 30th leaf. And his former words which he therewith defendeth, and mine answer also thereto, ye shall see in the nineteenth chapter of mine *Apology*, folio 119. Which when you have, good readers, there once read over… then forthwith, while it is fresh in remembrance… return again unto this, the ninth chapter of his *Dialogue*… and then judge whether it anything touch the point or not. For all this chapter is spent in preaching of restitution, full well and full truly, forsooth… and which in my poor mind I very well allow… and would have allowed in like wise his first book very well, if there had been no worse words in it than such. But now the matter standeth all in this: that this man maketh there as though the spirituality were very busy to procure men—and to “induce the people”—“to give money to trentals, to found chantries and obits, and to obtain pardons, and to go upon pilgrimages,” leaving their debts unpaid, and restitution unmade, which things should be done first; and that this is the manner of the “multitude” of the spirituality. In this standeth the question. And therefore is now the point, not whether debts be first to be paid, and satisfaction of wrongs first to be made, before all these other things, wherein this man saith here surely full well; but whether (as he would have it seem by his book of *Division*) that the multitude of the spirituality (that is to wit, either all save a few, or at the leastwise far the most part) do solicit and labor lay people to the contrary manner:

6 *divers*: several // *like words*: similar statements // *me*: i.e., for me
19 *of*: about // 19, 20 *full*: quite // 20 *truly*: correctly // 21 *allow(ed)*: commend(ed)
22 *worse*: less good // 24 *procure*: entice; get
26 *chantries*: chapels endowed for the daily singing of Masses for certain souls
26 *pardons*: indulgences
35–36 *for the most part*: the vast majority
36 *labor*: urge; try to push
that is to wit, to do those other things *rather* than to pay their debts or make restitution of their wrongs. This is, I say, the point. And of this point, wherein all the matter standeth, this man, in this ninth chapter of his, speaketh not one word. And therefore in this thing standeth mine answer made in the said twentieth chapter of mine *Apology* clean and clear untouched, as every man may perceive that readeth it. And therefore where, in the second side of his 32nd leaf, this man saith thus—

And to the intent I would have this matter the better looked upon, I would here advertise Sir Thomas More, not by way of argument, but for clearness of conscience, to consider whether is the more charitable way first to make restitution and pay debts, and relieve extreme poverty, and then to do the other, if he have to do both; or else to do the first and let the other pass . . .

—for this his good advertisement I very heartily thank him... and answer him as himself would wish I should: that surely methinketh as he doth, that the more charitable way of the twain were that that himself here moveth.

But then, lo, by and by, he giveth me another good lesson, wherewith he would I should amend mine own fault that he would it should seem I had in mine *Apology* made against him. For then, lo, thus goeth he further forth:

And if he think that this way that I move be the more charitable way, that then he help it forward, rather than the other... and then not to blame any man that maketh that motion, as though he were against trentals, obits, and such other. For he is not against them directly... but only intendeth to have them changed into a more charitable order. For though prayers be right expedient and healthful to the soul—yet they serve not in all cases as to discharge debts or restitutions, where there is enough to pay them with; no more than there can be found any one salve that can heal all manner of sores.

I neither have done, that I wot of, nor willingly intend to do, blame him for any part of this charitable motion... but think his motion right good, and that the fruit thereof, if it be followed, will be more yet than himself saith he mindeth. For

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6 clean and clear: completely and absolutely  //  untouched: unimpugned
10, 15 advertise(ment): admonish(ment)  //  have: i.e., has the means
18, 23 move(ths): propose(s)  //  by and by: right away  //  fault: transgression
21 would it should seem: would have it seem (that)  //  forward: go forward
25, 34 blame: rebuke; chide  //  directly: per se; as such
27 only intendeth: is only endeavoring  //  right expedient: very advantageous
31 all manner: every kind  //  willingly: deliberately  //  motion: proposal
35 fruit: benefit; profit  //  mindeth: has in mind; is aiming at
he saith, as you see, that he mindeth but to change obits and
trentals and those other things into “a more charitable order”—
that is to wit, into paying of debts and recompensing of
wrongs, in them that have not of their own besides; and in
them that have, then to pay the debts and recompense wrongs
first and do the other after. But methinketh there will come
yet a further profit of this order, too. For whereas here we speak
but of him that payeth his debt and recompenseth his wrongs—of
which folk many a man is able well to do the other when both
those twain be done—there is the other sort of men also,
besides, to whom those wrongs are done, and those debts
owing, of which sort there be many that if their wrongs
were once recompensed them, and their debts paid them, were
able and would do those other things also themselves, which
now, for lack, be not able; and so should there of likelihood be the
self things that bring (as his first book saith) richesse into the
Church, by this good order increased. And therefore not only
have I no cause to blame this good man for the motion of this
good “charitable” order… but also no more have the multitude
of the priests, which might of likelihood win as much by
this way as by the other, and more, except the multitude of
priests would, for the readiness to take it where it is already, move
them that have it to do these other things first and leave their
debts unpaid and their wrongs unrecompensed—which that the
multitude of priests do, I never heard yet any honest layman
that would for very shame say. For I think it were hard to
meet with a priest that were so wretched but that if he were asked
in that point his advice and counsel, he would in so plain a point,
though it were but for very shame, well and plainly counsel the
truth. And if percase there were some found so shameless
that they would give counsel contrary—yet am I very sure they
should be far the fewer part… and not, as this good man’s
first book saith, the more part and the “multitude.”

And therefore, since this order that this good man here moveth
is so good and so charitable—I never blamed him for the motion.
But though this motion in this book be good—I might well,
and so I did, blame his other book… not for this motion, but for another matter, that is because it labored under pretext of an untrue report to bring the spirituality in slander and obloquy among the temporalty by making men ween that of this charitable order which he now moveth, the multitude of the spirituality induced men to the contrary.

This is, lo, the thing that I blamed. And therefore, like as this good man saith that one plaster cannot heal all sores—so surely this same salve of this good, charitable motion cannot serve this good, charitable man to salve and heal well this uncharitable sore.

In this motion, of this charitable order, this good man waxeth so warm that of a good zeal he falleth in remembrance of the soul (which our Lord pardon) of the most noble prince of very famous memory King Henry VII, father to the most excellent prince our sovereign lord the king that now is; wherein, after mention made of obits and chantries letting the due examination requisite for restitution, suddenly thus he saith:

Howbeit, the right noble prince of blessed memory King Henry VII, father of our sovereign lord the king that now is, willed restitutions to be made. But how his will was performed I cannot tell. Howbeit, whatsoever was done therein, I suppose his good intent sufficeth to him.

What if this good man cannot tell? By likelihood there is nothing owing to him thereof. For if there were—then were it likely that he could tell. For he could tell then that all the will were not performed. I have heard, I wot well, that the king our sovereign lord delivered great substance into the executors’ hands to fulfill the will with. Which how they have bestowed, this good man may, if he have the authority, call them to the reckoning. And if he neither have authority to call for the account nor have nothing owing to him neither—the matter then toucheth not him so near, nor so specially pertaineth unto him, that he should greatly need to give all the
world warning thus, that himself is not made of counsel
how the King’s will is performed.

But here will this good man say that I do but mock him; wherein
I will not greatly stick with him. But surely, for my poor wit,
methinketh it somewhat more civility, in some such points as
this is, a little merrily to mock him than with odious earnest
arguments seriously to press upon him. Which I would
also be very loath to do for charging of mine own conscience.
And therefore in all things that methink are of great weight,
though I touch his words, I accuse not his own mind and
intent. For in good faith, I have of the man good trust that he
meaneth no worse, but would all thing were well himself; but
evermore my mind giveth me that some wily shrews abuse the
good man’s simplicity.

The Tenth Chapter

His tenth chapter beginneth in the 33rd leaf, wherein he
toucheth certain words of mine written in the twenty-seventh chapter
of mine Apology, that beginneth folio 162, wherein he varieth
not much with me, saving in that I say that if the prelates of the
Church would withdraw from their worldly countenance, as is
keeping of honest laymen in their service, and keeping of a
good, worshipful table, and would bestow their plate and the most
part of all their movables at once upon poor folk, and yearly
after, the most of their yearly revenues too—of which mind I
said I durst warrant well that some prelates be, if that would,
as I say there, amend all these grudges—that I durst be
bold to warrant as well also that if the prelates so did, “the
selfsame folk that now grudge and call them proud for their
countenance would then find as great a grudge, and call them
hypocrites for, their alms, and would say that they spend
upon naughty beggars the good that was wont to keep good
yeomen, and that thereby they both enfeeble and also dishonor
the realm.”

Upon these words of mine this good man maketh me, forsooth,
a full goodly sermon, in the 35th leaf of his book… where he beginneth it with these words “I cannot see.” And verily, if he had there left and gone no further, it had been well enough. For as for the thing that he speaketh of, it appeareth by his words he cannot see very well indeed.

Because Christ commandeth in the Gospel that we shall not judge… and that Saint Paul saith also, “Who art thou that judgest another man’s servant?”… and again biddeth us that we “judge not before the time”—all which places are understood of judging certain and determinate persons to do evil in the things that we see them do, where the things be but indifferent of themselves and may be done not evilly only but well also—this good man therefore layeth these texts to touch me for judging that some folk whom I neither assign by name nor as yet know not who they be will do evil hereafter by misjudging other men.

I ween verily that Saint Paul himself, at the time when he forbade us to judge before the time, did even then judge that some would after that misjudge, and judge before the time, too.

And albeit that our Savior saith that whoso call his brother “fool” is guilty to the fire—yet he meant not of him that would say that there were some fools abroad in the world. For if he so meant—then would there not ten fires be pain enough for him that wrote these words in the Scripture: “There are of fools an infinite number.”

And because this good man useth sometimes this figure of examination, “I would wit of Master More this and that,” I would now wit this one thing of this good man. Such faults as he findeth with the spiritualty, written in his book of Division—whether did he then judge that some of the spiritualty would fall in them anymore after, or not? If he judged that all their fantasies toward those faults were already past before, and that none of them would never do more so: then had he little cause to write all that work upon them.

And on the other side, if he judged that some of them would
afterward do some such things again, either but if he gave
them warning or else though he did—as I dare say, whatsoever
himself say, in some of those things he did—then, since
the time in which he judged in his mind, and made himself thereof
sure, that some of them would do some such evil things afterward
as were at the time of the same judgment of his mind
not common, himself fell, as you see, by his own argument, in the
danger of that prohibition that himself bringeth in, by
which Saint Paul forbiddeth, and saith, “Nolite ante tempus
iudicare” (“Judge you not before the time”).

Now, if he say that I tell whom I mean, though not by name,
yet by a sign and a token, in that I say even “the same” will then
call them hypocrites for their alms that now call them
proud for their worldly countenance: he must consider
that I neither tell nor can tell who be they; nor, though I say “the
same,” I say not yet “all the same.” And therefore I no more misjudge
any man determinately and in certain than he that
would say thus, as many men say indeed: “Even they that go
now full fresh in their guarded hose and their gay golden,
riven shirts, and in their silken sleeves, that naught have to
bear it out but gaming, will once, I warrant you, fall from
gaming to stealing, and start straight out of silk into hemp.” Thus
saith and thus judgeth, ye wot well, many a man—and yet
meaneth not that it shall so mishap them all, but that some
shall amend and do better... and that yet his word will be
verified in many; and so doth it prove indeed; and he that so
saith before is far enough from the danger of all those
texts which this good man preacheth to me.

But then he saith further, that he trusteth that those prelates
whom I say I durst warrant to be of such mind “will not
defer their good purpose for no such suspicion that haply
will never come, nor yet for no such uncharitable words
though they were spoken indeed.” And thereupon he descendeth
to the making of acts of Parliament.

If those prelates that I mean of reckoned themselves very sure that
all the wit and the learning that is in the world, or within this
realm either, were either in their own heads or in this good
man’s and mine—which, peradventure, for mine own mind,
could agree well with this good man in this point, and advise
those prelates that I speak of to follow their own mind
therein, and out of hand even so to do—then have I little doubt
but that they would even so do indeed. But some of them have
often been, as I suppose, than once where they have heard both
wise and good folk too—and peradventure yet should hear
again if it were, as this man would have it, spoken of in the
plain, open Parliament—that would not fail to dissuade it, and
lay no little causes why.

But I will not at this time with this good man enter in this
matter into serious, earnest arguments. But I shall show him a
good merry cause wherefore that though I be of his mind
therein, yet I dare not advise them thereto. The cause is that I see
them have so great desire and fervent concupiscence toward it
that I am afeard to counsel them follow it, because of the
Scripture that saith, “Post concupiscentias tuas ne eas” (“After thy
concupiscences go thou not”).

I will make no longer tale upon this matter. For if you read my
twenty-seventh chapter, in which my words are that we now dispute
upon, I trust you shall not think them so very far out of
the way but that they may be written without offense of Christ’s
Gospel well enough.

And also, concerning this word “proud worldly countenance,”
whereof we speak here—vouchsafe, good readers, to
read my thirtieth chapter of mine Apology, which beginneth in
the leaf 174.

The Eleventh Chapter

His eleventh chapter beginneth in the 36th leaf... wherein first
he showeth that I rehearse right and construe amiss this word of
his “And therefore.”

You shall find my words, good readers, upon these whole
words that he rehearseth here, in the thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth chapters of mine Apology; of which the one beginneth folio 183, and the other beginneth folio 184.

Here this man declareth that the words of his book, which here also he well and truly rehearseth, do not import that himself saith the thing which I by those words (and among others, by this word “therefore”) affirm there that he saith, as of himself; but he saith that the words prove plainly that he saith it but only of the report of much other folk’s thinking, and not as of his own saying.

Surely neither now nor in any place of mine Apology, I neither have done nor intend to charge this man that his mind and purpose was such in his intent as the great likelihood of his words would give men occasion to think. But, on the other side, that the words have given me good occasion and sufficient to say as I there have said… whoso read the said two chapters of mine Apology shall by the whole circumstance of the matter very well, I suppose, perceive. And you shall, over that, if after those two chapters read, you return to his own declaration here in his eleventh chapter, well perceive also that to cover slyly that oversight of his (for surely I think it was none other), he leaveth out properly in one place this word “therefore” whereupon a good piece of all the matter hangeth. For in the end of the 26th leaf, lo, thus he handleth wilily the matter:

And in that he saith that I say plainly those words myself… he saith plainly against the letter of the said treatise… which is that “they have punished many persons, which much people have judged them to do upon will”; and not that I said so myself.

Now, good readers, in this rehearsal of his own words, he rehearseth his own words wrong. For here he leaveth out, as I told you, the word that maketh the matter. Which he rehearsed himself in the whole context before. For his words were not that “they have punished many persons, which much people have judged

1 words: expressions 4 declareth: explains 5 well and truly: quite accurately
5, 31 rehearseth: quotes 5 import: imply 9 much: many
12 charge this man: make against this man the charge 13 mind: thinking
13 likelihood: indication 19 over: besides 20 declaration: explanation
21 oversight: slip 22 none other: nothing else // properly: specifically
23 piece: amount // all the matter: the whole issue // hangeth: depends
27 letter: literal meaning 29 upon will: arbitrarily; just because they wanted to
33 context: section
them to do upon will,” but that “therefore they have punished many persons, which much people have judged them to do upon will,” etc. Now, when he saith himself that they have punished many “therefore,” that is to wit, for the same cause; and hath before also showed a cause of his own divination too, and hath used the same word “therefore” in the same fashion before; and this word “therefore,” which signifieth “for the same cause,” hath here in his last clause no necessary place to the complement of the sentence following: it appeareth that he saith therein two things—both that they therefore (that is to say, for the same cause next before spoken of, the cause that himself there imagineth) have punished many… and also that (as he saith it so) much people judged the same.

And this shall you the more clearly mark if you turn these words “And therefore they have punished many, which much people,” etc., into these words (whereof the sentence is all one): “And for that cause they have punished many, which much people,” etc.

And therefore—that is to say, for that cause which I before told you (that is to wit, that you should not perceive this point)—this man in his last rehearsal, as you have heard, bringing the thing to the trial, left his “therefore” out. But read my said two chapters… and then as for the sentence of his open words, I trust you shall believe me. As for the secret meaning of his mind, I pray you believe him. For so that you believe not the shrewd words of his book, I would, too, choose you should believe well of the good man himself.

Now, where he saith in the 37th leaf that he thinketh I change his matter because I would be loath to have it “reported that much people take it so”—verily, I change not his matter. But truth it is that I am loath to have that thing so reported about. For truly the report abroad is naught although it were not untrue.

And whereas for the farther maintenance of his matter, he saith that if I make “search therein to know the truth,” I shall

8 place to the complement: role in the completing  9 appeareth: is evident  
10 next: immediately 16, 23 sentence: meaning 16 all one: entirely the same  
21 rehearsal: quoting 22 trial: examination 25 pray you: beseech you to  
25 so: provided // shrewd: wicked 29, 31, 34 matter: text 32 naught: bad  
32 although: even 34 maintenance: support
“find” that “much people” take it so—that many which have been punished for heresy, the spirituallty have done it of no love, but of will, for such evil mind as in the book is there imagined of them—he hath of likelihood himself made search to find it so. For as for me, though I go not about to search that point of purpose—yet I have talked with many one in this meanwhile, and yet, I thank God, it is not my fortune to find out that same “much people” that take it so. And if there were much people that so did, it were their own fault; wherein I cannot devise what the spirituallty might do to change them, but only pray God to amend them. And as for me, if there were much people that so took it, as I trust in God verily there is not—I would, as my duty were, be surely very sorry for them; but in this cause of truth, truly I would not flatter them. For though that sort of people were never so much indeed—yet is the truth in that point so clear against them that if their minds were such, it were both great shame for them to say it and also great sin to think it.

And surely that their saying is false and naught in his own secret judgment… you may see, good readers, by this: that he laboreth so sore to put it from himself and would be so loath to have it taken for his own. And therefore, while himself thought their saying so false, he should not have told it after them. Nor now should he not send me to search and seek them, but to save his own honesty—lest men might think he feigned—he should seek out and bring forth some of those shrewd sayers himself.

Another thing this man toucheth in the same chapter, concerning that second sort of people whom I say, in some places of mine Apology, that this man calleth politiques. And here he declareth that he doth not so… and proveth it by like words spoken of a good man’s mouth by a hypocrite, of whom a man may say, “This man useth himself as he were a virtuous man”… and yet call him not virtuous. And so might this man say that they spoke heresies “as of policy,” and yet call them not politic.
But here must he now consider that whoso speak such words in such fashion by a hypocrite saith it in his dispraise and in detestation of such hypocrisy… and therefore he that so saith showeth that by such words he taketh not that hypocrite for virtuous. And therefore read, good readers, this man’s whole process of his three sorts of people together, which you shall find in the twenty-first chapter of mine Apology, folio 123… and then if you find his words of their speaking such heresies “as of policy” in like manner spoken by him in dispraise of heretics as he putteth here his example of those words spoken by a good man in dispraise of hypocrites… and not spoken by a way of giving them by that word “as of policy” a colorable excuse for defense of sowing their heresy: then am I content that every man take it that I misreport him shamefully. And else, I trust, look in all the places in which I speak thereof, and you shall soon judge that upon his words used to such purpose as he there useth them, I may well use the words of “his politiques” in such wise as I use it.

And as for the tinker and the tiler, that he speaketh of in the end of the chapter, and saith, “God forbid but that they were dismissed and went home about their business, if they can by any reasonable and true allegeance so order themselves that it may appear that they ought to be dismissed of justice”: therein hold I well with him and God-forbid else too… for else might they lose between them, the one the price of his trowel, and the other of his clouted kettle. But look, good readers, in mine Apology, the forty-eighth chapter, which beginneth folio 272… and that done, I doubt not but you shall find for the tiler and the tinker… for heresy there called in of office, this good word so spoken here but a very vain word of office… and that the tinker would have tinked out of his pan’s bottom a reason that would at the leastwise ring a little better than this.

2 by: about 3 detestation: denunciation 6 process: discussion
12 word: expression // colorable: plausible 16 upon: on the basis of
19 tinker: a repairer of pots and kettles // tiler: a person who lays or makes tiles
22 alleging: citation of evidence // order: comport 23 appear: become obvious
24 hold: side 26 clouted: patched 29 of office (usually expressed in the Latin—“ex officio”): by virtue of the very nature of the bishop’s duty 30 good word: pious expression
30 word of office: handy expression 32 reason: argument
The Twelfth Chapter

His twelfth chapter beginneth in the 38th leaf... which because it is a good, sweet sermon and a short, made unto myself, to put me in remembrance how I should bear the like light faults of other men as I sometimes fall in myself—I shall take his chapter in here even whole. Lo, good readers, thus it saith:

Master More, in the 217th leaf of his *Apology*, speaking of defaults that, as he thinketh, should have been laid for causes of this division, conclueth thus: “If there be such a division”—whereby it appeareth that he doubteth whether there be any division or not; for this conjunction “if” purporteth always a doubt. And after, in the same *Apology*, folio 241, he confesseth plainly that there is a division... and maketh no doubt at it—and he calleth it there the “late-sprung division.” And so, in one place to make a doubt whether there be such a division or not... and in another to agree that there is such a division... seemeth to be a variance and contradiction in itself. Howbeit, surely I do not intend to lay that variance to him as for any notable default; for a like thing may soon happen in any man by a light oversight. But the cause why I speak of it is this: to put him in remembrance that he hereafter ought the rather to bear such light defaults of others the more charitably... since he himself hath likewise been overseen. For we be all frail, ignorant, and unstable... though we be esteemed, and taken, as angels in our conversation. And therefore is it said in the First Book of *The Following of Christ*, the sixteenth chapter, that no man is in this world without default, no man without burden, no man sufficient to himself, no man wise enough of himself. Wherefore it behoveth each one of us to bear the burden of other, to comfort other, to help other, to inform other, and to instruct and admonish other in all charity. And if we will note well the said words, we shall the sooner learn this lesson: to do in all things as we would be done to; and to do nothing that we would not have done to us. And that is, as I take it, one of the most sovereign doctrines that is... to instruct a man how he shall in everything concerning his neighbor keep himself in a clear conscience, learn it whoso may.

5 in: into 6 even: quite 7, 21, etc. default(s): fault(s); failing(s) 8, 9, etc. division: discord; dissension 9 appeareth: is made evident 13 late-sprung: recently arisen 16 variance: inconsistency 17 lay: charge 18, 20 light: slight; little 19 oversight: inadvertence 22 overseen: in inadvertent error 23 conversation: behavior 33 that is: i.e., that there is
Lo, good readers, first he bringeth forth mine oversight, in contradiction used between mine own words... and after, with good words and fair, excuseth my fault, by such oversight of frailty as may soon happen in a man. And then he putteth me after in remembrance that I must bear such things the more charitably in other men, since I am overseen likewise myself. He fareth, in all this tale, as though we sat together playing at post. For first he casteth my contradiction as a vie, to wit whether I would give it over with a face. And because that will not be, falleth after to entreaty, and would fain part the stake and divide all such oversights between us. But all this is in vain; for I am as sure of this game, and there lay twenty pounds upon it, as he that hath three aces in his hand.

For look, good readers, in his own first chapter of this book of his, and there shall you see the thing that shall serve me sufficiently showed even by his own words—that there is no such contradiction in mine. And then look mine answer to the same... and then shall you see it yet more clearly. Or else, if any man be loath to turn the leaves and look back—ye shall need to take no business in turning back at all. For he assoileth his argument himself against himself, even in the making thereof, and all with one word unawares.

For now read it again... and you shall see that he saith himself, in the one place I say “If there be any such division.” And so, because this conjunction “if,” he saith, importeth always a doubt—therefore he saith that, folio 217, I doubt whether there be any such division or not. And after, he saith that in the other place I confess that there is a division... and call it there the “late-sprung division.” Lo, now he forgetteth this little, short word, this monosyllable “such,” which he rehearsed first in bringing forth my first place... and then by and by, either of forgetfulness or else of wiliness, leaveth out in his illation that he maketh upon the same words of mine.

Now, good readers, you see well that to say there is a division, and to say there is no such division, be nothing contrary at all. For I did indeed not deny but that some division there
was—that is to wit, some little variance in some place begun, and by some few naughty folk blown forth too far (for a little way is too far in such a thing). But then mean I a division such as it is, not such a division as this man by his book maketh it. I may well without contradiction say to him, “There is a division”... and yet say that there is no such division as he speaketh of. For it is not all one to say there is a division and to say there is such a division.

Now, if I would stick with him upon trifles, I could prove him that “if” doth not always purport a doubt, as he saith that it always doth, but is sometimes used to confirm a certainty. As if a man say, “He that dieth in deadly sin shall go to the devil, if God’s word be true,” doubteth not of the truth of God’s word... but by the truth thereof, meaneth to confirm the damnation of them that die in deadly sin.

But I say not this as though it should be like in mine. For I do not indeed take “if” there in such fashion. And therefore I will not do here by “if” as this man doth by “as,” in his chapter next before, in heresies spoken “as” of policy... using the example of words spoken by a good man in reproaching of hypocrisy, to be like his own words spoken in the diminishing of their blame that under such pretext of policy... would speak, and sow about, plain and open heresy. I need here no such ways for my words. For here have you seen yourselves, by his own words, that there is in my words no contradiction at all.

The Thirteenth Chapter

His thirteenth chapter beginneth in the 39th leaf; and by the rehearsing of divers words of his own in divers other places of his book, here he declareth his mind that he intended not in his book of Division to bring in among the people any hatred against the spirituality.

Now indeed, I do myself declare expressly, in many places of mine Apology, that whatsoever words I speak therein, yet I meant evermore the intent of his book, and not of his person. And

2 naughty: bad 5 maketh it: i.e., makes it out to be 7 all one: one and the same 9 would stick: wanted to bicker 12, 15 deadly: mortal 13 doubteth . . . truth: does not doubt the trueness 18 next: right; immediately 19 in: regarding 19, 22 policy: prudence; i.e., self-protection 29 divers: several 29 words: statements
although that in some places I say “the Pacifier here doth this or that to this evil purpose or that”—yet I mean ever the deed his, the malice of the purpose some other wily shrews’… which, not being fully of so good Catholic mind as I think always this man is himself (which openly dispraiseth these new-broached heresies, and with detestation of them rehearseth them by name), have abused his plain simplicity… making him ween, good soul, that while he did put in, of his own good mind, these good words which he rehearseth here, and with them here and there in some sundry places prettily powder the book, it could not be taken that there were any hurt meant in the whole work together, how evil words and how malicious soever the subtle shrews made him stuff up the book with besides. Was not that a sinful wily way of them, to beguile a good simple soul so? For iwis it is easy to see that if the good man were not of himself very simple and plain, those double, wily shrews could never deceive him so as to make him ween that these words which he rehearseth here in his thirteenth chapter were any manner token that his book of Division meant not to bring the clergy in hatred among the people.

For who were there that, so intending, would yet for shame utterly say that there were none good… and not rather, to keep his credence in slandering the body, would cast in sometimes an exception of some? In such craft is no great sleight. It is but a common, plain point, and as easy to spy as a long nose upon a little face; especially while, as clearly as he saith that there be many good, yet, as you may see, folio 238 of mine Apology, he saith plainly that it is hard to find any one without that point that (if he say therein true) the very best is very naught, and as bad as a very beast. And for the further proof of this point, read mine answer to his seventeenth chapter in this book.

And whereas he speaketh here of the fear that he would every man should have of “the least censures of the Church” as though he therein meant much the favor of spiritual men—consider the place even here in his new book where he speaketh of inquisitions of heresies, in the eighteenth chapter, and you shall well perceive

3, 13, 16 shrews: scoundrels; creeps  5 which: who  // dispraiseth: deprecates
6 new-broached: newly launched  // detestation: denunciation  // rehearseth: mentions
7 abused: wrongly taken advantage of; exploited // plain: manifest  8 while: when
10 prettily powder: nicely besprinkle  11 hurt: harm  12 subtle: insidiously sly
14 iwis: certainly  16 double: duplicitous  18 manner: kind of
19 token: evidence // in: into  21 for shame: i.e., be so shameless as to
23 credence: credibility // the body: the bulk (of the clergy) // cast: throw
24 craft: deviousness // sleight: trickery  25 plain: ordinary // point: instance
26 while: since  28–29 that point that: that trait on account of which
29 naught: wicked  35 ever: right
35–36 inquisitions of: judicial investigations concerning
that they that made him there put those words in meant little good to the clergy. For it is there laid in a matter full childishly to their charge… as though they would have all the justices of the peace and all the juries of the realm accursed for inquiring of heresy.

But yet is it of all things a very special pleasure to see how he useth here for a plain, apparent proof of his good mind toward the spirituality that he wisheth well for them and prayeth God to “send” them, “abundantly,” “zeal of souls, pity, good doctrine, and devout prayer.” And saith that “then a new light of grace should shortly shine,” etc.; and that he saith also that it is “great pity,” and much “to be lamented,” that the spirituality do not fast and pray, and do other good deeds, to cease the division with… but that “all that ever they do therein, most commonly, is that they take it that they that find default at their abusions and disorder love no priests, but do all of malice that they do, to destroy the Church and to have their goods and possessions themselves,” and that “therefore the clergy think it a good deed to see them punished,” and “therefore” (that is to say, for that same cause) “have they punished many persons, which much people judge to have been done of will,” etc. And saith also that they do “continue still after their old course, pretending by confederacies, worldly policy, and strait corrections to rule the people.” Whereas he useth these things (which I have here rehearsed out of his thirteenth chapter of this his new book, and somewhat made them more plain with adding thereto his own other words written in his Division) as you may read in mine Apology, folio 158, in the twenty-sixth chapter (and answered there at length, in the same chapter and divers others, in order there ensuing, of which this man hath answered to some very little, and to the most part, and the chief part, nothing), now is he so simple that he useth the same things for a proof that he beareth the clergy very good will and mindeth not to bring them in obloquy… which he would we should take for a thing plainly proved because he pitieth and lamenteth them therein, and so bitterly prayeth God to make them good and amend them.

2–3 laid… charge: very childishly leveled against them as a charge in a case
4 apparent: excommunicated 5 inquiring of heresy: holding heresy inquests
7 apparent: clear // mind: attitude 9 of: for // pity: compassion; mercy
15 default at: fault with 16 abusions: wrongdoings // disorder: mismanagement
21 of will: just for their own gratification 23 pretending: attempting
23 confederacies: conspiracies // policy: craftiness; cunning
24 strait corrections: severe punishments 32 simple: dim-witted
33–34 mindeth not to: does not intend to; is not out to 34 in obloquy: into disrepute
34 would we should: would have us 36 so… to: prays so hard that God
This good man many times taketh record of his own conscience that he meaneth well, in such things as his words make many good men ween that he meant very naught. And therefore will I now be bold in this point to take record of his own conscience, whether himself, if one that knew his name would write such a work so touching him as his work of Division toucheth there the clergy... and would therein, under so many "some say"s, say that he were as evil as he saith there that they be (for worse could lightly no man say), would himself hold him satisfied and think that that writer meant him no harm because he powdered his shrewd slanderous "some say"s with lamenting and pitying that the man is no better. And would he ween, by his troth, that the writer meant not to call him graceless, because he prayed God abundantly to send him grace? Nor to call him witless, because he prayeth God send him wit? Surely if he can think so—then shall he well show himself so simple a soul as men may well see that some wily shrews beguile him. And, on the other side, if he be wiser than to think so—then he well showeth himself more wily in this same thirteenth chapter of his work of Division as he would here mean so well in his work of Division as he would here make men ween.

Now, where he saith these words—

Also I say not, in all the said treatise, that the spirituality make confederacies against the temporality... but I say that they "continue still after the old course" in not doing good deeds, but "pretending by confederacies, worldly policy, and strait corrections to rule the people"... 

—who could write thus but either he that were a man of very innocent simpleness or he that intendeth to mock of a shrewd, wily doubleness? For (saving that his word "pretending" signifieth not indeed the thing that he, for lack of language, pretendeth here thereby) to go about not to do good to the people, but by confederacies with wiliness and strait corrections to rule the people—what thing calleth he this but confederacies against the people?

1, 4–5 take(th) . . . conscience: calls his own conscience to witness 3 naught: ill 4 be bold: venture 5–6 if . . . would: i.e., if someone who knew who he is were to 6 touching: censuring 8 so: as 9 lightly: probably 10 hold him: consider himself 11 powdered: interspersed 11, 31 shrewd: cunning 13, 22 ween: think 13 by his troth: upon his word; in all seriousness 14 graceless: not in the state of grace 17 simple: naïve 19 wiser: more intelligent 30 simpleness: mental deficiency 31 doubleness: duplicity 33 pretendeth: professes
Howbeit, since this chapter goeth but to the discharging of his own personal intent, that he meant not himself maliciously whatsoever his book speak—I will not, therefore, wrestle against it much, but would he were well believed in that thing. But yet if you read the places of mine Apology and compare them with such parts of his book as I there speak of—ye shall well and clearly see that, though the man in his own mind meant it not himself, yet the thing that I say was the meaning of his book.

The Fourteenth Chapter

His fourteenth chapter beginneth in the 42nd leaf. In the beginning thereof he laboreth to prove that he did not (as I in mine Apology say that he did) go about in his book of Division to make men ween that the spiritual judges in this realm handled men for heresy so cruelly that all the world had cause to wonder and grudge thereat; which thing that I should so say, this good man much marveleth at.

For I said no more [saith he] but that it were pity it should be so, and that it should be true that is reported, that there should be such a desire in spiritual men to have men abjure, or to have men have extreme punishment for, heresy... as it is said that there is.

Read, good readers, the forty-fifth chapter of mine Apology, beginning folio 243, and then shall you find this answer of his a very bare, naked thing. This man answereth here as though he trusted that all the world were woodcocks save himself... and that his fair figure of “some say” were so wilily found that men had not the wit to see thereby what his book meaneth, and what work it goeth about. But this I doubt not, but that if either himself or such another man would devise me such another book either against the nobility of the realm or against the judges of the same, or against the high court of Parliament itself— which were soon done if a man in like wise list to slander and to belie them... nor it could not, I wot well, whatsoever he said therein, be lightly worse or more false than that.
book of his *Division*, concerning the point that we speak of, that is to wit, this false slander of the spiritual judges in mishandling men for heresy (as it hath oftener than once, before the lords of the King’s most honorable Council, upon like false bills and complaints of particular persons, by good examination been proved)—and then if he that would make, I say, of the nobility, the judges, or the Parliament such another book would bring in all his false tales against them under the selfsame figure of “some say,” and “many say,” and “they say”… and then say that himself would say no piece thereof, but only that it were pity that it should be true, that it were so as many folk report it is so, and then preach and pray God send them the grace that they do not so: I dare be bold to say that there is no wise man but he would both soon see and say that the man with such false leesings went about to defame and slander them, and make the people ween that it were so.

Then, after this thing so featly excused, he declareth his words again which he spoke in his *Division* of speaking heresies of lightness, or of a passion. And because I answered him in mine *Apology* that if such things should be excused by lightness and by passions, then might there pass by much lewdness and much mischief too… the beginning whereof groweth of lewd lightness and of evil passions: herein he showeth that there is difference in deeds, and that some be more and some be less. And because I did put for examples manslaughter and adultery, which he thought was too high to be likened to speaking and talking heresy, he bringeth it somewhat again to base and puteth other examples, of one speaking an angry word and yet would not kill one… and one that hath a passion of adultery and yet doth not the deed… and saith that his treatise meant not obstinate deadly passions, but passions of ignorance and of frailty, and done for lack of good advisement.

As for his passion of ignorance, he may put up again. For, whatsoever he say, he shall not find, I dare warrant him, while he liveth, but that the things that heretics are punished for be such things as be well and openly known for...
heresies, and to have been before condemned for heresies by the common-known doctrine of the whole Catholic Church.

Now, as touching his passions for frailty and for lack of good advisement: doth there no man kill another even suddenly upon a passion of anger, for lack of good advisement? Doth never none unthrifts upon a passion of lechery suddenly fall together in adultery for lack of good advisement?

“Yea,” will this man say, “but these folk do the deed.” That is very truth indeed. But yet they do the deed but of a passion of frailty, for lack of good advisement. In that adultery, the malice is the lack of goodness in the will to the keeping of God’s commandments.

And yet even in those passions, too, though the further deed be not done (no man neither killed nor struck, nor none adultery done in deed), though the laws of the world, for lack of power to look into the heart, cannot punish the bare intent of such things—yet our Savior saith himself very sore words therein, and saith that himself taketh their wills for their deeds.

But, now, in heresy the words be the work. For not only the speaking but also the defending thereof is in words too.

“But a man,” saith he, “may speak heresy of lightness, and of a passion of frailty, and yet not intend to fall from the faith.” So may a man speak very lewd and right traitorous words by his prince, too, of a passion and of a frailty, without an inward intent and purpose to procure his destruction. But then will this man peradventure say that then be such words yet no treason, without some manner of overt and open actual deed therewith. Whether they be treason or not, yet in any English book that I would put in print, I would, as thus advised, advise every man, for fear of treason, beware of all such lewd language; and not, under color to teach the judges their part, go tell the people without necessity that though they talk traitorous words, yet it is no treason, as this good man in his book of Division telleth them that to talk heresies is no heresy.
Now, as I said before, concerning heresy—which is the treason to God—the outward act thereof, by which men must judge whether the man fall from the faith or not, standeth in the words. And therefore both wisdom and reason will that folk well be wary, upon the peril of heresy, that they forbear all such talking of heresy as may declare their mind that they believe such heresy.

“That I will well agree,” will this good man say. “But then I would that they should be wary by means of charitable warning given to their persons.” I would verily ween that in a matter so heinous and of such weight, whereof so much harm may grow by the sufferance, the spiritual law that giveth him leave to abjure at the first, and in so great a crime saveth once his life, giveth him a warning as charitable and as large as, in a crime so perilous, reason can well bear. And that should we soon feel if we would give the like liberty for once-warning to every less crime than that… and shall shortly feel it in heresies if, besides that, we give them less fear and more liberty in bold talking and teaching without other peril than warning.

For as for the order of warning that this man here provideth in this fourteenth chapter of his new book, taking a color and a pretext of the Gospel of Christ, that speaketh of an order of monitions, requiring a tract of time before any open denunciation: I will not much stick upon. For I purpose not to make a long process upon every fond piece of his devices wherein this good man is content to lose time and spill paper. But I will say this and say truth: that the ordinaries of this order that he speaketh do use indeed as much as may well be borne, and sometimes, I fear me, more too.

For this must this good man understand: that this good soft, slow, sober order that he describeth here may not all, and always, be kept, neither in heresy nor treason, nor some other great crimes neither, without great hurt and damage to the commonweal, and utter loss and destruction of many a good simple soul that should, by this order always kept, perish in the meanwhile.

3 standeth: consists 4–5 will that folk: call for folk to
5 of heresy: i.e., of being taken and punished as heretics 6 their mind: their thinking to be
9–10 to their persons: to them personally 11 grow by: come of
12 sufferance: toleration // spiritual: ecclesiastical // abjure: recant 14 large: generous
16 less: lesser 20 order: procedure 21 color: semblance of justification
22 of the: from the // that: which 23 monitions: admonitory counsels
23 requiring: calling for // tract: span 24 stick upon: dwell on (that)
27 ordinaries: bishops
Nor our Savior meant not in his words that if I wist one that were walking about mischief, that would go give such drink about as should poison them that drank thereof... that then I should use all that tract of time, rather than cause him be taken up betimes, at the first sup that I see him give any man to sip upon. Nor that tract is not, therefore, to be used with them that speak and boldly talk heresies about, and thereby do plainly teach them, though they bid not the hearers learn them. For, as Saint Paul speaketh of such heresies, “evil communication corrupteth good manners.” Which words though the Greek poet Menander meant by the communication of other, fleshly lewdness—yet the blessed Apostle used them and applied them specially to the lewd communication of heresies, which with such bold naughty talking creepeth forth and corrupteth, as Saint Paul also saith, “like a corrupt canker.” And therefore, as I say, such a long, sober tract before their calling by the ordinary course of the law is not always to be used of necessity with every such manner man, and let them poison other good simple souls in the mean season, which they may do, percase, with such communication though they neither minded in their own heart to make any other men heretics nor to be heretics themselves.

And yet would there, besides this, some such as well wist their mischievous dealing to be such, and so well able to be plainly proved as the ordinary could not without God’s displeasure let them after pass unpunished—they would, at the first word spoken by the ordinary to him at large, fly out of that place... and, as I have in mine Apology said, and as we see it often proved, go keep like schools in another.

But yet, because I have heard say, even while I was writing this, that the mild, sober order which this good man hath here in this chapter devised is very well liked, and hath been well praised, with some such folk as myself have had some communication with ere this—I will therefore not hide it nor keep it away from you, but give you, good readers, here even his own words, folio 45. He saith:

1 one that: someone who
2 walking about mischief: going about the committing of a crime
4–5 cause... take up: have him seized
5 betimes: in good time
8 bid not... learn: do not tell... to learn
9–10: 1 Corinthians 15:33.
9 evil: bad
10, 11 communication: association
10 manners: ways
10–11 which words... meant by: by which words... meant
10–12: Menander, Thais 218.
12, 13 lewd(ness): wicked(ness)
12 the blessed Apostle: i.e., Saint Paul
14 naughty: bad
15 canker: gangrene
16, 31 sober: unhurried
16 calling: summoning
19 mean season: meantime
20 percase: by chance
21 minded: intended
24 dealing: conduct
25–26 without God’s displeasure: without offending God
26 after: afterward
27 at large: i.e., while he (the heretic) was still at liberty
32 liked: approved of
35 even his own: his own exact
And now will I say a little farther in this matter… concerning such words; that is to say, that if any man now in this dangerous time, while this division continueth, will show unto the ordinary that he heard any speak words that, as he thought, stood not with the Catholic faith… and the ordinary misliketh the words also: I would then think… that if he upon whom the information is made be such a man that he that complaineth of him may conveniently speak to him without danger, that then the ordinary shall advise him to keep the matter secret, if it be yet secret… and not openly known; and that he shall then charitably ask of him… what he meant by these words. And then, when the question is asked him, if he make so reasonable an answer… that it soundeth to no heresy… then is the matter answered. And if he avow the words… and yet they be indeed against the Catholic faith: then it seemeth good… that he that accused him follow the Gospel… and take witnesses with him… and eft charitably give him monition thereof. And if he will yet stand still opinatively in his opinion… and not accept the good monition of the other: then I think it good that he again inform the ordinary thereof… and then it seemeth to be convenient that the ordinary send for him… not as for a man yet notoriously known or detected for a heretic… but to know farther, whether it be true as the other hath reported or not; and if he find it true by sufficient proof… or by his own confession, and he will not be reformed, then it seemeth convenient… that he upon the witness of the other… be punished as he hath deserved. And if he will be by the ordinary secretly reformed: then it seemeth good that he depart without any open penance; but what were convenient to be farther done in that matter, I will commit it to others.

Consider now, good readers, the commodity of this order. You see that he speaketh of one that speaketh such words as to the hearers seem heresy. For both he so taketh them that informeth the ordinary of them, and so doth the ordinary too. Now may you perceive, by the progress of his device, that though there were more than one that heard him, or more than twain, or ten
either—yet would he not that the ordinary should send for him… but first assay by some such as heard him what he will say thereto when he is asked the question what thing himself meant thereby. And then if he have the wit to say he meant in his words but such a thing as that meaning soundeth to no heresies (which wit heretics enough have), then is all the matter answered. For then, ye wot well, a wily heretic by this wise order may be bold, with glosses readily provided, to say what he will and where he will. For the ordinary may not send for him to lay those heretical words to his charge, and to consider upon the circumstance of his dealing in such talking (peradventure in divers places used) whether he meant as himself declareth or meant to teach the thing that he spoke and to keep his declaration in store for an excuse. This first point alone of this good man’s order, if it were surely observed, were enough to fill a whole town shortly full of heresies.

Then goeth he farther to a second point: that if he that spoke heresies will when he is asked the question avow them—yet shall not he that heard him resort unto the ordinary, but go fetch witnesses first, before whom if the fellow be so foolish to confess them, and so frantic as to avow them, then this good man giveth them leave to go tell the ordinary the tale and accuse him. But, now, if he have the wit before the witnesses to lie and say that he never said them, or to say that he will say so no more—then is all the matter yet safe enough again; it shall never need that ever the ordinary hear any more word of him… but let him go forth and use that fashion still, in as many companies as he cometh. For that, ye wot well, can do no hurt. But and if every man to whom he speaketh heresy secretly, and secretly would make more heretics, should secretly inform the ordinary… and that he should upon twenty such secret informations afterward call him forth openly, and after, upon their open depositions, openly make him abjure and bear a faggot, or accuses him for his obstinacy; and after a whole year’s sufferance finally, for his immedicable malice, as a desperate
wretch deliver him to the secular hands, where a faggot should bear him: this were a cruel dealing of the ordinary, and a mishandling of a good, honest man for heresy.

And yet goeth he farther a little: that though he hold it and avow his heresies before the witnesses—the ordinary should not yet, for all that, proceed against him openly, but speak with him secretly. And though he avow them before himself too—yet should he not, by this good man’s advice, proceed against him by ordinary means openly, but let him depart without open penance, if the fellow be so wise as at last (rather than he would come thereto) say that he will amend and will say such things no more.

But then after all this, what were convenient to be farther done, he will, he saith, remit unto other men. And so were it much need indeed. Howbeit, if this order that he deviseth here were well observed for so far forth as he goeth—I ween all the world could not well devise farther, sufficiently to reform and remedy the mischief that his charitable device would do.

Howbeit, the best is, therein, that he deviseth not this order for a thing to stand forever, but for this time “now,” he saith, which is, he saith, a “dangerous time, while this division continueth.”

But now so is it, good readers, that whether this time be so dangerous as he speaketh of or no, or whether there be in this time such division as he maketh or no—sure it is, I say, that even in this same time heresies begin to grow a great deal faster than they have been wont in some other times past… and therefore is this time so much the worse to use such order in than were another time wherein there were many fewer. For if this Pacifier will now be so peaceable as to devise such an order that all mischievous, factious folk should be suffered in peace, he shall with his peaceable order (if it were observed) bring the world in that case that good peaceable folk that fain would live in peace should not, for such unquiet and unrestful wretches, without some ruffle live in peace long.
Were it not a wise order, ween you, if he would in like wise devise for thieves the same soft, charitable fashion that he deviseth here for heretics—that is to wit, that men should to him that had stolen a horse, or robbed a house, go give him a monition first, and then if he say that he did it not, or that he would do so no more, take all the matter for safe—and then say that he would not have that order always kept, but only in such dangerous times as many folk would fall to theft; for then were it good to spare them and speak them fair, and suffer them till they would wax fewer of themselves... and then, after that, use against them the laws and the old order again. Would not this wise way, trow you, do well in theft? Forsooth, it were a way as far unwise and as far against reason in heresy as either in theft or murder or any other manner crime.

And surely meseemeth that where he calleth this a “dangerous” time, he useth a very dangerous word... and to fear the ordinaries with, would make the world ween that heretics were here so many and so strong that the ordinaries might not now do their duties in subduing heresies without great danger. Wherein there is as great danger yet—and shall, I doubt not, in the King’s Grace’s days that now is, and long mote be—as there is in the paring of an apple. Howbeit, I will not deny him this indeed, but that if such dangerous words of his Division may make the ordinaries afeard of their own shadow a while—it may grow to some danger at the last.

But then goeth he farther, with another remedy that I trust in God shall never need. For I trust in God there never shall in this realm any such great personage fall into heresy as the ordinary “dare” not “proceed according to the law against him.” Howbeit, in case it should happen—then this good man provideth for the remedy (to say the truth) very well: that is to wit, that the ordinary should have recourse unto the King, that His Highness, upon petition made unto him and information given him, may (as no doubt were there but he would) with his royal assistance provide a means sufficient that the course of the law might proceed.
This is well devised. And herein he playeth the good cow, and giveth us a good gallon of milk. But then shall you see how he playeth the shrewd cow again, and turneth over the pail even by and by with his heel. For upon this good device, he forthwith addeth this shrewd saying to it:

But as long as there is an opinion among the people… that the ordinaries and their officers will give light credence upon informations made to them of heresy… and that they will noise them that be complained on as heretics… before due examination in that behalf; so long will the people grudge and peradventure the King not give his assistance so readily to have them attached as he would do if he heard that the ordinaries noised no man to be a heretic without due examination, as is before rehearsed.

If this good man had as much wit as I see well he lacketh, I would wax evil-content with him that he should once conceive any such opinion of the King’s gracious Highness as that His Grace would anything be the more remiss to give royal assistance unto the ordinaries about the attaching of such as are suspect of heresy as long as His Grace heard that the ordinaries noised that any man were a heretic without such due examination as this man before rehearsed. For the King’s high prudence very well perceiveth that if he should forbear till that time that he should hear no such thing said by them—it were almost as much to say as he should give no assistance against heretics till all heretics were gone. For never shall there lack such a false, seditious fame against the ordinaries as long as there are heretics here and there to sow it, and such seditious books of division, with such untrue “some say”s, to blow it farther abroad.

The untruth of such false fame hath been before the King’s honorable Council of late well and plainly proved already, upon sundry such false complaints by the King’s gracious commandment examined. And albeit that this is a thing notoriously known, and that I have also myself in mine Apology spoken thereof, and that since that book gone abroad, it hath been in like wise before the lords well

3, 5 shrewd: bad 4 even by and by: literally right away 5 saying: statement 7 give . . . upon: readily give credence to; readily believe // informations: accusations 8–9 noise . . . heretics: spread rumors that those complained about are heretics 10 grudge: murmur 11 attached: arrested 12 noised: reported 13 rehearsed: described in detail 15 evil-content: ill-content 17 anything: at all 18 attaching: arresting 22 forbear: hold back; wait 23 by: about 26 fame: rumor 26 against: about 30 fame: report 32 complaints: accusations 34 a . . . known: a matter of common knowledge 36 gone abroad: got out; was published
and plainly proved in more matters afresh; and albeit that this water washeth away all his matter: yet goeth ever this water over this goose’s back… and for anything that any man can do, no man can make it sink unto the skin that she may once feel it… but ever she shaketh such plain proofs off with her feathers of “some say” and “they say” the contrary. Is not this a pretty, proper way? And therefore thus you see, good readers, that this man’s devices in his order to be taken with such as speak heresies be very vicious, and have they never so fair a fleering at the first face, yet when they be considered well, they be found far worse than naught. And yet was I not minded, as you may see, to have examined them so far, saving that even while I was in writing of this chapter, and about to leave off—word was brought me that this device of his order for heresy was with some folk whom myself have known, so specially well commended.

But yet will this man say, and in effect so he doth, “Master More will not say, for all this, that everything that a man speaketh which if he obstinately would hold, he were a heretic, is enough to judge every such man a heretic as doth in any manner speak it.”

I will not at this time vary with this good man for that, nor dispute with him upon the truth of that tale, there be so many manner ways of speaking. For a man may speak thereof in dispraise thereof. But this will I say to him: That tale and such others like, were they never so true, were yet, as meseemeth, much better out of his English-printed book than in it. For if he think it necessary to write it because of any folk whom he thinketh necessary to learn it: either he meaneth that they need it which are the spiritual judges, or else the common people. Now as for the judges, verily I have known and do know many of them, and yet knew I never none so simple of wit, nor so far unlearned, but for any wit or learning that I perceive in this man, the worst of them wist a great deal better what pertained unto their part and their duty in such points as these are, than doth this good man here.

Then if he say he putteth it in because that though they

1 matters: cases  //  afresh: anew  2 all his matter: his whole case
6–7 a pretty, proper way: an ingenious, excellent tactic  9 vicious: immoral
9 fair: nice-looking  //  a fleering: an obsequious appearance
10 at the first face: at first glance  11 naught: worthless  15 order: system
22 vary . . . for: quarrel . . . over  23 dispute . . . upon: argue . . . about
24 manner: kinds of  30 spiritual: ecclesiastical
32–33 simple of wit: lacking in intelligence
know it they misuse it, and do the contrary and so do
thereby mishandle the King’s people, and put them to cruel
punishment unjustly: then I ask him how he proveth that lie
to be true. Thereto, ye wot well, he will bring forth for the
plain proof of his plain truth in the matter his old three
worshipful witnesses which stand yet all unsworn: that is to
wit, “Some Say” and “They Say” and “Folk Say.” And then hath he now
brought forth another two, whom he maketh, as meseemeth, both
as witnesses and judges too: that is, the good seely soul Simkin
Salem and his right honest neighbor Brother Bizance. Well, I
am content, I, that all his five witnesses be sworn and well examined,
how they know the things that they report; and then those
spiritual judges of whom they shall so speak and prove, let it be
laid unto their charges. And if you find of such so many,
and their dealing so cruel or unjust, as this man maketh
it, or anything well toward it: then am I content that ye shall
for them belie all the remnant the worse. And yet is that iwis
somewhat with the most. And then am I content that you
believe also that this man had for that cause a necessary occasion
and a profitable, to put that tale in his bate-making book.

But in the meanwhile, I lay against him for that point, and
against all his five worshipful witnesses too, the deed and the
report of the greatest and the most honorable temporal lords
of the King’s most honorable Council, and other right
worshipful temporal men of the same with them, which by
the gracious commandment of the King’s Highness have
examined divers such complaints at the suit of the parties
themselves and their friends, and have thereupon found the
same complaints false, and that the ordinaries have done
them but right, and that with great favor, too.

And therefore as for this point, the truth being so substantially
proved upon this side, by all his five forenamed
witnesses on the other side set I not five straws. And therefore,
good readers, as for this point, his putting of that piece in
his book of Division had neither necessity nor profit… except
it were either necessary or profitable to sow an evil seed

1 misuse it: carry it out wrongly  2 mishandle: mistreat  6, 22, 25 worshipful: reputable
9 seely: simple  // Simkin: Simple Simon  10 honest: honorable
11 sworn: put under oath  17 for them: on their account  // belie: slander
17 remnant: rest  // that: i.e., the rest  // iwis: certainly  18 somewhat: something
18 with the most: i.e., that is the majority  20 hate-making: strife-causing
23 temporal: secular  27 suit: supplication  28 friends: relatives and friends; loved ones
30 favor: kindness  35 except: unless  36 evil: bad
against good folk, of untrue, reprovable slander, in his own
writing, under the color of some other men’s unproved
words.

Then resteth there, as far as I can see, but one cause behind,
that should excuse him. And that is that it was a thing
profitable for the people, to know that though a man of a
lightness, or of a passion growing of ignorance, or of
frailty, speak and talk heresies at liberty—yet but if he
defend it opinatively, he should not be taken for a heretic
thereby. Verily, good readers, if this tale were true—yet would I
weep, as I said, this tale unto the people as good unwritten as
written, and a great deal better too.

As for this good man or any man else, I cannot let them to
write what they list, and say they think it good be it never so
bad indeed. But I durst in my conscience no more use this
fashion of writing concerning heresy than I would use it in
writing any book whereof I would speak of either treason or
any other felony… except some other necessary occasion should
haply drive me thereto, as no good occasion in his book of
Division drove this good man thereto.

If I were again to read in Lincoln’s Inn, and there were in
hand with a statute that touched treason and all other
felonies—I would not let to look, seek out, and rehearse whether
any heinous words spoken against the prince were for the
only speaking to be taken for treason or not.

Nor I would not let in like wise to declare if I found out any
cases in which a man, though he took another man’s horse
against the law, should yet not be judged for a felon thereby. And
this would I not only be bold there to tell them, but would also
be bold in such French as is peculiar to the laws of this realm
to leave it with them in writing, too. But yet would I reckon myself
sore overseen if all such things as I would in that school speak
in a reading, I would in English into every man’s hand put out
abroad in print. For there is no such necessity therein as is in the
other. For in the places of court these companies must
needs be taught it… out of which companies they must after
be taken that shall be made judges to judge it. But as for the
common people to be told that tale, shall, as far as I see, do many
folk little good, but rather very great harm. For by perceiving

1 reprovable: disprovable  2 color: disguise  4 resteth: remains  6, 7 of a: out of a
7 lightness: unthinkingness  // passion: strong feeling  // growing: coming
8 or of: or out of  9 but if: unless  9 opinatively: with an obstinate opinionatedness
13–14 let . . . say: prevent them from writing what they please, and from saying
15 durst: would dare  22 touched: concerned; had to do with  23, 26 let: forbear
23 rehearse: state  24 heinous: highly criminal  32 sore overseen: terribly imprudent
34 abroad: at large  35, 36 companies: assemblies  38 shall: i.e., that will
that in some things were nothing the peril that
they feared, some may wax therein more negligent... and by
less fearing the less danger, may soon step into the
more. And therefore have I wist ere this, the judges of a great
wisdom in great open audience, where they have had occasion
to speak of high misprision or of treason, forbear
yet the saying of some such things as they would not have
letted to speak among themselves.

If any man would haply think that it were well done that
every man were taught all... and would allege therefore that
if he know surely what thing would make his behavior high
treason or heresy, then though he would adventure all that
ever were under that, yet would he be peradventure the more
wary to keep himself well from that—as many a man, though he
believe that he shall abide great pain in purgatory for his
venial sins, doth, for all that, no great diligence in forbearing
of them, and yet, for the fear of perpetual pain in
hell, taketh very great heed to keep himself from those
sins that he surely knoweth for mortal...

As for such venial sins as folk, of frailty, so commonly do
fall in that no man is almost any time without them: though
the profit would be more if men did ween they were mortal,
so that the dread thereof could make men utterly forbear
them—yet since it will not be that men will utterly forbear
them, the knowledge of the truth is necessary for them... lest
every time that they do such a venial sin indeed, weening
that it were mortal, the doing of the deed with the conscience
of a mortal sin might make it mortal indeed.

But of any such kind of venial sins as be not so much in
custom, and may be more easily forborne—I never found
any wise man, to my remembrance, that would either write or
teach the common people so exactly as to say, “Though you do thus
far, yet is it no deadly sin”... but will in such things, since
the venial sin itself is a drawing toward the deadly, rather
leave the people in doubt, and in dread of deadly sin, and
thereby cause them to keep themselves far off from it... than by
telling them it is but a venial sin, make them the less

1 nothing: not at all  2 negligent: careless  3 the less: the lesser  4 more: greater
4, 20 of: out of  6 high misprision: a serious crime bordering on felony
8 letted: forborne  12 adventure: venture upon  21 in: into  23 so: provided
26 a venial sin indeed: a sin that is objectively a venial one
27–28 the conscience of: i.e., their conscience telling them it is  33, 34, 35 deadly: mortal
afeard to do it... and so come so much the nearer to mortal sin, and assay how near he can come to it and not do it, till he come at last so near the brink that his foot slippeth and down he falleth into it. For as the Scripture saith, “Qui amat periculum, peribit in illo” (“He that loveth peril shall perish in it”).

Now, as for heinous words speaking against the prince, or talking of heresy against the known Catholic faith—these are no things like these common venial sins... but be things, both twain, which they that do them may much more easily forbear them. And therefore were it more profit unto the people to think rather the more peril therein than the less.

The judges’ part is to see that the punishment pass not the gravity of the offense. And therefore shall the common people take no harm though themselves, concerning treason or heresy, fall not by such books to the mincing of such matters, and dispute how far they may go forward in them without the extreme danger and peril of them... but shall the better keep themselves from the greater if for fear of greater they keep themselves well from the less.

But surely such tales told unto the people, and given every man and woman at adventure in printed English books abroad, as may give them such boldness in talking as this man here in this fourteenth chapter doth—and to tell them that there is not therein so much peril as many men would ween—may be much harm, both unto themselves and unto others too. To themselves, for with a little less fear than they had before, they may soon fall further than they did before, or ever would have done. And then should he in whom it so should happen find that it were (as holy Saint Jerome saith) better to leave some things unknown than with peril to learn them.

To other men also may a man do thereby much harm. For some man with boldness talking heresies, whereby he maketh

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other men first to take them for light, and little and little
after to believe them, too (while they hear him so boldly speak
them, and hear him nothing reprove them), may do much more
harm by making many others fall from the faith, though he were
not fallen from it himself, than he should do if he held his
tongue though secretly in his heart he were a stark heretic
indeed.

And therefore surely, good reader, whatsoever the man meant
in his own secret mind, the fashion of his doctrine is yet, in
my mind, plainly a thing to the people much more perilous
than profitable… and in his book of Division very evil
put in, and here evil repeated again.

Now, whereas he referreth the remnant of the matter concerning
heresy unto them that can better skill… of whom he
desireth me to ask what were to be done with such as speak
heresies and are no heretics in their heart: surely if ever
any such case should happen as I should need to make search
for that point, I would with good will so do. But I look for no
such necessity. For it is enough for me, if I should hap to
hear any talk heresies, then to declare it unto their ordinaries—
to whom the further charge appertaineth to make thereupon
further search, such as he may; and thereupon, as he may
further find thereof, so further do therein.

And as for this man himself, as he canneth therein, for anything
that I see, very little skill, so would I that he had less
meddled therewith than to tell and teach the people, first by his
book of Division and afterward by this book again, that
they may speak and talk heresies well enough, without the
danger or peril to be, for such speaking, lawfully taken for
heretics. With which tale though it were true, he doth
them yet little good. For the using of such speaking of heresies,
if it fully prove not a man a heretic, yet may it make him, ye
wot well, of heresy in his heart very right sore suspect. For
as our Savior saith himself, “Ex abundantia cordis os
loquitur” (“The mouth speaketh such things as in the heart be
plenteous and aboundeth”). And therefore I say that though
he neither defend it obstinately nor can be precisely

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1 light: innocuous  //  little and little: little by little
3 nothing reprove: not at all express disapproval of  // stark: arrant; out-and-out
11, 12 evil: ill  // 14 can better skill: are more knowledgeable  // 18 with good will: happily
18 look for: anticipate  // 21 charge: responsibility  // appertaineth: belongs
24–25 canneth . . . skill: has . . . expertise  // meddled: involved himself
31 using of: engaging in; carrying on of  // 33 right: rightly; properly  // sore: strongly
proved a heretic in his secret heart—yet may his open
words be such (though they were spoken of I cannot tell you
what manner passion) that for the sore suspicion that his own
words hath brought himself into, he may well and with good
reason be compelled to abjure. And therein were there, iwis, no
great honesty nor no very great profit neither. And yet is it all
the profit that I see can come of this good man’s doctrine.

And this is the thing, lo, that this good man boasteth in this
chapter (the second side of his 44th leaf) that I do not deny—as
though he had gotten thereby a great overhand on me in the
matter. But yet would I, good readers, save for the length, let him
perceive his oversight and ignorance in another manner
touching the thing that he so boasteth that I deny him
not… and would make him look a little better even upon Summa
rosella, whom he so much allegeth here himself.

And whereas in the same leaf and side, he maketh a certain
certificate (as though I were a bishop, and had sent him
a commission to inquire) that he knoweth not one heretic in
all this realm in word nor deed: marry, I would marvel much
if he did. For it must needs be very long ere he can know any,
while the man is so little suspicious in matters of heresy that
though he should hear them talk heresy by him, yet because,
though he hear what their mouths speak, he cannot yet, pardie,
lo, look into their hearts there and see what they think—
not knoweth not also whether, if they were asked where
they were well afeard, they would hold it opinatively or else
(rather than be burned or bear a faggot) say that they said it
all but of a passion of ignorance or frailty—he cannot, therefore,
lightly know any one heretic (as he saith he doth not),
neither in word nor deed, in all this whole realm.

And then, for hearing by report, therein goeth he farther and
saith:

For howbeit that I have heard sometimes reported that there be
many heretics… yet I never heard so far proof therein that I might
with conscience judge or report… that this man or that man is a heretic.
And to every light word a man may not give full credence in
that behalf... nor report it lightly... that any man is a heretic, by
such light tales. And surely this point is much to be noted of all
men... but most especially of them that daily administer the sacraments
of the Church, lest haply through such reports they administer
them sometimes in deadly sin, and yet would not think so
themselves.

It would have done very well that this good man had given
as light a credence to such reports in mishandling
of heretics as some have made him of the spirituality
(if himself therein say true) as he seemeth to have given to
them that have reported unto him that there are many heretics.
For then—since, after his own preaching here, a man
ought to be so well wary how he lightly report again any
evil light reports that he hath heard to the slander of any
one man—himself would not of likelihood so lightly have made
such evil report in that point, to the slander and obloquy of
the prelates of the spirituality, thereby to bring them in
grudge of the whole temporality, upon such light reports
made unto him by some light, simple persons... whereas by
the King's honorable Council the truth hath been so
plainly proved to be contrary.

But yet, whereas he confesseth that he hath heard it sometimes
reported that there be many heretics: I would fain wit
of him whether that such report have been made unto him by
any of the temporality. If he say nay, but that all that so told
him were spiritual men: then may they believe him that think
his answer likely. For I would ween, in my mind, that between
him and spiritual persons were not so much familiar company
as to come to tell him that tale. For he seemeth not very
meet for spiritual men in that matter to make their moan
unto. And then if he heard it either of temporal men besides
or of temporal men only and no spiritual men at all: then did
he not very well when he wrote in his Division that spiritual
men make that noise for a policy. And yet also would I
farther wit, whether he have heard any speak heresies in any
place where himself was present in company. If he answer

1 light: spontaneous; unconsidered  2, 14, 16 lightly: readily; without good cause
3, 15, 19 light: unreliable  3, 4 of: by  6 deadly: mortal
11 say true: is telling the truth  13 after: according to  15, 17 evil: bad
15, 17 slander: discredit  17 obloquy: disrepute  18 spirituality: clergy
18–19 bring... temporality: turn all the laity against them  20 light: unthinking
20 simple: dim-witted  24–25 would... of: would like to know from
27, 33 spiritual men: clergymen  31 meet: suitable  32, 33 of: from
32, 33 temporal men: lay people  35 make that noise: spread that rumor // policy: tactic
me nay: then will I press no farther upon him, but let every
man, as I said before, believe it that thinketh it likely. But on the
other side, if he answer me yea: then would I fain farther wit,
whether ever himself went so far with them as to prove
whether he should, by his own rule in this chapter, have cause
to show their ordinary of them, that he might send for
them... or else that, hearing folk so speak heresies by him, he
took all to the best always, of his own special goodness... and,
lest he might with questioning hap to find it worse,
followed ever in that matter the good counsel that Saint Paul
gave in another matter, “Nolite interrogare, propter conscientiam”
(“Ask no question, lest you bring a scruple into your
conscience”). If he used any diligence in questioning: then
were it well likely that he found, in all this long while, somewhere,
at the leastwise some one.

But, now, if he heard them speak heresy and found no fault
therewith, nor no question asked: then is it, as I said, little
marvel though he never nowhere in all England found one.
And that is even one of the very things, while many folk now
fall to the same fashion (to hear heresies talked and let the
talkers alone) which yet will, if they be brought into the Court
before the judge, tell then the truth, and will not be so false as to
be forsworn—this is, I say, one of the very special things for
which in crime of heresy the suit *ex officio* (which in the
next chapter following he laboreth sore to destroy) may,
whatoveryer this man say, in no wise be forborne but if we
would have the streets swarm full of heretics, which very
likely were to follow, though he say nay forty times. And that
have I, against his book of *Division*, well declared in mine
*Apology*. And he hath again here in this book defended in
that point his book of *Division* (as yourselves shall anon see), God
wot, with much work full feebly.

4 *prove*: find out; ascertain  6 *show... of*: tell their bishop about  9 *worse*: less good
19 *even*: precisely  // *while*: given that  20 *fall... fashion*: go in for the same behavior
22 *false*: dishonest  23 *be forsworn*: commit perjury
24 *ex officio*: See the note for 60/29. 29 *declared*: explained  31 *anon*: soon
32 *wot*: knows  // *full*: very
The Second Part

The Fifteenth Chapter

His fifteenth chapter, concerning the suit *ex officio*, beginneth in the 48th leaf of his book, and holdeth on into the 54th.

And forasmuch, good Christian readers, as it may well appear that this point is the special thing that he fain would bring about—that is to wit, to sow an opinion in men’s heads that it were good to change and put away that suit—toward which purpose all his book of *Division* bendeth… laboring first, with his so many “some say’”s, to bring the spiritual judges in suspicion and obloquy and make the people ween that they marvelously did, with much wrong and cruelty, mishandle men for heresy: therefore I shall in this point here confute his arguments so plainly, and in such wise, that whoso list indifferently to read both the parts shall find here causes good and sufficient why by his unreasonable reasons never after to set a fly.

And first, because ye shall well see that I will not wrestle in the dark, but bring the matter into light open and plain at your eyes… I will in this matter leave you not out one word of this his fifteenth chapter, but bring forth his words with mine. And then—while you read the one first and the other even afterhand—there shall neither he nor I… by any sly sleight deceive you.

But two things for this matter will I require you first: one, that you reject one wily sleight of his, with which he goeth about even from the beginning to corrupt our judgment that are temporal men, and in the reading to blind us with affection.

For in all this matter he maketh as there were two parties. The one he maketh the spirituality. And this cause he so maketh theirs as though the commodity of that suit to be kept were a thing that pertained only unto them. The other party he maketh us of the temporality, whom he would have put that same

6 *fain would bring*: is bent on bringing 11 *marvelously*: terribly 12 *wrong*: injustice
12 *mishandle*: mistreat 14 *such wise*: such a way // *whoso*: whoever
14 *list*: cares; chooses // *indifferently*: impartially; without bias
16–17 *by . . . set a fly*: for . . . have the least regard
16 *unreasonable reasons*: irrational arguments 18 *because*: so that
22 *while*: when // *even afterward*: right afterward 23, 26 *sleight*: trick
25 *require*: ask of // *reject*: refuse to go along with; not let yourselves be taken in by
27 *even from the*: from the very 27–28 *our . . . men*: the judgment of us laypersons
28 *affection*: bias 29 *as*: as though 30 *spiritually*: clergy
31 *the . . . kept*: i.e., the benefit of having the suit *ex officio* kept in force
33 *temporality*: laity
suit away. For though that in the Parliament be spiritual men also—yet all were they all upon one side sure, he seeth well they were too few.

But it is necessary that we consider in this point that though the judges be spiritual, yet if that suit be necessary for preservation of the Catholic faith, then is the profit not the spiritual men’s only, but that profit and advantage is our own too. And if by the change of that suit ex officio the decay of the Catholic faith shall follow in this realm: then is not the loss and damage unto the spirituality alone, but the harm is importable unto the whole realm.

Therefore have this point in this matter ever before your eyes: that the change of that law if that law be good, but if he change it into a better, or at the least as good, is a common harm to the whole realm. And that harm happeneth in the greatest thing that we could possibly take harm in, if we be (as I wot well we be and ever intend to be) faithful, true Christian people.

Look, therefore, good readers, both to his reasons and mine, and if you find by his reasons that the putting away of that law be better for the keeping of the Catholic faith in this land—yea, or better otherwise for this land, without the diminishment of the faith in the same—then am I well content that ye account this good man both for very wise and for very faithful too.

But, now, if you find by mine answer on the other side, that all his reasons in this point are not worth one rush toward the proof of any necessary cause of change… but his reason and his arguments always such therein that either they be built upon a false ground… or else, if he make any that happen to be true, if ye find it yet but such as by the selfsame reason, if men would unwisely follow it, there might no law neither long last nor yet no law be made—if you find, I say, his reasons against this law but such—ye will then, I doubt not, think it but good reason, for all his royal reasoning, to let the law stand.
But then if ye find further yet, as I wot well ye shall, that the change that he would make under a needless pretense of preserving innocents out of danger and peril, and cannot prove that this hundred years anyone was wronged with it, should cause heretics to be bold, take courage, and increase, and for lack of this law the Catholic faith to decay: then will you not, I wot well, let to tell this man that he lacketh in this matter, how gay soever he make it, either wit or (which worse were) love to the Christian faith.

The other thing that I require, you shall yourselves see reasonable. For it serveth to the clear perceiving of us both, how both he and I bear ourselves in this matter. And I shall not require therein partially for my part, but a request indifferent and equal for us both, since ye shall the clearer thereby perceive whereabout we both go, and where any of us both swerve aside from the matter and, to hide the truth out of sight, slink into Lurkies’ Lane.

My request is no more but that it may like you to take the labor and pain, for perceiving of the truth, from the beginning to peruse the whole matter as far as pertaineth to the change of this law.

Read first his own words in his own book of Division. And after, read mine answer in mine Apology, which you shall find in the fortieth chapter, the 218th leaf; and his words too, therewith. And when those two things be both fresh in your mind, read then this his fifteenth chapter of this book, with mine answers everywhere added thereunto… and then have I when this is done little doubt of your judgment, ye shall see the matter prove against this good man so plain.

In his fifteenth chapter, good readers, he would make men ween that he sufficiently proveth three things. The one is that it were no hurt to change now this old law. The second thing is that it were great hurt to keep it. The third, that such examples of the laws of this realm as I resembled unto the suit ex officio, I resemble against reason, they be so far unlike.
Into these three points, therefore, will I divide this chapter, that the reader may the better see in what part he is.

I shall rehearse you first here his whole words together, that he bringeth for the first point. Lo, good readers, these they be:

Then to the conventing of men before spiritual judges *ex officio*, and whereupon Master More saith in his *Apology*, folio 219, that if it were left, “the streets were likely to swarm full of heretics”—verily I marvel right much at his saying therein, and that for this cause: it is certain that no man may, after the law, be detected of heresy but that there is some man that knoweth the cause before, why he ought so to be. For if it be secret in his own breast, none can be his judge but God only, that is the searcher of man’s heart. And if any will avow that he knoweth the cause, and will denounce him as a heretic therefor: then it is reason that he be taken as his accuser. And if he will not avow to be his accuser, it is to think that he doth it of some malice or craft, rather than for the truth of the matter. And if he say he dare not for fear of his life avow it, I have showed a means, in the seventh chapter of the said treatise, how the witnesses may be saved from danger, as by showing the matter to the King and his Council, and that then it is not to suppose nor so to think but that they will provide sufficiently for the indemnity of the witnesses in that behalf. And this remedy Master More denieth not to be convenient for this realm. And yet he will not assent that a law be made that it shall be so. And then if the witness will not avow it, but another will give credence to *him* and avow it: then it seemeth reasonable that they that will give credence thereto, and will report it... be taken as accusers—taking those witnesses for their warrant, if it be denied.

In these words, lo, good readers, you see how he proveth his first point: that of the change of this law by putting away this suit *ex officio* (wherein without any special accuser offering himself as party, the suspect may be called in before the judge *ex officio*; that is to wit, by reason of his office) there could no harm grow at all.
And how doth he now prove us this point? He proveth it, as you see, first by a certain reason put and presupposed for a ground... and then, after that, by a certain order that himself shortly deviseth and setteth up upon the same. His ground and his foundation is this:

It is certain [he saith] that no man may, after the law, be detected of heresy... but that there is some man that knoweth the cause before, why he ought so to be.

Very truth it is that no man can be detected, except a man detect himself, but if some other see something in him wherefore he should seem naught—some one thing or other that they which perceive it suspect him therefore themselves. And therefore, as for this ground, this good man and I will not greatly strive.

Then followeth his order that he deviseth and buildeth up thereupon thus:

And if any will avow that he knoweth the cause, and will denounce him a heretic therefor: then is it reason that he be taken as his accuser.

This is a right good reason... and the spiritual law will not refuse so to take him and accept him for an accuser if he will... and then will they not in that case use the suit ex officio. For in that case it needeth not. But, now, what if he that knoweth it, and secretly detecteth it, peradventure four or five and sometimes more too, and yet not one of them all will openly be called an accuser, but will be content to be taken and known for a witness, called in by the Court and sworn, and to tell the truth as of a necessity, and not as accusers of their neighbor of their own offer, willingly—what shall the ordinary do then?

Against this peril this good man giveth us this remedy:

If they will not be his accusers, it is to think that they do it of some malice or craft, rather than for the truth of the matter.

I ween, good readers, that there is no man but when he heareth
this answer, he would ween there were yet for the farther remedy some other more matter behind. For what madman would think that this were a sufficient remedy, so fully provided for this matter, that if there were any heretics, they could not fail so fully to be detected by this way of accusation that there should need no suit _ex officio_, because they that know it may either hold their peace if they list, or else, if they will _algates_ detect any man, may be taken and accepted for accusers… and if they will not openly be taken so, then be taken for malicious and crafty, and therefore believe them not, but bid them like false harlots hence and go get them home!

But how shall we do yet for one thing? For though that their refusing to become open accusers were a conjecture to lead us somewhat to believe them false or malicious—yet were it not so great a conjecture on that side, nor so sure, but that we might be therein deceived and they both charitable and true, and the man they detected a very perilous heretic in very deed. And then, for aught that this man deviseth yet, we should need the suit _ex officio_ to bolt out this matter better… or else that man that they detected shall (if he be such as they said he was) teach heresies still, and do much harm a great while.

Also, good readers, this good man hath no such cause so sore to mistrust such a denouncer only because that he refuseth to be taken of his own offer for a party and an open accuser, considering that he refuseth not to be brought in by process and depose in the party’s own presence as a witness, and will be content that his depositions, himself standing by, be published and read openly before the world. And therefore any wise man would ween that this good man to prove that we should not need the suit _ex officio_, if he would make his suit by way of accusation sufficient to serve in the stead, he had need to have devised some farther thing than this. But this good host of ours prayeth you for this feast to be merry with such as you have, for here is all your fare… saving that to make us like this

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2 _matter:_ thing  
5 _detected:_ made known  
8 _algates:_ at any rate  
10 _crafty:_ fraudulent  
11 _false:_ contemptible // _hence:_ vamoose; scram  
13 _though that:_ even if  
14, 16 _conjecture:_ indication; basis for judgment  
15 _false:_ dishonest  
17 _deceived:_ mistaken // _true:_ truthful  
18 _perilous:_ dangerous  
19 _aught:_ anything  
20 _bolt out:_ sift out; investigate  
22 _teach heresies still:_ go on teaching heresies  
26 _offer:_ accord  
30 _published:_ given public notice of  
35 _merry:_ happy  
36 _here . . . fare:_ i.e., this is all you get
meat the better, and fill our bellies somewhat the better therewith, he giveth us one little mess of sauce to it, in showing us a cause… wherefore it is good reason that we should give them no credence that detect a man of heresy and yet will refuse to become his open accusers. And the cause that he giveth us is this:

For if he say [saith this good man] that he dare not for fear of his life avow it, I have showed a means, in the seventh chapter of the said treatise, how the witnesses may be saved from danger, as by showing the matter to the King and his Council… and that then it is not to suppose nor to think but that they will provide sufficiently for the indemnity of the witnesses in that behalf.

Now, good readers, heard any man any reason made for sufficient, by any man that any reason had in his head—and handled so insufficiently? By this wise reason he maketh as though no man detecting any man of heresy, except he surmised the matter of falsehood and malice, would refuse to be his open accuser for anything save for only fear; nor for no less fear, neither, than only the fear of death. And then for that fear, he hath, as he saith, devised sufficient remedy.

Now, that none other thing can let a man to make himself a party and an open accuser but only fear, I ween there will no man grant him; and that, no less fear than only fear of death—and add fear of all bodily harm thereto—that will, I ween, every wise man less grant him.

But now let us consider whether the fear that himself granteth to be sufficient to let a detector from taking upon him to be an accuser be so sufficiently provided for by this good man that it must needs be that by his provision that fear shall be quite gone. For if that it may be that all his provision notwithstanding, the man’s fear may still remain in his heart—then may it also be, pardie, that be his detection never so true, yet he may for that fear refuse to make himself a party and become an open accuser.

Consider now, therefore, what is the remedy that he hath devised in his seventh chapter. He rehearseth it here again:
that upon complaint made to the King and his Council, “it is not to suppose nor think but that they would provide sufficiently for the indemnity of the witnesses in that behalf.”

I am content to grant him, for the while, that they will sufficiently provide for the indemnity of the witnesses. But first, all this provision is in our case here very needless. And his provision in the seventh chapter of his Division is brought in for another manner of matter: that is to wit, against a provision made in the \textit{spiritual law}, by which it is there devised that in some cases, for dread of peril that may fall to the \textit{witnesses}, the ordinary shall not suffer the party that is detected to know who hath \textit{witnessed} against him. And now would this good man beguile his readers in this chapter, and make them ween that that special provision in that one special case, which provision, I ween, was yet in England never put in ure, were a common order in every man’s case. But consider, good reader, that our case is now that the man refuseth not to be a witness… but is content both to be sworn when he is as a witness called in and to avow then his deposition true, before the judge, in the party’s own presence… and if he may so be used, as a witness, will neither be afraid nor ashamed, nor desire to put the King’s Council to any business about the provision of his indemnity at all. And therefore in our case, this good man’s provision devised for witnesses shall not need for our witnesses, if he let the suit \textit{ex officio} proceed, and receive them as only witnesses.

But on the other side, if this good man put away that suit, and will receive no man first for a denouncer secretly, and after that for a witness too, that will refuse at the beginning to make himself a party and become an open accuser; but, though they were such twenty, will take them all for false shrews and put them to silence except some one of them will take upon him the name and person of an accuser: I say that his provision doth not suffice, not even in his own case of fear, to make every true man content to accuse a heretic… but that we must either let that heretic alone and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{needless}: unnecessary
  \item \textit{manner}: kind
  \item \textit{spiritual}: Church
  \item \textit{dread}. . . \textit{fall}: fear of danger that could come
  \item \textit{suffer}: allow
  \item \textit{in ure}: into use
  \item \textit{order}: carried-out procedure
  \item \textit{receive}: admit; accept
  \item \textit{put away}: get rid of
  \item \textit{false shrews}: lying scoundrels
  \item \textit{except}: unless
  \item \textit{true}: right-believing
  \item \textit{content}: willing
\end{itemize}
let him go make more, or else must we use the suit _ex officio_ still.

“That is not so,” saith this good man. “For if he become an accuser I have devised a remedy for his indemnity.” That is well and properly said. But we speak not of his loss, but of his fear. “Why, what should he need to fear when he can take no loss?” Hath this good man never heard in his life that some man hath been worse afeard than hurt? A man may fear, pardie, though he fear causeless. And if he so do still, then will he not become the accuser and anger him whom he feareth, though the man be bound—and right good sureties with him—that he shall do his accuser no bodily harm at all.

His fear is also, for all the provision that can be made by sufficient surety, not all causeless yet. For he may well and with good reason fear that he that is bound may by some secret shrews of his acquaintance murder him; and that in such wise as when he doth it, he may ween and have hope that it shall never be known for his deed, nor he thereby lose forfeiture of his bond.

There can no man (ye wot well) also kill another but with the peril of his own life. And yet is there daily many a man that standeth, for all that, in dread that another man will for evil will and malice destroy him. And the common laws of this realm so far forth allow and approve his dread, for all that his enemy is upon loss of his own life bound to the contrary, that upon his own oath, they compel the party to be bound, with other sureties for him, in certain sums of money, that he shall not. And yet the man that feared before may peradventure be full feared still, that his enemy will as well adventure the forfeiture of his friends’ money, as he before feared that he would adventure his own life. But yet because it may be that his respect unto friendship will temper his respect of malice and make him loath, for hurting of one whom he hateth, to hurt twain whom he loveth—the man is content, since he can go no farther, to take that may be gotten, and so to sue for such surety to live thereby, though not in full surety, nor clean out

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5 _well and properly_: quite rightly  
10 _though_: even if  
11 _bound_: obligated by legal authority  
11, 27 _sureties_: guarantors; bond posters  
14 _surety_: guarantee  
16 _secret_: clandestine; underground  
18, 30 _forfeiture_: the fine  
20–21 _but___. _life_: without putting his own life in jeopardy  
22 _evil will_: ill will  
24 _allow and approve_: condone and sanction  
29 _full_: quite  
29, 31 _adventure_: risk  
32 _his_: i.e., that enemy’s  
36 _full surety_: complete safety
of fear, yet in surety somewhat the more, and in fear somewhat the less.

But, now, this man that doth detect this heretic, against whom he feareth to make himself an open adversary and accuser, is not in the case before he become his accuser, but may sit still, you see well, and hold his peace, and needeth not to make that heretic his adversary by his willful accusation; which if he should once do, he will never after, haply while he liveth, reckon himself so sure from bodily harm that he may after hap to have by him and by his means, as he will reckon to be in if he accuse him not, nor by such open accusation give him an open occasion of displeasure; no, not for all the provision that all the world can imagine for his surety—except only such surety as a poor man devised once for himself, when he came to a king and complained how sore he feared that such a servant of his would kill him. And the king bade him, “Fear not, fellow, for I promise ye, if he kill thee he shall be hanged within a little while after.” “Nay, my liege lord,” quoth the poor soul, “I beseech Your Grace let him be hanged for it a great while before. For I shall never live in the less fear till I see him hanged first.”

Now will this good man haply say that this manner of reasoning should prove not only that a man for fear would refuse to be an accuser, but also to be a witness… and then were it against myself, too.

That is not so in every case. For commonly no man is in such wise angry with them that are in a matter witnesses against him, and may seem to witness against their wills, for the necessity of their oaths whereto they may be or may seem to be compelled, as with him whom he seeth willingly, no man calling him, come forth of his own offer to accuse him. And therefore the cases be very far unlike. But yet in some cases when the party that is detected is known for mighty, and for so malicious therewith that he will of likelihood hate and mischief any man by whom he taketh any harm, though the other man do it never so much against his will: in such cases the fear may be such indeed that it may peradventure cause some that

5 case: legal action  7 willful: voluntary  8 haply while: perhaps as long as
9 sure: safe  13 imagine: think up; devise  15 such a: such-and-such a; a certain
26 matter: court action  27 for: on account of  // necessity: constraining power
29 willingly: voluntarily  // calling: subpoenaing
33 mischief: do physical harm to; inflict injury on
else would tell the truth, if he should never know them, for
dread of his displeasure to be forsworn rather than abide
the adventure, whatsoever provision any man should devise
for their surety.

And for such case, if it happened, was the law made which in
his seventh chapter this man so sore complaineth of: that the
party detected should in such case be kept from the knowledge
of the witnesses… and as (with the provisions that are in that law
made farther) very good reason is that he should. And therefore is
even here that point of his seventh chapter of his Division,
and all that ever he can farther devise for the farther defense
thereof, fully answered here by the way.

But now saith this good man thereto, that I deny not in
mine Apology that “remedy” of his device to be “convenient for
this realm”… and yet I will not, he saith, “assent that a law be made
that it shall be so.”

In this tale this good, honest man saith untrue. The words in
mine Apology whereupon he taketh hold to say that I deny not
his device to be convenient for this realm be these:

His device, though peradventure it would serve in some one land,
would yet not serve in some other. And they that made that law of the
Church made it as it might serve most generally through Christendom…
whereas this device, though it might serve in England, might not have
served in many places of Almaine that are perverted since; not even
while that matter was in a mammering, before the change was made.

But surely that same law and others of old made against heresies, if
they had been in Almaine duly followed in the beginning, the matter had
not there gone out at length to such an ungracious ending.

These be, lo, the words of mine Apology, the forty-second chapter,
folio 232, whereof this man taketh hold to say that I deny not
in mine Apology that his device is convenient for this realm. For
in these words indeed I do not deny it… but then, you see well, I
do not grant it, neither.

But afterward, in the selfsame chapter, the very next leaf
after, against the sufficiency of his device write I these words
following:

And on the other side, the remedy that he deviseth for the surety of the

2 *be forsworn* : commit perjury  2–3 *abide the adventure* : sustain the risk
9 *very good reason is* : it very much stands to reason  14, 19, 31 *convenient* : suitable
17 *honest* : honorable  23 *though* : even if  24, 27 *Almaine* : Germany
24 *perverted* : become apostate  25 *in a mammering* : not yet settled; up in the air
28 *ungracious* : ungodly / unfortunate  37 *side* : hand
witnesses should not peradventure make the men so bold as in a cause of heresy to meddle in the matter against some manner of man... but that they rather would for their own surety keep their own tongues still than, with all the surety that could be found them beside, have their persons disclosed unto the party.

Lo, good readers, the thing that he saith I deny not, because that in the first words I neither said yea nor nay (for I said not that it might serve in England... but that though it might serve in England, yet might it not serve in Almaine; which words I might have said though I had, in the next line before, expressly said that it might not serve in England)—that thing do I (as you see) forthwith in the next leaf well and plainly deny. And yet you see that he saith here again in this book that I deny it not. This good man seemeth not very shamefast, lo, but if his logic lead him to think that this were a good argument: “In these words he denieth it not: ergo, he denieth it not.” Which argument is even as good as this: “He denieth it not in one place: ergo, he denieth it not in no place.”

Now, where he saith that though I deny not his device to be convenient, yet I will not assent that a law be made that it shall be so: surely as much of his device as I think convenient for the realm, so much thereof will I not be against that a law be made that it shall be so. For where this good man thinketh it convenient for this realm that he which is detected or accused of heresy should be bound, and find sureties, that he shall not hurt neither accuser nor witness: I will not be against it that a law be made that it shall be so. But yet, though that law were made (since, for all that law, there would remain a fear behind in the men’s hearts for whose safeguard such sureties should be found, and peril and danger, too, sufficient to make them draw back from making themselves in heresy open accusers, and in some cases from bearing witness also, but if they thought their names should from the person against whom they should witness be surely kept close and unknown), I would not assent, for my part, to put away the said law that he speaketh of in his seventh chapter of his Division, for chances that might hereafter happen. And much less would I grant to
put away the suit against heretics *ex officio*, into his device of only open accusers, for the harm that would undoubtedly daily grow by the increase of heretics and hindrance of the Catholic faith—no more than, though I blame not the law by which he that is afeard of killing shall have his adversary bound to the peace, I would yet, when the other is so bound by recognizance, have that law stand instead of the other by which he shall if he kill that man fall thereby further into the danger of hanging.

And yet this his gay, glorious device, that he devised in his former book and here now repeateth again, no man needeth to give him any great thank for. For who knew not that always—that whosoever be afeard may desire and have surety for the peace, if he fear himself of his life or bodily harm, and may ask it of course upon his oath as soon as he is afeard (and sooner, pardie, this man deviseth it not), of the King’s ordinary justices, without any other, further suit to trouble the King’s Grace or his Council with.

But yet will all this surety-finding, as you see, never so take away the fear of harm from men’s hearts but that they will rather forbear to be accusers than by the becoming of an open accuser run in the deadly malice of that man by whom, for all his bond and all his sureties found, they fear still always that they shall take hurt.

But here will haply this good man tell me now that I am a man importunate, and one whom no reason can satisfy… and bid me therefore go devise some further thing mine own self for help of the matter, and assay also what further thing any other folk can find therein. And if neither mine own wit nor no man’s else can find no further remedy, wherefore should I then blame him when he deviseth as full a remedy as any man’s reason can find? Forsooth, I can, with any wit that I have—nor, I ween, no more can no man else—find no further remedy than he findeth here himself. But yet, since the furthest that he can find is very far insufficient with change of the suit *ex officio* to keep heresies from great increase and preserve the Catholic faith, I can therefore find at hand a much nearer remedy than this that he

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1 *into*: in favor of
4 *blame not*: find no fault with; have nothing against
5 *of killing*: i.e., of being killed
10 *gay*: brilliant
11 *glorious*: impressive
12 *thank*: credit
13 *desire and have*: request and obtain
14–15 *of course*: by standard procedure
22 *run in*: incur
26 *importunate*: vexatious; exasperating
26, 32 *reason*: reasoning
28 *help*: remedy
29, 32 *wit*: mental ability
31 *blame*: find fault with
98/37—99/1 *this . . . far*: i.e., this one that is so far-fetched
fetcheth so far: that is to wit, to let his new devices pass and let the old law stand still.

And thus you see, good readers, that this piece, wherein he so boasteth the provision that he hath devised so sufficient to deliver the accusers from fear, leaveth them so in dread and fear still, that though there were no let but the fear of bodily harm—yet of many true men that will detect and bear witness, ye should find but very few that would become accusers.

But, now, though there were found provision good and sure to drive out of the accuser’s heart all fear of bodily hurt—yet are there many that dare secretly detect, and by whom the ordinary shall know who can tell more, and will also, if they be called and sworn, and will not uncalled and unsworn tell no tale at all… and they themselves, also, will neither accuse nor yet bear witness neither, nor so much as have it known that ever they spoke word therein. And that not for any fear of their life, for which this good man findeth, as he saith, a “remedy”… but for loss of their living, for which he findeth none, nor never once thought thereon. And yet is the living to some folk as lief almost as the life. And their living they fear utterly to lose (that they get, peradventure, by them whom yet of charity, for their amendment, they detect) if they were once perceived anything to meddle in the matter.

And yet, as I said before, every wise man well wotteth there are many other affections besides all such fear that let men to become accusers in heresy, and yet letteth them not to do otherwise truly and charitably their duty, both in secret detecting of them and also in open bearing witness against them, when they be called forth and commanded by the Court to depose, that will never, as I said, of their own offer make themselves a party and openly become their accuser.

Now, what if there were but two witnesses of the matter, such as were well able plainly to prove the thing? If neither of both may be heard but if the one should become the accuser—when the one were made party, then were the proof lost. But we shall not need much, I warrant you, to care for this case. For of them both, you shall have neither nother that will.

2 stand still: remain in effect 6 let: deterrent 7 true: orthodox; right-believing 9–10 good and sure: quite certain 13 called: subpoenaed // sworn: put under oath 14 yet: even 20 lief: dear 23 anything to meddle: to have any involvement 24 wise: sensible 25 affections: feelings // let men: make people unwilling 27 truly: uprightly 36 care for this case: worry about this situation
Howbeit, yet hath this good man at last found a good way for that. For lo, sir, thus he saith:

And then if the witness will not avow it, but another will give credence to him and avow it: then it seemeth reasonable that they that will give credence thereto, and will report it, be taken as accusers—taking those witnesses for their warrant if they be denied.

If he think it likely that none of them will become accusers that were present and heard it themselves—then is it yet less likely that he will become the accuser that heareth it but at a second hand. And therefore methinketh that this device is not much wiser than the device that a good fellow devised once for his neighbor, that had a great hillock in his close... which for planing of the ground he counseled him to have it away. “Marry,” quoth his neighbor, “I must carry it, then, so far that it were less loss to me to give away the close and all.” “Marry, neighbor,” quoth the other, “I shall soon find a way for that. For I shall devise a provision that it shall be had away and yet never carried hence. For even thereas it lieth, lo, dig me a great pit, and carry it never further, but bury it even in that.” “Where shall I then lay that heap,” quoth his neighbor, “that cometh out of the pit?” At that the other studied a little. But when he had well bethought him—“Marry,” quoth he, “even dig another great pit under that, and bury me that heap there.”

So this man will in any wise, lo, have away this hillock, this suit ex officio, that he saith doth here much hurt. “How shall we have it away,” say we, “without yet much more hurt?” “Good remedy,” saith this good man, “shortly shall I devise. Put accusers in the stead of that suit, and they shall do much better.” “Who shall be the accusers?” say we. “Marry,” saith he, “they that hear them.” “They will not,” say we, “become accusers in no manner case.” “No will they,” saith he, “then be they but false shrews.” “What remedy, then,” say we, “to supply the said suit?” “A ready way,” saith he: “Take some other that heareth the other that heard the heretic speak.”
“He will much less become accuser,” say we, “than they that heard it themselves.” What hath this good man farther to say than bid us take then another that will? And ever we follow still and say we shall never find him; and that word he denieth not, but always biddeth us go get one. And now if the second man were content, or the fifteenth after—yet hath this man marred all this matter with one thing. For you wot well that if the witness that saith he was present and heard it his own ears will refuse to become the accuser himself—this good man will that the ordinary shall take him for malicious or false. Now, then, if we get, with long labor, some other man to accuse—yet him that heard it and would not be the accuser himself, since the bishop must take him always for malicious or false in the matter, he may never accept him therein for a witness. For if we take him for fraudulent and malicious to the party… this man’s credence is ten times less, in all reason, than his is that afterward deposeth to his harm where he was first forsworn while he would fain have done him good; and that man would not this good man believe after, in no wise.

And thus both for the one cause and the other, for lack of an accuser and credence of the witness, you see plainly, good readers, that by this man’s device, if we dig up and bury this hillock ex officio, we shall when we have all done, say he what he list, make and leave that never will then be voided, as great a hillock of heretics in the stead.

And this you see, good readers: that this good man showeth us yet no let, but that for anything that he saith here, if the suit ex officio were changed as he would have it, and instead thereof trust all unto accusers—of which, for anything that he deviseth, we were likely to find few, and as I fear me, verily rather none at all—it were well likely to come to pass, as I said, that the streets should swarm full of heretics ere ever they were convented and repressed by his way. Of which saying of mine as much marvel as he saith he hath, yet showeth he nothing (as you see) wherefore he should marvel of it; nor to the things

3 follow: keep on 4 word: statement 6 content: willing 7 marred all this matter: ruined this whole case 8 heard it: i.e., heard it with 10, 14 false: dishonest 11 accuse: i.e., do the accusing 17–18 was first forsworn: first perjured himself 22 credence: credibility 25 voided: gotten rid of 28 yet: so far // no let: i.e., nothing to keep this from happening 34 convented: summoned // repressed: suppressed 34–35 of . . . hath: as surprised as he says he is at this claim of mine 36 wherefore: on account of which // marvel of: be surprised at
that I prove it with... he no more answereth than though he never heard them.

Which dealing of his you may clearly perceive even by the very same leaf wherein I wrote those words of which he marveleth so much and hath so little cause. For there, lo, my words be these:

For surely if the conventing of heretics \textit{ex officio} were left, and changed into another order by which no man should be called, be he never so sore suspected nor by never so many men detected, but if some man make himself party against him as his accuser: the streets were likely to swarm full of heretics before that right few were accused, or peradventure any one, either.

These were, lo, my words in mine \textit{Apology}, against which you have heard what he saith. Then, because he should \textit{not} need to marvel at the matter, I show by and by what maketh me so to say. For there it followeth thus:

For, whatsoever the cause be, it is not unknown, I am sure, that many will give to a judge secret information of such things as, though they be true, yet gladly he will not, or peradventure dare not, be openly known that the matter came out by him.

Consider here, good readers, that as to become open accusers, I speak here of two lets. One, that men \textit{will} not; another, that some men \textit{dare} not. And yet that they dare not... I put as the more rare and more seldom. Now cometh this good answerer, and for the more seldom, that is to wit, where they dare not, he deviseth a "remedy" which seldom yet, or never, sufficiently shall serve the matter. And the other cause, that I call most common, as in very deed it is—that cause he neither denieth nor any one word speaketh of it, but softly slinketh beside it, as though he had never read it. What manner of answering, good readers, call you this?

Moreover, lest he might deny me that I said true therein, I laid there for the proof the plain, common experience, which this good man himself, I am very sure, but if he be a recluse and have been all his life, knoweth well to be true; and, indeed, he saith not nay.

Then go I there farther yet, and I declare what profit there

8 \textit{order}: procedure; system // \textit{called}: subpoenaed 9 \textit{sore}: strongly // \textit{detected}: reported
14 \textit{because}: so that 15 \textit{show by and by}: state immediately 19 \textit{be}: i.e., have it be
22 \textit{lets}: hindrances // \textit{will not}: do not want to 26 \textit{serve}: take care of
37 \textit{declare}: explain
cometh to the commonweal to give such folk hearing—such folk, I say, as this good man would have rejected back, and taken for false or malicious, because they come secretly and will not themselves openly become accusers. Therein, lo, these are my words:

And yet shall he sometimes give the names of divers others... which being called by the judge, and examined as witnesses against their wills, both know and will also depose the truth, and he that first gave information also; and yet will never one of them willingly make himself an open accuser of the party, nor dare, peradventure, for his ears.

This thing, good readers, every man everywhere findeth true that any order of justice hath in his hand. And in these words, you see well, I told him there once again not only that some dare not, but that though men dare they will not (except the thing do privately touch themselves), for the causes of the commonweal become open accusers. And as I again there told it him—so he here again forgetteth it.

Then go I yet forth a little farther, and these are there my words:

And this find we not only in heresy, but in many temporal matters among ourselves... whereof I have had experience many a time and oft, both in the disclosing of felonies and, sometimes, of much other oppression used by some one man or twain in a shire, whereby all their neighbors sore smarted—and yet not one durst openly complain.

Lo, thus I there declared, good readers, by common experience, that if men should do as this man here deviseth—reject every man for malicious and crafty that will give secret information, but if he be content to become an accuser openly—there should much harm grow thereof... not in heresies only, but besides that, in much other mischief too. To all this gear you see, good readers, that this good man playeth as though he came in in a mummery, for any one word he saith; which should not so have escaped him, ye may be very sure, but that he saw full surely that he could never answer them. For though he would have denied all that I speak of mine own experience, yet in the like

9 willingly: voluntarily 10–11 for his ears: for fear of serious harm 13 any... hand: presides over any legal proceeding 15 except: unless 16 do... themselves: affects them personally 18 forgetteth: disregards 25 sore smarted: suffered greatly 26 declared: showed 30 grow: come 31 mischief: wickedness // gear: stuff 32 mummery: mime show 33 which: i.e., which things 33–34 escaped him: gotten by him; gone unmentioned by him 34 full surely: quite certainly 35 though... denied: even if he had wanted to deny 36 all... of: everything I say from
things so many men of worship daily do prove the thing true that I tell it for, that he could nothing win in his cause by all that denying. And yet did I not mine own self my business in such wise but that I can, if need require, prove it plain enough. But of this gear, as I said, he denieth nothing, nor answereth nothing neither thereunto. And sure may you be that if he had could, he would not have failed to have done the one.

And therefore, good readers, my words stand still so sure that this good man hath not yet, nor never shall while he liveth, be able to void them with all the craft he can, but that if men would be so far overseen as in this matter to follow his device—to put away this old law, the suit *ex officio*, and trust that all would be well helped by means of open accusers—it would at length come to pass, the thing that I have said: that the streets were well likely to swarm full of heretics ere ever that right few should be thereof accused, or peradventure any one heretic either.

And now, good Christian readers—since you see so clearly that by such changing of that law, the Catholic faith should decay—I care not now greatly what he say for his second part, since he hath so foul an overthrow in the first, upon which first part all the matter hangeth. For though he could in his second part make you now good proof not only that there might, but also that there did and hath done, great harm grow by that suit (which he shall never prove you while he liveth; but at sundry times and that of late, where it hath been so surmised, it hath always been proved the contrary): yet since you see well that by this change that he deviseth, while we would help these harms that he speaketh of (that is to wit, that no man should be convented of heresy causeless), we should by the providing for that harm be the cause of far more hurt and harm in the stead—that is to wit, that when that suit were so changed, the Catholic faith should decay, and heretics so should increase that (by such insurrections as they have herebefore made, not in other countries only, but in this realm of England

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1 worship: high standing // prove: find by their own experience 5 gear: stuff
7–8 the one: either the one or the other 9 words: statements // sure: indisputably true
10, 26 while: as long as 11 void: nullify // craft he can: trickery he knows
12 far overseen: very imprudent // follow: go along with // device: idea
14 helped: remedied 20, 34 decay: fall off; erode 22 foul: disgraceful; shameful
22 overthrow: defeat 23 all the matter: the whole case 25 grow by: result from
27 surmised: alleged 29 help: remedy
31 convented . . . causeless: hauled in for heresy without cause
have also attempted the same) put it upon the peril and
assay to rob, despoil, and kill, also, much innocent people
openly, and turn folk from the faith by force, and work
other manner of masteries many more, such as my heart abhorreth
so much as to rehearse or name—since every man may see, I
say, that such harm were in peril to fall by this change of his,
there will, I ween, no wise man follow his fond device in
putting this law away, although he proved well in his second
part that there were harm in the keeping… while he cannot
defend the contrary but that there were incomparably much
more harm in the leaving.

But by what way he proveth that there is great hurt in the
keeping, that shall we now consider. After which well examined…
I shall again return, good readers, eftsoons unto the
first: that this suit ex officio taken once away, the streets were
likely to swarm full of heretics. And as clear as you see that
point already—and that this man hath therein neither answered
nor once touched such things as yourselves see that I said therein
before—yet shall I make it you anon, with the farther folly of his
device, doubly (ere we depart) so clear.

Concerning the second part, thus, lo, this man beginneth:

But to put the party that is complained on to answer, and to
condemn him if he say contrary to that the witnesses have said,
not knowing who be the witnesses, nor who be his accusers: it seemeth
not reasonable to be accepted for a law. For as I have said in the said
treatise, if he that is accused knew their names that accused him, he
might percase allege and prove so great and so vehement cause of
rancor and malice in them that accuse him, or bear witness
against him, that their sayings by no law ought to stand against
him. As if there were two men that had sworn the death of another… and
because they cannot bring it about, they imagine how they may
bring him to all the shame and vexation that they can, and thereupon
they appeach him of heresy—if he in this case knew their names,
he might prove their rancor and malice. And because he knoweth
them not, he cannot prove it. And also the witness may be such as shall
have his lands by escheat after his death. And if it be said that these
cases fall so seldom that it ought little to be pondered—so may it be
said likewise that it falleth but seldom that the witnesses in heresy
stand in any fear of them that they accuse. And then to make a
general law to prohibit all men that they should not have knowledge
of the witnesses in no case, it is not reasonable.

Now, good readers, one thing opened unto you which is
truth, which this man of wiliness hideth from you and would
make you ween the truth were contrary—divide, after that
known, all this mischief and unreasonableness that he telleth
us here into twenty parts… and with the bare knowledge of that one
truth, nineteen and a half of all his false, feigned mischiefs
are gone.

The truth is, good Christian readers, that except only one
case, whereof he speaketh in his seventh chapter of his Division,
where to let the party know the witnesses were peril—to which
I have answered him both in mine Apology, first, and since
even in this same chapter before—else, in all other cases, the
witnesses whose depositions shall be taken and laid against him
to prove him a heretic, and upon which deposition
sentence of condemning him for a heretic shall be given
against him, he shall see them and shall hear their depositions
too. So that if there be any such great causes as this good
man here imagineth that might happen, of enmity, or
hope of lucre, or any much less either, the judge both may and
will consider them before the sentence.

“But why shall he not know them forthwith, when he is first
convented?” For it were not well done he should, no more than the
King’s Council, that many times call malefactors before them
upon secret information first, use always there by and by to
disclose who told them the matter and what; which if they should,
and by and by bring him forth, then though the suspect would
confess haply something thereby the sooner—yet should it be
but that thing which he thought the other knew. Whereas
while the thief knoweth not who hath given the information,
and yet thinketh by his examination that among his many fellows, though they be thieves all, yet some false shrews there be, he misguesseth among and weeneth it were one where indeed it was another... and so instead of one felony, to light there cometh twain.

But at another time and in another place, before he shall have any judgment thereupon, he shall commonly see them sworn and hear them speak, too.

And here I say “commonly” because that sometimes, percase, in point of judgment, he shall not have them brought forth and sworn in his presence, nor peradventure never hear them speak in the matter. For they may happen to be some that deposed and died, too, before himself were taken; and some haply that were his fellows confessed his felonies at the gallows, when they were on the ladder. And some peradventure became approvers when they were cast, and called for a coroner... and the law, keeping no store of him but hanging him up forthwith, useth yet his information and all these others’ too, which may happen to come so many together and so likely to be true that his life may go therefore, and be well worthy to, and yet neither himself nor the inquest never hear any one witness sworn, neither the first nor the second, neither at the indicting nor at his arraigning.

Now may it so fortune in like wise, and sometimes so doth it, too, that folk some good and honest depose in cause of heresy against some one man that is detected thereof. And haply there depose also some others of his own affinity... and in deposing against that one man, detect by their depositions another man, of the selfsame company, that is then walked far off (no man can tell where), that appeareth plainly, upon all their oaths, peradventure the very chief heretic of all. If he hap long after, when these witnesses be dead, to come again into the country and teach heresies afresh, and one or twain detect him—they shall now be sworn and shall be brought forth face to face before him, that he shall object against them what he can before his judgment pass. But yet those
old depositions shall not serve for naught, but are *adminicula probationis*, though the men be dead. And against all reason were it that it were otherwise. Howbeit, what they said he shall hear... and also who they were.

Lo, this is, good Christian readers, the manner of that suit, whereof this good man would here make us ween the contrary, and that men were commonly condemned of heresy by depositions of those men whom he should never know. And therefore, since the truth is indeed that all the wrong which he speaketh of, he groundeth upon a plain untruth, though he make not this lie wittingly himself, but, hearing some folk say so, weeneth that it were true: yet is, as I said before, all his reason spilt... and, as I told you, the harm that he layeth in that point, if he should divide it into twenty parts, nineteen parts and a half were now clearly gone. For there remained but that one case which he would have here seem common, and yet in his seventh chapter of his first book he declareth himself that the case is but special; that is to wit, where the witnesses are kept away for fear. Else, in all the remnant, this man’s harms that he layeth here against the law be very clearly gone.

And therefore his two gay cases of swearing a man’s death and winning a man’s land by escheat have place but in the special point of that one special law. And yet are his two cases such as, well considered, are of no great effect. For if we should regard those two cases—the publishing of the witnesses’ names would seldom remedy the matter. For it might then as well hap that such folk might hire others that should bear such false witness as do the thing themselves, and of likelihood so would they rather do.

But seeing that his cases, for the far fetching and likelihood of so seldom fortuning, were likely to be taken for fond—yet, for the favor of his own devising, he was loath to scrape them out, but excuseth the devising of them thus:

And if it be said that these cases fall so seldom that it ought little to be pondered—so may it be said likewise that it falleth but seldom that the witnesses in heresy stand in any fear of them that they accuse.

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1–2 *adminicula probationis*: aids to proof
7 *condemned*: found guilty
9 *wrong*: injustice
11 *make*: tell // *wittingly*: knowingly
12 *so*: that // *weeneth*: supposes
12–13 *all... spilt*: his whole argument ruined
13 *layeth*: claims that there is
18, 22 *special*: exceptional
20 *layeth*: alleges
21 *gay*: brilliant
22 *escheat*: forfeiture
23 *special*: particular
25 *publishing*: making publicly known
27 *hire*: bribe
29 *rather do*: do instead
31 *fortuning*: occurring // *fond*: foolish
34, 35 *fall(eth):* occur(s)
36 *in heresy*: concerning heresy
Now, if this answer of his were good and true, that it happeth as seldom that the witnesses stand in any such fear: then he assoloth his own reason himself. For then hath he no cause to complain, for the law to keep the witness close is made but for to serve in that special, seldom case where it happeth such fear to fall.

And therefore is his last cause verily not very shamefast, where he maketh as though the law were made general, “to prohibit all men that they should not have knowledge of the witnesses in no case.”

And as for in this point of his, whereupon all his whole matter hangeth, to show you that he saith plain untrue, and groundeth all this gear, of always keeping witnesses close, upon a plain, open lie: I will for this time take none other witnesses against him but his own plain, open words. For in his seventh chapter of his Division, lo, thus, good readers, he saith:

And in the chapter there that beginneth “Statuta quaedam,” it is decreed… that if the bishop or other inquirers of heresy see that any great danger might come to the accusers or witnesses of heresy by the great power of them that be accused: that then they may command that the names of the accusers or witnesses shall not be showed but to the bishop or inquirers… or such other learned men as be called to them, and that shall suffice… though they be not showed to the party. And for the more indemnity of the said accusers and witnesses it is there decreed… that the bishop or inquirers may enjoin such as they have showed the names of such witnesses unto… to keep them close upon pain of excommunication, for disclosing that secret without their license. And surely this is a sore law: that a man shall be condemned… and not know the names of them that be causers thereof.

Now, good Christian readers, here you see plainly, by his own words, that the cause of that law is special, and serveth but whereas there is fear that the witnesses might stand in danger by reason that the person detected were a man of great might and power, which happeth very seldom, and almost never till it be well nigh past remedy. And therefore now you see by these
words of his own that those other words of his are too shameful—where he now saith, here, that the law is general and forbiddeth “all men that they should not have knowledge of the witnesses in no case.” Upon my faith, except this good man see better how to salve this sore than I see—I would not have written such another point in my book, for more than all the paper cost, and the printing too.

But now, as I say, since you see that all these griefs of his be gone save in this one only case of so great probable fear, while he groundeth all the remnant upon a great, open untruth—it is, you see well, a very seldom grief that is left. For I never saw, nor to my remembrance read, nor, trust in God, never shall see the need, that ever any great man whom folk needed to fear was condemned in this realm for heresy, save only Sir Hugh Oldcastle once (in the time of King Henry V), that was then Lord Cobham; nor yet he neither, till that through his heresy he fell to treason too, and would have been the captain of heretics in a sudden traitorous insurrection.

And therefore as for this harm that this good man telleth us here, that ariseth by the suit *ex officio* in heresy, this point is, as you see, both reasonable if it happed, and in law sufficiently provided for… and yet, besides that, so seldom happeth here in this realm that it was folly for him to speak thereof… and yet no more toucheth indeed the suit *ex officio* than if the suit were begun and pursued by some great man that would and feared not to profess himself for accuser. And thus is this case utterly nothing to purpose… and all the remnant is (as you see also by his own words proved) grounded upon great untruth. And therefore, all this that he hath said set aside for naught—let us now see what other harm the good man findeth further. Lo, good readers, therein thus he saith:

Also Sir Thomas More denieth not but that by reason of the law *Ex. de hereticis*, *ca. Ad abolendam*, which is recited in the seventh chapter of the said treatise, that a man may be driven to a purgation without any offense in him, or be accursed, as if he be notably suspected, and yet not guilty, as it may well be; and yet he will not condescend that that
law should be changed, but saith, in fortifying thereof, that “verily” he thinketh that “he which cannot be proved guilty in heresy, and yet useth such manner of ways that all his honest neighbors ween he were one… and therefore in their conscience dare not swear that he is any other… is well worthy to do some penance.” Truly this is a marvelous persuasion: that a man should be put to his purgation… because his neighbors dare not swear that he is no heretic.

Now, good readers, because this good man beginneth here to fortify his word with that I did not in my said fortieth chapter of mine Apology deny “that a man may be driven to a purgation without any offense in him, or be accursed, as if he be notably suspected, and yet not guilty”: I will first bring you forth mine own words written in the said chapter; and afterward, then, shall we see whether he can take such great hold upon my words as he would it should seem. Lo, good readers, these are my words (folio 220):

It may be sometime (albeit very seldom it happeth) that in heresy, upon other vehement suspicions, without witnesses a man may be put to his purgation, and to penance also if he fail thereof; which thing why so many should now think so hard a law as this Pacifier saith there do, I cannot see… nor those wise men, neither, that made the law. And yet were they many wise men… and not only as wise, but peradventure many more also in number, than those that this Pacifier calleth many now, that, as he saith, now do find the fault. For though it be alleged in the Extra. de hereticis—yet was that law made in a general council. And verily methinketh that he which cannot be proved guilty in heresy, and yet useth such manner of ways that all his honest neighbors ween he were one indeed, and therefore dare not swear that in their conscience they think him any other… is well worthy to do some penance for that manner of behavior whereby he giveth all other men occasion to take him for so naughty.

Now, good readers, where this man taketh me that I say a man may be driven to his purgation without offense: you see well I say not so… but I say that he doth a great offense, and well worthy were to be driven to his purgation and to do penance, too, if he be not able to purge himself… but have used himself so like a
heretic in all good folk’s opinion that he can find no good folk
dare in their conscience swear that they think otherwise.
This, say I, is a great offense and worthy to drive him to this
point. And this good man saith that I deny not but that he
may by the law be driven to it without offense!

And whereas he saith I deny not that he may be driven
there to without witness: wherefore not, I pray you? For the
suspicions being proved by witnesses to be notable and vehement,
wil they not be cause sufficient to drive him to purge
himself of that infamy, or else to do penance for bringing
himself there into, but if there be witnesses of his express
heretical words? No, saith this good man, and marveleth that I
could think this any reason. But why he should so marvel at the
matter, or why I should be ashamed to think so, thereof telleth us
this good man no tale at all, but only saith…

Truly this is a marvelous persuasion: that a man should be put to his
purgation because his neighbors dare not swear that he is no
heretic.

Marvelous God, where was this man’s mind when he wrote
these words? Do I say that he shall be put to his purgation because
his neighbors will not swear with him? Nay, I say that when there
be, by witnesses sworn before his face, suspicions of heresy
proved upon him—then may the ordinary put him to such
purgation, to prove whether they will swear with him or no.
For when they will not, but refuse it, what madman would say
that he shall be put to that purgation then, when he hath failed
thereof, and it already past? This man speaketh here as one that
perceived no piece of the matter.

For whereas I declare that he is in great offense that so useth
himself that none of his honest neighbors dare swear that in
their consciences he is any other than a heretic: this man
taketh it as though they that should swear with him in his purgation
should precisely swear that he were no heretic; whereas
their oath shall not be what he is indeed, but what themselves
think of his oath; they shall not swear that he is no heretic,
but that they believe that he hath sworn true in denying the articles

7 wherefore: why  // pray: ask  8 notable: widespread  // vehement: cogent
11 but if: unless  13 any reason: at all reasonable
17, 20, etc. purgation: See note for 110/34.  24 prove: test out
28 perceived: understood  29 useth: conducts  30 honest: upstanding
36 true: truthfully
laid unto his charge. Like as in the wager of a law, they shall not swear that the defendant oweth not the money, but that they believe that he sweareth truth.

I marvel, in good faith, that this good man handleth this matter in this manner, and without any telling why, marvellest so much that I would think that law reasonable. But surely, though he could make me a proper reason for his part, and myself another for the same side also—yet would I think myself right unreasonable if I should upon his reason and mine advise and counsel this realm, in a matter concerning the conservation of the faith, to alter and change that law that was made, by so great advice, by a whole general council of all Christendom… wherein there were (I doubt it not) men that had as good zeal to keep innocents out of trouble as any of us twain… and much more reason also than we both have, too. But that point that I showed him in my *Apology*—that the same provision that is made in the law *Ad abolendam* was also made in a general council—that tale he letteth go by, as though he heard it not.

But then he cometh forth with a word or two of a further fault in the law, which either the man understandeth not what it meaneth, or else it is hard for any man to think that he meaneth well. These are his words, lo:

And verily the law is that their oath in that case should not be accepted—for the said chapter *Ad abolendam* is that if a man be notably suspected of heresy, that he shall purge himself after the will of the ordinary or be accursed; and so the purgation of his neighbor will not serve. Let every man therefore consider whether the said law be indifferent or not. And if it be not, let them put to their hand to have it broken. And I think, verily, they shall deserve great thank of God if they turn it to a more indifferent way than it is at now. For under this manner the most innocent man that is may of malice be reported to be suspected of heresy and be not so indeed, and so be driven to his purgation or be accursed; and then there is another law, that if he in that case of an indurate mind stand so accursed a year, he shall be punished as a heretic, and that is by the law *Extra. de hereticis, ca. Excommunicamus*.

1 *wager of a law*: a form of trial in which the defendant could gain acquittal by producing eleven witnesses who would swear to belief that what he or she had said under oath was said truthfully

2 *sweareth truth*: is swearing truthfully

3 *proper*: fine

4 *part*: side

5 *any*: either

6 *through*: even if

7 *tale*: bit of information

8 *word*: statement

9 *chapter*: i.e., canon

10 *law*: i.e., canon law

11 *tale*: bit of information

12 *word*: statement

13 *chapter*: i.e., canon

14 *law*: i.e., canon law

15 after: according to

16 *ordinary*: bishop

17, 36 *law*: i.e., canon law

18 *tale*: bit of information

19 *word*: statement

20 chapter: i.e., canon

21 *law*: i.e., canon law

22 *purification of*: compurgation of; character witness given by

23 *purification of*: compurgation of; character witness given by

24 *purification of*: compurgation of; character witness given by

25 after: according to

26 *ordinary*: bishop

27, 33, 35 *accursed*: excommunicated

28, 30 *indifferent*: impartial; unbiased

29–30 *put . . . broken*: set about having it changed

31 *deserve . . . of*: merit a great reward from

32 *purification*: compurgation

33 *purification*: compurgation

34 *indurate*: obstinate
This provision, good readers, that he speaketh, which is in the
law Ad abolendam (recited in the fifth book of the decretals, in the
title De hereticis)—that such as were suspect should purge themselves
at the arbitrament and discretion of the ordinary—was, as I before
have said, afterward looked upon and allowed in the general
council called Concilium Lateranense, as every man may soon
perceive that will well consider the paragraph “Excommunicamus”
afterward in the same title. For whereas that law there
saith, “Qui inventi fuerint sola suspicione notabiles, nisi statim
innocentiam suam congrua purgatione monstraverint,” these
words “congrua purgatione” be referred unto the other law (Ad
abolendam) thereof made before, as both appeareth by such doctors
as write upon the laws… and also, to him that will consider it well,
it well appeareth by the self text. For in the paragraph “Excom.” be
rehearsed part of the very words of the law Ad abolendam,
whereby we may see that the council there looked upon that law.
And so was, I say, that provision which this man calleth so
unreasonable not only made by Pope Lucius III, but after
also made again, by ratification, by Pope Innocent III in a
whole general council. And read the stories whoso will, and he
shall find, both by Platina and Cronica cronicarum too, that
both this Pope Lucius and this Pope Innocent were very virtuous
men. And here had it been reason now, therefore, that this
good man, since he findeth in this point so great a fault in the wits
of both these good popes, and in all them that were members of that
general council, and in all the wits of all Christian regions
that have used and allowed that law for good ever since—reason
would, I say, that he should at the least have laid some reason
here wherefore the law cannot please him that he which,
though he be not proved guilty of the deed, is yet proved suspect,
should purge himself after the arbitrament of the ordinary;
that is to wit, in such manner wise as the ordinary
should think convenient, upon the qualities of the person and
circumstances of the cause considered.

Suppose, now, that there were none other manner of purgation
but by his neighbors’ swearing with him, and that those words

1 speaketh: mentions
2 recited: quoted
3 decretals: papal decrees concerning canon law
4 in the (same) title: under the (same) heading
5 purge: clear
6 Concilium Lateranense: i.e., the Fourth Lateran Council
7 paragraph: article
8 under the (same) heading
9 be referred: have reference
10 the other law (Ad abolendam):
11 paragraph: article
12 doctors: theologians
13 upon: about
14 the self text: the text itself
15 rehearsed: quoted
16 the very words of the law
17 whereby
18 the self text: the text itself
19 rehearsed: quoted
20 stories: historical accounts
21 which
22 had it been reason: would reason have dictated
23 would: i.e., would dictate
24 laid: given
25 upon: on
26 give
27 approved: taken
28 upon: on
29 which: who
30 manner wise: kind of way
31 convenient: appropriate
32 upon: on
33 cause considered: upon consideration of
“ad arbitrium episcopi” were not written in the law: were it yet reason to accept his oath in whatsoever manner the man would himself devise it? And with as few hands as himself list appoint? And with what manner folk soever himself would bring?

Nay, sir! For it may so be that there shall be good cause why, sometime and in some place, that the ordinary should not put some man to that kind of purgation which if he did, were he never so naughty, he should be sure of compurgators, peradventure more than enough.

For it hath been seen in many countries ere this, and sometimes in England too, that some evil preacher, preaching plain, open heresies, should yet, if he might have been put to such purgation, have lacked no hands to lay on the Book with him, that he never spoke such words. Howbeit, where the words are open and plain heresy, the law hath provided another way for the remedy good enough.

But then have there been some preachers such ere this, that teaching plain heresies to their familiars secretly, would preach in such wise abroad that their words should have two senses, and one boot serve for either leg, like a shipman’s hose… and so should be tempered as the people should have occasion always to take them to the worst… and himself if he were examined would say before the ordinary, and swear too, that he never meant but the best.

Now, when it should by good witnesses appear that his manner was such the people took much harm thereby, and always took his words so that they thought he so meant them that he purposed by them to set forth and advance those things that were stark heresies indeed: if the ordinary should then appoint him with other compurgators to purge this suspicion—were these suspicions never so vehement, he should lack no compurgators to purge himself every week, and then do as he did before. And many good simple folk, taking him even as he meant, should fall into his heresies the while… and ween while he preached so still, that to believe that way were no peril.

1 ad arbitrium episcopi: at the determination of the bishop
3–4 as . . . appoint: i.e., as he himself arranges to have put on the Bible on his behalf
9 naughty: wicked 12, 15 open: obvious / publicly witnessed 14 Book: Bible
15, 20 words: statements 19 familiars: close associates 20 abroad: in public
21 shipman’s hose: very loose-fitting trousers worn by sailors
23 to the worst: in the worse way 26 appear: be made evident 30 appoint: arrange for
32 never so vehement: no matter how cogent 33 purge himself: clear himself (of them)
34 even: just
And therefore those wise men that made the law left the thing in
the ordinary’s discretion to assign him that is proved suspect of
heresy such kind of purgation as the circumstances of the
person, and the people and the time, shall most require.

And therefore will the ordinary, to some man so suspect, sometimes
assign him (to purge his suspicion that with his lewd manner
of preaching he is fallen in, to the great hurt of his hearers)
that he shall openly confess that those heresies that the people
took him to mean be very false heresies indeed... and openly
shall detest them and swear that he so believeth them to be... and
swear that he neither meant to teach them nor never was minded
that any man should take him so, nor never would afterward teach
nor hold heresies, but abjure them for ever.

And yet for the further purgation of such suspicion, the ordinary
might also enjoin him some certain things to do
such as may declare the more clearly that he is not of such mind—
as open preaching against the selfsame heresies, and the
doing of some such things as those heresies did stand
against.

And now, by this purgation, this good shall he do—that if he
would after preach the same things again, though he used
again such another wily fashion, yet would his audience then
think thus (as many as had any mind to be good): “Either this
man meaneth not now by his words to teach us that point that
himself hath abjured, and then let us not learn the thing of
him that he would in no wise we should; or else he meaneth to
teach it us still, for all his abjuration. And then wherefore should
we be so mad to believe a false wretch that would make us believe
now that that thing were true... which himself hath openly
confessed and sworn to be false?”

But then will haply this good man say that this abjuration
is perilous, for jeopardy of the relapse. The peril of death by
relapse is not upon every abjuration. But of truth, he
that is abjured upon such things proved as maketh him not
slightly but very vehemently suspected, if he fall after into
And thus this provision for purgation at the discretion of the ordinary is not, I trust, so unreasonable, nor they so unreasonable that made it, nor they so unreasonable that ratified it, nor all they so unreasonable that this two or three hundred years have accepted and allowed it, but that it may now stand by this good man’s leave at this day as well as it hath stood all this while before. But yet is there one thing that he taketh for a thing very sore. “For then is there,” saith he, “another law: that if he that is so proved suspect refuse to purge himself at the discretion of the ordinary, and be for his contumacy excommunicated—that in that case if he of an obdurate heart stand, so accursed, a whole year, he shall be punished as a heretic. And that is,” as he saith, “by the law Extra. de hereticis, capitulo Excommunicamus.”

This provision was made, as I told you, in the said general council. And whereas he bringeth it forth as though it were a very sore thing and a cruel—it is indeed very favorable. For, saving that I will not do as he doth—go find faults in their doings that were so many so much better and had so much more wit than I—else could I lay a little better cause to prove that provision over-favorable than ever this good man shall find, while he liveth, to prove that provision too sore. And surely he that being proved suspect, and refuseth in such reasonable manner to purge himself thereof as his ordinary shall by his discretion assign him—which must both by law and all reason be his judge, and not himself—showeth himself little to force or care though folk ween he were a heretic: which thing sore aggrieveth the suspicion that he verily is one indeed. And then when he will rather be once accursed than of such suspicion yet to purge and clear himself: he yet increaseth that suspicion twice so sore. But finally, when rather than to purge
that suspicion, he continueth excommunicated all the whole
year, and never will be purged in the while but if he may have
it accepted in such a faint fashion as himself list to offer:
the suspicion of his heresies from sore and vehement turn
by such dealing into plain, open, and violent, so that he can in
reason be none other reckoned but a plain heretic indeed,
whom to tolerate so long doth sometimes little good. And
then since the law is that such as the favor of the Church shall
preserve from the temporal hands should by the law be only
those which, upon their detection, turn of their own offer
meekly by and by, and show good tokens of right hearty repentance—
I will let no man from the inclination toward pity, in
preserving the life of any man… whencesoever he seem penitent.
But yet surely when the Church receiveth again that
man that, by his obstinate dealing, with abiding excommunicated
and contemning the great curse all the whole year rather
than he would purge the suspicion of his heresy but if he
may purge it after his own sweet will, proveth himself at last
to have been a heretic so long, and all that while would not
return but evermore draw back—if the ordinary, for
all that, receive him to grace again, and keep him still and
preserve him from the secular hands—I will not say that he
doeth wrong; but finding him yet repentant, fain would I
see him saved.

But yet without doubt, as far as I can see, the ordinary to save
the man’s life of pity stretcheth out with his teeth the law and
reason both so far that even scantly can any of the both
hold.

And therefore, these laws being such as they be, made and
ratified by whole general council, accepted and used so
long through all Christendom… when this good man cometh
now forth, and upon his own bare reason (as bare as ever I heard
yet in all my life!), because only that an innocent may sometime
take harm (which may happen upon any law that ever all
the world can make whereby there shall be devised any
punishment for the evil folk), he biddeth every man consider
now whether the law be just or not, and if it be not, biddeth
every man put to their hands to have it broken and make a
better, and saith that he thinketh they shall have great thank

1, 16 all the whole: the whole entire 2 while: interim 3 list: cares 4 sore: serious
4 vehement: strong 5, 15 dealing: behavior 5 violent: raging; full-blown
9 temporal: secular 9, 22 hands: authorities 10 detection: being reported (to the bishop)
10 turn . . . offer: repent on their own initiative 11 by and by: right away
11 tokens: indications 12 let: dissuade 14 receiveth again: takes back
15 abiding: staying; remaining 16 contemning: pooh-poohing 18 after: according to
23 fain would I: I would be glad to 26 of pity: out of compassion
27 even scantly: just barely // any: either 30 used: kept in effect
38–39 put . . . better: set about having it abrogated and getting a better one enacted
39 have great thank: receive a great reward
of God therefor—his request is now no better, but in effect even this: that against every wise man’s reason well approved hitherto, every man should in this matter now, either trust unto his, or else at the leastwise every man to his own… and instead of a better old law, make a new much worse. For if his device were followed, it appeareth plainly so there should… and heresies should grow up on height, and the Catholic faith decay. And then God save us from that thank of God that shortly we should with such dealing deserve!

Thus have I, good readers, as you see, clearly confuted this good man’s answer in both the principal points, of which the one was wherein he minded to show that in heresy the suit of office might be left, and that by the leaving there should no harm follow to the Catholic faith… because heretics might as well come to correction by the way of open accusers as by that manner suit.

But in this point you have seen clearly that his device would never so serve the matter… but that it were very likely so to diminish in this realm the Catholic faith with increase of heresies that the indignation of God were sore to be feared thereby to follow thereon—and the realm to fall in trouble and business, with insurrection of the same rebellious heretics that by the change of that law had so been suffered to grow, as other countries have been of late, and this realm was, ere this, so near likely to have been… that for the avoiding of the like peril to fall afterward, it was provided by Parliament of great policy… for the better repressing of heresies, to fortify that law and give the ordinaries yet greater power to maintain it… and with temporal assistance to make it more strong.

His second point was to show that of the keeping of that law there should grow great harm… because the law is so unreasonable, he saith, that innocents may come to trouble thereby without offense.

This part how properly this good man hath proved, that have you seen also… and that he therein is so fully and wholly confuted that when he readeth it again, I suppose he will not now greatly like it.

1 of: from // therefor: for that // even: just 3 hitherto: to this point
7 grow up on height: rise to ascendency // decay: suffer a decline
8 thank of: reward from 9 dealing: conduct // deserve: earn 12 minded: intended
13 of office: i.e., ex officio; see note for 60/29. 13, 15 might: could
13 left: done away with 18 serve: take care of 21 in: into
21 trouble: civil unrest // business: turmoil 23 suffered: allowed
23 grow: increase in number 26 of: out of // policy: prudence 31 grow: come
32 come to: get into 33 without offense: without having done anything wrong
34 properly: admirably
Now, these two thus handled, he cometh to the third point, which though I granted him altogether, yet were he never the nearer. For that point is such as if I win it, then it maketh my part more plain; but on the other side, if I lost it and he won it, yet were mine plain enough. And strong enough were my part with the first point alone. For if by the leaving of the suit of office should follow the increase of heretics—as every man, I think, that wit hath may well see that there would—then though there would some other harm happen sometime thereof, yet must that other harm in reason rather be borne than that.

But now to come, good readers, unto the third point, which if he won altogether could very little serve him—ye shall see him yet, by God’s grace, win him never a piece.

The third point, good readers, in mine *Apology*, you see well yourselves intendeth nothing else but by example of the common laws of this realm to show that the same spiritual law which this man would prove unreasonable is not indeed proved unreasonable by this thing that he here putteth for the proof: that is to say, because that by that law sometime it might hap that a man might fall in peril of a crime which he committed not. For if it so were, now, that in all the cases that I rehearsed of the common law, there could never no man that had not done the deed take any harm so much as a fillip—yet though I had missed in those examples, the thing might yet be true. For there might be, for all that, other examples enough, both in other good laws and in the same too, that a law were not unreasonable, nor to be put away, though there might hap sometime some man take some harm that never did the deed that were laid to his charge. And of truth this conclusion is so clear that it needeth no proof at all. And therefore though he won all that point… yet had he lost the matter. But let us now a little see whether he win this point or no.

And because the effect of all his answer lieth always in this—that he saith always that the example of the common law that I lay is not like the thing that I resemble it unto in the

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2, 9, etc. *though*: even if 2–3 were … nearer: would he have gotten nowhere
4, 6 *part*: side of the argument 4, 5 *plain*: clear
7 *leaving*: getting rid; abolishing 8 *that wit hath*: who has any sense // *may*: can
21 *fall in peril of*: incur the penalty for 23 *rehearsed*: mentioned
28 *put away*: abolished 32 *all that*: that whole 33 *matter*: case 37 *resemble*: liken
spiritual law—I shall first rehearse you mine own words in mine Apology… and then shall I rehearse you his words here, that when you have heard both twain, whether they be like or unlike ye may the more surely judge. These were, lo, good readers, my words:

And verily methinketh that he which cannot be proved guilty in heresy, and yet useth such manner of ways that all his honest neighbors ween he were one, and therefore dare not swear that in their conscience they think him any other… is well worthy, methinketh, to do some penance for that manner of behavior whereby he giveth all other folk occasion to take him for so naughty.

And by the common law of this realm, many times upon suspicion the judges award writ to inquire of what fame and behavior the man is in his county; and himself lieth sometimes still in prison till the return; and if he be returned good—that is to wit, if he be in a manner purged—then is he delivered; and yet he payeth his fees ere he go. And if he be returned naught—then use the judges to bind him for his good abearing, and sometimes sureties with him too, such as their discretion will allow. And then to lie still till he find them is sometimes as much penance to the one as the spiritual judge enjoineth to the other. For the one cometh to the bar as openly as the other to the consistory; and sometimes his fetters weigh a good piece of a faggot, besides that they lie longer on the one man’s legs than the faggot on the other’s shoulder. And yet is there no remedy but both these must be done, both in the one court and in the other; or else, instead of one harm (which to him that deserveth it not, happeneth seldom, and as seldom, I am sure, in heresy as in theft, and much more seldom too), ye shall have ten times more harm happen daily to folk as innocent as they; and of innocents many made nocents, to the destruction of themselves and others too, both in goods, body, and soul.

To this piece, lo, good reader, this is this good man’s answer:

Then he goeth further for maintenance of the said suit Ex officio, and resembleth it to arresting for suspicion of felony, and to the surety of good abearing, and to indictments—whereupon men be put to answer at the common law. And how far these resemblances

1, 2 rehearse: quote  4 surely: accurately; unerringly
7 useth such manner: acts in such kinds  // honest: upstanding  8 ween: think  // were: is
9 is . . . do: well deserves, it seems to me, to have to do  11 naughty: wicked
13 fame: reputation  // the man: i.e., the person suspected of having violated the common law
14 lieth: is kept  // till the return: i.e., till the reports come back  15 purged: cleared
16 delivered: released  17 use the judges: the judges are wont
17 bind . . . abearing: put him under a peace bond  18 sureties: bond posters
19 lie still: i.e., go on being kept in prison  20 spiritual: ecclesiastical
21 consistory: Church tribunal  22 faggot: bundle of sticks (carried by a convicted heretic as a punishment)  28 nocents: guilty people  33 for maintenance: in support
34 resembleth: likens  // felony: a crime such as murder or theft
35 surety of good abearing: peace bond  36 put to answer: put on trial
vary from the suit *Ex officio*, he in some place openeth it himself. But yet, for a more plain declaration therein, I shall say a little farther in that matter. First, as to the arresting for suspicion of felony, it is indeed an old law of this realm that for suspicion of felony a man may be arrested, so that he that doth arrest him upon a reasonable cause doth suspect him; but it is a general rule that he shall never be put to answer upon that arrest, but proclamation shall be made that if any man will lay anything against him that is so suspected, that it shall be heard; and if none such come, he shall be delivered, without fine or any other punishment, with a good exhortation of the judges that he shall take good heed how he ordereth himself in time to come. And then Master More likeneth the penance of such a man that hath been in prison upon suspicion of felony, and so delivered by proclamation, to the bearing of a faggot for heresy. For he saith that the one of them shall come “as openly to the bar as the other to the consistory.” And that sometimes his fetters shall “weigh a good piece of the faggot, besides that they lie longer on the one man’s legs than the faggot on the other man’s shoulder”; but he rehearseth not how they lie many times longer in prison for heresy than they do either for suspicion of felony or for good abearing. And over that, I dare say that there are but few but that they had well liefer abide the pain to be thrice acquitted by proclamation, and peradventure oftener, than once bear a faggot for heresy.

How goeth now, good readers, this answer of this good man unto the purpose: to prove the trouble of him that is arrested upon suspicion of felony to be unlike to the trouble of him that is sued *ex officio* for heresy, touching the point that I resemble them for?

The point, ye wot well, for which I speak of the arresting for suspicion of felony is to show that, likewise as it may happen a man for heresy to fall in trouble sometime though he were no heretic indeed, so may it happen a man sometime to be troubled upon suspicion of felony though he be no felon indeed—and yet both the one law necessary and the other too… and neither of both may be forborne. Hath this good man

1 vary: differ // openeth: explains  2 declaration: clarification  
2 therein: i.e., on it (the subject)  3 in that matter: on that subject  
4, 5, etc. felony: a crime such as murder or theft  5 so: provided  
7 put to answer: put on trial  8 lay anything: make any accusation  
10, 14 delivered: released; set free  11 of: from // ordereth: conducts  
16 consistory: Church tribunal  19 rehearseth not: does not mention  
20 good abearing: (a breach of) good conduct  21 over: besides  
21–22 had well liefer: would much rather  23 after: more often (than that)  
27 touching: concerning  29 wot: know  35 forborne: dispensed with
proved us the contrary of this? That, you see well, he hath not. And then hath he not, pardie, proved them unlike.

He weeneth he saith somewhat when he telleth us that upon the arresting upon suspicion of felony, he shall not be put to answer till he be indicted. What is his trouble the less for that? If he lie in prison till the session, as he may hap to do, were it not more his ease to be put to answer before and acquitted, if he be not faulty (for of such folk we speak), than for lack of putting to answer lie still in prison the longer?

As for that that in conclusion, if no man lay naught to his charge at the sessions, he shall be delivered by proclamations—so shall he that is suspected of heresy, too. For if there be nothing found against him, he shall neither be driven to abjuration nor purgation, but delivered quite, howsoever that either this man mistake or would make other men mistake the matter to the contrary.

And as to that that the one shall pay no fine—no more shall the other neither.

If this man will peradventure say, “Since that the ordinary findeth the man not suspect in the end, why did he take and arrest him for suspect in the beginning?”—because that in the beginning the man seemed upon good considerations suspect, and seemed likely to flee; and upon his examination, the matter fully searched out, the causes of suspicion so well voided that the ordinary declareth him for discharged without any other purgation. “But yet hath it mishapped him to have some harm the meanwhile”—and so hath it him also that was arrested upon suspicion of felony, that never was after indicted, but delivered forth free upon the proclamation.

I see no great difference between these two men in all this matter yet, save that the one lieth at his own finding, the other at the bishop’s cost.

For whereas this man saith that he which is delivered by proclamation hath always given him by the justices a good lesson at his departing: if the bishop give not the other a good lesson at his departing too, then is he somewhat to blame indeed;

2 pardie: by George 3 somewhat: something 6 lie: remain // session: court session 7 were . . . answer: would it not be more to his advantage if he were put on trial 8 faulty: guilty 14 delivered quite: completely set free 24 voided: refuted 25 purgation: clearing of the defendant from suspicion 31 lieth: is kept in prison 31 finding: provision; i.e., expense 36 to blame: at fault
but in good faith, I hear say that he doth so too. And therefore where is this difference yet? I look always for that. For as for the shame of open bringing forth, is both one, as I said—saving that the session hath commonly much more people present to gaze upon the one than in the consistory looketh upon the other.

And where this man saith that they lie longer in prison for heresy than they do either for suspicion of felony or for good abearing—if he speak of those which are in conclusion found in no more fault concerning heresy than those that are delivered by proclamation be found at the session concerning felony… I dare be bold to tell him nay. And I am very sure the truth will prove so too. But, now, if he speak of those that appear upon the end in such fault that by the law they be bound to abjure… then is it good reason that they lie longer indeed. And so lie there, as reason is, sometimes some for felony, too, reprieved upon causes from one session to another, and sometimes kept, you see well, all the whole year and more—and that, sometimes, such as are in conclusion never indicted neither, but, after all that, delivered by proclamation;

and yet good causes in the meanwhile why they were kept so. And, therefore, whereas this man saith that they be in worse case that bear a faggot: very truth it is somewhat, and so is it reason they be. For they be not faultless, but convicted of the fault. And our dispicions is of innocents that happen by the law, the one law or the other, to take harm without their fault. For if he would compare the faulty with the faulty, then must he compare the one bearing the faggot with the other at the very first time borne up with the rope.

And therefore I did in that place not only show that he that is innocent may by arresting for felony hap to have as much harm as he that is innocent and arrested for heresy, but that he may happen to have sometime also as much harm as he that for the first time is found faulty in heresy and plainly convicted thereof. And surely, save for the further peril upon his further fault, so may it hap indeed; and yet, as I said in my Apology, the law must needs be kept, but if

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3 *is both one*: i.e., that is the same in both cases
9 *good abearing*: (a breach of) good conduct
10, 14, etc. *fault*: guilt
15 *is it good reason*: it well stands to reason
16 *as reason is*: as is reasonable
17 *reprieved*: remanded
22 *whereas this man saith*: as regards this man’s claim
22–23 *they . . . faggot*: those who (have to) carry a faggot are in a worse situation
24 *faultless*: guiltless
25 *dispicsions*: discussion
26–27 *their fault*: their being guilty
27 *faulty*: guilty
28 *the other*: i.e., the thief or murderer
29 *at . . . time*: i.e., for the very first offense
29 *borne up with the rope*: i.e., hanged
30 *show*: point out
31 *by arresting*: i.e., through getting arrested
32 *have*: receive
34 *faulty in*: guilty of
35 *the further peril*: i.e., that of being burned at the stake
37 *but if*: unless
you will by the change have five thieves for one. And thus, as for this piece, of arresting for suspicion of felony, the case hath he not proved unlike, touching the purpose that I put it for, but for my part very strong. And so hath this good man, in this first piece of the third point, a very great fall.

Then cometh he next unto another case that I spoke of also: that is to wit, arresting upon good abearing. And whereas in mine Apology that piece is the third, that piece in his answer he maketh the second; and I see why well enough. For since himself seeth that he answereth it so slenderly, he wrappeth it up in the midst because it should be the less marked, and would end with another piece wherein himself weeneth that he saith somewhat better.

Now, as for this good abearing, to the end that ye may see the better how gaily this good man answereth it, I shall first rehearse you the words of mine Apology that he maketh this answer to.

After that I have showed there that the judges of the spiritual court be not so foolish but that they had liefer not meddle with any man save only upon some such open inquisition as are indictments of felony, for avoiding of obloquy, saving that necessity compelleth them to take this way, for fear that with sufferance of heresies to go forth and grow, all might at length through God’s displeasure very far grow to naught… I say there farther thus (folio 225):

Necessity sometimes causeth also both the temporal judges and the King’s Council to put some folk to business, or dishonesty sometimes, without either jury or bringing of the accuser to the proof of the matter in the party’s presence.

For if the judge know by sure information that some one man is of such evil demeanor among his neighbors that they may not bear it; and yet that the man is, besides, so violent and so jeopardous that none of them dare be known to speak of it: will there no judges upon many secret complaints made unto them, without making the party privy who told him that tale, bind that busy, troublesome man to good abearing? I suppose yes, and have seen it so, too; and wrong would it be sometimes with good, poor, peaceable folk in the county but if it were so done.
among. And myself, when I was Chancellor, upon such secret
information have put some out of commission and office of justice of the
peace, which else, for much money, I would not have done, and yet if I were in
the one room still and they in the other again, but if they be amended
(whereof I neither then saw nor yet hear any likelihood), I would put them
out again, and never tell them who told me the tales that made me so
to do.

Lo, good readers, here you see that in this piece I mean
nothing else but that whereas this good man findeth a fault
that the spiritual judge should meddle with any man for heresy
without an open accuser complaining to him, or an open
presentment in the beginning… I show there that necessity is the
cause, and forthwith afterward I prove it, which this good
man dissembleth here and inverteth here the order for the
nonce. And I show that necessity (lest much more harm should
grow thereon) causeth the temporal judges and the King’s honorable
Council, too, to put some man to business sometimes and
some to dishonesty, both without either indictment or open
accuser, or suffering him to make answer either… and thus be
they fain to do, but if they should suffer many great harms to
grow. Now mark well, I require you, how substantially
this good man answereth this. These are his wise words, lo:

And then as to the arresting for good abearing, truth it is that a
man by commandment of the justices may so be arrested, but he
shall never be put to answer upon that arrest, but only bound, and
sureties with him, of his good abearing. And if he can no such surety
find, and he have lain there long in prison, then the judges by their
discretion may send a writ to inquire of his fame, and of his
behavior, which is called a writ De gestu et fama, whereof Sir Thomas
More maketh mention in his Apology; and if it be found for him,
upon that writ, that he is of good fame and behavior, then he
shall be delivered. Whereby, Master More saith, he is “in a manner
purged”; and by that saying it seemeth that his meaning is that that
delivery should be resembled to his purgation upon the suspicion
of heresy, as is said before. But how far they be unlike, it appeareth
thus: when a man is delivered upon the said writ De gestu et fama,
he is delivered as a man proved to be of good honesty and to be cleared by his neighbors of that he was suspected of. And when he is purged upon the suit *Ex officio*, or for suspicion of heresy, he is put to penance by the ordinary, as a man suspected, whereof he is not cleared, and so shall he be taken among his neighbors as a man worthy to do that penance for his offenses; wherefore it appeareth evidently that they be nothing like.

In this answer, good reader, one piece he answereth with an untruth, another piece he leaveth half unanswered, and to another piece he maketh none answer at all.

For whereas he saith that he that is purged of heresy in the suit *ex officio* is put unto penance by the ordinary as a man suspect, whereof he is not cleared: this man saith untrue, and wotteth not, also, what he meaneth. For the spiritual judge not only (as I have said), though he were sore suspected in the beginning, when he took him, yet if he find in the examination those suspicions cleared he putteth him to no further business at all; but also, if it be not so fully cleared but that there remain some tokens of suspicion, of which he think it good to purge him by the oath of himself and some other compurgators with him, he putteth him after that purgation unto no penance neither. But, now, if it so be that there be well proved such suspicions as are so vehement that, though they prove not precisely the deed, yet make every man that heareth them, that he can none otherwise think: there will the ordinary cause him to abjure... and the rather to purge him of the suspicion that he were still naught, and afterward still would be naught, than that he was not such before. And then, for using himself in such wise before: though he do penance he hath but right.

But in all those other cases of suspicion purged, he saith untrue; for they do no penance at all.

Now, concerning the good abearing awarded by the justices: he answereth that it is true... but it is, he saith, unlike unto this matter, because the justices (saith he), when he hath long lain in prison, may by their discretion (if he can find no sureties) award a writ *de gestu et fama*.

1 honesty: repute 2 that: what; that which 6 worthy to do: deserving of having to do 7 evidently: plainly; manifestly 14 wotteth... meaneth: also doesn’t know what he’s talking about 15 sore: strongly 16 took: arrested 19 tokens: traces 23 vehement: cogent 25–26 cause him to: have him 26 purge: clear 27 naught: wicked 28 using: conducting 29 hath but: is done nothing but 32 good abearing: peace bond 35 sureties: bond posters 36 de gestu et fama: of behavior and reputation
This is but half an answer, nor scant so much neither. For first himself saith that this writ they may send out after that the man hath long lain in prison... so that then the man, yet without presentment or open accuser, hath had that long lying in prison in the meanwhile for his evil demeanor at home among his neighbors, whereof they durst not openly make complaint. And this doth, as you see, this good man not deny, which is for my purpose enough.

But then saith he further for me, in that he saith they may award that writ if they will. Wherein he implieth that if they will not, they may upon good discretion let him yet lie still and let the writ alone. And so hath he therefore put in one point further for me.

But yet hath this good man one stopgap for me still, to prove always that my example is not like... and that is that whereas in the suit ex officio, men be put to answer, upon this arrest and imprisonment upon good abearing, the man shall never be put to answer.

For answer of this evasion I will ask this good man this: that he which is in prison upon good abearing shall never be put to answer, whether is it his profit or his loss? If his loss: then his not putting to answer maketh the matter of my resembling much the more strong for me. And if this good man dare answer me that it is his profit: then will I no more but pray him to put the fellow in choice, and then if himself choose it for the better, let him lie still for me.

This you see, good readers: that this man saith not nay but that upon good abearing, by discretion of the justices, for all the writ de gestu et fama, a man may lie long in prison and some peradventure ever; howbeit, I trow it happeneth not so.

And yet can neither this good man say, nor, I suppose, no man else, but that it may sometime hap by possibility that all that information were wrong. But that is a thing not likely to hap so often but that if we should for such may-haps put away that order which order very necessity brought up—there
would much mischief grow, and many great harms would there
then hap indeed.

Now, as touching that I said that the King’s Council used
also sometimes upon great secret information to put some folk
to business and to some dishonesty too… and I letted not to lay
some example in mine own deed while I was Chancellor myself,
by putting some out of commission in their counties…
which dishonesty, save for such secret information, I would not
for a hundred pounds have done them, and dare yet upon such
secret information very well avow the doing… and doubt not but that
if I should declare the cause openly, both good men and
wise men would allow my deed: to all this point, lo, this good man
saith nothing at all, but letteth it go by his ears as though he
never heard it.

And thus, as I told you, concerning this piece of good
abearing—this good answerer hath here borne himself so well
that some part he answereth with untruth, some part he answereth
a great deal less than half, and some part never a
deal. If men be content to take this fashion for answering—let
any man make then against me as many books as he will, and
put in what matter he list, and I shall never need to study much
for an answer, but may make answers to them all shortly and
short enough, and answer a long book in space of one paper
leaf.

But now let us see how he handleth this third piece, of
indictments at the sessions. For that piece he setteth in
the rear ward, to stay therewith all the field. But now, that you
may see what strength he hath in that ward—I shall first bring
you forth that ward against which it fighteth. In mine Apology,
folio 222, these are my words, lo:

And because this Pacifier taketh it for so sore a thing in the spiritual
law that a man shall be called ex officio for heresy, where he shall not
know his accuser: if we should change the spiritual law for that cause,
then had we need to change the temporal, too, in some such points as
change it when ye will, and ye shall change it into the worse for aught
that I can see, but if it be better to have more thieves than fewer.

For, now, if a man be indicted at a sessions and none evidence given

1 mischief: evil // grow: come 3 as touching: as regards 5 business: trouble
5, 8 dishonesty: disgrace 5–6 letted… in: did not forbear to use for an example
6 while: when 7 by: in 10 avow: stand by 12 allow: approve of
15, 25 of: on 16 borne: conducted 18–19 never a deal: not any amount
20 make: write // will: wants to 21 what… list: whatever stuff he chooses to
27, 28, 29 ward: guard 27 stay: defend // all the field: the whole battlefield
31 sore: sorry; terrible 31, 33 spiritual: Church 34 had we: we would
34 temporal: civil 36 but if: unless 37 evidence: testimony
openly at the bar (as many be, and many may well be; for the indicters may have evidence given them apart, or have heard of the matter ere they came there, and of whom be they not bound to tell, but be, rather, bound to keep it close, for they be sworn to keep the King’s counsel and their own), shall, then, the party that is indicted be put unto no business about his acquittal? And who shall tell him there the names of his accusers, to entitle him to his writ of conspiracy? This Pacifier will peradventure say that the same twelve men that are his indicters are his accusers, and therefore he may know them. But what helpeth that his undeserved vexation if he were faultless? For amends the law giveth him none against any of them, nor it were not well done he should; but may when he is after by other twelve acquitted, go get him home and be merry that he hath had so fair a day—as a man getteth him to the fire and shaketh his hat after a shower of rain. And, now, as it often happeneth that a man cometh into a shower by his own oversight, though sometimes of chance and of adventure: so surely, though sometimes it hap that a man be accused or indicted of malice, or of some likelihood which happed him of chance and not his fault therein… yet happeneth it in comparison very seldom but that the party by some demeanor of himself giveth occasion that folk have him so suspected.

In this piece my purpose is, good readers, as you see, to show that likewise as a man shall in the suit ex officio, for heresy, not know his accuser—so may it also happen, many times, that no more he shall neither, when he is at the common law indicted of felony. And I show also therein, as you see, that though it may sometime hap either of malice or chance—yet it seldom happeneth, for all that, that the party so falleth in trouble without some default of himself; and that the common, general law may not for such seldom, special haps be forborne. To this piece, lo, this good man answereth me thus:

And then Master More saith yet farther, that upon indictments at sessions, the indicters use not to show the names of them that gave them information. And he saith farther, that they may not show their names; for they may not disclose the King’s counsel nor their own. But as I take it, that prohibition of opening of the counsel in this case is only to be understood of their own counsel among

themselves, after that they be sworn; but for opening of the names of
them that gave them information before they were sworn, I know no
prohibition. And if they will not show their names, they be not bound
to do it... for they be not bound to help the party to his writ of
cracy, but as they list to do in conscience.

Now, good readers, all this pretended defense is nothing
else in effect but a fair confession that it is indeed true, the
thing that I said myself: that he which is indicted of felony
may be (as for any advantage that he can take thereby) as ignorant
sometimes who be his accusers as he shall in the suit ex
officio. And thereby may happen sometimes that he which is
faultless shall not be all saved harmless... and when he hath
had his harm, shall be remediless. And yet, for all that, the
law not unreasonable, nor, for avoiding of much more
harm, may not be forborne. And therefore, as for my purpose,
even at that point might I have left, and needed to go no
farther. And then, as you see, this good man had been quite
answerless.

But yet went I farther, where me needed not, and that this good
man saith that I did of necessity whereof for this matter I had
of truth no need. And yet would I not now but I so had done
indeed. For I have thereby the better brought to light what
lack this good man hath of any sufficient answer. For these
are there, lo, good readers, therein my farther words:

Now, if this Pacifier say that yet here is at the leastwise in a
temporal judge an open cause appearing, whereupon men may see
that the judge calleth him not but upon a matter brought unto him;
whereas the spiritual judge may call a man upon his own pleasure if
he bear the party displeasure: this is very well said as for the temporal
judge. But what saith he now for the temporal twelve men? For ye wot well,
they may do the same if they were so disposed; and then had I as lief
the judge might do it as they. For in good faith, I never saw the day yet but
that I durst as well trust the troth of one judge as of two juries. But the
judges be so wise men that for the avoiding of obloquy, they will not be
put in the trust.

And I dare say the ordinaries be not so foolish neither but that they

1 after that they be: after they are 1, 2 sworn: put under oath 1 opening: revealing
2 know: i.e., know of 3 will not: do not want to // show: disclose
3, 4 bound: obliged 5 list: choose // conscience: i.e., good conscience
6 pretended: alleged 7 effect: fact; actuality // a fair confession: an open admission
12 faultless: not guilty // harmless: unharmed 13 had: suffered
15 forborne: dispensed with 16 even: right // might: could // left: left off
17 had: would have 19-20 that this . . . necessity whereof: this . . . necessity that of which
21 of truth: in actuality // would . . . but: I would not now have it any other way but that
26, 29, 30 temporal: secular 27, 28 call(eth): summon(s) 28 spiritual: ecclesiastical
31-32 had . . . they: I would as soon have it done by the judge as by them
32 in good faith: in all honesty 33 troth: uprightness; integrity 34 obloquy: ill repute
36 ordinaries: bishops
Here you see that I mean in these words that though the Pacifier would tell me that the temporal judge hath by such indictment at the leastwise an open cause appearing, whereupon a man may see that the judge calleth him not of his own mind, but upon a matter brought unto him—I would then grant him that this is indeed a good ease to the temporal judge, to keep him out of obloquy. And the spiritual judges be not so unwise but that they would be glad of such another pavis, saving that they be bound to take the other way, and suffer themselves evil people’s obloquy, for avoiding of the harm that else would follow, by the decay of Christ’s Catholic faith. Which thing I there prove well too, as you shall after see. This, as I say, would I have granted always this good man. But then I would always therewith have told him too that yet all that tale of his had nothing touched the point… but that always, for all this tale, the man that was indicted, if the matter were indeed untrue, was never the nearer the knowledge who were his accusers, to get any amends thereby, no more than he that is called of office for heresy before a spiritual judge. And hear now what he saith to this, and whether we be by his answer, for the point that was meant by me, any one inch yet the nearer. Lo, good readers, this is his proper answer:

And then because he can none otherwise do but confess a great diversity betwixt them that be put to answer Ex officio and them that be put to answer before the King’s justices upon indictments at the common law—for there the judges have sufficient and apparent matter to put them to answer upon, and in the other there is none, but that the spiritual judge upon a displeasure may do it ex officio, if he will—therefore he goeth yet farther and saith that the twelve men may yet do the same, and make a man to be called that is not guilty, if they were so disposed. And truth it is, they may indict a man that is absent, and that is also not guilty, and be untrue, if they will; but yet in such case the twelve men be known that do it, and be

1 as fain: be as glad to 2 fall to naught: come to ruin 8 ease: advantage
9 obloquy: ill repute 11 pavis: a large shield protecting the whole body from harm
11 bound: obliged 12 evil: bad // obloquy: bad-mouthing
13 decay: falling into decline; erosion 15 after: later 17 all that tale: that whole speech
17 had . . . point: had no relevance at all 19 matter: charge
21 of office: See note for 60/29. 22 spiritual: ecclesiastical 24 proper: excellent
26 confess: acknowledge (that there is) 26–27 a great diversity: a big difference
27, 28 put to answer: put on trial 30 apparent: discernible 33 called: summoned
35 untrue: unjust
also compelled to be upon the inquiry—for they may not be
upon it, but they be thereto assigned—and also, the party upon their
verdict shall not be put to answer before them, as it is upon the suit
Ex officio, but before the King’s judges, before whom the indictment
is no attainder to the party…but that he may be found not guilty, notwithstanding
that indictment. And though Master More say that
he never saw the day yet but that he durst as well trust the troth of
one judge as of two juries—I think the judges will can him but little
thank for that praise; for surely juries must needly be believed and
trusted. And therefore it is not the manner of the judges to lay untruth
upon a jury, nor yet to commend them that do it, but it be proved
before them of record after the order of the law.

Here you see, good readers, that touching the point that we
spoke of, all this tale helpeth nothing, but goeth all about another
matter: to prove another difference between the suit of
office and indictments, as though I had said there were no
difference between them at all. But I was never yet so mad to
be of that mind. For then must I say they were both one. And
then were every indictment a suit of office, and every suit of
office an indictment, if there were no diversities
between them at all.

And therefore if his diversity shall serve aught for the purpose,
he must make it appear that the suit of office because
of that difference, and because it is not like indictments in
that point, is therefore in heresy either very clearly naught or
else that at the leastwise it were somewhat better that they should
never put any man to answer in heresy but either upon
open accusation or presentment had before. For else if he ween
to win this point of me with showing forth a difference—if
his difference prove me no such thing as I tell you—he may for
the matter as well bring us forth any verse difference, at adventure,
that he learned at grammar school.

Now, when he hath laid all his diversities on a heap, and would
thereupon conclude that because of those diversities, the suit of
office were naught and unreasonable: I say that followeth nothing;
for it proveth yet no farther, at the farthest, but that the order
of the common law were better, and not that the other were naught. For it might well be, for all that, that the common law might be good enough though they that secretly or openly come now and inform the inquest came either secretly or openly and likewise informed the Court.

And now saw I well that to this point was there none answer for this good man again... but to tell me that in such things as they now trust the inquests, it were peril instead of juries so much to trust the Court, because the judges might then feign matter against men, and say they were secretly informed. To this, since I saw what trust the realm must needs put in the judges’ hands, so far above the weight of the first indictment, that serveth for nothing but for an information; and seeing also what manner of men they be that be chosen to be judges, so that there is nothing of so great weight but that it well may be put in their hands—I reckoned them of such troth that, save for evil folk’s obloquy to-themselves-ward... else to the people there should come no harm though the trust that we put in the indicters were instead of them put in the judge himself. This I there said, lo, and this I think indeed. For as I said there, I never saw yet the day but that I durst as well trust the troth of one judge as I durst trust the troth of two juries. What hath this good man answered me now to this? To all this gear here is, lo, his worshipful answer:

I think the judges will can him but little thank for that praise. For surely juries must needs be believed and trusted. And therefore it is not the manner of the judges to lay untroth to a jury... nor yet to commend them that do it... but it be proved before them of record after the order of the law.

This answer of truth is not worth a straw. For as for that he saith the judges will for that praise can me little thank: that word were somewhat if I had said it for their thank. But I said it, in good faith, not for their thank at all, but because it is very truth that I never saw the day yet indeed, nor never, I trust in God, I shall, but that I may well, and so will I do indeed, trust the troth of one judge as well as the troth of two juries. I would here wit of this good man, what displeasse is this to any

1 naught: bad  
8 were peril: would be dangerous  
8–9 so . . . Court: to trust the Court as much  
9 feign matter: trump up charges  
17 evil: bad // obloquy: verbal abuse // to-themselves-ward: (coming) toward them  
24 gear: stuff // worshipful: impressive  
30 of truth: truly  
32 that . . . somewhat: that statement would have some merit; he would have something there  
33 in good faith: in all honesty  
37 wit of: (like to) know from
jury? What untroth is there here laid unto them, or to any one man of them? I will use one word now, this once, which this good man useth often. For now will I “say a little farther, and that is this” (though this man may hap to think the saying strange): I will not let to believe the troth of some one man, of whose troth I make myself sure and doubt nothing at all, even as well as the troth of a great many at once, though they be all such as I believe every one of them as well as I believe himself. And I also believe some one judge alone, not in cunning but in truth, as well as I will believe both himself and all his fellows too. For some one man may be such that if he should tell me a tale as of his own perfect knowledge—I would so little doubt it to be true that I could believe it no better though all the town told it with him. Lo what a great untroth I lay here to the juries! And this I say for myself. And now will I, with this good man’s leave, say yet a little farther, and I ween I shall not say so alone. I suppose verily that there be very few but so that it might make a final end in their matter—except haply some such as trust more in the favor of the county than in the troth of their cause—they would rather be content to put it wholly into the judge’s hands than trouble the county with calling up of the juries; whose troth yet many times deceiveveth them that in an evil cause have very great trust unto them.

And yet in all this say not I that the common order and long-continued law of this realm, to try the matters by juries and in felony or treason never to proceed but upon indictments, is not good; nor that the contrary way were better. Marry, two things I say: that in treason and felony this ordinary law of indictments is many times fain to be helped forth by another means much like in many things to the suit ex officio; and that is by diligent, politic search and examinations besides, both by the King’s honorable Council and the judges, and justices of peace, every man for their part in every part of the realm; and else would there many such mischiefs pass by, and by indictment never would be found. And some

14 untroth: lack of integrity  1 laid: ascribed  2 word: turn of phrase 5 let: forbear  // believe: believe in  5, 6, 22 troth: integrity 6 make . . . all: feel confident and have no doubt at all  // even: just 9 cunning: deviousness  11 fellows: colleagues; fellow judges  14 lo: look 14 lay: ascribe  18 make . . . matter: put a definitive end to the charge against them 18 haply: perhaps  20 troth: uprightness  23 deceiveveth: disappoints 23 evil: meritless; not legitimate 26 matters: cases  28 marry: indeed 30 is . . be: many times has to be  32 politic: sagacious  35 mischiefs: crimes 36 found: established as having been committed
great and clearly proved felonies before divers and right
worshipful of the King’s Council… have I wist, ere this, that
never could be gotten to be found by indictment in their
counties, for all that. Howbeit, such examinations hath
caused yet many mischievous people to be brought to their
punishment… and have put also many such other unthriffs
in fear, and made them refrain from thev and draw themselves
to thrift… or else, notwithstanding that there are yet thieves
enough, there would be without doubt many more.

The other thing that I will say is this: that all these
differences and diversities that this good man putteth here between
indictments and the suit ex officio prove yet nothing
that the suit ex officio is not good… but only, at the very uttermost,
that the order not to proceed without an open presentment
were better. For as I said before, though this law by
indictments be better in felony now—yet were not the other
way naught: if the law were so that the judges might proceed
and put felons to answer without indictments… as in treason
is used in this realm, by the law martial, upon war
reared, as we saw by experience in Captain Quintyn, Captain
Genyn, Corbet, and Belke. And yet is that law not evil, though
that our own common law be better; and that though we trust
the juries never so well, yet might we trust the judges as well.
And this may I say, methinketh, without any dispraise or
fault finding in the juries at all. For let him assign me two
juries of very well-known good men… and then if he will ask me,
“What fault find you, sir, in these men?”—I will answer him, “Marry,
sir, no fault at all, I. I take them all for good men and true,
and think they will not say but truth; nor I never said nor
thought otherwise.” But then would I assign him by name one of
our judges again… and say, “Now, sir, that I trust the troth of
your two juries well, what fault is that that you find in this
judge’s troth, that maketh you to check me so because I will
trust him no worse than I will trust them?” For that is, ye wot
well, all that ever I said: that I would trust the judge as well, and
not that I would trust him better. And yet if I had said I would
of the both trust the judge better—I had not by that word, neither, dispraised the troth of juries. For he that saith he will better believe twenty-four than twelve dispraiseth not the troth of the petit juries, but believeth them well also, save such as be found false. And thus I have showed you that I may well say the words that I said without any finding of any fault in any juries. And it appeareth also meetly well that himself cannot well say the contrary—that is to wit, that he will not trust a judge so well—this can he not say without some manner of distrust in their troth. And yet since their Worships be so well known that this good man’s distrust cannot impair it—they will, I dare say, forgive him. Howbeit, since the judges would (as this man saith, and as I dare also say they would) be sore discontent with me if I distrusted the troth of the juries, the juries may now no less do again of courtesy than for his worse opinion of the judges’ troth somewhat be angry with him.

Now herein see I none other shift for this good man but, for the maintenance of his matter, to say that in the common law, the law would be good enough in felony, though the trust were put in the judges, to put traitors and felons to answer without indictment… but in heresy it could not be good before an ordinary; and would lay for his cause a diversity between the one judge and the other, and say that our judges be good men and worshipful, and ever have been and ever shall… and that the ordinaries be, and ever have been and shall be, very false and naught. Other shift hath this man none, that I see, than even to say thus. And verily his book of Division, save that it saith nothing to the praise of temporal judges, that I now remember, yet to the dispraise of the spiritual (for those, algates, that be now) saith even, in effect, as much—yea, and rather yet worse too, save that the color of “some say” saveth him from saying it himself.

But, now, if he defend himself with that fashion again—what the juries will say, that can I not tell; for the panels be not yet called. But as for our judges, I know their Wisdoms 1

1 had not: would not have // word: statement 2 dispraised: cast aspersions on 5, 26 false: dishonest 7 meetly: fairly 10 Worships: Honors 18 maintenance of his matter: support of his case 24 worshipful: respectable 26 naught: wicked 27 even: just 29 algates: at any rate 30 even: quite 31 color: subterfuge
and their Worships such, that I am very sure in his so saying and his so lying upon the spiritual judges, they would can him no thank at all.

And verily, that the spiritual ordinaries be not at these days likely to be such, the temporal judges being so good as they be, there is among many other one likelihood this—that he hath chosen the one that hath chosen the other: the King’s gracious Highness himself; which, having on both sides very good to choose of, hath, I dare say, been as circumspect in choosing of the ordinaries as of the judges. And yet, lest in their absence the officers of their own choice might hap to misorder the matters—His Grace keepeth not two bishops of all the realm out of their dioceses, nor, to say the truth, not so much as one. For he whose attendance His Grace useth most is far the most part of the year in his own diocese every day.

And therefore, as I said before, all these verse differences, and all these diversities, which this good man layeth between the suit *ex officio* in heresy and the not proceeding without indictments upon treason or felony, proveth at the very furthest not that the suit *ex officio* is naught, but that not to proceed but upon a presentment were the better a way. And then I say that it is a poor tale and a cold, if a man would come forth and labor us to break every old law long used in this realm, which he could not prove but that it were good enough… but yet would needs have it changed because that if it were now to make, himself could, he saith, make it better.

But now will I come a little nearer unto this good man, with the other point that I touched before; that is to wit, that it is not in this matter enough for this good man to prove us that not to proceed without open accusation or presentment is the better way both upon treason and felony, but if he prove us further, that the same way were also better in heresy.

But then have I showed before, in mine *Apology*, that in heresy that way will not serve. And that have I there proved by the plainest proof that in such manner things any man can

2 upon: about 3 can . . . thank: give . . . thanks 6 likelihood: indication
6–7 he . . . other: i.e., the same person has chosen both the one and the other
8 which: who 9 good: i.e., good ones 9, 10 of: from 11 disorder: mismanage
22 tale: speech // cold: unpersuasive 23 labor us to break: try to get us to change
28 touched: touched upon
make: that is to wit, by common, open experience… whereunto this good man of policy would give none ear, but in his answer he hath left it quite out.

And therein he fareth, lo, like a guest that maketh his reckoning himself, without his host… which is therefore after fain to reckon again… as I shall now bring in here one penny more into this good man’s reckoning which I perceive well himself would very fain forget. Lo, thus wrote I further, good readers, touching this point in that selfsame chapter of mine Apology (folio 226):

But yet will peradventure this Pacifier say that sometime, in some very special case, he could be content that the spiritual judge should upon his discretion call one for suspicion of heresy ex officio; but he would not have men commonly called but either by accusation or presentment in their sene(s) or indictments at the common law. I had as lief, for anything that I see, that this Pacifier should say thus: “By this way that they be called I would not have them called; but I would have them called after such an order as they might be sure that then they should never be called.”

For as for accuse folk openly for heresy, every man hath experience enough that ye shall seldom find any man that will… but if the judge should set an officer of the Court thereto, without any peril of expenses; and then were this way and that way all of one effect. And as for presentments and indictments, what effect would come of them concerning heresy, ye see the proof, I trow, meetly well already.

For this is a thing well known unto every man: that in every sene, every session of peace, every session of jail delivery, every leet through the realm, the first thing that the jury have given them in charge is heresy. And for all this, through the whole realm how many presentments be there made in the whole year? I ween in some seven years not one. And I suppose no man doubteth but that in the meantime some there be. I will not be curious about the searching out of the cause, why it is either never or so very seldom presented, not five in fifteen years. But this I say: that since some will not, some cannot, and none doth… if he should put away the process ex officio, the thing should be left undone; and then should soon after, with heretics increased and multiplied, the faith be undone; and after that, through the stroke of God revenging their

1 common: general  2 of policy: out of expediency  4 maketh: writes up
4 reckoning: (hotel) bill  5–6 which . . . again: who therefore has to redo the billing
8 very fain forget: very much like to leave out  9 touching: concerning
11, 16 Pacifier: Peacemaker; Appeaser  13, 14, etc. call(ed): summon(ed)
13 one: someone  15, 25 sene(s): ecclesiastical visitation(s)
15 had as lief: would just as soon
17–18 after such an order: in accordance with such a procedure
19 for heresy: of heresy  20 but if: unless  21 thereto: i.e., to do this
21 peril of expenses: danger of having to pay the court expenses if the defendant is acquitted
22 one: the same  24 trow: suppose // meetly: fairly
26 session of peace: sitting of the justices of the peace
26 of jail delivery: concerning a release from jail // leet: session of a misdemeanor court
29 ween: think  31 curious: solicitious; studious
32 presented: formally charged against a person  33 will not: do not want to
33–34 put away: do away with
malice and our negligence, should by sedition, and trouble, and dearth, and
death, in this realm many men, both good and bad, be undone. And
therefore, for conclusion of this piece, my poor advice and counsel shall be
that for heresy—and especially now, this time—men shall suffer the processes
ex officio stand; and for as many other sins also as are only
reformable by the spiritual law, except there be any such sins of them
as ye think were good to grow.

What hath this good man, good readers, said unto this piece? What shall we, good readers, say now to this good man, that in this
goodly answer of his (which he would were taken for so
strong), unto this piece—upon which great part of the matter
hangeth—saith not so much as mum... but letteth it slip even by,
as though he were one that had for this point been born deaf and
thereby dumb!

And now, concerning this point, I will yet say a little further:
that in places more than one, good evidences have been given unto
inquests of plain and open heresy, which yet would not find it…
that would upon much less evidence have shortly presented
felony.

And one of these matters, with the priest that preached it, when I
was Chancellor was brought unto me by right worshipful
folk, that before me avowed it in his face. And yet could not all
they cause the inquest to present it, but some folk began to fall to
favor him; and had he not been taken by good worshipful
temporal men, many would have flocked after him, and have
followed him about, for pleasure of his new-fashion preaching.
And yet, for all that flocking, though they had made two or three
hundred (as they should haply within a while if a few good
men had not letted it), they had been yet but a handful to their
good Catholic neighbors; and yet, by such flocking together,
and following on a plump, they should have seemed in
folk’s eyes far the more part; and at length, peradventure, if
they went on and were not letted, they might grow to it indeed.

That priest I delivered unto his ordinary, and that with good
and plain proof of his heresy… which was indeed, soon after
that, abjured. But for this I tell it you: that the jury would not find

1 trouble: civil unrest // deaRth: scarcity  5 stand: i.e., to remain in effect
6 spiritual: ecclesiastical // except: unless  7 were: would be // grow: cultivate
10 Goodly: sizable  12 mum: hmm // even: right
17 find it: i.e., find the defendant guilty of it
18–19 presented felony: formally charged someone with a crime such as murder or theft
20 matters: cases (concerning plain and open heresy)  21, 24 Worshipful: respectable
26 about: around  27 though: even if  29 letted: prevented // had: would have
29 to: compared to  31 on: in // plump: band; cluster
32 far the more part: the vast majority // at length: eventually // peradventure: perhaps
33 letted: hindered
it, for all the good folk that gave them open evidence. And that this is not in one case, nor a thing that happeth seldom, as I said in mine Apology, plain experience proveth. Whereby you may see that in heresy, if the judge should not *ex officio* proceed, till the matter were presented by the juries—heretics might be bold to proceed on apace, and so they would, I warrant you, and multiply full fast.

And thus you see, good readers, that concerning this piece, this good man hath in every point a great overthrow.

And therefore, now, the last clause of this fifteenth chapter of his is clearly wrested awry. For as though he had all proved (whereas all is disproved!)—he finisheth his chapter thus:

And thus it appeareth that Master More can neither prove the suit *Ex officio* to be like to the arresting of men for suspicion of felony or for good abearing, to putting of men to answer upon indictments, nor yet to them that may be accused by twelve men and know not of it; and that for the causes before remembered. Wherefore it seemeth that though it were clearly put away, the streets should not swarm full of heretics never a whit.

This good man saith here I cannot prove any of all these things like. But every man may well see, that list to look back and read it, that there is not any one piece, of all these that he speaketh of, but I have very plainly proved it very like, for the purpose and intent that I resemble it for. And this shall every man clearly see that will advise piece by piece.

And therefore—while upon differences and diversities that he putteth between them such as let them not to be like in the thing that I liken them for, he boasteth in conclusion that I cannot prove them like—I shall show you what thing, now, this boast of his is like.

If it had come in this good man’s head to devise a law, and write a book therefor, to kill up all the bandogs throughout all the realm (wherein his time, as unwisely as it were bestowed, had not yet been so ill spent as it hath been in this), and then would lay for the cause that bandogs do spend victual, and will sometimes bite folk, too: if I would then write against his wise
book and say that he might by that reason kill up hounds and
greyhounds and all, for they must eat too, and will sometimes bite
children too . . . but likewise yet as they may not yet, for all that, be
forborne, both for the pleasure that they do and also for that
they help to take us some such beasts of venery as men eat,
and hunt and kill also such other beasts and vermin as else
would destroy much victual . . . so the bandogs may not be
forborne neither, for they both defend husbandmen’s
houses from thieves and help folk home, with their beasts too, sometimes,
such as would not else come home—now might this good
man, by this reason that he useth here, write again and defend his
politic device against bandogs . . . and therein answer me thus.
First, that for defense of folk’s houses there shall need no bandogs
at all . . . for men may make their servants watch,
or make fast all their doors . . . and when thieves would break in,
defend their houses themselves. And as for such beasts as would
not come home, if they be not over heavy they may bear them
home . . . and those that be too heavy to be borne home, tie ropes to
their tails and draw them home. And then might he say yet
a little further . . . and that is this: that he marvelled much that I could,
for shame and fear of mine own conscience, resemble and liken
together gentle hounds, or goodly greyhounds, to such ill-favored
mastiffs. And then, to prove them very far unlike,
put his differences and his diversities and say, “A mastiff hath,
you wot well, a great jolt head, and a great muzzle and a thick,
boistous body . . . whereas a greyhound hath a proper head, with
a goodly small, long snout, and fair long, slender sides; and the
hounds yet much less like, too.”

And thereupon might he there conclude as he now concludeth
here . . . and say thus:

“And thus it appeareth that Master More can neither prove the
mastiffs to be like to the greyhounds nor to the other gentle
hounds neither, and that for the causes before remembered.
Wherefore it seemeth that though all bandogs and mastiffs
were clearly put away, yet men’s houses should be defended
well enough, and their beasts brought home well enough too, so
they should, lo.”

1, 11 reason: reasoning  1 up: off  4, 8 forborne: dispensed with  4 do: give
5 venery: game  6 vermin: birds injurious to game or to crops
8 husbandmen’s: country folks’  12 politic device against: sagacious expedient regarding
13 need: be needed  14 watch: keep vigil; stand guard  17 over: too // may: could
17 bear: carry  18 borne: carried  19 draw: pull  21 resemble: compare
22, 32 gentle: noble; of an excellent breed  22 goodly: handsome // ill-favored: ugly
24 put: state  25 great: big // jolt: clumsy  26 boistous: bulky
26 proper: fine  27 goodly: nice-looking // small: narrow // fair: attractive
31 appeareth: is evident  33 before remembered: previously mentioned
35 clearly put away: completely done away with
Now, if he royally triumphed upon this, and thought he had avoided me well—I could no farther go therein, in good faith, but let him take that glory to him. And surely with any wise man that readeth over, here in this chapter, both his words and mine, and one after another considereth wherefore I resemble them together… shall find, I dare boldly warrant, that with his differences and his diversities he winneth like worship in this.

But now to turn again, as I promised, to the first point; that is to wit, his device of open accusers. Consider well this, good Christian reader: that whereas this good man in his book of Division, where he would have the suit ex officio left off—he then reserved us yet both open accusations and presentments, to put heretics to answer upon. But now, in this fifteenth chapter of his in his book of Salem and Bizance, for favor toward the Catholic faith he deviseth no more against heretics but open accusers alone… and saith that open accusers shall sufficiently serve the matter. And unto that here that I say, and that every man seeth—that no man will in heresy make himself a party by way of open accusing—thereto saith this good man nothing.

He seeth, pardie, very well that in many things forbidden by sundry statutes for the common weal—as against the great excess of apparel, and some such other things—the law doth invite and hire every man to the accusing of the breakers of the same by giving them the one half of the forfeiture. And yet for all that—as long and as many laws, and as sore, as have been made against such excess of apparel, and as much as some men might have won by the suit—yet how few folk have been found that have taken those actions and thereby accused those offenders, the King’s courts can declare, and the little amendment may show.

Riots be open things and inquirable, with pains also set upon the concealers, yet many great riots go by unfound and the concealers never spoken of; and a statute was there fain to be made that it might be pursued and punished by the King’s Council without presentment, and that even by suit in manner ex officio, too. For though the parties that made the riot and the party upon whom it was made were so well agreed
again that neither nother would by their wills have the matter moved or any more spoken of it—yet may the King’s Council, upon secret information, cause the King’s attorney to make a bill of the riot, and put the parties to answer, and send for what witnesses they will.

Now this man will not be so mad, I trow, to lay me for a difference that in the suit ex officio there is none accuser, and that here, the King’s attorney is. For as I have said before, if the spiritual court should assign in like wise an officer of their own without either peril or cost—what would it avail the party?

If this good man had, therefore, devised rewards for accusers, and great pains of forfeitures for them that would conceal and hide—yet would not all that have helped well the matter in heresies. And weeneth he then that his bare device of open accusers alone, neither compelled nor hired, will help it? Nay—not and take indictments and presentments to them, with pains set upon the concealer, too.

And this hath all Christendom, good Christian readers, perceived; and therefore in every good Christian country do they use the same suit of office which upon a light reason this man calleth unreasonable, and have used many long years. This law also which this good man thus impugneth upon his own unreasonable reason was thought a law right reasonable, as I told you, in a general council at Rome there held by Pope Innocent III, and many great, wise, and well-learned virtuous men thereat. There were the ambassadors of all the realms and countries christened… and among the others, the ambassadors of England. There were also the four great patriarchs; that is to wit, the patriarch of Antioch and the patriarch of Alexandria by their deputies… and the patriarch of Constantinople and the patriarch of Jerusalem in their own proper persons. In this great full and whole council of Christendom was this law agreed and approved. And from the

1 nother: the one nor the other
2 moved: brought to trial
3–4 cause . . . to make: have . . . write up
4 a bill of: i.e., a bill of indictment for
5 to answer: on trial
6 spiritual: ecclesiastical
7–8 what would it avail: what good would it do
9 hired: bribed
10 not and take: i.e., not even if you add
11 pains: penalties
12 light: not weighty
13 realms . . . christened: Christian realms and countries
14 Almaine: Germany
15–16 in . . . persons: in person; their own very selves
17 agreed: agreed on
first making, all Christian countries received it... and have by the continual use ever since allowed it. And this realm hath found it so necessary that by statutes it hath strengthened it. And all true Christian countries to this day still observe it... nor no country hath there anywhere left and forsaken it except such places only as have left and forsaken the faith of Christ withal...
whose examples I trust this realm is too faithful to follow, upon such good reason as this good man here bringeth... whereof the very whole sum, when it is gathered together, amounteth to no more but that it may sometime happen that an innocent may take harm thereby—a reason that, once received, may suffer no law to stand. For what law can he give so made in all this world, whereby none innocent can possibly take hurt? But here you see plainly proved against this good man that by the changing there would surely follow another manner of peril: the decay of the Catholic faith by the encouraging of heretics... which would be well content that we made laws to burn them twice when they be proved heretics, so that the good counsel of this good man be followed, that the suit ex officio may be changed into such open accusers as in seven years shall never one come forth, nor one heretic of likelihood once be put to answer; with another good counsel of this good man’s also devised for their farther safeguard against arresting of them, whereof we be to speak afterward, in another chapter. Say this good man what he will, if we break this law so long approved through Christendom, and take his device in the stead—his word will never so stay the thing but that after his ways once taken, and by his new, evil counsel the good old laws broken, men should shortly see, without any doubt, great increase of heretics... which, whereas they were wont but to creep together in corners and secretly skulk together in lurkies’ lanes, shall soon wax bold and put out their horns and flock and swarm together so thick in the open streets that such mischief would finally follow thereon as woe will every good man be that should live to see it. And yet would God, of his goodness, turn at length the chief harm upon their
heads. But better folk should first feel so much thereof that it were better for both that, by these good laws well kept which this good man would break, these heretics be well repressed and kept under betimes.

The Sixteenth Chapter

His sixteenth chapter beginneth in the 54th leaf, wherein he first reciteth again his own words written in his book of Division wherein he disputed against the law in the chapter “Accusatus,” paragraph “Licet,” whereby it is ordained that though one being accused and sworn confess nothing, and yet afterward he confesseth, both of himself and others, such things as it may well appear that if he were not forsworn in the second, he was forsworn in the first… and yet that law there admitteth him for a witness in that same court and in that matter of heresy, if there appear manifest tokens that he doth it not of lightness of mind, nor of hatred, nor for other corruption; which he saith is therefore “a dangerous law, and more likely to cause untrue and unlawful men to condemn innocents than to condemn offenders.”

And you shall understand, good readers, that in his book of Division he not only did impugn the law that he speaketh of here… but also another chapter, “In fidei favorem,” because that thereby such as are accursed, and such as are parties to the same offense, shall be witnesses in heresy.

This reason of his, good reader, albeit that me then thought and yet think so unreasonable that I reckoned it little worth the answering, as a reason reproved by the common law and by the course and usage of all realms christened, and in other crimes besides heresy plainly reproved, and the contrary well used in this realm here also—yet in the forty-first chapter of mine Apology, folio 228, in this manner wise I answered him:

This piece, concerning the testimony of known evil persons to be received and taken in heresy… I have somewhat touched in the third chapter of the Third Book of my Dialogue; where since they may read it that will, I will make here no long tale again thereof. But well he wotteth.

that heresy, whereby a Christian man becometh a false traitor to God, is in all laws, spiritual and temporal both, accounted as great a crime as is the treason committed against any worldly man. And then why should we find so great a fault that such witnesses should be received in a cause of heresy as are received not only in a cause of treason, but of murder also, and of other more single felony; not only in favor of the prince, and detestation of such odious crimes, but also for the necessity which the nature of the matter worketh in the proof. For since evil folk use not to make good folk of counsel in doing of their evil deeds… those that are done should pass unpunished, and more like be committed afresh, but if they were received for records to their condemning that were of their counsel and partners to the doing. Which kind of folk will not let to swear twice nay before they confess once yea; and yet their one yea more true upon their bare word than their twice nay upon a solemn oath; and yet confess they not so simply but that it is commonly helped with some such circumstances as make the matter more clear.

Now, as to those things that I wrote in my Dialogue concerning great criminous witnesses to be taken in great criminal causes, he answereth with no word at all. Howbeit, to say the truth, he the less needed. For he giveth over here all that fault that he found in the chapter “In fidei favorem,” as a thing wherein himself seeth now that he was overseen then, and therefore he letteth that here pass by, as though he had never spoken thereof, and sticketh only upon that one case of him that is once forsworn.

But now let us see what he saith here concerning this selfsame case. First he saith that the laws, though they must devise such ways as evil persons may be punished—yet the makers of the laws must “as much as in them is” provide that innocents shall be saved harmless. This is very true—“as much as in them is …”—the other point being provided for too: that offenders may be punished. But then say I that it is not in all the wits of the world, for punishment of mischievous wretches, to devise a law in such wise that men may be sure that none innocent can take harm thereby. And then if he grant me this

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1 false: despicable; sorry
2 spiritual and temporal: ecclesiastical and secular
3 worldly: earthly
4, 11 received: accepted
5 cause: case
6 single: solitary; not committed in the presence of many witnesses
7 prince: sovereign
8–9 use not: are not wont
9 make . . . of counsel: take . . . into their confidence
10 should pass: would go
11 but if they: unless those
12 for records: as givers of testimony
13 let: forbear
14 true: trustworthy
15 so simply: in such an unadorned way
16 great criminous witnesses: witnesses who are guilty of great crime
17–20 great criminal causes: cases concerning great crime
18 giveth . . . that: here drops that whole
19 in the: with the
20 overseen: in error
21 sticketh: dwells
22 perjured
23 saved harmless: kept free from liability to punishment
24 mischievous: evil-doing
(which whether he grant or no, yet very true it is), then say I
that his only reason against the suit ex officio and against this
law too—that is to wit, that innocents may take harm thereby—
is such a reason that if it were followed in every law whereby misguided
folk are punished, there should no law stand for their
punishment at all, but lest it might mishap that some innocent
might take harm, we should let all mischievous folk
alone, and thereby suffer many more good innocent men take harm.

But then goeth this good man further and saith that the punishment
of an offender must be by a due and reasonable order.
And that is very true also... and therefore we shall agree well in that. But
then goeth he further and saith:

I cannot see what due or reasonable order of trial it is that he that upon his
oath hath first cleared himself and his neighbor of heresies should after,
contrary to his first oath, be received again as a witness to condemn
him that he cleared before, and that in the same court, and in
the same matter.

Though this good man cannot see it—other men can see it... and
have seen it, and daily do see it too, well enough. I have seen such
things as this is myself proved, I cannot tell how often—that
in the excuse of a thief, some have taken an oath that the felon
was with him in his own house at such time as the felony
should be done in another place. And a man would have went
he had been credible and said truth. And yet afterward
hath himself confessed that the felon and himself also were
at the robbery, both twain; and his bare word then more
true than before was his solemn oath. And every man
that hath meddled much with such examinations hath a
sure experience that this is a common fashion of murderers
and thieves and such as are thieves’ receivers... of whom at the
first face some seem honest men, and are so sometimes reputed,
and come forth for declaration of them that are suspected and
in trouble, and depose for them... and yet after, upon some other
occasion in examining of the matter, begin to be suspected
themselves, and afterward confess it too, both of themselves

2, 4 reason: argument  4 followed: gone along with  //  in: with regard to
4 misguided: ill-behaved  6 mishap: unfortunately happen  7 mischievous: evil-doing
8 suffer: let  10, 13 order: procedure  15 received: accepted  17 matter: case
20 proved: borne out by experience  21 excuse: defense  23 went: thought
24 credible: worthy of being believed  //  said truth: told the truth
26 bare word: mere statement  27 true: trustworthy
28 meddled much: had much involvement  29 sure: soundly established
30 receivers: receivers of stolen goods  30–31 at the first face: at first glance
31 honest: honorable  32 declaration: clearing
and them whom they came to clear by their perjury before. And I am very sure there be not a few that have heard such evidence given in causes of felony divers times to the jury.

But hereupon, because I spoke in mine Apology of such witnesses in felony: this good man maketh here a doubt what manner witnesses I mean—whether I mean the twelve men that are the jury, or other witnesses that are brought into the court for to inform them. And then first, if I mean the twelve men, then he answereth me certain things to show that he can skill of the law. But verily as for me, I shall put him out of that doubt that I meant not them. For I never took the twelve men for witnesses in my life. For why should I call them witnesses, whose verdict the judge taketh for a sure sentence concerning the fact without any examination of the circumstances whereby they know or be led to believe their verdict to be true?

And also, wherefore should I mean to call them witnesses, whom I see desire witnesses at the bar to inform them in the matter as witnesses inform a judge? He might therefore have spared his labor in that piece well enough. For I neither meant the jury nor never took them for witnesses.

If he will ask me what they be, then: I say they be the jury! And if he will wit furthermore what person they represent of those that are usual in other courts, wherein there be no juries used: that can I meetly well tell him too, if the tale were as necessary as it would be long.

But then cometh he to the other part, and saith:

And if Master More by that term “witness” mean such witness as be sometimes brought into the King’s courts to give evidences to an inquest, then is that witness no such witness as the witness be in the spiritual court, that shall acquit or condemn the parties; for of those witnesses so brought into the King’s court to give evidence to an inquest at the common law, no mention shall be made in the records, nor the jury be not bound always to follow those witnesses. For if the jury, of their own knowledge or otherwise, know the truth against the saying of such witnesses, they be bound to find

3 causes of felony: murder or theft cases // divers: several
5 maketh here a doubt: expresses here a doubt as to 9 can skill: has knowledge
13 sentence: pronouncement 15 true: correct 16 wherefore: why
17 desire: ask 18 matter: case 24 tale: telling 28 evidences: testimonies
30 condemn: convict 31 evidence: testimony 33 follow: go along with
35 against . . . witnesses: to be contrary to what such witnesses have said
according to the truth, and let those witnesses go. And yet if it happened that such collateral witnesses first testified upon their oath that the party were not guilty; and after it were informed the judges that they revoked their first saying and would say that the party were guilty: I cannot think that the judges would anymore call them to hear their saying therein. And though they would, yet, as I said before, it were far unlike to this case. For their saying there is but as an evidence, which the jury should not be bound to believe, but as the truth is. I cannot see, therefore, how Master More can prove his saying that such witnesses—that is to say, such as be perjured in the same court—should be afterward received as witness in any of the King’s courts.

Now, good readers, evermore remember this: that it is not enough for him that will avoid a resemblance between two things—it is not enough, I say, for him to prove that in some point those two things are unlike (for so must every two things needs be, for else were they not two but one), but he must prove that they be unlike in the selfsame point wherein, and to the selfsame purpose wherefor, they were so resembled together.

And now I say that in that point, for that purpose for which I resemble them, I say that they be like. I did not say that they were like in the manner of the examination, and putting of their names and their depositions in the record, in which things this man saith and I confess that they be unlike; but I said that they were like in this point: that like as he that hath been sworn, and cleared one (as far forth as in him was) of heresy, may yet be received, sworn again, and heard, and by his new, contrary deposition may hurt the same party whom he did clear, before the same spiritual judge, which lawfully may give credence unto him upon certain circumstances by his wisdom well weighed—so may in like wise he that hath been sworn, and by his oath cleared a man (as much as in him was) of felony, be yet received and sworn again and heard, and by his new, contrary deposition may hurt the same party whom he did before clear in a temporal court, before the selfsame

2 collateral witnesses: witnesses coming from the same pool as the jurors, but not serving on the jury
6 though: even if 7–8 an evidence: a testimony 14 will: wishes to
14 avoid: disprove 19 wherefor: for which 27, 28, etc. sworn: put under oath
27 one: someone // as far . . . was: to the extent that he could 33 as much . . . was: as much as he could
judges... by the reason that the jury may lawfully believe him in the second oath, upon certain considerations by their
wisdoms wisely weighed, notwithstanding his former oath in the
same court to the contrary.

And albeit that herebefore I thought upon no further than
upon such witnesses taken before the King’s Council, or
justices of the peace, men of worship in the county, and afterward
those depositions with such contrary oaths and all the
circumstances therewith given in evidence to the jury at the
bar, in the face of the King’s ordinary court, sitting upon
the deliverance of the prisoner: yet since this good man dissembleth
that point and draweth me forth before the judges, I
am well content to wait upon him thither. And I nothing
doubt but that even there he should—the case might so fall—find it
true that I tell him.

“That is not so,” saith this good man. “For if it happened that
such collateral witnesses first testified upon their oath
that the party were not guilty; and after it were informed the
judges that they revoked their first saying, and would say that
the party were guilty: I cannot think that the judges would anymore
call them to hear their saying therein.”

Here you see, good readers, that he proveth this point by none
other thing than only by his own thinking. Now, albeit that
against his thinking that they would not, it were enough for me
to say that I think they would: yet will I not leave it so bare, but
I will show you some cause wherefore in some case they should; and I
will also put you some such case which, if the case happed, I
nothing doubt but they would.

First, the cause wherefore a person once perjured is repelled
from bearing witness again is because the law presumeth that
he setteth not so much by an oath but that his oath notwithstanding,
he were likely enough to lie.

Now, since this presumption is the general let, and therefore
the reason of the general law: if the case happen that this presumption
be more than counterpoised with a contrary presumption

7 worship: high standing 11 the deliverance of: consideration of what should be done with
11 dissembleth: turns a blind eye to 13 thither: there
13–14, 28 nothing doubt: doubt not at all 14 even: right
14 the . . . fall: this could turn out to be the case 24, 32 were: would be
29 repelled: debarred 31 setteth . . . by: has not so much regard for 33 let: deterrent
34 of: for 35 counterpoised with: balanced out by
upon the other side, there is the contrary presumption
a reason sufficient to make in that case a contrary law, or a
law that shall be for that case an exception out of that general
rule.

   Now, sir, as he that on his oath cleareth himself and his fellow too
(either in heresy or in felony), doth after confess and swear also
the contrary—if we would not believe him in the second oath because
we find him thereby perjured in the first… then, in that we judge
him in the first to have sworn false, it implieth that even thereby
we judge him in the second to say true.

   If we will refuse his second oath, and not think him worthy to
be believed, because that he swore the contrary before, and
thereby presume him a false shrew when he should by the second
oath prove himself once perjured, and then we could
not tell in whither oath of the twain—here I say that the first
presumption is overborne with the second. For it is another
presumption that no man will cast away his soul for naught.
And yet a greater presumption that no man will cast away his
soul to do hurt either to his own body or to his friend’s.

   Now look me, then, upon this man’s two oaths, his first oath
and his second. And though there be a common presumption
therein also, whereupon the credence of all oaths resteth; that is to
wit, that a man reputed good and honest will not for his friend’s
body nor for his own, neither, cast his soul away by perjury:
yet when himself after showeth upon his second oath that
he was perjured in the first, the presumption of his
troth in his first oath is taken away by the second.

   Now, the second, if it be to the accusing of himself and his
friend both, whom his first oath excused, hath these other
two presumptions for to bear against the first presumption
general of his untroth for his perjury: the one, that though it
be presumed in the law that he would be false and forsworn for
somewhat—yet is it presumed that he will not be forsworn for
right naught. And yet, as I said, it is more strongly presumed
that he will not be forsworn to the hurt of himself and his
friend. And therefore hath his second oath enough to bear it
against the first, since in the first he swore for his friend’s advantage and his own, for which (since he now appeareth false in the one oath or the other) he was then likely to be forsworn. And in the second if he were forsworn, it were to their both harm. And therefore is that oath presumed to be true, though the man himself be presumed false.

This is, I trow, to no man any doubt, but that though a man had been openly perjured thrice—yet if the world might (as it may not) be sure that in another matter he would, for all that, swear true, the world would receive his oath. Now, forasmuch as of no man’s oath any man can be so sure but that he may be by possibility deceived: the law goeth as far forth as it can, and taketh their oaths for a proof which are in that case by presumption likely to swear true. And since that he, therefore, whom the respect of his friend’s safeguard and his own gave occasion to be forsworn in the first, in the second sweareth contrariwise to their both peril and harm—therefore in that case reason beareth the law that in such heinous crimes his second oath should be received.

Here have I showed you a reason which seemeth me sufficient that both in heresy and felony, the judges should be content, notwithstanding the first oath, in some case to suffer him swear the contrary.

But now for the temporal courts let us put some case for an example, to see whether the judges would, if the case happed so, hear the witness again or not.

I will not put the case in treason, wherein there would, I ween, be no doubt... but that if, after his evidence given upon his oath in clearing there the prisoner, he happed even suddenly there at the bar to repent himself, and say that he was hired to be forsworn, and that he was forsworn indeed, and then would tell another tale far contrary to the first, ere ever he went from the bar: would his tale not be heard, trow you? Yes, and (the jury so desiring, as peradventure they would) the judges would swear him, too, I suppose; and very good reason would bear it that they should.

But, as I say, let treason go, and come but even unto felony. If

2–3 appeareth false: is shown to be untruthful 4, 16 forsworn: perjured 5 were . . . harm: was to the detriment of them both 6 true: truthful // false: untruthful 8 might: could 8–9 may not: cannot 12 deceived: mistaken 13 their . . . which: for a proof the oaths of those who 15 respect of: regard for 15 safeguard: safety 17 their . . . harm: the peril and harm of them both 18, 35 bear(eth): support(s) 22 suffer him: allow him to 24 temporal: secular 28 evidence: testimony 29 even: quite 30 repent himself: have a change of heart 30 hired: bribed 30–31 be forsworn: commit perjury 31 was forsworn indeed: had indeed committed perjury 34–35 swear him: put him under oath 37 even: just
two or three witnesses would at the bar excuse upon their oaths some one man of felony… and afterward, when they were stepped from the bar, happed to be heard round and rejoice together that they had given good evidence for acquittal of their fellow, with whom themselves had been at the same robbery: if they were suddenly brought again to the judges, the jury not yet departed from the bar; and, being severally questioned in that sudden abashment, seeing that God had so uttered their falsehood, began to have remorse and came forth with the truth, and agreed in the circumstances and told all one tale, confessing both the prisoner and themselves guilty, and would be content to swear that this tale were true, contrary to the oath that they swore there before—would not the judges, trow you, give them the hearing? Yes, yes, I doubt not, and the jury too.

And thus you see clearly, good readers, that in this point if this man had wisely wrought, he should have given it over.

And now, albeit that here I might end this chapter, and have no need at all to go any further—yet to the further opening how little hold there is in the causes that he layeth of dissimilitude and unlikeness between the witnesses brought into a spiritual court and the witnesses brought into the temporal for information of the jury… I marvel much if himself know not that like as the jury may, if they see cause why, weigh the witnesses at light and acquit the prisoner for all the witnesses’ words, so may the ordinary do too. For in his estimation the power lieth to weigh and consider the qualities of the witnesses… and all such other circumstances as may diminish or increase their credence.

Yea, and unto the other side, the witnesses are not in the temporal courts weighed and esteemed so light but that the jury shall if they believe them not, be sometimes driven to yield a good reckoning why. For though the words of the witnesses be not entered in the record, yet in attain they shall again be given in evidence against the petit jury, and be testified by the court and by the oaths of them that before heard them depose.

1 excuse: exculpate  
3 round: whisper  
4 evidence: testimony  
4 fellow: companion  
6 again: back  
7 severally: separately  
8 abashment: embarrassment  
uttered: exposed  
10 circumstances: details  
10 told all one tale: all told the same story  
11 content: willing  
16 wisely wrought: acted wisely  
given it over: conceded it  
17 might: could  
18 opening: making clear  
hold: substance  
layeth: alleges  
23 weigh . . . light: regard the witnesses as unreliable  
24, 32 words: statements  
ordinary: bishop  
estimation: judging  
28 credence: credibility  
unto . . . side: on the other hand  
31–32 driven . . . reckoning: made to give a good accounting as to  
33 attain: the attempt to convict the jury of having given a wrongful verdict, and to get the verdict reversed
And then if it appear unto the grand jury in their conscience that the petit jury willfully, of some corrupt mind, regarded not the witnesses, and therefore in the giving of their verdict passed against their own conscience: every man well wotteth that they shall be attainted.

And necessity hath also driven the King’s Grace and his Council, for the sure punishment of felons, to provide that if the jury likewise regard the witnesses so slightly that the judges think they acquit the felon against their own conscience—they bind them sometimes to appear before the King’s Council. And there have divers juries been proved so to have misused themselves therein that they have been punished therefor.

Now will I, good readers, come unto that piece which (as a thing already confuted and of itself unworthy to be touched) I would have passed over and not once vouchsafed to write one word therein, saving that I see him to have taken such labor thereabout that he seemeth to ween that he hath defended it well—which whether he have well defended or not, yourselves shall, good readers, judge. These were his words in his book of Division:

This is a dangerous law, and more likely to cause untrue and unlawful men to condemn innocents than to condemn offenders. And it helpeth little that if there be tokens that it is not done of hatred, nor for corruption of money, that it should be taken; for sometimes a wolf may show himself in the apparel of a lamb. And if the judge be partial, such tokens may be sooner accepted than truly showed.

To this piece these were my words in mine Apology (folio 229):

Since evil folk use not to make good folk of their counsel in doing of their evil deeds… those that are done should pass unpunished, and more like be committed afresh, but if they were received for records to their condemning that were of their counsel and partners to the doing. Which kind of folk will not let to swear twice nay before they confess once yea; and yet their one yea more true upon their bare word than their twice nay upon a solemn oath; and yet confess they not so

4 passed: went 11 misused: misconducted 12 therefore: for that
14 unworthy to be touched: not worth discussing 15 vouchsafed: bothered
20 untrue: unjust 22, 25 tokens: indications; signs 22 of: out of 25 truly: truthfully
28 use . . . doing: are not wont to take good folk into their confidence in the doing
29 should pass: would go 30 but . . . received: unless those were accepted
30 for records: as givers of testimony
31 were . . . to: were taken into their confidence and were accomplices in
33 true: trustworthy // bare word: mere statement
155/34—156/1 so simply: in such an unadorned way
simply but that it is commonly helped with some such circumstances as make the matter more clear.

Now see you well that, as himself showeth, the law provideth well against all light receiving of such confession. And yet this Pacifier saith that all that helpeth little, because the judge may be “partial,” and the witness may be a “wolf” showing himself appareled “in the apparel of a lamb”—which appearing in apparel poor men that cannot apparel their speech with apparel of rhetoric use commonly to call a wolf in a lamb’s skin.

But what order may serve against such objections? What place is there in this world, spiritual or temporal, of which the judge may not have some say that he is, or at the leastwise (as he saith here) may be, partial? And therefore not only such witness should be by this reason of his rejected in heresy, treason, murder, or felony; but also, by his other reason of a wolf in a lamb’s skin, all manner of witness in every matter. For in every matter may it happen that he that seemeth a lamb may be indeed a wolf… and be naught where he seemeth good… and swear false where he seemeth to say true. And therefore this patch of this Pacifier concerning witness—every wise man may bear witness that there is little wit therein… and less good would grow thereof if folk would follow his invention and make of the laws a change.

Now that you have, good readers, heard what we say both before: now shall you see how substantially this man defendeth his first words again. These are, lo, in this sixteenth chapter of his new book, his words:

Now, by reason of this objection, I will speak somewhat farther in this matter than I did in the said treatise. And first I will say thus: that it is to me a great marvel to see Master More so far overseen—or else, if he be not overseen therein, that then he would, if he could, deceive others and make them so far oversee—to believe that it should be one like reason of a perjured witness, that will look like a lamb and say contrary to that he hath deposed before, and of a witness that cometh to depose in a matter that he was never yet sworn upon. For when a witness is brought in that was never sworn upon the matter before… the judge may not by the law refuse him, nor judge any default in him… unless he know a sufficient
cause himself in that behalf... or that the parties do allege it; but he
must believe... that he is honest, good, and indifferent... till the
contrary be showed... as every man is in charity bound to do of his
neighbor. But when a witness hath deposed in the court... and
then will offer himself to depose to the contrary that he said
before: the judge may with good conscience mistrust and think
that he doth it of lightness of mind, hatred, or for corruption of
money.

If I were in this point overseen, I need not greatly to be
ashamed of the oversight. For then hath there been many
such other men overseen also, as I would not wish to be wiser.
And I no more intend to deceive other men in this matter
than many others have intended that used and allowed this
thing that I defend now before—such men as, with the
condition that I were never worse, I would never wish to be
better. This man maketh as though it were great shame for me
to liken together a person once perjured and a person that was
never yet once sworn. I would indeed be ashamed to liken
them together in every point, although there were no more
difference between them but that the one had a long nose
and the other a short. But I am not much ashamed to say that
for some purpose, where he speaketh of the one I may speak of
the other, and liken them well enough together. For I may say
(as I said) that likewise as he that hath forsworn himself may
feign himself to say true, and look like a lamb, and yet be a
wolf indeed—even so, I say, may he that never was sworn
before.

“Yea,” saith this man, “but yet these two be not like. For he
that was never sworn, there is no cause to mistrust nor presume
that he will play the wolf in a lamb’s skin. But he that
hath been forsworn is of reason to be mistrusted... and it is to
be presumed that he will play the wolf in a lamb’s skin.”

Mark yet, in the meanwhile, that if I could make no farther
answer—yet had I won and he lost. For his first words
were, in his book of Division, that he that confesseth himself
forsworn should in no case be received to swear again the

2 honest: honorable // indifferent: impartial  5 offer himself: volunteer
7 lightness: unsteadiness  13 allowed: approved of  18 once: ever
18, 26, 29 sworn: put under oath  19 although: even if  24, 31, 36 forsworn: perjured
25 feign... true: make himself appear to be telling the truth  33 mark: note
contrary... because that though there seem a good cause to believe him in his second oath, yet it may be that he doth but feign; and I said so may he too feign and dissemble that never was sworn before. And then if the only power and ability to feign were a cause sufficient to put any one man from bearing witness upon his oath—every man were by that reason repelled... for every man is able to feign. This was, as you see, the thing that I then said. Which thing neither this man nor any man else is able to confute, nor prove the forsworn man and the man unsworn unlike in the point that I likened them; that is to wit, in power and ability to feign. And farther than that went not I. For I had no farther cause in answering him there, while he went no farther there, nor said none other, but that he that was forsworn may feign. And now read yourselves his words, and look whether I say true.

But now, this being proved, as it is proved plain—that he hath a fall in those words which he spoke before—let us a little see whether with this leisure after, his matter again considered afresh, he hath caught any better hold now. And surely methinketh not one whit.

For where his new reason resteth in this—that he which confesseth himself once forsworn is by reason mistrusted, as one not only to be able to swear false, and wilily cloak his falsehood under a color of truth, but also presumed that he so will do indeed—to this I say that he saith truth, as long as there is no greater presumption on the other side to serve for his second oath. But when the case happeth that there is, as it happeth in the case of this law—then is the presumption that he will swear false gone, as I showed you before. And then—that presumption by a greater presumption being purged—this man forsworn and the man unsworn are, in the thing that I resembled them for, waxen well like again. And that the said presumption is purged—I showed you before, in that it is now a greater presumption for his second oath, that he will not forswear himself to the peril of his friend and himself too.
Then goeth he farther, and enforceth his reason with the reason of the law before that paragraph “Licet” was made. And therein thus he saith:

. . . insomuch that before that paragraph “Licet” was made, the judge might none otherwise have done of justice but to have refused to have taken any farther examination of him. And if he had, and the other had said contrary to that he had said before—his saying had been void in the law.

And this thing wherewith he thinketh his reason made the stronger maketh his reason a great deal feebler. For while the general rule of refusing such witness in all cases was made so long before—it appeareth plainly that necessity found the fault, and caused out of the general rule this case to be made an exception… and so the law made by better deliberation.

And in such other horrible crimes, the same law is used in temporal courts, and was also before that law made by the Church.

But against all this yet, this man maketh me this reason:

What the makers of the said paragraph meant, to put into the discretion of the judge that if he saw by evident tokens that it is not done of lightness of mind, nor of hatred, nor for corruption of money, that his saying shall stand as well against himself as against others; I cannot tell. For I cannot see how there can be any evident token in any such case, but that there might be in such a perjured witness sometimes inward hatred or corruption that the judge cannot know, so that he cannot judge of certainty that there is none.

Consider now, good readers, that all the strength of this reason hangeth in this: that the judge cannot surely see sometimes whether the perjured witness do it for the truth, or have a hatred in his breast so secret that the judge cannot see it; and therefore he cannot certainly judge that he hath none. Consider here, now, that he saith not that it is presumed, or must be presumed, that the perjured witness hath so (for if he so said, he should say to

1 enforceth: reinforces 1, 2, etc. reason: argument
2, 4, 20 paragraph: i.e., article of canon law 7 that: what // had: would have
10 while: given that 17 made: i.e., was made 22 lightness: unsteadiness
34 hath: i.e., has done // should say: would be saying it
no purpose; for, as I have showed you how, that presumption may be overweighed with greater presumptions to the contrary); but he saith that it *may* be indeed that the forsworn witness hath so. And then say I yet again, if we go to the possibility of the deed, and not unto the presumption and likelihood… he that was never sworn before *may* have a secret hatred which the judge cannot see, as well as he may that was twice sworn before. And thereon I say also yet again that if the judge were charged to give no sentence but such as he knew of certainty sure to be true, he could never upon any witnesses in this world give any sentence at all. For no witness were there but he might swear false and the judge might ween he swore true.

Now, if this man would say that he meaneth no farther certainty than only a sure thinking in the judge’s own conscience, and that therefore he moderated all his other words with this word “conscience,” saying that the judge could not with conscience judge of certainty that there were no hatred: this meaning were a very marring of all that he goeth about there to prove. For though the perjured witness might have (and haply had indeed) a secret hatred in his own breast, as another witness might have (and haply had indeed) that never was sworn before—yet might the judge, being induced by certain tokens and likelihoods, have a sure and a certain persuasion and belief in his own conscience that neither the one nor the other had any hatred at the time, but only deposed the truth. And therefore if he would say that he meant thus: he marred all his matter.

But it appeareth plainly that he meant in the other manner, upon which there must needs follow (if he were not in his saying deceived) that every judge in every sentence that he should give upon any witnesses, were they never so honest in appearance, were in a danger inevitable. And that he meaneth in that manner—that the belief of his own conscience induced reasonably thereto could not excuse the judge if he were deceived and the thing otherwise indeed—he declareth farther by the words that next ensue, where he goeth farther thus:

4 *hath*: has done 9, 11, 30 *sentence*: verdict 10 *true*: correct
10, 31 *upon*: on the basis of 12 *ween*: think 16 *moderated*: qualified
19 *were a very marring*: would be a real destroying
24 *tokens and likelihoods*: signs and indications
27 *marred all his matter*: ruined his whole case
30 *deceived*: erroneous
31 *honest*: honorable 34 *deceived*: mistaken
35 *declareth*: shows
And therefore meseemeth that the makers of the said paragraph laid over great a danger to the judges, that they should have liberty to accept, if they would, the saying of him that so offereth himself against his first oath… forsomuch as the judge cannot be sure to save his conscience therein but if he clearly refuse to accept anything that the witness would say contrary to his first oath. For if the judge did otherwise, and thereupon the witnesses testify against the party, and yet the party not guilty indeed: I suppose verily that the judge were party to the same offense.

And I suppose not the contrary, but am very sure of the contrary. For I am very sure that where the judge seeth such tokens as seem unto him manifest and open tokens to prove that his second oath is not offered of any corrupt affection, but of remorse of his perjury and of a mind to amend his fault and say true: he falleth in no danger of conscience, though the truth be otherwise indeed. For if there never had law been made at all to refuse any witness because he was once perjured: the judge had been clear at liberty, upon reasons and likelihoods leading his conscience, to have received him again without any peril of his own conscience at all, wheresoever himself had thought greater likelihood that he would say truth at the second oath than he did before at the first. And then, since he was now letted to receive him, and his liberty therein restrained, but by a law made: what peril can he more fall in when a second law hath set him at large, than if the former law had never made the restraint?

And where the law there provideth that the judge shall still reject that witness which offereth to tell the truth upon a second oath contrary to his first, but if there appear manifest tokens that he do it not of any corrupt affection: it meaneth none other but that if the tokens seem such unto the judge that they induce him in his conscience so to believe and think—and not that he shall be certain and sure that the thing is so indeed, by looking into the secret corners of the man’s heart… no more than the King’s judges at the common law, by what words soever they give the inquest an oath, nor by what precise words soever

1 makers: authors // paragraph: article (of canon law)
1–2 laid . . . danger: gave too great a power // 4 forsomuch: inasmuch // 5 but if: unless
5 clearly: completely; utterly // 8 were: would be // 13 of: out of
13, 30 affection: motivation // 14 of his: for his // 15 say true: tell the truth // 16 though: even if
14 fault: wrongdoing // 18 had: would have // 19–19 upon . . . likelihoods: on the basis of reasonings and indications
18–19 otherwise indeed: actually otherwise // 18 had: would have // 20 clear: completely
23 letted to receive: prevented from accepting // 27 still: always // 29 but if: unless
29 but if: unless // 36 give . . . an: administer to . . . an; put . . . under
they receive their verdict, mean not to charge them upon peril of their souls to say none otherwise than the truth of the thing shall be indeed... but as the truth shall seem to them to be, upon such things as they shall perceive either by the evidence given them at the bar or otherwise ere they came there. Nor the judges themselves, in the judging of a matter of law, never mean precisely that the law is so. For then if other judges after reversed that judgment or judged the same case otherwise in another time between other men, the one judges or the other had put their souls in peril, doing both twain their best to judge as well as they could.

But since no man can see farther than his eyes will serve him; no, nor no man can see farther than his own reason can upon the matter thoroughly debated perceive: if either the twelve men or the judges, neither negligent nor corrupt, judge as they think true, their souls are safe enough—as safe as is the soul of the carpenter that putteth in his frame no timber but such as is good and sound as far as men can see... and yet some of it secretly may be such in very deed as soon after shall fail and fall down all the roof. His soul is safe enough, though his purse may hap to sweat, if he bound himself to provide the timber at his own peril. But so bindeth himself neither judge nor jury for the witness on peril of their own souls, that the other shall swear true.

And thus you see, good readers, that the judge is out of peril using diligence and troth, though the witness be false and have hatred in his heart... where the judge weeneth none, upon tokens that he thinketh manifest, although the witness were forsworn before. And thus is this good man in this matter all gone quite awry.

But yet being sore troubled with the wild wolf, that may swear false and seem true, nothing mistrusted because he cometh lapped in a lamb’s skin—this good man goeth further yet, and therein thus he saith:

And where I said in the said treatise, as before appeareth, that sometimes a wolf may show himself in the apparel of a lamb, and that if the judge be partial, such tokens may sooner be accepted than truly showed—it is evident enough that by those words I note no judge to be partial, but I say that if the judge be partial, such tokens may be

4, 27 upon: on the basis of  5 evidence: testimony  8 after: later 10 one: i.e., one set of  // had: would have  11 doing both twain: both of the two doing 11 well: rightly  12 serve him: allow him to  14 debated: pondered  15 true: correct 21 sweat: suffer loss  22 peril: risk  26 troth: uprightness  26, 28 (al)though: even if 26 false: dishonest  27 weeneth: supposes (there to be) 28–29 were forsworn: committed perjury 32 true: truthful  // nothing: not at all 37 truly: truthfully  38–39 note . . . to be: accuse . . . of being
sooner accepted than truly showed. As who saith, the judge may accept such a token to be true though there appear some suspicion of untruth in the witness. In which acceptance he shall more liberally and without offense of the law do wrong to the party that is accused... than he could do by accepting of any other witness against the law, that were never sworn before. For if he accept any such witness contrary to the rules of the law, it appeareth to all them that know the law that he doth against the law therein; and that will sound somewhat to his rebuke, and that will make him the more loath to do it. But if the judge accept such a perjured witness where there is no sufficient token to prove that he doth it not for lightness of mind, hatred, corruption, nor such other: yet he breaketh no law therein. For all is committed to his discretion. And that may haply give a boldness to some judge to accept such a perjured witness where he ought not to accept him. And though the said paragraph say that if there be such tokens as before appeareth, that then in favor of the faith his witness shall be taken—yet I cannot see, if the party accused be guiltless indeed, as he may be for all that witness, how it can be taken in favor of the faith to accept the witness. For it cannot be said in favor of the faith to condemn an innocent.

All this tale, when it is all told, weigheth unto no more but that if the judge be partial, then he may abuse the law, and then that law in that case may do harm in heresy.

Now, besides that the inquest hearing the same witness sworn first, and after contrary, may, if they be partial, do like harm in felony—what law was there ever made wherein the judge could do no harm if he would be partial? What laws may there serve, if the ministers would be false? This man is content that to a man’s condemnation, the presumption shall serve that the witnesses will swear but true—such witnesses, at the leastwise, as are not proved false before; and yet may they mar all if they be false and partial. And when he presumeth such indifference in a witness—why feareth he so sore partiality in a judge? If he say he mistrust the judges because of “some say”s—then must he mistrust witnesses, juries, and judges, and altogether. For such “some say”s there lack not that can say well by no man.

1 as who saith: that is to say; in other words 3 untruth: untruthfulness
2 more liberally: more freely; with less constraint 7 appeareth: is obvious
5 as who saith: that is to say; in other words 8 doth: acts; goes // sound: have repercussions 9 rebuke: shame // loath: reluctant
6 10 he doth it: i.e., the witness does not offer to change his testimony 11 lightness: unsteadiness 15 paragraph: article (of canon law)
7 12 guiltless indeed: in fact not guilty 13 taken: i.e., taken as being
8 14 15 paragraph: article (of canon law) 16 said: i.e., said to be // condemn an innocent: convict an innocent person
9 17 18 all this tale: this whole speech // weigheth: amounts 19 taken: i.e., taken as being
10 abuse: take a wrong advantage of 20 would be false: wish to be dishonest
11 felony: i.e., murder or theft cases 21 to a man’s condemnation: toward the convicting of someone
12 would be false: wish to be dishonest 22 heresy: i.e., heresy cases
13 23 why . . . judge: why is he so afraid that a judge will be biased
14 24 taken: i.e., taken as being 25 said well by no man: speak well of no one
15 26 the ministers: i.e., those administering it 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35
This reason of his doth but put a suspicion in men’s heads against the judges for everything that is put in their discretion. But surely (as I have often heard that great, wise, and right worshipful man Sir John Fineux say, late Chief Justice of the King’s Bench), whoso taketh from a justice the order of his discretion taketh surely from him more than half his office. If this realm should mistrust justices—it must in the laws then make many such changes as I never saw need yet, nor trust I never shall. What harm might any justice of the peace do, if he were disposed to be false and partial? And ever shall be able to do, make what laws men will, but if men would utterly put away that office. And then instead of one harm that may hap, we shall have a hundred hap in very deed.

Consider also, good readers, that by the laws before made, there was not only forbidden to bear witness he that appeared to be once forsworn, but also many other manner of criminous persons, for the general presumption that they were unworthy credence; and yet have been, by other laws after made, received to bear witness against themselves and their fellows in heresy and in treason both, for the necessity, as I have said, and upon presumptions more probable that they were in that case well likely to swear true.

Now, if this good man, for fear of such harm as may by possibility fall upon an innocent, will put one of these from witnessing—he must repel them all. For as the latter laws have since received all—so the former laws generally did first refuse them all. For the general rule is naturally before its particular exceptions.

And then if he would in like wise repel them all, then for one harm that may hap—and haply never shall—he should have many mischievous people very bold, while they might be sure they must needs pass unpunished, because their privy mischief could never well be proved but if they would, when they went about it, take honest men with them to bear record of it.
And thus you see, good readers, very clear and plain, that this good man hath hitherto brought you forth no reason. And I think he saw that himself... and therefore he thought he would say better at last, and not leave it so. For then goeth he further and saith:

And furthermore, it appeareth also that the words of the said treatise extend no further but to such as be judges where there is before them such a perjured witness, and not to all judges. And in like wise those words that “a wolf may show himself in the apparel of a lamb” stretch only to such a perjured witness. For there is no other witness spoken of in the said treatise in that place.

This man goeth to his words and forgetteth what I say—which is that though his words go no further, yet the reason of his words (if it were reason, as I have proved it none) would stretch so far farther that it would mar all. And this point have I proved you very clear and plain.

And thereby is meant that such a perjured witness may haply show himself to deny that he said before of a compunct heart and of a new knowledge of the truth—and yet do it indeed of covetousness, falsehood, rancor, and malice to the party. And so, as the Gospel saith, he may hap outward to appear in the apparel of a sheep, and withinforth be a ramping wolf. And such one may that perjured witness be, that is spoken of in the said treatise. And of such a witness in heresy the said treatise speaketh only there, and of none other witness, as to the readers will appear. And therefore, as meseemeth, Master More findeth default in this behalf where he had no cause reasonable so to do.

Now, good readers, whereas this man saith that he meant that such a forsworn witness may haply play the wolf in a lamb’s skin: I grant that he meant so. But as I grant it to him—so must he grant this again to me: that so may he play, too, that was never sworn before. And then while he goeth no further but that the one haply may, and cannot himself

2 hitherto: thus far  13, 14 reason: reasoning  15 mar all: bring everything to ruin  
18 that: what; that which  18, 19, 20 of: out of  19 very: true  
20 do it indeed: actually do it // falsehood: dishonesty  
24–25 and of . . . only there: and of only . . . there  
26 appear: be obvious // default: fault  32 while: since
say nay but that the other haply may so too—there followeth upon that the thing that I said before, which this man saith he marveleth much that I would say: that is to wit, that by that wise reason there should be received in such criminal causes no manner witness at all!

Now, if he leave his “may haply” and say that it is likely that the forsworn witnesses will say false, and the other true that never was sworn before... and that the witness once forsworn before is, in his second oath contrary to his first, more likely to play the wily wolf in the lamb’s skin than such a plain, simple man as was never sworn: I will be so bold for this once as in some case to tell him boldly nay. For whereas he said a little before that he could not see how there could be any such evident token in any such case but that such a perjured witness might do it of a secret hatred, and seem charitable, and so play the wily wolf in the simple lamb’s skin: I can see well enough that in some case there may be an evident token that some such witness as was so first forsworn were after, in his second oath swearing the contrary, less likely to lie and play the wily wolf in the lamb’s skin than were another that never was in his life before neither forsworn nor sworn.

For if he that was before, upon his oath, examined both of himself and his son, or himself and his father, or his other special-known friend, and on his oath cleared them all, do at another time upon a new oath confess them all guilty, and himself also... and where peradventure himself must to the fire, because he was abjured before, and they may turn yet in time and be but abjured: were not this an evident token that he doth it not of any secret hatred, nor playeth not the wily wolf in a lamb’s skin? For iwis, to confess himself guilty in such case, and putting himself in worse case than his fellows, were but a poor point of a wily wolf. And as I put this case for example—so may there be many others. For the tokens might be plain enough though they were less plain than thus. And therefore, to conclude in this matter, this man hath no reason in this world to defend his first book with.

And therefore where he spendeth a patch in the end about

say nay but: deny 4 wise: brilliant 4, 35 reason: reasoning 5 causes: cases
6 leave: drop 26 must: i.e., must go 30 iwis: indeed // case: a situation
31 worse case: a worse situation // fellows: accomplices // were: would be
32 point: characteristic
166/37—167/1 spendeth... declaration: tacks on in the end his explanation
his declaration that it may be lawful for him to find default at laws made by the Church, so that he find them upon a sufficient reason: because all that point nothing helpeth him here in this law—against which he showeth no reason reasonable, but a reason as unreasonable as ever reasonable man heard—I shall, I say, therefore let that piece pass by, and here make an end of his sixteenth chapter.

The Seventeenth Chapter

His seventeenth chapter beginneth folio 62. In the beginning whereof, he marveleth that I speak so often in mine Apology of his using this word “some say.” And he showeth that in a tale told him by other folk, there is good reason that he so should say… and that I use the same word myself too sometimes, and telleth two places where: folio 77 and folio 100. I neither did nor will find fault that he use this word “some say”; nor I will not let (where the case requireth) to say myself that “some say” this or that. For I know well it is English. But the fault that I found, and yet find, is that his book of Division abuseth the figure of so many “some say”s to the seditious slander of the clergy… and especially of the ordinaries in the punishment of heresy, to bring them in obloquy of the people thereby. And whereas upon complaints made, the matters have late been examined, and the truth hath been plainly proved contrary—yet hath he never one “some say” thereof in all his book, neither in the one book nor the other… but all his “some say”s evermore say evil, and never a “some say” well. This is the fault that I find. For if he made a book with five times as many good “some say”s as his “some say”s in that book be naught—I would find in his “some say”s no default at all. For “some say” is, as I say, good English. But when a book is full of shrewd “some say”s—there do some men say that “some say” is as shrewd English as any Deutsch woman speaketh.

But now, to show that in all his “some say”s he meaneth none

1–2 default at: fault with 2 so: provided // them: i.e., the faults 3 all . . . helpeth: that whole point does not at all help 4 showeth . . . reasonable: presents no rational argument 11, 13, 15 word: expression 11 showeth: says // in: with regard to // a tale told: something said to 15 let: forbear 16 case requireth: situation calls for it 17 English: i.e., good English 19 figure: figure of speech 20 ordinaries: bishops 21 in obloquy of: into disrepute with 22 complaints made: the filing of charges // late: of late; recently 25–26 say evil: speak ill 27 made: wrote 28 naught: wicked // in: with 29 default: fault 30, 31 shrewd: bad 31 Deutsch: German
harm, he goeth further, and for an example he bringeth forth
one which is in very deed a very malicious, naughty, pestilent
“some say,” whereof the pretense is the safeguard of innocents,
the effect is the decay of the faith by the emboldening of heretics,
the instrument is a false, imagined slander against the ordinaries.
And as wilyly as those shrews that beguile him have
helped him to involve and intricate the matter—I shall use so plain
and open a way therein that every man shall well see the truth.

Lo, these are this good man’s words:

And one of the “some say”s that he findeth default at is this. I say in
the eighth chapter of the said treatise thus: “And here some say that
because there is so great a desire in spiritual men to have men
abjured or to be noted with heresy; and that some, as it were, of a
policy do noise it that the realm is full of heretics, more than it is
indeed: that it is very perilous that spiritual men should have
authority to arrest a man for every light suspicion or complaint
of heresy, till that desire of punishment in spiritual men be
ceased and gone; but that they should make process against them to
bring them in upon pain of accursing—and then, if they tarry forty
days, the King’s laws to bring them in by a writ of Excommunicato
capiendo, and so to be brought forth out of the King’s jail
to answer.” And it followeth in the said eighth chapter thus: “But surely, as
it is somewhat touched before in the seventh chapter, it seemeth that the
Church in times past have done what they could to bring about that
they might punish heresy of themselves, without calling for any help
therein of the secular power. And therefore they have made laws that
heretics might be arrested and put in prison, and stocks if need
were; as appeareth in Clementinis de hereticis, Cap. Multorum querela.
And after, at the special calling on of the spirituality, it was enacted
by Parliament that ordinaries might arrest men that preach, hold,
teach, or inform others in heresy, there prohibited, or that thereof
hold any conventicles or schools. For some men think that the said
Clementine was not of effect in the King’s laws to arrest any man for
heresy. But if a man were openly and notably suspected of heresy,
and there were sufficient record and witness against him, and
there were also a doubt that he would flee and not appear, whereby he

2 naught: wicked  //  pestilent: pernicious  3 pretense: pretext
3 safeguard: keeping safe; protection  4 decay: erosion  5 imagined: invented
6 shrews: wenches  7 involve: entangle  10 default at: fault with
12, 15, 17 spiritual men: clergymen  13 noted: branded
13–14 a policy: an expediency  14 noise it: spread the rumor  16 light: slight; trivial
16 complaint: accusation  18 make process: initiate legal proceedings
19 accursing: excommunication  22 answer: be put on trial  23 touched: discussed
29 calling on: appeal; request  30 ordinaries: bishops  //  might: could
32 conventicles: clandestine heretical meetings
36 doubt: fear  //  appear: i.e., show up in court
might infect others, it seemeth convenient that he be arrested by the
body; but not upon every light complaint that full lightly may be
 untrue. And that it will be right expedient that the King's Highness
and his Council look specially upon this matter, and not to cease, till it
be brought to more quietness than it is yet; and to see with great
diligence that pride, covetousness, nor worldly love be not judges,
nor innocents be punished, nor yet that willful offenders go not
without due correction."

And when Master More in his *Apology* hath recited the said
words of the said treatise, then he endeavoreth himself very much
to make it appear that the motions that be made in the said treatise in
the place before-rehearsed be unreasonable and cannot be brought
about; or else that if they were brought about, they should do hurt
and no good. And to make his sayings the more acceptable... he layeth
sometimes default in my sayings and saith that I thereby defame the
judges spiritual, where I defame them not... but say only that it is
expedient that the King's Highness and his Council see that "pride,
covetousness, nor worldly love be no judges." And whether those words
amount to that effect... that Master More saith they do—that is to say,
that I defame all spiritual judges—it appeareth evidently they do not.

Now, good readers, to the intent that you may the more plainly
perceive both the good mind of this good man's first
book of *Division*, and also his second book here in defense of
the same: take the labor to read the forty-sixth chapter of mine *Apology*,
folio 232. And then shall you think, I suppose, that all his
defense is so faint that I little need to reply.

For first, where he saith that I say that in those words he
defameth the judges spiritual: I would he had rehearsed my
words with which I say so. For I am sure enough my words be
no larger than the truth. But that is his usual craft: to leave out,
for the more part, both my words and the place, because men
might ween it were in some part of my book though they remember
not where.

But now, because he saith that it is evident that those words
of his do not amount unto the defamation of the spiritual
judges: I have showed and proved indeed, in one or two places

1 convenient: appropriate  1–2 by the body: bodily; physically  2 light: trivial
2 complaint: accusation // full lightly: very well  11 motions: proposals  13 hurt: harm
14 layeth: alleges  15 default: error // sayings: assertions  22 mind: intent
24 labor: trouble  26 faint: weak  28 would: wish // rehearsed: quoted
29–30 be no larger than: do not exaggerate  31 more: most // because: so that
of mine Apology, that all the great matter of his complaint upon the cruelty of the spiritual judges in handling men for heresy, since there hath been very few troubled therefor in any diocese in England or Wales... by the space of these twenty years or thirty last past... except only Lincoln and London... and that therefore the false complaint of mishandling could have little color any farther than those two dioceses... and yet, to say the truth, never complaint brought forth by any such man but in London diocese, nor yet not but in London and some piece of Essex alone... and the complaints, upon examination had by the King's honorable Council, always found causeless and false—since this is, I say, so clear that no man can say the contrary but that this is true—I declare and show in my said Apology that where with his false "some say"s he defameth and laboreth to bring in obloquy of the people all the spiritual judges in the realm... of wrong and cruel handling men for heresy... all the men that his false "some say"s (if they were true) did touch were yet indeed so few that he might in a manner as well speak of them by name. And in very deed so few they be. For they be as few or fewer than are the judges either of the one bench or the other.

And therefore when he cometh now forth under shadow of a shrewd "some say" and showeth that the spiritual men have a great desire to put men to abjuration, and to have men noted of heresy, and that therefore till they leave that condition, it were well done they should have less authority... and that it will be "right expedient" that "the King and his Council look specially upon this matter," and "to see with great diligence" that "pride, covetousness, nor worldly love be not judges," nor innocents punished, nor yet that offenders go not without due correction: is not this a lewd colored slander and (without any such thing proved) a shameless defamation?

If this good man would in like wise write and put in print another book, and therein speak first of justices in general, as it might seem to touch all the judges of every base court and justices of the peace too... and then, by some certain circumstances, restrain it in such wise that every man may see that he meaneth only the King's judges at Westminster, and say that some say that, especially of late, the matters of common pleas be evil-handled

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1, 6, etc. complaint: accusation; charge  upon: concerning  color: plausibility
11 had: held 23 shrewd: cunning; devious // showeth: says  noted of: branded with
25 leave that condition: cease to have that disposition  lewd: vile
31 colored: camouflaged  touch: be referring to // base: lower
36 circumstances: details 37 restrain: restrict 39 evil-handled: handled badly
by the judges… and that in writs of error and in pleas of
the Crown the judges mishandle the people sore and do
much wrong… and that some say that they have this evil desire, and
that… and that till they have left them, it were well done that they had
less authority; and then, after such a false, foolish “some say,”
come forth with his saying, and in approbation of his other saying,
conclude and say thus much farther—“It will be right expedient,
therefore, that the King’s Highness and his Council
look specially upon this matter, and to see with great diligence
that pride, covetousness, nor worldly love be not judges,” etc.—were this
wily, foolish handling no false defamation at all?

And now, when he handleth the spiritual ordinaries with
like words for heresy and his “some say”’s false, imagined lies—
and… though his book of Division laboreth to draw that false
suspicion farther… yet himself seeth by experience that while
there hath in long while but in two dioceses very few been
punished for heresy, the slander that he soweth toucheth
some very few, no less than though he wrote in their names—
how can he, therefore, for very shame, say that it is no defamation?
Weeneth he the readers of his work were all such fools that
he might void his plain, open deed with his bare, bold
word?—where he saith it appeareth evidently nay, where every
wise man that readeth it seeth well himself that it well
appeareth evidently yes!

Now goeth he farther with another piece, and saith:

Nor yet my words prove not that I would have all spiritual judges
changed. For the spiritual judges that be now may be judges still,
and have all the properties before-rehearsed, as well as others, for anything
that I have said. And yet Master More taketh it otherwise, and
saith… I would have such judges as have no spice of any of the said
points. And he saith that till such judges may be found, heretics
may “make merry for a little season… while men walk about and seek
for such judges”… which he weeneth will not be done in a “week’s work.”

Here he leaveth out again the place of mine that he toucheth.
For when that is once read, all his gay tale is gone. For
there shall you see that I consider his words, and declare two

2 mishandle: mistreat // sore: terribly 4 left them: ceased to have those bad desires
11 false: untruthful / despicable 13 imagined: fabricated 15 while: since
23 wise: sensible 30 spice: trace 31 points: characteristics // may: can
34 place: text; passage // toucheth: is referring to
35 all his gay tale: his whole fine speech 36 declare: set forth
ways that the good man might mean… of which twain he
taketh here the one, and the other he letteth slip. And yet in
taking his words as he would now seem, my words which
he dissembleth here turn up all his tale; and that the
man saw full well… and therefore winked at them. But I shall
bring them in again here, and repeat them for him. Lo,
good readers, in the forty-sixth chapter, folio 253, after his words rehearsed
at length, thus I begin mine own:

In this process, lo, good readers, this Pacifier declareth that he would
have the King’s Highness and his Council so specially look upon this
matter that neither innocents should be punished nor yet willful offenders
go without due correction. Who could end and conclude all his
matter more fruitfully?

But, now, the special ways whereby he deviseth that the King’s
Highness and his Council should bring this thing about be twain.

The one is if they provide that neither men that be proud nor
covetous, nor have love to the world, be suffered to be judges in any
cause of heresy.

The other is that the bishops shall arrest no man for heresy till
the desire that spiritual men have to cause men abjure heresies, and to
punish them for heresies, be ceased and gone.

And surely I think that his two devices will serve sufficiently for the
one part—that is to wit, that none innocents shall be punished. But I
fear me very sore that they will not serve half so sufficiently for the
other part—that is to wit, that willful offenders go not without
correction.

For now, to begin with his first device, that none be suffered to be
judges in cause of heresy that are proud or covetous, or have love to the
world: if he mean of such as have none of these affections with notable
enormity, then till he prove them that are already, worse than he
proveth them yet—that is to say, till he prove it otherwise, by some of their
outrageous deeds in the dealing and mishandling of men for
heresy that he here defameth them of; than he hath yet proved, and that he
prove their cruel, wrongful dealing otherwise than by “some say”s, or by
his own saying—the King’s Highness and his Council can see, for all his

4 dissembleth: ignores // turn up all his tale: overthrow everything he’s said
5 winked at: turned a blind eye to    7 his words rehearsed: quoting his words
9 Pacifier: Peacemaker  12–13 all his matter: his whole case  14 special: specific
17 suffered: allowed  18, 28 cause of heresy: (a) heresy case  20 cause: make
24 fear me very sore: am very much afraid  29 affections: dispositions
30 enormity: departure from moral rectitude
30 them that are already: the ones already in office; the current ones
32 outrageous: grossly immoral
wholesome counsel, no cause to change those judges that are already,
but to leave them still; and then serveth that device of naught.
And on the other side, if he mean that the King’s Highness shall suffer
none to be judges in cause of heresy that hath any spice at all either of
pride or of covetousness, or any love at all unto this world: heretics may sit
still and make merry for a little season, while men walk about and seek for
such judges. For it will not be less than one whole week’s work, I ween, both
to find such and to be sure that they be such.

Here have you heard, good readers, a reasonable cause why that I
should take him that he would have the spiritual judges
such as should have no spice of pride, covetousness, nor worldly
love. For either he must mean so… or else (as I said) he must
mean on the other manner which I rehearse first, and which he
would now seem to mean. But then (as I have said), if he meant in
the first fashion, as he would now seem—all his tale is overturned.
For then had he no cause of any such complaint. For he
neither had himself when he wrote, nor any man else,
proved by any of them the contrary. And then needed he not to
spend out his profound wisdom in making such exhortations
to the King’s Highness and his Council to see with
so great diligence (as though they had been so long negligent!) to
the thing that himself could not say nay but that it was meetly well
enough already. And thus you see, good readers, that he left out
and dissembled that first part of my words because he
wist ne’er what to say thereto. And therefore, since except he
meant in the first manner (which he could not do without the
marring of all his matter)—you see well that himself drove me to
think that he would have the King’s Grace and his Council see
diligently that there should be no spiritual judges but they that
had no spice of pride, covetousness, or worldly love at all. And then
might heretics, as I said, while such judges were in
seeking make merry for a little while. And I kept myself
meetly well within my bounds. For whereas I said it would be a
week’s work to seek them—I ween it would be fortnight full
ere we found them.

2 of naught: for nothing  4 cause of heresy: a heresy case  4, 11, 30 spice: trace
15 all his tale: everything he has said  // overturned: invalidated
16 of any such complaint: to make any such accusation  24 dissembled: ignored
25 wist ne’er: had no idea  // except: unless
26–27 without . . . matter: without his whole case being destroyed
31–32 in seeking: being sought  34 fortnight full: a whole two weeks
But then goeth he farther, somewhat about, to show that I have mishandled his words and, with joining mine own unto his, have made it seem that he saith much worse by the spiritualty than he either said or meant. But when you have heard all his tale and mine too, you shall well see, good readers, that he shall never while he liveth convey this gear so clean. For these are, first, his words here:

And he saith… that it will be the “more hard” to find such judges. For he saith that I have “put” that matter “out of doubt” that “whereas men would have went soonest to have found them, that there” I say “it will be marvelous hard to find any one of them”—either “prelates, secular priests, or religious persons.” For he saith that I say “plainly” that, “have they never so many virtues beside,” that yet I say “it will be hard to find any one spiritual man… but that he is so infected with desire and affection to have the worldly honor of priests exalted… that he is through such pride far from such indifference and equity as ought and must be in such judges” which, as he saith, I “assign” to be such that they “must have no spice of pride, covetousness, nor love toward the world.”

As to this last-rehearsed sentence of Master More, this is the truth therein: I say in another place of the said treatise, other than that… that Master More hath rehearsed here… that is to say, in the seventh chapter of the said treatise, that “though many spiritual men may be found that have many great virtues and great gifts of God—as chastity, liberality, patience, soberness, temperance, cunning, and such others—yet it will be hard to find any one spiritual man that is not infected with the said desire and affection… to have the worldly honor of priests exalted.” And there my sentence endeth, as to this purpose. But then, as it appeareth before, Master More, in his said Apology, addeth immediately to those words of mine, words of his own putting in… which be these: “that he is, through such pride, far from such indifferency and equity… as ought and must be in the judges” which he saith I assign. And he combineth those words to mine… in such manner as though I spoke them myself. So that they that shall read them can none otherwise take them but as my words; whereby he perverteth clearly my meaning and my sentence.
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therein. For my sentence, nor yet my meaning therein… is not but that judges spiritual may have some spice of pride, covetousness, and worldly love, and yet be meet judges in heresy… as the frailty of man suffereth. For we be no angels but sinners, that lightly may fall and be deceived. Nor I mean not, nor yet my words amount not to it, but that a man may have a desire and affection… to have the worldly honor of priests exalted… and yet be a meet judge in heresy. For I suppose… that a man may have that desire in some degree, and to some intent… and not offend therein… especially deadly. Howbeit, he may also lightly offend therein, if he be not right well wary.

If this good man here say true in these aforesaid words of his “And there my sentence endeth as to this purpose,” then am I content to confess that he saith well, and I wrong. But on the other side, now, if he say not true, but that in the defaming and slandering of the spiritualty his sentence ended not there, but went there much farther forth, and so far forth also… as amounted unto as much as I say that he said, and unto much more too: then will every man bear me record that I misreport not him but he me.

Now shall you, good readers, soon see this tried between us. For his whole words as they lie there together, I shall now rehearse you here. Lo, these they be as you shall find them both in his book of Division and in mine Apology, folio 237:

And though many spiritual men may be found that have right many great virtues and great gifts of God, as chastity, liberality, patience, soberness, temperance, cunning, and such others… yet it will be hard to find any one spiritual man that is not infected with the said desire and affection to have the worldly honor of priests exalted and preferred; and therefore if any layman report any evil of a priest… though it be openly known that it is as he saith— yet they will be more diligent to cause the layman to cease off that saying… than to do that in them is to reform that is amiss in the priest that it is spoken of… taking, as it were, an occasion to do the less in such reformations… because laymen speak so much against them. But surely that will be none excuse to spiritual rulers
before God… when he shall ask account of his people… that were committed unto their keeping.

Now you see, good readers, how untrue it is that this man telleth you. For here you see that his sentence leaveth not where he saith it left as to that purpose: but you see that it goeth forth farther about that purpose still, to show that it will be hard to find any one spiritual man just and indifferent, but that the desire and affection to have the worldly honor of priests exalted and preferred hath so far infected them that if a layman report any evil of a priest, though it be openly known that it is as he saith, yet they will not only rather put the layman to silence than anything amend the priest—but that they will also do the less to the amendment of the priest because the laymen speaketh of it. Which affection cannot be but a very proud, damnable frowardness.

And therefore while this good Pacifier there saith that all the priests be so far infected with such a proud, damnable desire of their worldly exaltation that it will be hard to find any one of them any other, and then a little before those words (as you may see in his said chapter in mine Apology, folio 235) he saith under the figure of “a great rumor among the people” that spiritual men punish heresies “rather to oppress them that speak anything against their worldly honor and riches,” etc., than for “zeal of the faith”: these words of his being there such, judge now, good reader, whether I might not well say that this good man saith it will be hard to find any one spiritual man but that he is so infected with the desire and affection to have the worldly honor of priests exalted that he is through such pride far from such indifference and equity as ought and must be in such judges as himself assigneth to be such as they must have no spice of pride, covetousness, or love toward the world. I am very sure that his words maintain mine and more too.

Nay [saith he], for I do not mean that they should have no spice thereof. For they may have some spice thereof—and yet may be judges in heresy well enough. For they may have that desire in some degree and some intent, and not offend therein, especially deadly.

But I have against that proved before that he must mean so—or else must have left his tale untold. For if he meant to be content with folk of mean conditions without notable enormities, such they were already, and then had his great exhortation little place.

Also, this pride with which his words say that they be all so sore infected that it will be very hard to find any one other… is a very pestilent pride… and in a high degree, and such as he could not well devise a more deadly defamation of the whole spirituality… than those words be, which if they were true (as they be false) plainly proved that in all the whole clergy it were hard to find any one good, honest man, or meet to be a judge, either in heresy or in anything else. And so would he by this device of his take away, as I said, from examination of heresy, all the spiritual judges, and leave them none at all.

And yet, good readers, to the end that you may the better perceive what those words of this man amount unto… which he would make you ween here that I both misrehearse and misconstrue: vouchsafe to read my words that I write upon them in mine Apology, folio 238.

But now, this good Pacifier perceiving that it will be hard to bear it but that his words clearly take away from the clergy all such indifference and justice as himself assigneth to be required of necessity in every man that should be suffered to be judge in heresy—he falleth to another shift to save the matter upright. And therein thus he saith:

And furthermore, though it were as Master More taketh it to be—that my words should sound to that effect that the judges that were then were through such pride far from the indifference and equity that I assign—yet that proveth not… but that they be now indifferent and

4 offend: sin // deadly: mortally 6 tale untold: speech unsaid 7 mean: tolerable
7 conditions: dispositions 8 enormities: departures from moral rectitude
12 pestilent: pernicious 16 honest: honorable // meet: fit 17 in: regarding
22 misrehearse: misquote 23 vouchsafe: be so good as
32 that were then: who were then in office 34 but that they be: i.e., that they are not
rightwise. For they might since the making of the said treatise 
become through grace indifferent, rightwise, meek, liberal, and 
loving to God and their neighbor… though they were not so then. 
And if they be so, then heretics shall not make merry for lack of 
judges a week, nor yet a day. For the same judges may sit still without 
changing… to hear and examine them when need shall be. Thus, as 
mesemeth, it appeareth every way… that the exception that Master 
More taketh of changing of spiritual judges is but of small effect.

This reason hath, lo, some subtlety; but it hath no substance.
For if they were all so naughty so late as this good man 
saith they were, it will be but hardly believed that so many of 
them, upon so short a sermon of this poor preacher, should be 
so well changed so soon but that, as I said, heretics were well 
likely yet one week longer to make merry, before men might 
have so sure experience as to put them so soon in trust to be 
judges in heresy whom this Pacifier had persuaded to be so 
far unmeet for the matter so lately. And therefore it appeareth 
every way that this good man’s invention is toward evil of 
very great, toward good of very small, effect.

Then goeth he forth on with the matter, and thus he saith:

Then saith Master More further, that “if ‘some say’ be no sufficient 
proof,” then is my “tale” all “lost.” And to these words I will answer thus. 
I will agree that my saying that some say this or this… is no proof… 
neither to prove that some say so… nor yet to prove that it is so. For in 
every proof must be two witnesses at the least. But if two will say it is 
so, then it is a proof. 

And surely if Master More will inquire for the truth in this matter, 
he shall find that there be many more than two that say so. And verily if 
many men say so, though the truth be not so, yet the tale is not all 
lost to say that some men say so. For then it shall put the bishops 
and rulers spiritual in mind that they are bound in conscience to 
help them that say so all that they can, from the danger that they 
run in by that saying. And if it be true, then may the spiritual 
rulers order the matter as they shall see cause, and reform it in such
charitable manner that none shall say so hereafter but they will of
malice do it, and run into the slander of the Pharisees. And that
would charitable be examined, whether it be so or not.

This is a pretty piece, and such as I have seldom seen the
like come out of any wise man’s mouth. For though that in
judgment, men must presume a thing is true which two
good, honest persons sworn and examined deposite and testify,
that themselves have seen the deed, or heard the words spoken
by the mouth of the person which for such deed or saying is
accused—yet saith no man, for all that, that because two men say
it and swear it too, therefore it is so. For as to the necessary consequence
of the deed… this argument is very faint that this
man maketh: Two men say it is so; ergo, it is so.

Then, upon this argument such as you see, he sendeth me to
inquire, and then I shall, he saith, find that there be many more
than two that say so. That may well hap now, by occasion of
his book of Division. But what if I inquired of them, and I
should hap to find not only many more than two, but also many
more than two hundred, that would say that the spiritual men for
such evil affections as this good Pacifier surmiseth have
great desire to abjure men or note them of heresy? Yet while
all they could, among them all, lay no proof at all… but always the
truth proved contrary—both by that that in far the most
part of this realm, and take Wales thereto, there have not been
before his book of Division five men abjured in fifteen years,
and in those that have been… rigor hath not been used
more than necessary, but there hath been used more than necessary
favor… and that this hath been already proved oftener than once
before the King’s honorable Council—I would not esteem the
babbling of two hundred (no, not though they were two thousand,
and yet many more) to the mountenance of two straws, for anything
that I would regard any good man the worse. But I would for
their own parts be sore ashamed to hear them, and clearly perceiving
that they so lewdly lied—I would be sore ashamed to tell
the tale again after them. And this, I say, if I should with inquiry

1 but: unless  2 run into the slander: incur the ill repute
4 pretty: fine  5 wise: sensible  6 judgment: a trial  7 honest: honorable
7 sworn: put under oath  8 themselves: they themselves  9 for: of  10 because: since
12 faint: weak  19 spiritual men: clergymen  20 affections: dispositions
20 surmiseth: alleges  21 note them of: brand them with  // while: when
22 all they: they all  // lay: put forth  23 far the most: by far the largest
24 take . . . thereto: add . . . to that  26 rigor: severity; harshness  28 favor: leniency
28 after: more often  29 esteem: rate  31 mountenance: value
31–32 for . . . worse: i.e., toward my thinking the worse of any good person
32–33 for their own parts: as for their own selves  33, 34 sore: terribly  34 lewdly: evilly
thus hap to find, as I verily trust I should not if I did inquire.

But, now, his “some say” being so false as it is, it is a world yet to see what a fond shift he findeth, that he would not yet by his will have that lie lost. For he saith that “though the truth be not so, yet the tale is not lost to say that some men say so”; for he saith that “then it shall put the bishops and spiritual rulers in mind that they are bound in conscience to help them that say so all that they can, from the danger that they run in by so saying.”

What good, I pray you, can this false “some say” do? For what can the spiritual men do for their help that so belie them, any other than advise them to leave such lying? And that had been a better part for this good Pacifier to have played himself, and so to have told them upon whose tale he wrote it, than to the reproach and rebuke of so many good, worshipful men make a book of division, and therein write every lewd word that any lewd folk or any false shrews would tell him. Whose evil tongues the spirituality can never appease… but if to please them, they should displease God… and without letting heresies grow and go forth, should themselves rather do evil than let lewd folk speak evil.

And now, to the intent, good readers, that you may the more clearly see to how little purpose the Pacifier hath in this point answered me—ye shall understand that my words in mine Apology which he would seem to answer well here were these (folio 257):

But yet is this Pacifier not so favorable toward folk suspected of heresy as to take away the power of the bishop forever, of arresting them, and to drive the ordinaries forever to sue citations against heretics and process of excommunication; but will have, he saith, the bishops’ power of arresting no longer suspended than as long as spiritual men have that great desire to cause men abjure or to have them punished for heresy—as though he had well proved that they have so, because he saith that some men say so.

But, now, if “some say” be no sufficient proof… then is his tale lost. For then he showeth no cause why that power of theirs should in any case be more suspended now than in any time herebefore. And on the other

1 thus hap to find: i.e., find it to be the case that thousands of people were telling this story
3 world: marvel  4 fond shift: silly tactic  4–5 by his will: willingly; if he can help it
5 lost: wasted  11 their . . . them: the help of those who thus slander them
12 leave: cease; desist from  // had: would have  14 upon: on the basis of
15 worshipful: respectable  // make: write  16 of division: about dissension
16, 17, 20 lewd: vile  17 false shrews: lying scoundrels  18 spiritualty: clergy
18 but if: unless  19–20 letting . . . forth: preventing heresies from arising and advancing
29 sue: seek to obtain  // citations: subpoenas  32 spiritual men: clergymen
32 cause: make  34 so: that  35 tale lost: talk in vain
side, if “some say” be a good proof… then the suspending will be as long as a depriving forever, since there shall never be any time in which there shall lack one or other “some say” to say more than truth.

Lo, good readers, here you see that unto the second part of these words of mine, he answereth nothing at all. And then have you seen before that unto the first, his answer is so feeble that it had been better for him to have done therewith as he doth with the other, leave it unanswered too.

But now goeth he further and saith:

Then saith Master More yet further, that “which is a light suspicion and which is a heavy,” and “which witness be sufficient and which not,” must “be weighed by the spiritual judges”; and “upon their weighing of the matter for light or heavy,” to “follow the arrest of the party or the leaving of the arrest.” Now, verily in this point methinketh that Master More maketh a right good motion—that is to say, that the matter should be examined before the arrest. For it hath been said in times past that in such case the arrest hath many times gone before the examination. Nevertheless, under what manner the examination and the arrest should be made in such case, I will make no device at this time: for haply Master More would anon find a default at it; and therefore I will leave it to them that have authority, to treat further of it, and to devise how to avoid the “maze” that Master More speaketh of in his said forty-sixth chapter.

Now, good readers, this man maketh here as though I had given him in my words some great advantage to ground some great matter upon. And therefore I shall rehearse you what my words were, that yourselves may see how sore I oversaw myself therein, and what he meaneth by the “maze” that he nameth here. These are, lo, my words in mine Apology (folio 257):

Yet is he content at the last, lest every man might spy the peril of his device, to temper his device in such wise that till the spirituality have left their cruel desire of abjuring and punishing folk for heresy, they should not be suffered to arrest folk for every light suspicion, or every complaint, of heresy. Howbeit, he granteth that where one is openly and notably suspected of heresy, and sufficient record and...
witness against him, and besides all that, a doubt that he would flee, whereby he might infect others: then he granteth it convenient that he should be arrested by the body. And therein he bringeth in the Clementine and the statute by which the ordinaries have power to arrest folk for suspicion of heresy; and would, as far as I perceive, have the King reform them after his device. But yet, since which is a light suspicion and which is a heavy, and which is a light complaint and which is a heavy, and which is an open suspicion and which but a privy, and which suspicion is notable and which is not notable, and which witnesses be sufficient and which be not sufficient, be things that must be weighed by the spiritual judges; and upon their weighing of the matter for light or heavy must follow the arresting of the party or the leaving of the arrest: we be come again, as in a maze, to the point where we began—that, be the matter great or small, lest all the while they be cruel they should judge light heavy and small great, their arresting of any at all must be suspended from them, and send them to sue by citation, till men see that same mind of theirs of desiring men’s abjuration and punishment utterly changed and cease; that is to say, till there be no man left that will so much as say that some men say that they have not left that mind yet, and make a lie again of them then as those “some” have done that have so said already to Sir John “Some Say” now. And long will it be, I warrant you, ere ever all such folk fail.

And therefore—since in the mean season, by this Pacifier’s good device, heretics may go unarrested—I cannot believe that if his way were followed, it would be any good means to make that willful offenders in heresy should not pass unpunished, as fast as, both in the end of this chapter and the other before also, he calleth upon the King’s Highness and his Council, and his Parliament, to look upon this matter after his good advertisement, and never cease till they bring it to effect.

Here you see, good readers, because this man with his devices bringeth himself into a maze out of which he cannot see how to get, he would now set other folk to study thereabout. And would make them very careful about a thing little needful. For it hath well appeared, and well been proved too, that the spiritual judges have yet hitherto, in arresting for heresy, right well examined and considered first both the cause and the necessity, and have been rather therein many times too slow… than any
time over hasty. And therefore I may and will say here again as I said there, that I little doubt but that if the King's Highness do as I doubt not but His Highness will do—maintain and assist the spiritualty in executing of the laws, even those that are already made against heresies... and command every temporal officer under him to do the same for his part—though there were never more new laws made therefor, yet shall both innocents be saved harmless well enough and offenders punished too.

To this cometh forth this good man in this wise:

Now, verily, to those words of Master More I dare say thus: that Master More, ere he had spoken those words, had occasion by reasonable conjecture to have doubted more at the matter than he hath done, and to have thought it very likely that if the same laws should stand as do now in every point concerning heresy, that many innocents that be not guilty might upon suspicion of heresy be driven to purge themselves after the will of the ordinary—and yet be not guilty. Yea, and over that, Master More might have reasonably doubted, and, as I suppose, in conscience he ought to have doubted more than he hath done, that sometimes innocents might happen upon the suit Ex officio, or upon light complaints by favor of officers, or upon malice or displeasure, be arrested before examination, and yet Master More himself assenteth that the examination should be before the arrest. And he might have doubted also that some innocents might by such perjured persons as be above rehearsed in this chapter be sometimes condemned. And therefore the said words of Master More whereby he taketh upon him to say, as it were in his own authority to perform it, that innocents by the same laws as be already made for heresy shall "be saved harmless well enough" might happen to be of small effect to help an innocent man or woman that should happen to be wrongfully troubled in time to come against his words before rehearsed.

Now, verily, to all these words of this good man I dare say thus: that I when I wrote the words had, and yet have, very good conjectures to put little doubt therein. For though I might think

1 over: too 3 maintain: support 4 spirituality: clergy // even: precisely
5 temporal: secular 8, 28 saved harmless: kept unharmed
11–12 by reasonable conjecture: on reasonable grounds
12 doubted more at: had more fear about 16 after the will: at the discretion
17 over: besides 18, 23 doubted: feared 20 light complaints: trivial accusations
20 favor: aid; support 21 be: i.e., to be 24 by: by means of
24, 31 rehearsed: mentioned 25 condemned: convicted; found guilty
26–27 as... perform it: as if he had the authority to make it be the case
30 troubled: gotten into trouble 31 against: with respect to 34 conjectures: reasons
that this harm and this harm might hap: yet since I have well
seen it proved that the spiritual judges have used themselves in
these matters not only so truly, but, over that, so favorably, that
no man can prove in this realm such harms to have happed
yet—but whereas such things have been of late surmised,
the truth hath been well proved contrary before the King’s
honorable Council—I had and have very good cause to think
that as they have done well hitherto, so shall they well do
hereafter.

And since all this good man’s ground is no more, to take
away well-approved laws with, but that harm may hap sometime
to some good man thereby—which reason he may make
against the best law that all the world can make—I dare be
bold to warrant that that cold reason so fervently set
forth in such a weighty matter is not well worth a rush.

And if men would go about to change these old long-approved
laws: I would, as my duty is, pray God give them the
grace to make the changes good; but for that little wit that I
have, I verily believe and think that if any changes be
made rather more slack than straiter—then shall the changes
be made rather far worse than better. And thus end I, good
readers, this good man’s seventeenth chapter.

The Eighteenth Chapter

His eighteenth chapter beginneth folio 69. Wherein he beginneth
first with the *ca. Ut inquisitionis negotium* (and 51.6), “whereby it
appeareth that . . . all lords and rulers temporal be prohibited
that they shall not in any manner take knowledge or judge upon
heresy.” And upon this, himself addeth unto it in his book of
Division that “he that inquiereth of heresy taketh knowledge of
heresy,” and that himself saith not so alone, but that
*Summa rosella* saith so too; and hereupon he concludeth that it should
seem that “all the justices of the peace be excommunicated,” and “all
stewards in leets,” and all inquests too, as many as meddle withal.
For whether in leets they may or may not—that, he saith, he doubteth,
but he saith that I say they may; but he telleth not where I say so, nor, as I verily think, he never found it in any book of mine. I say in mine *Apology*, folio 227, that in every leet they do so; whether they lawfully so may do or not, thereof speak I nothing—albeit I think they may well enough, both without offense of the King's law or peril of accursing either.

For I little doubt but that there were of the clergy at the making of the statute more men than one that understood *Summa rosella* as well as this good man doth, if *Summa rosella* were then made and in men's hands.

And I doubt also as little but that there were at those days in the clergy more than one, that were of counsel in the making of the statute, that understood the chapter *Ut inquisitionis* as well as this man doth, and as well as he that made *Summa rosella*, too. And that they well understood that the said chapter meant of such inquisitors, and such inquisitions as they make, that are in the corps of the law called *inquisitores haereticae pravitatis*... of which there are in some places special officers to inquire, proceed, and do therein as the ordinaries do; and meant not of such inquirers and such inquisitions as do none otherwise inquire but only by way of information to bring the matter to the ordinaries' knowledge.

For as for the minor of this good man's argument—that he that inquireth of heresy taketh knowledge of heresy—so doth every denouncer, every accuser, and, in a manner, every witness too, take upon them knowledge of heresy in some manner wise: for they take upon them, as they well may, that this thing or that thing is heresy. But this is not the knowledge that the law forbiddeth; but the knowledge that we call "holding plea" upon it, which our inquisitions do not—but only serve to bring the matter to the ordinaries' hands, which else should peradventure not have heard thereof.

And for this cause, to be sure that by these inquisitions no man should fall in danger of any excommunication, it was substantially provided in the said statute that the inquisition and

6 offense: violation // peril of accursing: danger of excommunication
10 were then made: was already written at that time
13, 15 chapter: i.e., chapter of canon law  14 he that made: whoever wrote
15 meant: was speaking
17–18 inquisitores . . . pravitatis: investigators of heretical depravity
19 ordinaries: bishops  20 meant not of: was not referring to
23 minor: i.e., minor premise  24 inquireth of heresy: holds heresy inquests
27 manner wise: kind of way  29–30 "holding plea" upon: taking jurisdiction over
31–32 ordinaries' . . . peradventure: the hands of the ordinaries, who otherwise would perhaps
34 in: into // substantially: thoroughly
the indictment of heresy should serve the ordinary
nothing to the proceeding in the matter, but that he should
begin his process against the party afresh, without
laying that indictment unto his charge.

And therefore whereas this good man, by the high authority of
*Summa rosella*, denounceth here all the justices of peace accursed,
I dare be bold by the high authority of *Summa angelica*
to denounce them all assoiled again. And therefore
whereas this good man, weening that he had well won his
spurs in this point, triumpheth upon me and saith—

And to this law Master More answereth not, but passeth it over, as
a thing that, as it seemeth, he little regardeth… but only that he saith
that the laws of this realm and of holy Church in heresies “may well
stand together” for aught that he seeth. And yet it appeareth that
upon this law they do not agree nor stand together. And therefore
methinketh it would not be so lightly passed over as Master More
doth pass it over. For it is a dangerous thing to fall into the least
censure of the Church . . .

—there were two causes for which I answered him not: one a
general cause, concerning all his matters of laws of the
Church wherein he findeth faults, of which I shall speak
afterward. Another special cause there was concerning this
excommunication. And that was that me thought, and yet think,
that he spoke therein so childishly that I was ashamed on his
behalf to meddle with it… and to make open his childish
handling thereof.

But now since I see him count for so great a conquest that
he put me to silence therein—what purpose can he devise for
which I should have answered anything to that point? Had I
made any profession to prove every word wrong that he said
in all his book? He knoweth that I said not that I would meddle…
but with those certain things that I there speak of.

But now suppose that there were in that law such fault as he
allegeth—what could mine answer amend the matter, or his
book of *Division* either? If men were accursed, as he mistaketh

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2 nothing: not at all; in no way
6, 8 denounce(th): declare(s)
6, 35 accursed: excommunicated
7 be bold: venture
7 *Summa angelica*: A dictionary of moral theology, titled *Cases of Conscience* by its author,
Blessed Angelo Carletti
8 assoiled: absolved from excommunication
9 weening: thinking
13–14 may well stand together: are quite compatible; can harmoniously coexist
14 appeareth: is evident
22 special: specific
23 yet: still
25 meddle: deal
25 open: obvious
28 devise: come up with
30 profession: promise
186/35—187/1 mistaketh it: erroneously says they are (for holding heresy inquests)
it, could my book or his book take away the curse? “No, but we may put the Parliament in mind to make a law.” His book alone is as able to put them in remembrance thereof as his and mine together. And yet for that point neither needeth mine nor his neither. For the Parliament hath made already a law for these inquisitions. Which if they might lawfully make in such form as they have (as I am sure they might), then am I sure that they fall not in excommunication for it. Now, if they might not lawfully make it, and thereby fell therein, what could the Parliament farther add unto it, that might deliver them of it? And therefore I cannot, in good faith, see to what purpose he wrote of that point himself.

“No, but this law is one great cause of division between the spiritualty and the temporalty.” That would I very fain wit how. For temporal men be not, I wot well, so far overseen as to be angry with the spiritual men here now, for that law that a pope made at Rome ere they were born. And the spiritual men have also as little cause again of any grudge against the temporalty for the matter. And therefore why he should put it in his book of Division for a cause of division, I can devise no reason. For as for that that he would should seem a cause here, is too unreasonable, where he saith:

As long as that law standeth so, unrepealed… some priests that see it will say that they that do against it… be accursed; and so may lightly fall thereby into a wrongful and untrue judgment… which though it be no great offense (unless it be of pride… by despising of the temporal power in that behalf), yet it would be eschewed. And also, if they that be so noised to be accursed hear of it, they will be discontented. And so grudges and variances may rise and increase by occasion of it.

This is a very cold tale, and as dead as ever was doornail. For before himself brought in this babbling of his own about that law (which babbling is yet, as I have showed you, to no purpose at all), I never heard any man talk any such word of that law in my days, nor, in good faith, no more I ween did he neither.
Nor, I dare say, he heareth nowhere yet any priests say that the justices of the peace be accursed for inquiring against heresies—none, I dare say, but such priests as be heretics. And therefore this whole tale of his, save for the malice that it meaneth... is even a very trifling.

For as for the motion that he maketh so often to have that law repealed because it is, he saith, against the laws of the realm: except he mock, I wot ne’er what he meaneth. For if the realm here may repeal it—then by that the law is here made to the contrary (if it were contrary, as it is not), it is repealed already. And if he think that the realm here cannot repeal it—then whereto writeth he and printeth that piece in his book of Division, as a thing for which the temporality and the spiritualty of this realm should fall in variance for, where neither the making nor the repealing lieth in neither nother of their hands?

But surely the repealing, though it be the thing that is spoken of, is not yet the thing that is meant in this matter, as it appeareth in these words:

And therefore methinketh it would not be so lightly passed over as Master More doth pass it over. For it is a dangerous thing to fall into the least censure of the Church. And if it be said that the said law “is void, because the Church had no authority to make it”; and that it “is therefore not to be feared.” And I will yet say thereto, that though it were void, that yet as long it standeth so, not repealed, it were good to eschew it, and not to fall willfully into the danger of it; and therefore it were better to repeal it than to let it stand still and rather do hurt than good.

Here you may see, good readers, that whereas otherwise to repeal that law than it is repealed lieth not in our hands if our law were against it; and whereas of truth it needeth no repealing at all (but the law of the realm standeth therewith well enough), he maketh as though all the justices of peace were accursed thereby, as often as they give the juries in charge to inquire of heresy: therefore, lest they should willfully fall into

6 motion: proposal 8 mock: is joking // wot ne’er: have no idea 9 may: can 9 that: the fact that 12 whereto: to what purpose 13 temporality: laity 14 spirituality: clergy // in variance for: into dissension over 23, 25 void: not legally binding 25 though: even if 26, 27 were: would be 26 eschew: steer clear of 26, 35 willfully: deliberately 27 stand still: remain in effect 28 hurt: harm 32–33 standeth... enough: is plenty compatible with it 34 accursed: excommunicated 35 inquire of: investigate // they: i.e., the juries
the censures of the Church (whereof, as he saith, the least is a
dangerous thing), ye may plainly see that these wily shrews
which abuse his labor mean in all this matter nothing else
but that they would not have heresies inquired of. And yet they
need not so greatly to care therefor, for any great things that by
such inquisitions are in heresies presented. But yet thus declare
they their good wills, these wily shrews that thus deceive this
good simple soul and set him so evil a work.

If he fear so much the censures of the Church as he
maketh for, and understand and believe *Summa rosella* so
surely as he pretendeth: it had been better for him to examine
well his book of *Division*, and this his second book also, by the
titles of *Summa rosella*, and see well whether himself vary not
from *Summa rosella*, and be by the sentence of *Summa rosella* fallen
in the censures of the Church himself, by some such manner of
writing as his said books have.

But now cometh this good Pacifier forth with a goodly piece;
and to declare himself indifferent, and to show also a great
oversight used upon my part—thus the good man “Some Say”
saith:

And therefore it seemeth right expedient that the said law be repealed.
And in like wise it were good to repeal all such laws
spiritual as be made contrary to the King’s laws and the custom
of the realm. And if it be said that it were good also… that such
statutes and laws… as be made and used by the temporal power to the
grief of the people were also reformed… and that if I were indifferent…
I would make some motion so to have it—and so, it
seemeth, Master More doth partly move that I ought to have done, and
to have found as well default in the temporal law as in the spiritual
law; howbeit, because he would bear no blame of the temporal law
in that motion, it seemeth that he somewhat mitigateth his sentence
therein and saith… that if I do so… and that then I “handle them” (that
is to say, the temporal laws), and find defaults at them, as “truly” as
I do at these (that is to say, at the spiritual laws): that then I should
“make two lies for one”; and yet, as I suppose, I have assigned some
defaults in the spiritual law… which Master More cannot tell
how they should be excused.

As to his repealing, I see, as I have said, no substance in his
words. For we repeal them as far as I see we can, when we
keep them not but make our own laws to the contrary. And
therefore, as far as I see, all that he speaketh of these repealings,
save only for setting forth of his division, is else but a very
vain tale.

But, now, where he saith that I would have him, and seem to
move him, to find faults in the temporal law too: I wot ne’er
whether his words have herein more falsehood or more folly;
but surely they have both twain, and either the one or the
other double.

For first, every man may see by his own words even here,
that I move him not to use as for indifference to find faults
in the temporal laws as he hath done with the spiritual
laws, when himself here showeth that I say that if he so
did, he should make double lies. This showeth that he useth in
this saying plain and open untruth. And since his own
untruth appeareth upon his own showing, this showeth
also that he useth open folly.

And where he saith that he hath assigned some defaults in
the spiritual laws which I cannot tell how they should be
excused: I answer him again that unto all laws, or all matters
that he list to babble of, am I not bound to meddle with; but
of these spiritual laws that were made for the repressing of
heresies, with which our temporal laws are also conformable
and concurrent, with which this good, wise man, for the
ease of heretics, hath now found such “faults” as a wise
man may be ashamed to speak of, I have clearly declared that
they need not to be excused… but that, for the finding of such
“faults,” his folly to be much accused. This have I proved so
plainly that he can find no great cause of glory when he
looketh back upon it.
But now, to the intent you may, good readers, see that either this man is not so simple in himself as he seemeth or else that some wily shrews shamefully do deceive him: I beseech you consider a little either the folly or the craft that the man useth here.

He hath brought you forth words of mine which I speak, he saith, of the laws, whereas of truth I speak them not of the laws at all, as yourselves shall well see. For though he dissemble the place because he would not have you read it—yet have I sought it out for you, in the 99\textsuperscript{th} leaf of mine Apology; and there, lo, these are my words:

And this Pacifier aggrieveth—as much as in him lieth—the clergy of England for use of the laws not made by themselves, but be common laws of all Christendom. If he will say that he blameth but their abuses thereof, the truth appeareth in some place otherwise in his book. And yet, since he proveth that point but by a “some say”… he might with the same figure lay like faults in the temporality concerning the laws of this realm, and prove it in like wise with a great “some say” too. And therein he showeth himself not indifferent, when he bringeth in the one and leaveth the other out. And on the other side, if he bring in the other too—then shall he make two faults for one. For if he handle them as truly as he handleth these—then shall he make two lies for one.

Lo, good readers, consider here, I beseech you, the manner of this good man. To the first piece of these words of mine—in which case is also the law that we be now in hand with, \textit{Ut inquisitionis}, wherewith he would in his book of \textit{Division} aggrieve the clergy of this realm, which never made the law—he answereth not in all his book one word. And yet in his such manner of aggrieving he useth a very sinful, and in his not answering, a very shameful, way.

Then in the remnant you see, good readers, yourselves, that I speak not of the laws. For when I say thus—“If he will say that he blameth but their abuses thereof: yet since he proveth that point but by a ‘some say’… he might by the same figure lay like faults in the temporality too, concerning the laws of this realm”—
is it not here plain that I lay blame in him, for his belying of
the ministers of the spiritual laws under a figure of “some say,” as
though they abused the spiritual laws in mishandling of
heretics (whereof I speak more after)? And I say that by a like
figure of “some say” he might defame all the temporal ministers
too, and bring them in grudge and obloquy of the people with
like lies of abusing the temporal laws too.

Now consider, good readers, either how falsely this honest
man hath himself, or else how foolishly he hath suffered false
shrews, to make him turn and change the sentence of my
words from the men to the laws, to bring in his matters
upon, and say that I move him to find faults in the temporal
laws and put them in print abroad as he doth in the other,
whereas you plainly see I speak not of the laws but of the
ministers… nor yet advise him to use such fashion with the
temporal ministers neither, lest he make two lies for one.

Is not now this change of my sentence that he maketh here a
very shameless dealing, either of himself or of some
shrewd counsel of his?

And now knitteth he to this handling the remnant of the
said eighteenth chapter, and showeth that he speaketh first of the
spirituality because the causes of the division specially be
grown by them… and layeth forth a sort of griefs, some
part very trifles, and some part remedied before his book of
Division made, and some part very foolish, and some part,
for all his “some say”的s, undoubtedly very false.

He hath there two leaves, in the end of that chapter, which any
wise man that readeth them shall, I suppose, judge a very
dreaming tale. And therein it seemeth that as he hath begun
with the spiritual laws, so he will after proceed in the temporal
laws too. And fain would the man make me so fond as to be
his fellow therein… and saith if I know any such made as “the
Parliament had none authority to make,” or whereupon “the
people have just cause to complain,” it were “well done” that I
should “show them.” And so he thinketh “verily” that “charity should
compel” me to do, seeing that I am, he saith, “learned in the laws of
the realm.”

Verily if I knew any such—yet would I not follow neither this

1 belying: slandering 2, 5, etc. ministers: judicial officers 2, 3, 30 spiritual: Church
5 might: could 5 temporal: secular 6 in grudge: into the ill will
6 obloquy: vituperative speech 7, 30 temporal: civil 8 falsely: dishonestly
8 honest: honorable 9 suffered: allowed 9–10 false shrews: lying scoundrels
10, 17 sentence: focus 11 matters: allegations 12 move: exhort
13 in print abroad: out there in print 19 shrewd: devious / malicious // counsel: adviser
21 showeth: claims 22 spirituality: clergy 22, 25 division: discord
22–23 specially… them: come from them in particular 23 sort of griefs: set of grievances
25 made: was written 28 wise: sensible 29 dreaming: illusive; out of touch with reality
29 tale: speech 31 fain would the man: the man would much like to // fond: idiotic
32 fellow: accomplice 34 were: would be // well done: i.e., a good thing to do
35 show: tell
good man’s holy exhortation nor his godly example
neither, to do in the one as he hath done in the other, but if I
liked his doing a little better than I do.

And if I be learned in the temporal laws, the less will I
follow his counsel. For the better that I were learned in them,
the less would I ween it would become me to print and put
abroad among the people a slanderous book of them to
shame them.

And unto this point, good readers, I have answered and showed
my mind in mine Apology before, whereto this man giveth a
deaf ear always. And here, upon a sought occasion, with a
fond wily change of my words, exhorteth me to the thing to
which I made answer already. And what I before said therein—
that he dissembleth, and saith not one word thereto. But in
mine Apology, good readers, the 159th leaf, these were in
this point my words:

His other murmurs and grudges that he saith he cannot now rehearse,
he rehearseth after many of them in his other chapters... which I will pass
over untouched, both for that the more part of them be such as every
wise man will, I suppose, answer them himself in the reading, and
satisfy his own mind without any need of my help therein, and for
that some things are there also therein that are very well said; and some
also that be they good or bad, I purpose not to meddle much with, as
are the things that touch any laws or statutes already made, be they of the
Church or of the realm; defend them I am content to do, if I think them
good. But on the other side, if I think them naught... albeit that in place
and time convenient I would give mine advice and counsel to the change,
yet to put out books in writing abroad among the people against
them, that would I neither do myself nor in the so doing commend
any man that doth. For if the law were such as were so far
against the law of God that it were not possible to stand with man’s
salvation... then in that case the secret advice and counsel may become
every man; but the open reproof and redargution thereof may not, in my
mind, well become those that are no more spiritual than I. And surely if the
laws may be kept and observed without peril of soul, though the
change might be to the better: yet out of time and place convenient to put
the defaults of the laws abroad among the people in writing, and

2 but if; unless  6 ween: think  7, 28, 37 abroad: out there  7 of: about
8 shame: discredit  9–10 showed my mind: made known my thinking  12 fond: foolish
14 dissembleth: ignores  17 grudges: complaints  17, 18 rehearse(th): relate(s)
18 after: later  19 untouched: (leaving them) undiscovered  19, 21–22 for that: because
19 more part: majority  23 meddle: involve myself  24 touch: concern; have to do with
25 content: willing  26 naught: bad  27, 36 convenient: appropriate
31–32 it... salvation: i.e., it would be a mortal sin to obey it  32 secret: private (giving of)
33 reproof: criticism  34 mind: opinion
35 though: even if  37 defaults: defects
without any surety of the change give the people occasion to have the laws in derision under which they live—namely since he that so shall use to do may sometime mistake the matter and think the thing not good whereof the change would be worse—that way will I not, as thus advised, neither use myself nor advise no friend of mine to do. And therefore I will, as I say, leave some things of his book untouched, whether he say well or evil.

Here you see, good readers, mine answer to this point concerning the finding of faults and putting them abroad in print: which answer he dissembleth, and again provoketh me to the same, as though he had never heard it; which answer I will therefore be had as repeated in every place where he provoketh me hereafter to the same point. And thus you see, good readers, that whereas he hath not in any one chapter of his brought forth any reason yet—yet hath he brought forth least in this his eighteenth, in which he boasteth most. For by this hath he plainly declared that he neither understandeth the law Ut inquisitionis, that he allegeth, nor so much as the poor summa called Summa rosella, neither. For that good man that made it undoubtedly never meant of such inquisitions as ours are, of which manner he had haply never known none. And as for the law, the very first words thereof, to him that understandeth them and considereth them well, sufficiently do declare that that law forbiddeth laymen to meddle with such manner knowledge of heresy as should be a let and impediment to the ordinaries, or other the spiritual inquisitors; and not such knowledge as we take by our inquisitions, that only serve to help the other forth and bring the matter to their hands.

And therefore, since I see well that this man in the Latin laws and summas hath so little understanding, I shall be the more content in his laws and his summas so much the less to dispute or meddle with him.

The Nineteenth Chapter

In his nineteenth chapter he declareth what he meaneth by “confederacies” of the spiritualty... and saith he meaneth “confederacies

1 surety of the change: i.e., assurance that they will be changed
1–2 have... derision: hold in derision the laws 2 namely: especially 3 use: be wont
4 advised: considered 5 untouched: undiscussed 6 evil: badly 7 abroad: out there
8 dissembleth: ignores 9–10 provoketh me to the same: issues to me the same challenge
11–12 provoketh... on: challenges on 13 whereas: while 14 reason: rationality
15 boasteth: proudly claims 16, 22 declare(d): show(n)
16 Ut inquisitionis: See 184/25–28. 17 allegeth: cites (as his authority)
18 Summa rosella: See note for 83/14–15. 19 made of: had in mind
20 haply: perhaps 22 meddle: concern themselves 24 let: hindrance
25 ordinaries: bishops 26 other the spiritual inquisitors: the other ecclesiastical examiners
29 meddle with: concern myself 33 declareth: explains 34 spiritualty: clergy
whereby spiritual men pretend to maintain” some
such “laws of the Church,” and some such constitutions provincial,
as are “against the King’s laws and the old customs
of the realm”… and puttheth for an example the putting of priests
to answer before temporal judges, and the statute made De silva caedua,
and the statute of mortuaries.

As for conventing of priests before secular judges, truth it
is that one time the occasion of a sermon made the matter come in
communication before the King’s Highness. But neither any
times since nor many years before, I never heard that there was
any business about it. And yet was that matter ceased long
before any word sprang of this great general division, that
his book maketh as though there were such, in a manner general
through the whole realm.

And divers statutes have there since been made, concerning
the same point. And many priests convented as they were
wont to be before; and no business made by the spiritualty
therefor, that I heard of, nor, I trow, himself neither.

And in like wise, men cut down their woods every year, in
one place and other of the realm… and either is there not asked the
tithe against the statute… or if some parson would with good will
get it, and therefore ask it, he gettet it not yet indeed.

For where he saith that if I would “remember” myself “well
how often the . . . constitution provincial made [against the statute
De silva caedua] hath been put in execution . . . of late days, to the
grief of many laymen,” I would “not have said so generally
that there is not any one constitution provincial,” that he
speaketh of, “to any man’s grief or grudge put in execution in
the time of any of the prelates that are now living”; and affirmeth
that the same “constitution hath of late . . . in the time of
divers of the same prelates that now be, been put in execution,
to the grief and grudge of many persons within this realm”:
first, as touching mine own remembrance—in good faith, I
cannot remember one. And as to his own remembrance, upon
which he affirmeth it to have been done so lately, to the grudge
and grief of so many: he shall pardon me though I believe him
not till he prove it, or at the leastwise name them that have had
the winning, and them also that have borne the loss… so that I may
myself prove whether it be true or not. For except he do the
one, else have I good cause, in the meanwhile, in this
point to give no great credence to him.

For first, I can scantly believe that upon the parson’s bare
word, for allegation of the constitution provincial, his parishioner
would let him have it. And if there happed any man that
would—not I sure they were so few that it were double folly to
lay that for any cause of division… which were done both but by
a few and also not without the party’s will, and rather of his own
private devotion than for any fear of compulsion.

Now, if the parson would take it of his parishioner by force—I see the
common experience therein such that I dare boldly say the
whole parish would not suffer him. And yet if it were taken indeed—
neither should the parson enjoy the profit nor the parishioner
bear the loss… but should at the King’s common law recover
a right large amends. For well ye wot his damages
should be taxed him, not by twelve priests, but by twelve
temporal men, and his costs by the King’s judges, that are no
priests neither.

Now, if this man will say that many of the parsons have in
the time of the prelates that now be living, or that were living
at the time that himself wrote those words, recovered in any
of the spiritual courts the tithe of such woods, against the
statute, by force of that provincial constitution: I will see this
man prove it ere I believe him in it. For the danger of that
suit may be peradventure more than I suppose the parson will
put in peril for his tithes. And also, the parishioner may soon
stop the suit in the beginning by the King’s prohibition…
whereby the King’s judges shall see whether the parson sue for
such tithes or not, and will not therein suffer him to proceed.

And therefore till this good man make me better proofs of this
matter than his own bare saying, he giveth me no cause,
against so many lets to the contrary, therein to believe his
word. But I durst well warrant it that if he come once to the
naming of the parties, so that the specialties of the matters may
be sought out and made appear: you shall surely find it untrue.

Now, then, to maintain, withal, his great word of “confederacies”—
he bringeth forth that some priests say still that

3 scanty: scarcely
3, 31 bare: mere
4 allegation: invoking
6 were: would be a
7 lay: allege // division: discord
10 of: from
12 suffer: let
15, 17 his: i.e., the parishioner’s
16 taxed: assessed against // him: i.e., the parson
17 temporal men: laymen
22 spiritual: ecclesiastical // against: in virtue of
26 put in peril: take a chance on
26, 34 may: can
26 soon: readily
27 stop: block
29 suffer: allow
31 lets to the contrary: contraindicating impediments
33 durst well warrant: would well dare guarantee
34 specialties: particulars
35 matters: cases
35 sought: searched // made appear: brought to light
36 maintain: defend // withal: along with the rest
those tithes and mortuaries also, for all the statutes, be their duties
still, and that they which pay them not be accursed. I have
espied this good man is a man of sadness, and no great gamer.
For if he were, he would never be angry for an angry word
spoken by a man that is on the losing side. It is an old
courtesy at the cards, pardie, to let the loser have his
words. And in good faith, in this matter I hear no such talking
at all. And verily this device of his, to put this for a cause of
division, is in my mind a very childish thing.

But then goeth he further: that priests make “particular
confederacies” to “maintain” obits and priests’ wages, and to
“have more at burials” than they have been wont to have, “or else
to show themselves not content”; that is to say, to ask more than
they can get… and because they cannot get it, show themselves
not content… that is to wit, lour and look angrily, and say they
be not pleased. Be not these high matters and meet for that
heinous name of “confederacies”?

And yet goeth he further, with another heinous confederacy—
that “if a priest have a business to do in some counties,
other priests will, as it is said, so confederate with him at arbitraments
and other meetings… or else make them such friends privily,
that the other party, though he be of right good substance and have
also good right… yet shall he sometimes have much ado to obtain it.”

Is not here, good readers, a wonderful heinous work, and
well worthy the name of confederacies of the spiritualty… that
but in some counties—nor there, neither, of any certainty, but
as some say—some priests in the business of another priest
will, and yet but sometimes neither, at arbitraments confederate
with their good word to help forth their fellow, or else to
make him friends? Yea, and then what a mischief he showeth
that ensueth thereupon! The other party hath, he saith, much ado
to obtain his right; and yet that but sometimes neither. But as
for lose his right by their means, he saith not that any man
doth. Be not these heinous confederacies, and things meet
for this man to make a book of division for? And yet, as though

1 mortuaries: See note for 195/6. // be their duties: are debts owed to them
2 accursed: excommunicated  3 sadness: sedateness  // gamer: gamester
6 pardie: by George       6–7 have his words: have his say; say whatever he wants to
8 device: scheme  9, 35 division: discord  9 mind: opinion
11 obits: annual memorial Masses  12 have more: receive more  15 lour: scowl
16 high matters: serious things  16, 34 meet: fit  20, 28 arbitraments: arbitrations
21 privily: secretly  22 be of right good substance: have quite good resources
29 fellow: colleague  30 mischief: calamity
he had very well acquitted himself, he knitteth it up with these words:

And these be some of the confederacies of priests that I meant of; and not the gathering together of the clergy at the convocations.

In good faith, I saw not how he should mean any other thing, nor that neither well. For the name of “confederacies” taken to an evil part, as this man taketh it, doth signify a meeting and gathering together and a determination of certain evil folk, conspiring together about an evil thing to be done, with a covenant and promise by each of them made unto other, each to stand with other therein. Now, whereas at convocations good men come together to do good, and therefore he could not call them confederacies, as he now saith he meant not to do—yet I doubted somewhat whether he so meant or not, because the convocations be at the leastwise common assemblies together, whereof he might hap, I thought, to give a good thing an evil name. But these matters that he now speaketh of, I could not imagine that ever he meant to call them confederacies, wherein he neither seeth assemblies nor can assign and prove any conspiracy and mutual promise in assisting each other about the procurement of anything at all, good or bad. For whereas he saith that these be “some” of the confederacies that he meant, I am sure no man doubteth but that these be either all the confederacies that he findeth, or else at the leastwise the greatest. And then are those that he calleth here “particular confederacies” so childish that, in good faith, I much marvel that his heart could serve him for very shame to speak of them. And then the others, that he taketh for general confederacies—he neither seeth nor assigneth so much as any assembly about them, or promise or abetment to procure and pursue them. And therefore—though some priests would here or there speak of them as their own affection leadeth them—this is far from the nature and name of confederacy.

And yet, when he hath altogether done, while he proveth nothing at the uttermost (though all that he layeth were as
true as it is not) but that they would fain have the tithe of timber still, and that they would fain have the mortuaries still, and that some would fain have greater wages, and some would fain have more money at the burials, than for all their fain willing they can get; when they would only fain have it, and yet indeed get naught of it, nor other folk nothing lose: to make now so great a matter of this and call it a heinous name of “confederacies” is, as meseemeth, somewhat like to him that would needs have an action against his neighbor because his neighbor’s horse stood and looked over his hedge. For he said that he saw by his countenance that he would have eaten his grass if he could have gotten to it. For as for that that the hedge letted him, was little thank to him; for his will was never the less. And thus his nineteenth chapter, you see, good readers, how little reason is in it.

The Twentieth Chapter

His twentieth chapter, beginning in the 76th leaf, hath so little effect and substance in it, and so faintly defendeth his former matter which it pretendeth to defend, that I purpose to make no long work about it.

For if you read first his words as they lie in mine Apology, folio 159 (in the second side, beginning at these words “And here methinketh I might say”), ye shall there, good readers, find that I rehearse those words of his even whole, with those words in them which he would in the beginning of this his twentieth chapter make men believe that I had withdrawn—as though they were words of such substantial effect that I would not have it appear in my book that he had written so pithily.

Afterward, in another place where they be rehearsed again (folio 162), the printer of likelihood left them out of oversight and haste. And surely they be not of so great weight but that if the author had himself left them out in his book of Division, it had made little matter. And if he had, over that, left out the whole clause—then had he left in his book one lie the less, and his

1, 2, 3, 4 fain: love to 5 fain willing: strong wanting
6 indeed get naught: actually don’t get any 7 so great a matter: so big a deal
8 meseemeth: it seems to me 11 his countenance: the look on his face
13 that that: the fact that 14 never: not at all
13–14 was . . . him: he didn’t deserve much credit for that 19 pretendeth: professes
24, 29 rehearse(d): quote(d) // 24 even: quite
28 appear: be shown 30 of oversight: due to carelessness
32–33 had . . . matter: would have made little difference 33 over: beyond
33 clause: passage
book the better by so much. For whereby proveth he that the
spiritual rulers pretend themselves to be so clean and pure
that there is no default in them, but all in the people alone, and
in themselves no manner fault at all? Where heard he ever any
spiritual man say this, by the whole spirituality or by any one
man thereof?

They confess themselves to be men and sinners. And they
confess and acknowledge also that the very cause of this chief
mischief that now beginneth to make division—that is to
wit, the execrable heresies which mischiefs this good
man’s evil devices with change of good laws were likely to
maintain, if men would follow them—did both begin,
and is also set forth and advanced forward, by those ungracious
folk that are such among the spirituality as Judas was
among the apostles; and this not in this realm only, but in
other countries too. As by Friar Luther, and priest Pomerane,
Otto the Monk, and Friar Lambert, Friar Huessgen, and
Zwingli; and here in England Tyndale, Friar Barnes, George
Joye, and some others such as with the seed of seditious heresy
have sown and set forth division.

This thing the spirituality both knoweth and acknowledgeth.
And therefore they do not pretend, as this Pacifier saith they do,
that there hath been no fault among them, but all among the
people. And therefore this good man, where he saith that I left
out three words in that clause of his (which yet I did put in indeed)—
himself had somewhat amended his matter, with leaving
in of one lie the less, if he had left out the whole clause
altogether.

As to that that he saith I changed his words in the end from
these words, “the light of grace that is spoken of before
will not appear,” into these words, “the light of grace that is
spoken of before be with you now and evermore, amen”: therein
he saith very true. For since he was fallen into preaching, I
not only in the first place rehearsed him as he spoke himself,
but afterward also in the second place I took the pain for him
1 whereby: how  2 spiritual: Church  2, 22 pretend: profess  3 default: fault
5 spiritual man: clergyman  //  by: about  5, 14, 21 spirituality: clergy
8 very: real; actual  9, 10 mischief(s): evil(s)  9, 20 division: discord  11 evil: bad
11 were: would be  12 follow: go along with  13 ungracious: ungodly; wicked
16 Pomerane: Johannes Bugenhagen, who was from Pomerania; Luther called him “Doctor
25, 27 clause: passage; section  33 was fallen: had gotten  34, 35 place: (quoted) passage
34 rehearsed: quoted  35 pain: trouble
to amend his collation in that point and make it end somewhat more like a sermon, with a good, gracious prayer.

Then goeth he forth, and in the same leaf and the next following, he maketh a suspicious matter, and “cannot tell” what mind I was of in changing his word “spiritual rulers” into this word “prelates.” But look, good readers, upon the place, and you shall see that I did it of good cause. For I do not there say that he saith “prelates,” but I say there that peradventure he will say so. And also, besides this—that there is no very great difference between these words, the “prelates” and the “spiritual rulers”—the change from this word the “spiritual rulers” into this word “prelates” seemed me the more meet and more proper for the matter that the Pacifier speaketh in that place, where he speaketh of authority that they pretend, and obedience that they claim.

Howbeit, rather than I would give any cause of division against me, to him that useth to make great divisions upon small grounds… I shall be content to give him his own word again. And therefore I pray you, good readers, every of you amend your books… and in the stead of “prelates” in that place, put in “spiritual rulers.” And when you so have done, the change shall for the matter not be very great… and yet so much as it shall be, shall more serve me than him.

But yet, to make me sorry that ever I was so far overseen as to take away his gay golden word of “spiritual rulers” from him, he beginneth, as it were, with a great threat, and saith:

What Master More meaneth, to change these words “spiritual rulers” into “prelates,” I cannot tell. But now, by occasion of the words that Master More hath spoken, I will say farther in the matter than I had thought to have done.

How happy was I, lo, that I had not the grace to let his own word stand! For now will he say farther in the matter than ever he had thought to have done! “And that is,” saith he, “this”:

... that I think verily that if so great an oversight fell into prelates and spiritual rulers that they would take upon them to preach heresy, that they would that the people should believe them therein... and to
take it to be Catholic that they preached. For who would preach anything but such as they would have their audience believe?

Believe me, good readers, that this man weeneth he saith well-favoredly in this point… wherein he taketh such pleasure that afterward (folio 79) he falleth into the same again, and saith thus:

[Master More] goeth about only to prove that all my tale is lost because prelates pretend not to be believed if they preach heresy, as he taketh it that I should say they do. And yet I said not so indeed. And if I did say so… I said but truly. For if they did preach heresy, it is certain that they would look to be believed, as I have said before; yea, and if they would preach and say that if they preached heresy, that they would the people should not believe them—yet if they did after preach heresy indeed, they would look that the people should believe them. For they would say that they were no heresies that they preached. For who will confess that he preacheth heresy?

Now, good readers, here have I joined you together this good man’s gay words in two places wherein I perceive he pleaseth himself right well. But to the intent that you may see whether he have so good cause as he weeneth, consider well his words and mine before, whereupon he cometh to this point. For he maketh as though I without occasion given of his words had written that the prelates pretend not to be believed if they would preach heresy. Wherein whether he say true or not you shall see by his own words, which are these:

The light of grace will not come as long as the spiritual rulers pretend that their authority is so high, and so immediate of God, that the people are bound to obey them, and to accept all that they do and teach, without arguments, resistance, or grudging.

Now, good readers, first consider well here, in these words of his, what wisdom the man hath showed in making such a mumbling of changing “spiritual rulers” into “prelates.” For when he saith here that the “spiritual rulers” pretend that their

authority is so high—what doubt is there but though he mean
other rulers more besides, whom he calleth no prelates, yet he
meaneth prelates too… yea, and prelates especially too. And then when
he saith that the prelates and the other spiritual rulers pretend
this or that—may I not well say that he saith the prelates pretend
this? Yes, verily that I may. And yet in so changing his
word—I change it to his advantage and not into mine, in that I
make his odious saying much less, and nothing more.
And thus first you see, good readers, this man’s much oversight
in finding of that fault.

Now consider farther, good readers, that he saith in those
words, not that the spiritual rulers (that is to say, both the prelates
and all the remnant too) pretend their authority to be so
high and so immediately derived from God that the people are
bound to obey them in this thing or that thing, one, or
twain, or ten, or twenty… but utterly to accept and obey not
only all their teachings, but also all their doings, too… and
neither argue, resist, nor grudge at any manner thing that they
would either teach or do.

This general thing he saith. And therefore—though I deal,
as you see, so favorably with him in my twenty-seventh chapter of mine
_Apology_ as to divide the matter and ask whether he meant it by
their whole authority or part—I might well upon these words
of his have taken it that he had very shamefully belied them, and had
said that they had pretended to have their whole authority immediately
of God, every whit. For if I would so have said… his
general words would well have warranted mine. Also, since his
saying is so general, and extendeth utterly not only to all their
teachings, but also to all their doings, too… and saith that they
pretend that by God’s immediate ordinance the people should
accept altogether both all that ever they say and all that ever they
do—by how many manner things might I have confuted his
saying, and have proved it false?

But yet, his saying being such, I took but one thing… and that was
such as, for the matter that we both specially spoke of, was next at
hand. And therefore I said that they pretend not to have such an authority that men should obey them in all things… for they pretend not to have authority to bind men to believe and obey them if they would preach heresies; but they plainly profess that if they so would, men should not believe them nor obey them therein.

Here you see that where he saith that he meant not that the prelates would preach heresy, he speaketh all beside the purpose. For I said not that he either so said or so meant. But I said, and yet say, that in those words he said that if they would preach heresies, they do now pretend that by the authority which God hath given them, the people were then therein bound to believe and obey them. And in his so saying I there said and yet say that he saith very far untrue, and that they pretend it not, but plainly pretend the contrary. And thus in this point that he maketh a matter without ground or cause, and that himself with his own words gave me good occasion to write the thing that I wrote—this you see, good readers, proved very plain.

But now consider his other words wherein he liketh himself so well, and weeneth that he proveth that the spiritual rulers of the realm pretend that if they would preach heresy, the people were by God’s ordinance bound to believe and obey them therein, because they would then say that it were no heresy. In this point his reasoning hath, I promise you, a little more subtlety than substance… and yet but simple subtlety neither.

First, as for his case, that if all “the spiritual rulers” would preach heresy—if he had meant of the spiritual rulers of all Christendom, I would have admitted his case none otherwise but as men put and admit a case impossible, to see what might ensue thereon if it were possible; as Saint Paul putteth the case that if an angel came from heaven and preached a contrary gospel, yet the same angel should not be believed. But, now, since he putteth it but by the spiritual rulers of one realm, I admit the case as possible… but yet as such a case as I trust in God this good man shall see the sky fall first and catch larks ere it happen, though

1, 3 pretend not: do not claim  8 he… purpose: everything he says is beside the point
11, 15, 22 pretend: claim  16 in… that: i.e., that in this point  // a matter: an allegation
21 weeneth: thinks  21, 27, etc. spiritual: ecclesiastical; clerical  26 subtlety: craftiness
it may be likely enough to happen in some one or twain, or some few, against whom the remnant shall preach and teach the truth.

But now saith this good man thus: “If it so happened in them all—then would they all pretend that by their authority given them of God, the people were bound therein to believe and obey them. For they would then say that their heresies were no heresies.”

I am content, lo, to grant him all this… and I ask him now, what then? For all this, good readers, proveth (you see very well) no more but that if that case happened that they all so preached, they would then all so pretend. But all this proveth never a whit that the spiritual rulers either now do, or at any time have done, pretended their authority such. Now consider, then, for what purpose he speaketh of such pretending. He layeth (you wot well) their pretending of their authority to be so great that the people should obey them without argument, grudge, or contradiction in all that ever they either say or do. This he layeth, I say, for so sore a cause of this division which he maketh in his book, that he saith the light of grace will not come to cease it till they cease so to pretend.

And therefore, good readers, since this is the thing that he saith, and the purpose that he saith it for—making it a cause of division present—how can he maintain his saying with a case feigned, whereby it may be that they will so pretend hereafter… whereas ever hitherto himself saith not nay but that they both have pretended and yet pretend the contrary? Can he maintain that the temporalty is at division with the spiritualty now, already, because it may peradventure hap hereafter, by a far-fetched possibility, that they may then, no man wotteth when, pretend peradventure a thing whereof they presently pretend the contrary… and protest also that if the case should so mishap hereafter, they desire now for then that no man should therein then believe them? Saw you ever, good readers, any man with such a simple subtlety cast all his matter in the dust so shamefully?
Now, where he saith, to maintain his matter here with, that
“it is not to suppose that spiritual rulers will pretend that such
authority as they have of the grant of princes is immediately . . .
of God”: I say that therein he saith truth, and that I suppose that
they will not. But yet let himself look well in his own book of
Division, and he shall find that himself saith the contrary there
of that he now saith here… and showeth some things which he
both saith that they have but by the means of princes and the
good mind of the people, and yet saith also that they pretend
to have the same things immediately of God. As, for example,
both their authority to have the tenth part for tithe, and the
thing which they enjoy by the name of the liberties of the
Church, whereby their persons be in many things privileged
in this realm before the person of a layman. These things
himself saith that they have but by a mean and not immediately
of God. And yet he saith in this same twentieth chapter that the
things which they call the liberties of the Church, they pretend
to have immediately of God; and for all that, he saith now
that it is not to suppose that they will pretend so. And thus you
may see, good readers, that for the defense of this place, he is
driven to a shrewd narrow strait, when to defend one fault
he is fain to make twain.

Now, whereas he saith I might have satisfied myself well
enough, and that the letter of his words were plain—you see that in
the rehearsing again of his own words (folio 80), he is fain to
suppress and steal away these his own general words, “all that
they do or teach,” to make his words seem plain. For as you see,
they standing still, his words are plain against him. For
himself now confesseth that they pretend not to do by authority
immediate from God such things as they do by authority given
them by princes.

But because I would fain fully satisfy him—I shall now show
you that with his new declaring that his words were well enough, he
hath made his matter out of all measure worse.

For now read his words again (folio 80), and there you shall see
that he saith that he meaneth only of such authority as the spiritual
rulers pretend to have immediately of God. And yet after, he
declareth it further and better, on the second side of the same leaf,
in the fourteenth line, that he meaneth only such authority, not as they
pretend to have, but as they have indeed, immediately of God.

And to the intent men might see that he meaneth not of authority
falsely pretended, but truly had immediately of God, he putteth
for the example their authority in administration of the
sacraments.

This is his own exposition of his own words, which he
would have taken for so plain that he is angry with me that I
could not spy it, and so satisfy myself before.

Well, go to, now: let us rehearse his own words again as himself
for his own advantage (folio 80) rehearseth them, and let
us plant in his own exposition with them, to make his sentence
the more clear… and then shall we see to what good conclusion he
bringeth all in conclusion. For then cometh his whole tale to
this:

“As long as the spiritual rulers will pretend that their authority
is so high and so immediately derived of God, in such things as they
have their authority immediately of God indeed (as in the administration
of the sacraments and such other things like), that the people
are bound to obey them without argument or resistance: so long the
light of grace will not appear.”

Now, good readers, here be now his own words, with his
own exposition therein. And how like you them now? For now
the sentence hath he brought at last, with much work, to
none other but that the light of grace will not appear as long
as the spiritual rulers pretend to be obeyed and not resisted in
the administration of the sacraments, and such other things
like, because they have their authority therein immediately of
God indeed. But then on the other side, whensoever they will
not pretend their authority so high therein, nor so immediately
derived of God, as to be obeyed therein, but will be content
that men grudge and argue and resist them therein, and

1, 4, etc. pretend: claim // immediately of: straight from
2 declareth: explains
9, 14, 25 exposition: explication
12 go to: come on
12, 13 rehearse(th): quote(s)
14, 26 sentence: meaning
16 tale: speech
19 derived of: obtained from
28 pretend: aspire
34 grudge: grumble
pull them from the altar, and suffer them to administer no sacraments
nor any such other things like—then shall, by this good
man’s new declaration, the light of grace appear by and by.
Hath not this Pacifier here, good readers, with much labor
at last brought this matter to a wise conclusion?

If he will now go from this again, and put in his other general
words again… which for his advantage he left out in
that place: then is all gone again that he goeth about… and all
mine answer made (as I have showed you) good, and all his
own words naught.

In the leaf also 81 these are his words:

. . . where I say that as long as the spiritual rulers will pretend that
their authority is so high and so immediately derived of God that the
people are bound to obey them without argument or resistance, etc.
By these words I confess that they have authority immediately
derived from God. But as I said before in the seventh chapter, Master
More hath a right great and a right inventive wit, whereby he can
lightly turn a sentence after his appetite. And so he doth here [etc.].

What high wit or inventive I have to turn a sentence, let
the readers judge. But surely the height of my wit cannot reach so
high as to perceive in those words of his the sentence that
himself turneth them to… nor, I trow, no man’s else… till these
words, “They have authority,” and these words, “They pretend
to have authority,” be both one thing, which they were
never yet. And therefore before his confession that he now
maketh here new, I might then well take that exception which I
have brought there, to a little better effect than he doth his here,
which, with all his wrestling and all his new declarations,
bringeth altogether ever the longer unto the worse conclusion.

For now, to color this his oversight with, he tellecteth us
which manner of pretenses he meant in those words which he
would here so fain defend. And then, instead of “pretending
to be by God’s ordinance believed and obeyed in all things as
well words as deeds,” he bringeth forth here a few amounting
in a sum total to the infinite number of four.
The first is that the order and disposition of the “things that are to be disposed of the Church” be to be disposed by the priests: which point to put as for a matter that hath made division between them and us is a point of small reason, as far as my reason can give me. For I remember not of any variance that ever arose between them and us for that point.  

The second is that all “princes must subdue their executions to bishops”, and not to prefer them above them.” I cannot tell you whether there be any such law made or not. But I can tell you well that though there be, this point will not serve his purpose the value of a blue point. For I am sure he never saw in his days any bishop in this realm use that pretense against the king, or that ever there arose any division thereupon.

The third is that “no charge should be set upon clerics by lay power.” I never heard yet any division rise upon this point in my days; nor he neither in his, I dare say. For I never saw the day yet, nor he neither, but that when any need of the king and the realm required it, they have evermore been ready to set taxes upon themselves, as liberally and as largely as any man well might with any good reason require.

The fourth is, he saith, that “if a secular judge be negligent in doing of justice,” that then, after “monition to amend it” given to the judge, “if he will not, then the spiritual judge may compel him to it, or else supply his room and hear the cause.”

If I should look now for these four laws, it might peradventure happen that I should find that this man had mistaken some of them, as well as he hath misunderstood some of the others that he hath spoken of before. But since that I never knew grudge or division rise here upon any of them, me needeth never to look more for the matter. For since this man never saw that any spiritual judge hath enterprised in default of justice to give any such monition or to supply the room: were that law never so unreasonable, yet to say that upon that law the temporality hath here conceived such grudge as it hath been a cause of division, this pacifier of division may be much ashamed that ever he devised it. For I dare say that as well this fourth cause as many of all his others be such as the people
never neither talked of nor thought upon… nor, before his
own book, had never read nor heard of. And therefore by the
putting in of such things, every child, as I said in mine
_Apology_, may soon perceive that his books labor and intend not
to quench but rather to kindle division.

And therefore verily—with his laying here, even in the end
and conclusion, such causes of his division which causes
but by himself the people never heard of—I may well say once
again, good readers: is not this gear by this good Pacifier
brought unto a wise conclusion?

To those words written in mine _Apology_ (the 169th leaf), this
good man answereth thus:

And now to this conclusion of Master More I will say thus: that I
beseech Almighty God that the end of all these matters may come to
this conclusion—that the very groundly causes of these divisions
that now be not only in this realm, but also, in manner, through all
Christian realms, may come to perfect knowledge. For surely I do not
take it that they began either by heresies or apostasies, as Master
More in his _Apology_ meaneth that they should do.

Here you may see, good readers, that this good man would be loath that
it should appear that the division, peril, and harm have anywhere
sprung upon heresies begun and set forth by false apostates,
wedded friars and monks, as clearly as it is known that by the occasion
thereof, there have been slain in Almaine, within these very
few years, above eighty thousand persons in one summer, and yet since
among the Swiss, when Zwingli was slain, many thousands
killed too… and the war begun by the heretics, and
the lash by God’s great goodness laid in their own necks—as
falsely as Frith belieth the Catholics and, against the plain
and open-known truth, would with shame enough to himself
make men ween that the Catholics began the war.

But then goeth he further and saith:

And if Master More will needly endeavor himself to hide the truth
therein, as it seemeth he hath done in this chapter and divers other
places of his _Apology_, by keeping secret such abusions and pretenses

1 upon: about 9 gear: business 10 wise: brilliant 15 very: real
15 groundly: root 16 in manner: very nearly 19 meaneth: imagines
20 may: can 22 false: despicable 24 Almaine: Germany
27 begun: i.e., was begun 28 in their own necks: on their own shoulders
29 falsely: abominably // belieth: slanders 31 ween: believe
33 needly: painstakingly 34 divers: several 35 abusions: wrongdoings
35 pretenses: pretensions
as in my conscience have been most principal causes of this
division, whereof part be recited in the said treatise and part in this
answer, but not all . . .

Of these there had need indeed to be more, and some more true,
and some of a little more substance, too, than be the most part
of these that this good man hath laid forth yet.

Now, here he saith that I keep secret such abusions and
pretenses as be the principal causes of the division,
whereof himself hath, he saith, showed some—either he meaneth
that those which I kept secret be those that himself hath
written, or others besides them. If he mean others: then either
himself knoweth them or not. If he know them not: how
knoweth he that I know them, or that there be any such at all? If
himself know them and show them not: then he hideth
them and keepeth them secret himself as well as I. Now, if he
mean but those that himself hath written: how can I keep
those secret that he hath written? Can I both gather up all his
books and go hide them, and also make them that have read
them go unread them again, or forget what they have read?

But now after this, likewise as he is wont, when reason
faileth him, to fall to preaching—so here, because reason faileth
him, he falleth to praying… and therein thus he saith:

I beseech Almighty God that he have no power to do it, but that the
truth may come to light therein, though he resist it all that he can.
For if it were known… and the faults charitably reformed—all these
divisions would shortly have an end.

Nay, pardie, this man seeth well enough that though the faults
of the spirituality were never so fully reformed, yet could not
all that suffice to bring all divisions to an end but if one
thing be done which will never be done, whereof (which he
forgetteth) I gave him warning in the 116th leaf of mine Apology,
in these words:

But now if this Pacifier, to cease and quench this division, could
find the means to make all the whole clergy good: yet for all that—since

2 the said treatise: i.e., the Division 2–3 this answer: i.e., the Debellation
27 pardie: indeed 29 but if: unless 31 forgetteth: disregards
30–31 whereof . . . I gave him warning: to which . . . I called his attention
he layeth for causes of this division that some men say this by the clergy, and some men say by them that—were all the clergy never so good indeed, and served God never so well, this division, by his own tale, yet could not for all that cease... except he could provide farther that no piteous Pacifier should, in lamenting of division, put forth a book and say that some laymen say that some of the clergy be naught, and love their ease and their wealth... and that some say that those that seem best and take most labor and pain be but hypocrites for all that, and serve God but for vainglory, to get themselves laud and praise among the people.

Also, if defaults should be charitably reformed, as this man saith he would have them—it would be need, then, to set a little more charitable folk about it than those have been that have beguiled this good man with evil counsel in his books... and have made him, under pretext of pacifying division, set forth and increase division with devising and spreading abroad causes of murmur and grudge, making in some of them an elephant of a gnat, and for old grudges bringing forth some such as the people never had heard of till they read his books; and some of the very worst, which were most effectual causes if they were true, bringing forth by heaps with a figure of "some say," and very plain lies indeed. Is this the way, good readers, for a pacifier to make peace with, and put away divisions?

And now, himself handling the matter thus... he taketh of his charity great thought lest I go about to hinder his holy purpose. And therefore saith:

I doubt me very sore that Master More goeth about rather to mar all than to endeavor himself to make all well.

Which be the likelihoods now, good readers, that lead this good man into this great fear? Because I make open the shrewd mind of his demure countenance, and the harmful intent and purpose of his holy, wholesome words. Because I would have the temporality and the spirituality as the body and the soul of one man love well together and agree, and neither of

1, 3, etc. division(s): dissension(s)  1, 2 by: about  3 tale: account  4 except: unless
5 piteous: pious / plaintive  6 naught: wicked  11 defaults: failings  14 evil: bad
15 pacifying: settling  17 grudge: ill feeling  18 grudges: grievances
20 were: would be  21 effectual: valid  22 figure: figure of speech
28 doubt me very sore: very strongly fear  28–29 mar all: bring everything to ruin
30 which be the likelihoods: what are the indications  31 open: manifest
31–32 shrewd mind: devisious purpose  32 countenance: demeanor
35 love well together: have a good mutual love // agree: live in harmony; get along
them be glad to hear evil of other, nor to give ear to false, seditious slander, but the good folk of either party draw both by one line, according to both the laws, to repress and keep under the bad... and, among other vices, especially such pestilent heresies as else would oppress the Catholic faith, and provoke the displeasure of God, and first sow division, and afterward rear rebellion in the realm, as they have done before this time both here and in other places; and that I to this intent give mine advice to keep still those good laws that both this realm and all the corps of Christendom have long used and approved. Because I thus do—lo, therefore this good man feareth that I go about to mar all.

But while his books go about, on the other side, to make the world ween that heresies be no causes of division; and, to have heretics live in the less fear, with many malicious “some say”’s falsely slandereth the ordinaries of cruel, wrongful handling of the people, to drive them, by dread or by shame or other tedious business, to let heretics alone; and go about with bald reasons, the best not worth a rush, to put away the good laws that have been made against them; and under color of a fervor to the faith, exhort men to go win the Holy Land... and in the meanwhile yet, with such wily ways, labor with heretics to fill up the streets at home, and by the decay of the Christian, Catholic faith, provoke the wrath of God upon all our heads, which our Lord rather turn upon theirs that so would have it: his books busily going about this gear, himself goeth about (ye see well, pardie) to make allthing well.

But now will I finish up his twentieth chapter, wherein he goeth forward thus:

And in this chapter Master More layeth divers other objections to prove the said letter unreasonable, which were very tedious to rehearse at length. And therefore I shall as shortly as I can... touch some of them.

Ye know well enough why they be tedious to rehearse. Surely because they be very tedious to answer. But whereas he saith he will rehearse some of them—he beginneth first to show that I had no
cause to doubt of his words wherein he saith that the spiritual
rulers pretend their authority to be so high and so immediately
derived from God, etc. I had, saith he, no cause to doubt of
what authority he meant. For he saith that his words were plain
enough, that he meaneth only of such authorities as they
pretend to have immediately from God.

To this I say plainly that then are his words plain false. For
his words be that they “pretend that their authority is so high
and so immediately derived from God that the people are
bound to obey them, and to accept all that they do and teach,
without argument, resistance, or grudge.” Now knoweth every
man very well that they do not pretend to have authority immediately
from God to do all things that they now lawfully do and
may do in which the people are now bound to accept and
obey them. For as I said in mine Apology, in many such
things they pretend and claim their authority derived from
princes. And therefore ye see that and he labor about it this seven
years, he can never defend his words, but that I answered
him truly… and, with the necessary distinction that I there
made, answered every part. And this himself seeth well enough…
and therefore in the 80th leaf, in the beginning of the second
side, where he rehearseth his words again, he leaveth out these
words of his own: “and to accept all that they do and teach.”
Upon which words the point of the matter hangeth. And
therefore here you see now that, whereas in the beginning of
this chapter, he would make it seem that I steal two or three
words of his (which I neither did nor needed for any strength
that was in them), here was himself fain to steal away his
own words, to beguile the reader upon the reading of the
place, and make him pass over his fault for the while
unmarked.

And thus, good reader, you see that to save his own words
upright, and to impugn mine—in those two leaves 80
and 81 he bestowed his labor in vain.

1, 3 doubt of: be in doubt about  1 spiritual: ecclesiastical
2, 6, etc. pretend: claim; profess  // immediately: directly
3, 9, etc. derived: (to be) obtained  5 meaneth: is speaking  10, 14 bound: obliged
11 grudge: grumbling  17 princes: sovereigns  // and he: if he  19 truly: rightly
22 rehearseth: quotes  26 steal: surreptitiously remove  28 fain: constrained
30 fault: error  32–33 save his own words upright: make his own statements stand
But then goeth he farther and toucheth these words of mine Apology, written in my said twenty-seventh chapter, folio 165:

Surely in such things as the whole clergy of Christendom teacheth and ordereth in spiritual things, as be divers of those laws which this Pacifier in some places of this book toucheth, being made against heretics… and albeit that they be, and long have been, through the whole corps of Christendom, both temporality and spiritualty, by long usage and custom ratified, agreed, and confirmed, yet he layeth some lack in them, calling them very sore: in those things I say that—since I nothing doubt in my mind but in that congregation to God’s honor graciously gathered together, the good assistance of the Spirit of God is, according to Christ’s promise, as verily present and assistant as it was with his blessed apostles—men ought with reverence, and without resistance, grudge, or arguments, to receive them. And if a provincial council err… there are in Christ’s church ordinary ways to reform it. But in such things as any spiritual governors, after a lawful order and form, devise for the spiritual weal of their souls that are in their charge, and which things are such as good folk may soon perceive them for good: in these things, at the leastwise, should the good not give ear to the bad folk and froward, that against the best thing that can be devised can never lack a fond froward argument.

To these words this good man answereth me thus:

Then to show my mind in some things that Master More hath touched yet farther in the said chapter: I will first agree with Master More… that in such things as the whole clergy of Christendom teacheth and ordereth in spiritual things… and which of long time have been by long usage and custom through the whole corps of Christendom, spiritualty and temporality, ratified, agreed, and confirmed, ought with reverence to be received; but yet if the same things, through long continuance and through abuses that rise by occasion of them, prove hurtful and over grievous to the people to bear—then may the people grudge and complain lawfully to their superiors… and desire that they may be reformed… as lawfully as they may do to have temporal laws reformed when need requireth.
As unto this, because he is so genteel to agree with me, I shall as genteelly agree with him again; but yet he getteth naught thereby. For since the laws against which he writeth, made for the correction of heretics, as I have in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth chapters plainly proved against him (and reproved his objections therein), be good and very reasonable; and that abusions (by occasion whereof he would make it now seem that in long continuance they become hurtful) he proveth not one in this world but by false, slanderous “some say”’s surmised against the ordinaries, and divers times found false before the King’s honorable Council: this answer here of his helpeth nothing his matter.

Then goeth he farther and saith in this wise:

I will also agree that in the congregation of the clergy, to God’s honor graciously gathered together, the good assistance of the Spirit of God, according to Christ’s promise, will be as verily present and assistant with them as it was with his blessed apostles—if they order themselves in meekness and charity and put all their trust in God, as the apostles did. But if they will trust in their own wit and in worldly policy—then may they lightly lose the Spirit of God. And whether it were so at the making of the laws which Master More speaketh of concerning heresy or not, I cannot tell; but this will I say: that if they were not good and reasonable in themselves at the first making, that they were never made by the assistance of the Spirit of God. And surely I cannot then see how the usage and long continuance of them can ratify or confirm them. For as it is of an evil custom, that the longer it is used, the greater is the offense: so is it of an evil law. And like as an evil custom is to be put away, so it is of an evil law.

Of what strength the general councils be, and whether we may in any of them by lawful order gathered together put any diffidence or mistrust—and if we may, then in what manner things, and in what wise they bind, and whom, and how long—I shall not need for this matter to dispute with this good man. And all his doubt concerning the said laws, whether they be reasonable or not, and whether the continuance of them be good or
not: in all these things have I so confuted this good man already, that these words of his can serve of naught. But yet, to make it seem that he said somewhat... and that no law of the Church which he hath here impugned, made against heretics, was either ratified or approved in this realm—ye shall hear how properly he proveth. Lo, good readers, these are his words:

And the laws affirmed by usage and agreement of the people be the laws of fasting and keeping of holy days, and such others as the people of their free agreement accept and agree unto; but these laws made for punishment of heresies were never agreed by a common assent of the people, but that some particular persons—whereof some have been guilty... and some peradventure not guilty—have been punished thereby right sore against their wills. And that cannot be a confirmation of them that so agree against their will. But as to them that do the correction, it is a confirmation; for they do it with their good will. And though that correction were a sufficient confirmation as against them that be so punished—yet it cannot be a confirmation to make the law approved for all the residue of the people.

I cannot see, therefore, that any ratifying, agreeing, or confirming of the people can be proved in those laws concerning the correction for heresy.

Did ever any man, good readers, hear such another reason as this is? He denieth not but that the suit ex officio, and the order taken in the general council, and the other farther proceedings against heretics according to the common-received spiritual laws, have been, usually, long accustomed in this realm; and by the princes of the same and generally by all the people by common usage accepted—and over that, by plain Parliament laws and orders made for all temporal officers to assist the ordinaries therein, and to put the offenders in execution thereupon—and knowing well all this, he dissembl eth it every whit, and saith not one word thereto... but argueth that it was never ratified in this realm, because the heretics that are for heresy punished be burned against their will, and

2 serve of naught: be of no use  3 said somewhat: said something; i.e., had something there 6 properly: admirably 11 agreed: acquiesced to 14 right sore: quite strongly 15, 20 of: by 15 agree: acquiesce 16, 17, 21 correction: punishing 16–17 with their good will: quite willingly 17 though: even if 18 as against: with respect to 23 reason: argument 27 usually: generally speaking 28 princes: sovereigns 31 in execution: into the legal system; i.e., under arrest 32–33 dissembleth it every whit: ignores every bit of it
agree not themselves thereto. This reason will I never labor to confute. For if any man be so mad to like it, I were almost as mad as he if I would reason with him.

After this he resorteth again to the unreasonableness of the laws… and proveth them unreasonable by the sentence of his own conceit. For these are his words:

And then whether the laws in themselves be good and indifferent or not, I will remit the judgment in that behalf to them that have authority. But to show my conceit therein, I shall with good will, even as my conscience moveth me to; and that is, that I could never see that it was reasonable to be accepted as a law… that a man should be accused and know not his accuser. And that it is yet more unreasonable that a man should be condemned… and know not the witness that condemned him. Also, that a man upon suspicion should be driven to make his purgation at the will of the ordinary or be accursed; or that a perjured witness should condemn him that he had cleared before; that a great offender and a less offender should have one like punishment, if they renounced, or be alike arrested and put in prison: I never saw no indifferency in it.

Now, good readers, as for the “conceit” that the good “conscience” of this man hath conceived, is of very truth but even a very poor conceit… as in the said chapters the fifteenth, the sixteenth, and the seventeenth every man may soon perceive.

Howbeit, in the last point that he findeth so great a fault—that a greater offender and a less offender should have one like punishment—this man looked not well about him when he wrote that word. For when the thing is well looked on… the weight of his reason will fall upon the wrong side, and all against his mind. For wheresoever a greater offender and a less offender be both punished alike: if the greater offender have no more pain than the less hath deserved, there is the order somewhat less sharp than it should be… but yet not unrighteous. For if it were, then were the laws of this realm unlawful that hang up him that doth but rob a man as

1 reason: reasoning  // will I never labor: I will make no effort
2 to like: as to approve of  // were: would be  5 sentence: verdict
6, 9, etc. conceit: thinking  // 9 show: make known
9 with good will: quite willingly (do)  // even: just  15 accursed: excommunicated
19 indifference: impartiality; lack of bias  // 21 is: it is  // even: only
27 word: assertion  // 28 reason: argument  // 31 have . . . pain: get no more punishment
32 order: established procedure  // sharp: severe
well as him that robbeth him and killeth him too. Now, so is it in
the spiritual law that when two do both renounce their heresys,
and abjure and bear faggots both, if the one held ten
heresies and the other but twain, the greater offender hath no
more pain than the less deserveth. And therefore if this man
in that case complain—this complaint (as I said) turneth on the
other side… and findeth the fault in that that where the less
offender beareth one faggot, the greater beareth not five, if their
bodies be like of strength.

Howbeit, good readers, all this tale of his is to no purpose at
all. For in the spiritual law, they weigh the offenses… and consider
the circumstances, and enjoin the penance after
the weight or gravity of the trespass… and for imprisoning, use
to put no man to it but where good reason would not suffer him
walk abroad. And therefore I suppose… that when the man was
writing this… his wit was walking toward the Holy Land.
For if he would say that he meaneth by the less offender and
the more offender such twain as abjure both, and bear
faggots both, where the one was worthy and the other not
worthy at all: I say that neither his words will maintain any
such meaning (for he speaketh generally of the less offender and
the more), nor also he proveth none such but by his slanderous
“some say”s, which have been plain proved false.

Then goeth he further and knitteth up all the chapter
with this goodly conclusion:

And if any man will say that these reasons will give a boldness to
heretics—truly, I will not fully make answer thereto. But this will I
say: that I think verily that they will give a boldness to truth and
true men. And verily I have heard say that it were better to suffer an
offender go unpunished than to punish him unrighteously and
against due order of justice.

Mark, good readers, here, for our Lord’s sake, what manner of
reason this is. The thing that himself very well perceiveth to
be the very weight and pith of all the matter, and therefore at last
objecteth it against himself, as a thing that had need to be
assoiled: what answer doth he make unto it? He saith he will not
answer it “fully.” In faith, that is spoken very dully. Well, since so
great weight hangeth on it, if he would not answer it fully, he
should have answered at the leastwise half. If not half, a
fourth part yet, or a fifth part at the least. For this that he saith
answereth no part at all. For two things he saith: one, that
though he cannot say nay but that his reasons, if they be
followed, shall give a boldness to heretics—yet he thinketh
they shall also give boldness to troth and true men. And by
my troth, I think verily on the other side—that if heretics
have boldness given them, and (as they thereby soon shall)
take courage and much increase, they shall make the troth
shrink, and many true men afeard. And if the giving
boldness to falsehood shall give boldness to troth—assay, then,
and give boldness to thieves… and then look whether true
men shall wax the bolder by it.

The second thing that he saith is this—which yet he doth
not affirm, but saith he hath heard it said—that “it were better to
suffer an offender go unpunished than punish him unrighteously
and against due order of justice.”

This were somewhat prettily said, if this good man had
proved that heretics might not be punished by those laws but
unrighteously and against the order of justice. But then
how hath he proved that? By no means in this world but twain.
The one, that it is not righteous nor indifferent that a greater
offender and a less offender should be punished, imprisoned,
or arrested alike; which unreasonable reason oppugneth
plainly, in all criminal causes almost, all the laws of this
realm, and yet helpeth not his matter, but impaireth it much, as
a little herebefore I have well and clearly proved.

His other reason is his general reason that is his whole ground
whereupon he buildeth against all those laws all his whole
matter: that is to wit, that by those laws which are made for
punishment of heretics, it may sometime fortune that a man
may be punished which is no heretic indeed.

1 dully: inexact; imprecisely  7 followed: gone along with
8, 13 troth: uprightness / right thinking  8, 12, 14 true: upright / right-thinking
8–9 by my troth: upon my honor  11 troth: right thinking; orthodox belief
13 assay: go ahead  14 look: see  15 wax: become  18, 22 unrighteously: unrightly
20 were: would be // prettily: aptly  21 might: could  24 righteous: right
24 indifferent: fair  26 unreasonable: irrational  26, 30 reason: argument
26 oppugneth: assails  27 causes: cases  28, 32 matter: case  29 well and: quite
31 all his whole: his whole entire  33 fortune: happen
Now is this reason so unreasonable to be laid for a reason to take away a law, that if it were admitted for reason, it could suffer neither in this realm nor in any realm else any law stand in this world that all the wits in this world could imagine or devise for any manner punishment of ungracious folk. And albeit that of such laws some may be reformed from the worse unto the better... though never fully to such point but that an innocent may take harm; yet, both by reason and experience, it appeareth plainly that these laws which he would have changed and made more easy can never have any good change but by making them more strait.

And thus hath this good man sore overseen himself more, I trow, than twenty times in his twentieth chapter.

The Twenty-first Chapter

In his twenty-first chapter (beginning in the 84th leaf), because I said in mine Apology that there be few parts in his book of Division that shall, if they be well considered, appear so good at length as they seem to some men at the first sight and at superficial reading, he provoketh me to show what other faults I find therein. And then, to prick me forward, he bringeth forth two or three things which he saith it seemeth most likely that I should mean. But wherefore it should be most likely that I should mean those things... thereof showeth he nothing... but leaveth folk occasion to think that his own mind misgiveth him in those things. For me hath he never heard make any business of them.

And afterward, in the leaf 91, again he provoketh me to the same. And there he reciteth how many chapters of his I meddle not with; wherein he might have made a shorter work if he would have let them stand that I touched not... and have spoken of them only that I touched—for they were very few—as he that was very unwilling to have touched any one at all, save for the much evil that covertly was cloaked in them. And for the withdrawing of that cloak, that men might the better see what it meant, I touched the first chapter for a show, and the seventh and...
the eighth for that they labored, to the great decay of the Catholic faith, to put away or change into worse the most especially good laws, both of the whole Church and of this realm, that have been made and observed long for the preservation thereof. And the first chapter was in effect nothing else but by false, slanderous surmises against the ordinaries (as though they mishandled men for heresy) a shrewd preparative to it. And therefore, leaving his other trifles alone—I answered in effect only these, of which so much harm might grow. Which things if they had been out of his book, all the remnant, good and bad together, should have gone forth for me; and therefore yet so shall they. For I purpose not to embusy myself with confuting of every fault that I find in every man’s book. I should have then overmuch ado.

Nor I will not dispraise or deprave anything that I think good either in his book or in any man’s else. And therefore I have in mine Apology said expressly that he saith some things well. But forasmuch as there be many things naught, too: I give therefore the reader warning not to walk away with them over-hastily, but read them with judgment and advise them well… and not believe every spirit, but prove whether it be of God or not… and that that is good, take… and that that is evil, let it go to the devil.

I well allow, therefore, and like not a little, the great good mind of Salem toward the vanquishing of the great Turk… and conquering of the Holy Land, wherein he spendeth the other three chapters of his book. But I mislike much, again, that as he would dilate the faith by force of sword in far countries hence—so he laboreth to change and take away the good and wholesome laws whereby the faith is preserved here at home.

I like also marvelously well that such points of the Catholic faith as heretics now labor to destroy, as praying to saints, pilgrimage, and purgatory, and the sacraments, and especially the Blessed Sacrament of the Altar, whereof in the 86th leaf he speaketh so well that, as help me.
God, it did me good to read it—this, I say, liketh me marvelously well: that the right faith of these points, he confesseth so well and so fully for his own person. But the better opinion that I have of his own person therein, the more sorry am I to see that his books are, by some shrewd counsel, handled in such wise as if they were followed… would make the faith decay and perish in many other folk. This is the great thing that in his books grieveth me.

For as for the point that he speaketh of in the leaf 91, of that that the priests should eat no flesh from Quinquagesima to Easter: I take it for a matter as small as he doth. But then he asketh me wherefore in the thirty-first chapter of mine Apology, beginning in the 175th leaf, I make so great a matter of it. Whoso list to read the chapter shall see that I wrote it not all in vain, nor show myself unwilling that the priests should do it, neither, though they be not bound to it. But the less that the weight of the matter was…the more cause this man gave me to speak thereof. For the more was he to blame to put that, and other such small matters as that is, for causes of so great a division as he surmiseth that this is. This was, lo, the cause that made me to speak thereof. Which cause this man gave himself… and therefore needeth not to marvel as he doth, wherefore I spoke thereof.

And therefore thus have I, good readers, now replied to every chapter of his book by row, save only the last three, which go about a good voyage into the Holy Land, a great way far off from me. And I have not leaped to and fro, now forward, now backward, in such manner as he playeth in his answer made unto me, without either order kept or cause appearing wherefore, save only the cause that every man may spy: that he would not have it seen what places he left untouched. Which is, in a manner, the most part of altogether that in my book is touched of the three chapters of his. And I have, on the other side, not left any one piece unproved that myself spoke of before, or that anything pertained unto me.

And therefore whereas, in the beginning of the twenty-second chapter, Simkin Salem giveth his sentence upon the said answer

1 liketh: pleases  2 faith of: belief concerning  5 shrewd: bad
6 followed: gone along with  7 decay: disintegrate  10 flesh: meat
10 Quinquagesima: the Sunday before Ash Wednesday  12, 22, 28 wherefore: why
13 whoso list: whoever cares  16 though: even if  19 division: discord
20 surmiseth: alleges  24 by row: in order, one after another  30 places: passages
30 untouched: undiscussed // in a manner: as it were  31 most: greater // altogether: all
31 touched: discussed  32 side: hand  33 unproved: unexamined // anything: at all
36 Simkin: Simple Simon // sentence: pronouncement
to the said apology, and alloweth the said answer well: methinketh that if he considered not only how much he hath left unanswered, and how much of his own words undefended which he nothing hath touched at all... but over that, how feebly he hath defended those things that he hath touched here—Salem being indifferent had been like to have allowed it but a little.

For, setting aside for the while all the remnant, if he go but to the very principal point alone—wherein he laboreth to change and put away those good laws... the change whereof (such as he deviseth) the decay of the Catholic faith and the increase of heresies would follow—in that point alone, I say we lay against him the common consent of this realm. And he layeth his own reason against it. We lay against him the consent of the general council. And against this he layeth his own reason. We lay against him the general approbation of all Christian realms. And against this he layeth his own reason. And what is his own irrefragable reason that he layeth against all this? Surely no more, as you see, but that by those laws an innocent may sometime take wrong. Against this reason we lay him that if this reason should stand, then against malefactors there could no law stand. We lay against it also that by his devices, if they were followed, by the increase of heresies many innocents must needs take much more wrong.

To this answereth he that he will not answer that. And now, when Salem seeth that he cannot answer that, and seeth that all the weight of the matter hangeth upon that: then Sim Salem giveth sentence that he hath answered very well. But surely if such answering be well... I wot not which way a man might answer ill.

And therefore whereas Simkin Salem saith that if this good man will, he will cause a friend of his answer all the remnant—he may do this good man a much more friendly turn if he make his friend answer this better first, that this good man hath answered already. Howbeit, if they list thus to

1 alloweth: accepts  2 methinketh: it seems to me  4 nothing: in no way
6 indifferent: impartial; unbiased  // had been like: would have been likely
6 allowed: praised  8, 33 remnant: rest  10 put away: do away with  11 decay: decline
14, 16, etc. reason: reasoning  18 irrefragable: irrefutable  20, 24 take: suffer
20, 24 wrong: injustice  21 malefactors: evildoers  23 followed: gone along with
28 sentence: pronouncement  27, 31 Sim(kin): Simple Simon  29 wot: know
31–32 if... man will: if this good man wants (him to) // cause: have
33 may: can  35 list: choose
give over this, and assay what they can say better to any other piece—let them in God’s name hardly go to, for me. And if they say anything meely to the matter, I will put no friend to pain to make them answer—but at leisure convenient shall answer them myself. And where they say well... I will not let to say so. And where they say wrong... I will not let to tell them. But on the other side, if they go no better to work, nor no nearer to the matter, than this man hath done—I shall peradventure let them even alone... and let them like their writing themselves, and no man else.

But now letting pass all the special points—I shall answer the generalities that this good man speaketh of. For in the leaf 90 these are his words:

And now shall I say somewhat farther in a generality, as Master More hath done... and that is this: that all that I speak in the said treatise was to appease this division... and not to begin any, nor to continue it. And therefore how they can salve their conscience that say I did rather intend a division than agreement, I cannot tell; their own conscience shall be judge. And I intended also somewhat to move that might be occasion to put away abusions, evil examples, and heresies—and not to increase them or maintain them, I dare boldy say.

To this I answer that it neither was nor is my mind that men should think that he meant evil himself, as I have in many places of mine Apology testified. But verily I thought, and yet think, that by some wily shrews his book was so mishandled that it meant naught though he meant well. For whereas he saith that with his book of Division all his purpose was to appease division—I will not contend with him upon his own mind. But surely this will I say: that if I had been of the mind to sow and set forth division—I would have used even the selfsame ways to kindle it that he used (as he saith) to quench it.

Then goeth he farther and saith:

1 assay: see 2 go to: get to work; have at it // for me: for all I care
3 meely: fairly 3, 8 matter: point 4 pain: trouble
4 convenient: suitable 5, 6 let: forbear 9 let them even: just let them
11 special: specific 14 somewhat: something 16, 28 appease: settle
16, 18, etc. division: discord 19-20 somewhat to move: to propose something
20 put away: put an end to // abusions: abuses // evil: bad 21 maintain: support
24 evil: ill 26 shrews: scoundrels 27 naught: badly
28 all his purpose: his whole intention 31 even: exactly
And farther, as Master More knoweth better than I, “Mentire est contra mentem ire”; that is to say, “To lie is when a man saith against his own mind.” And in good faith, in all that treatise, I speak nothing but that I thought was true.

To this I answer that indeed such a thing I have read, and, as I remember, in Aulus Gellius. Which thing though I have now no leisure to look for, yet two points I remember thereof. One, that it is there “mentiri,” and not “mentire”… which infinitive mode in what book of grammar this good man hath found, I cannot tell. I was afeard it had been overseen in the printing. But I have looked the corrections, and there find I no fault found therein.

The other point I remember: that there is a difference put between “mentiri” and “mendacium dicere”; that is, as we might say, between him that wittingly lieth and him that telleth a lie weening that it were true. And there it is said, “Wittingly not to tell a lie pertaineth to a good man. And not to tell a lie unawares is the part of a wise man.” And surely, since the Scripture saith that he that shortly believeth is over light: this good man to believe so many lies so soon, and with so many “some say”s to set them forth in print, to the rebuke and slander of the spiritual judges, and make men ween they mishandled men for heresies—though the man’s innocent mind made the sin the less, yet was the thing at the least no less than a very great lightness; yea, and also a great proof toward the reproof of his words that follow next, where he goeth farther thus…

And farther, I will ascertain Master More, as far as in me is, that I neither had any “subtle shrews’ counsel” nor any evil counsel at the making of the said treatise which he calleth the “book of Division” (as is said before).

To this I answer that albeit this good man and I be at much variance here in divers things—yet for the good and plain profession of the Catholic faith that I find in him, in good faith I much better love him than in that point to believe
him. For if he said therein true, then were all the faults only
his own... in which, as I have often said, I much rather
think that some subtle shrews have deceived him.

And besides sundry other things that lead me so to think,
one very strong thing is this, that every man may well
see by his book: that all such as have resorted to him to tell him
any such things as under “some say”s he put out again, have
always told him evil... and never told him good. And of mishandling
for heresies have ever told him lies, and never
told him true. For whereas the punishment for heresies
hath been very little anywhere, save even here at hand—and
here but right done to them, and that with much favor, too—
they have made him, good, seely soul, believe that ordinaries
mishandle men for heresy in manner throughout the realm.

Also, whereas such slanderous clamor hath been sundry
times of late, in all that ever complained, plainly proved false
before the King’s most honorable Council, not one man came
to tell him nothing thereof, nor not one “some say” thereof written
in all his book; and over this, whereas mine own self have
plainly told him the same things in mine Apology by writing—
yet (which most marvel were of all, save for such wily shrews)
every man may well see that he never read it. For he saith not
one word thereto. And therefore it is easy to perceive, whatsoever
himself say, which is loath of his goodness to put other
folk in fault, that there be some wily shrews so much about
him that they neither suffer him anything to hear but that themselves
list to tell him, nor yet anything to read but where themselves
list to turn him.

And now, since I have here answered these generalities of
his—I will not long encumber you with any generalities of mine
own, but generally I would that all were well. And so help me my
Savior, and none otherwise, but as I would wish no heretic one
halpworth harm, that had clearly left his heresy and were
well turned to God. But on the other side, whoso stick still
therein: rather would I wish him sorrow to his sin, whereby
there are many folk many times amended, than prosperously
to proceed in his mischief to the loss of his own soul and

6 resorted: gone    11 save even here at hand: except right here close by    13 seely: simple
14 in manner: practically    15 slanderous: defamatory    16 complained: filed charges
19 over: on top of    20 by: in    21 most marvel were: would be the most amazing thing
22 may: can    24–25 other folk in fault: blame on other folk
26 suffer... that: allow him to hear anything but what they    27, 28 list: choose
27 yet: even    33 halpworth: halfpenny’s worth (of)    33 clearly: completely
33 left: given up    35 sorrow to: physical suffering for    37 mischief: evildoing
other men’s too. And toward that point, against all malefactors in the spirituality and the temporalty too, would I wish all good folk of both parties to agree, and each love other well, and stick fast to the faith, which were likely sore to decay by the change of these good laws that this good man goeth about to destroy. For whose unreasonableness therein the better to be perceived, with the danger and peril that would ensue thereon: I will desire you, good readers, to resort to mine Apology... and beginning at the leaf 270, read unto the leaf 287, wherein you shall, I trust, be well and fully satisfied. And unto all that ever is in all that spoken—this man hath nothing said.

And whereas in confuting the faults that this man findeth in the suit ex officio and the laws made against heretics, I have used some examples of the common law, which this man hath labored to prove unlike... and I have therein clearly confuted him afresh: it may peradventure happen that he will now take another way therein, and say that in such points those spiritual laws may be reformed, and those temporal, too.

Howbeit, if he so say: but if men forget what hath been said before, else shall they see that his saying will not serve him.

For first, as I have said ofter than once already, the same things in the common law be not to be changed. For if they be, there shall come thereof more harm than good. And if it happen one innocent to take harm by the law—there shall five for one take more harm by the change.

Moreover, if we should for that cause change those temporal laws—that is to wit, because some innocent may sometime take harm by them—we must change, by the same reason, all that old-used law that a man may be arrested, and remain in prison till he find sureties for the peace, upon the bare oath of his enemy that saith he is afraid of him. For by that law may sometime an innocent take harm too. And yet must that law stand if we do well. For else shall there, by the change, more innocents take more harm.

1 malefactors: evildoers  2 spirituality: clergy // temporalty: laity
4 were... decay: would likely be badly eroded  8 desire: ask // resort: go
10 well and: good and; quite  19 spiritual: ecclesiastical  19, 29 temporal: civil
21 but if: unless  22 saying: assertion  24 ofter: more often
27, 28, etc: take: suffer  31 reason: reasoning
32 all... law: that whole law in force from of old  33 sureties for the peace: bond posters
33 upon the bare: merely upon the
What trouble have there many men in Wales, by that they be compelled to be bound to the peace, both for themselves and for their servants and other friends too? And yet is the order there so necessary that in many lordships it may not be forborne.

And surely if we fall to changing laws upon that simple ground—we must then change so many that it would not be well.

Besides this, if men should reform and change a law because that an innocent may sometime take harm thereby—then must they when they have changed it, change it yet again… and after that change, yet change it again… and so forth, change after change, and never cease changing till the world be all changed at the Day of Doom. For never can all the wits that are in it make any one penal law… such that none innocent may take harm thereby.

Howbeit, if a new law were drawn and put forth to be made against any such mischief as would else do much harm: good reason it were to take an exception to the bill, and show that innocents might be much harmed by this point or that… and therewith provide the remedy and put it in the law, and stop as many such gaps as then could be spied. Yea, and if after the law made, men found notable harm, that good folk were much wronged by it… and the law such that it either might be forborne or else the means found to be changed to the better: good reason would it to make provision for it.

But surely to come forth as this man cometh here, against so good laws, so well made, and by so great authority, so long approved through the whole corps of Christendom, in this realm ratified specially by Parliament (and that upon a proof not without great ground and cause), ever since found so profitable for preservation of the faith, and proved so necessary, upon this man’s own devices, that without great increase of heresies they cannot be forborne… nor never can be changed but either to the straiter or else to the worse—to come now forth and, for appeasing of division, sow first a
slander that may *make* division; and then labor to change those laws, upon none other ground but only that an innocent may hap to take harm by means of false judges; and then prove not any wrong done... but by false “some say”’s only, against which false “some say”’s the truth is proved contrary, both by just examination before the King’s Council and, over that, plainly by this one point also, which no man can deny... that there is no law provided against so great a crime, by which lawless people have in this realm been punished—therefore to come now thus, as this good man doth, and procure the change of these laws so old, so good, and so necessary, and to make them more easy, wherewith heretics would wax bold, which thing himself (as you see) denieth not in the end: what is this, good Christian readers, but to procure that the Catholic, Christian faith might fade and fall away?

And yet, as for this man himself, to tell you for conclusion what I think: albeit there are, as you see, right evil and perilous things in his books, with devices that would make heresies increase—yet since he professeth so plainly the Catholic, Christian faith, and by his exhortation also toward the conquest of the Holy Land, declareth his mind zealous and fervent toward it, I rather believe, though himself thereto say nay, that in those things which he writeth so perilous and so naught, some wily shrews beguile the good, innocent man, than that himself in his own mind mean all that harm.

But yet, forasmuch as in this point, without sight of man’s heart, we can but go by guess... and whoso goeth by guess may be deceived (for, as himself saith, a wolf may look simply, lapped in a sheep’s skin), I shall therefore trust the best, and leave the truth to God. And concerning such evil writings, since it must needs be that he wrote them either deceived by some shrews or else but of himself... I can no more do for him but heartily pray for him thus. If shrews deceive him: God send them shortly from him. If he wrote them of his own mind: then, since the things be naught, he wrote them

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3 *false*: corrupt
8–9 *a crime*: i.e., that of making slanderous allegations
12 *easy*: soft
13 *wax*: grow
22 *declareth*: shows
25, 37 *naught*: bad
25, 35 *shrews*: scoundrels
26 *mean*: intend
29–30 *be deceived*: make a mistake
30 *look simply*: have a guileless appearance
31 *trust*: believe
32 *evil*: bad
37 *mind*: accord
either of evil will or of oversight. If he wrote them of malice:
God give the evil man more grace. If he wrote them of folly:
God give the good man more wit.

And thus I beseech our Lord send us every one, both the
spiritual and the temporal too, both wit and grace to agree together
in goodness, and each to love other, and each for other to
pray… and for those that of both parties are passed into purgatory,
and there pray for us as we pray here for them, that
they and we both, through the merits of Christ’s bitter Passion,
may both with our own prayers and the intercession
of all holy saints in heaven, avoiding the eternal fire of
hell, have pity poured upon us in the very fire of purgatory,
which in those two places verily burneth souls. And finally,
for our faith and good works, which his grace (working with
the wills of those that wit have) giveth each good man here:
God give us in heaven, together, everlasting glory.

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yard, the
year
of
our Lord
1533.
Cum privilegio.

1, 2 evil: bad  3, 15 wit: sense  5 agree together: get along with one another
25 cum privilegio: with due authorization